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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY 
 
OF THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM PROGRAMS IN UGANDA AND TANZANIA 
 
by 
 
Genevieve Enid Kyarimpa 
 
Florida International University, 2009 
 
Miami, Florida 
 
Professor Jean-Claude Garcia-Zamor, Major Professor 
 
Administrative reform is a challenging endeavor for both developed and 
developing countries alike. For developing countries, the challenge is greater because 
numerous reforms are implemented concurrently sometimes under conditions of resource 
scarcity and political instability. So far there is no consensus as to what makes some 
reforms succeed and others fail. The current study seeks to fill that gap by offering an 
empirical comparative analysis of the administrative reforms initiated in Uganda and 
Tanzania since the early 1990s. The purpose of the study is to explain the similarities and 
differences, and give reasons for the successes and failures of the reform programs in the 
two countries. It focuses on four major areas; the size of the civil service, pay reform, 
capacity building, and ethics and accountability.  
Data were collected via in-depth face to face interviews with 35 key government 
officials and the content analysis of various documents. The results indicate that the 
reforms generated initial substantial reduction in the size of the public services in both 
countries. In Uganda, the traditional civil service was reduced from 140,500 in 1990 to 
41,730 in 2004; while in Tanzania Ministries, Departments, and Agencies were reduced 
 viii 
by 25%. Pay reform has generated substantial increases in civil servants’ salaries in both 
countries but in Uganda, the government has not been able to abide by the pay strategy 
while in Tanzania the strategy guides the increments.  
Civil Service capacity building efforts have focused on enhancing the skills of the 
personnel. Training needs assessments were undertaken in all ministries in Uganda and a 
training policy was formulated. In Tanzania, the training needs assessments are still under 
way and a training policy has not yet been developed. Ethics and accountability are great 
challenges in both countries, but in Tanzania, there is more political will and commitment 
to improve the integrity of the civil service. 
The findings reveal that although Uganda started the reform with much more rigor 
and initial success, Tanzania has surpassed it and has a more stable, consistent, and 
promising reform record. This is because Uganda’s leadership lacks political legitimacy. 
The country has since the late 1990s experienced a civil war in the northern and western 
parts of the country while Tanzania has benefitted from relative peace and high level 
political legitimacy. 
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CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
  
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The present comparative study assesses the performance of the civil service 
reforms undertaken in two East African countries, Uganda and Tanzania. The two 
countries, both originally under British colonial administration (Tanzania was a British 
administered UN Trusteeship), attained their independence in 1962 and 1961 
respectively. Uganda, a relatively small country that covers an area of 241,038 square 
kilometers, of which 82 percent is land, has a population of 24.4 million people (2002 
Population Census) while Tanzania, a far larger country covering 945, 000 square 
kilometers, has a population of 34.4 million people (2002 Population Census). The Civil 
Service (CS), also known as the public service in both countries, is the operational arm of 
government, and is charged with analysis, recommendation, and administration of public 
policy.  
The civil service systems in the two countries have had a long history, dating as 
far back as the colonial period. Some of the problems that emerged during that era are 
still prevalent. In addition, the functions and structure of the Ugandan and Tanzanian CS 
have, over time, been shaped by historical, economic, political and ideological factors. 
The CS system that was inherited from the colonial regime at independence by both 
countries was relatively small, with its objectives primarily focused on the maintenance 
of law and order. More than forty years later, these systems have changed both in 
structure and functions. Besides maintaining law and order, the CS has increasingly 
become the vehicle for social and economic development.  
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It should however be noted that the historical, political, economic, and ideological 
factors manifest themselves differently in the two countries. Therefore, the CS systems in 
both countries took, over time, differing paths and evolved differently. The objective of 
this research is to answer the question: why do some reforms succeed and others fail? To 
meet my objective, the study traces the development of the civil service systems in both 
countries, illustrates the differing paths of this development, and critically analyzes the 
outcomes of the reform programs instituted since the early 1990s. The study empirically 
examines why or why not, and the extent to which the reforms have attained their goals 
and objectives based on the perceptions of the public servants involved in the reform 
process.  
 
1.2 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Administrative reform is a challenging endeavor for both developed and 
developing countries alike. Indeed, there is no consensus as to what makes some reforms 
succeed while others fail. Yet, reform of the administrative system is not new. Prior 
administrative reform efforts, for instance, in the nineteenth century, aimed at stamping 
out the spoils system, and establishing efficient, effective, and economic administrative 
systems. Earlier decades of the twentieth century saw the focus shift to “institution 
building, bureaucratization, nationalization, and a wide variety of organizational and 
administrative capacity building for national and economic development.”1 
Contemporary reform efforts on the other hand are part of a wider New Public 
                                                 
1 Farazmand, A. (ed.) 2002. Administrative Reform in Developing Nations. Westport, CONN: Praeger, p. 
ix. 
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Management (NPM) movement geared towards reversing the traditional role of 
government by shrinking the size of the civil service, reducing both administrative and 
financial waste, and improving performance and productivity, accountability, service 
provision, and general capacity of the administrative system.  
The relevance of the NPM movement to the developing countries and the level of 
its implementation therein is still a matter of contention (Minogue, Polidano, and Hulme, 
1998; McCourt and Minogue, 2001; Dibben, Wood, and Roper, 2004). According to 
Polidano (2001), “while many developing countries have taken up elements of the NPM 
agenda, they have not adopted anything close to the entire package.” He asserts further 
that countries are implementing numerous reforms concurrently some unrelated and even 
contrary to the NPM ideals. In his view, the NPM “is only one among a number of 
contending strands of reform in the developing world.”2 Indeed in the Ugandan and 
Tanzanian cases, some aspects of NPM are evident. Among them are the reduction in the 
size of the CS, commonly referred to as “retrenchment,” and privatization.  
Since the 1980s, administrative reform has become a catchword for numerous 
countries. According to Pollit and Bouckaert (2000), a wave of civil service reforms 
swept across many of the OECD countries since the 1980s, reshaped the manner in which 
public budgets are managed, considerably altered many lives of public officials, and in 
some countries a number of previously public- owned enterprises have been privatized. 
They assert further that resultant from the reforms, “large claims have been made for 
                                                 
2 Polidano, C. 2001. “Administrative Reform in Core Civil Services: Application and Applicabilit of the 
New Public Management.” In McCourt, W. and Martin Minogue. The Internationalization of New Public 
Management: Reinventing the Third World State. Cheltenham, UK: Edwad Elgar, pp. 45-46. 
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‘savings’ and ‘efficiency gains’” but are quick to add that such claims are “seldom 
straightforward and uncontestable.”3 The picture is not that different in the developing 
world.  
With specific reference to Uganda and Tanzania, administrative reform efforts 
have been pursued with a mixture of great zeal and caution. Prior to colonialism, neither 
country had any modern-day administrative systems to boast of. However, the onset of 
colonialism brought with it western-style bureaucratic organizations to the colonies. The 
newly imposed administrative systems were mechanisms for control and subjugation 
rather than for serving and entrenching administrative ideals. As such, focus was placed 
on maintaining law and order, collecting taxes, and ensuring the colonial master’s 
interests rather than training, developing and creating viable administrative 
infrastructures manned by the natives. Mutahaba and Halfani (1993:7) put it succinctly 
when they assert that the organization of the colonial administration was “highly 
hierarchical, inhibiting lower-level participation in decision making, and since it was in 
the service of the colonial masters, it was highly suppressive and did not respond to 
public demands.”  
The first reform efforts therefore emerged just prior to independence to prepare 
the indigenous people for self rule. The attainment of independence generated immense 
development expectations and increased responsibilities that demanded changes in the 
administrative processes, culture, orientation, and capabilities. Both countries sought to 
reorient their systems to be responsive to the development needs of the people. As a 
                                                 
3 Pollit C. and Geert Bouckaert. 2000. Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis. Oxford: 
Oxford Univesity Press, p. 1. 
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result, the Africanization4 policy was introduced by which native Ugandans and 
Tanzanians replaced the Europeans and other foreigners, even in the face of a desperate 
lack of suitable local replacement and a continuing availability of trained foreign 
personnel. The Africanization policy was implemented in most former British colonies. 
Heady (2001) cites a Nigerian offering justification for the policy: 
The decision was taken by our leaders that the British officials should be replaced, 
not because they hated or distrusted them, but because they felt that political 
independence was a sham unless you had also a great measure of administrative 
independence. You just could not be politically independent and remain 
administratively dependent, over a long period, without misunderstanding and 
tensions arising between the expatriate administrator and his indigenous political 
master.5    
 
In spite of the Africanization program and numerous subsequent reform efforts, 
efficiency, effectiveness, accountability, and responsiveness were not gained. If anything, 
the efforts proved inappropriate, inadequate, and uneconomic as the governments took on 
much more than what they could handle, while a dismal economic performance made 
worse the already dire administrative conditions. As a result, the post-independence 
administrative systems of both countries have been characterized by a bloated civil 
service, inadequate administrative capacity, limited financial and administrative 
resources, and a fragile political environment. The 1990s reform efforts were aimed at 
rectifying these problems. Individually, however, the administrative systems in the two 
states have faced and have been shaped by differing circumstances. While Uganda’s 
                                                 
4 “Africanization” is a term used to refer to the process of indigenization of the civil service and other 
sectors of government. 
5 Heady, F. 2001. Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective. 6th ed. New York: Marcel Dekker, 
Inc. p. 301. 
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administrative system has been afflicted with many problematic colonial legacies and 
post-colonial failures common to most African countries, it has had a very deeply 
troubled and unique political and economic context that exacerbated the administrative 
pathologies.  
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Uganda was characterized by immense political 
turmoil and economic collapse that negatively affected the performance, service delivery, 
management, and financial viability of the civil service. Idi Amin’s military dictatorship 
coupled with Milton Obote’s subsequent authoritarian rule destroyed most mechanisms 
of administrative, political, and financial accountability, thereby eliminating effective 
management, monitoring, and control within the civil service. When the National 
Resistance Movement (NRM) took over power in 1986, it found the country traumatized 
by civil war and state terror and the public service inefficient, demoralized, unresponsive, 
and corrupt. The NRM government with the support of the World Bank set up the Public 
Service Review and Reorganization Commission (PSRRC) in 1989, to examine the 
problems and to make appropriate recommendations. The Commission found that the 
Uganda Public Service was bloated in structure, inefficient, and generally a poor 
performer. The PSRRC made numerous recommendations on how to revamp the Service 
namely; 1) Rationalization of Government Structures and Functions including 
Decentralization of power to districts; 2) Reduction of the size of the Public Service; 3) 
Pay Reform through salary enhancement and monetization of non-cash benefits; 4) 
Personnel and Establishment control; 5) Improvement of Records Management; 6) 
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Introduction of Results Oriented Management; and 7) Capacity Building.6 The overall 
objective of the public service reform program was to create a service that is small, 
motivated, accountable, efficient, effective, productive and responsive.  
Tanzania on the other hand, has not endured critical political strife since 
independence and is considered one of the most stable nations in Africa. Instead, it is the 
country’s ideological and economic predicament that put a strain on the civil service 
system. In a bid to hasten its development, the country upon attaining independence 
enacted the Arusha Declaration which explicitly called for an egalitarian society 
embodied in African socialism (Ujamaa).7 The country initiated a broad nationalization 
program of all firms, major commercial and financial institutions, and generally took 
charge of the economy’s ‘commanding heights.’ In addition, the government “initiated a 
concerted program of collectivizing peasant farming and gave traditional agricultural 
cooperatives exclusive marketing rights, replacing private (mostly Asian) traders”.8 
These efforts seemed to generate initial benefits especially in social service delivery like 
provision of education, health care, and clean water. However, they also generated a huge 
public sector that was expanded even further by the many government parastatal 
organizations. As a result, the Tanzanian civil service over time became overstaffed, 
under-resourced, under-paid, inefficient, unresponsive, unmotivated, undisciplined, and 
ultimately unethical. By the mid 1980s, Tanzania’s civil service, just like Uganda’s, was 
                                                 
6 The Public Service Review and Reorganzation Report, 1989, Kampala, Uganda. 
7 The Arusha Declaration was enacted in 1967 and its main goal was to increase the economic participation 
of indigenous Tanzanians. 
8 Kiragu, K. 1999. “Tanzania” In Adamolekun, L. Public Administration in Africa: Main Issues and 
Selected Country Studies. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, p. 329. 
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characterized by limited capacity, a collapse in service provision, mal-administration, 
very low wages, corruption, and a general administrative decay.  
In Tanzania, as in Uganda, since the colonial administration was instituted, 
attempts to reform the civil service have been many. The current study focuses on 
critically analyzing the reforms initiated in the country in 1993 with the support of the 
World Bank. The major components of this reform program include organization and 
efficiency reforms; rationalization of government employment; personnel control 
management; capacity building; and pay reform.9 In addition, great focus was placed on 
improving accountability and stamping out corruption. In both Uganda and Tanzania, the 
civil service reforms are being pursued not only for the sake of administrative efficiency, 
but also for democracy and good governance. In essence, the current civil service reforms 
in the two countries are linked to reforms in the economic and political spheres. Since the 
civil service reform initiatives were implemented in the early 1990s, a considerable 
number of reports, documents, articles, and books have been published. Many of them 
have been clarifying and enlightening, yet, they have at the same time fallen short of 
offering an in-depth critical analysis of the reform programs. The lack of critical analysis 
can be attributed to the fact that many of the reports and documents have been 
commissioned by the governments, by the implementers of the reform programs, and by 
the financiers of the programs, namely the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). Some of the publications have quite enthusiastically applauded the reform 
efforts. Others have been quite prescriptive, while some have shown a lack of balanced 
                                                 
9 President’s Office – Civil Service Department. 1999. Civil Service Reform Programme: Implementation 
Status Report (1993 – 1999). Dar es Salaam. 
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critical analysis. Further, most of the studies have focused on one country and rarely been 
comparative.10  
The current study aims to undertake an in-depth empirical comparative analysis of 
the reform programs in Uganda and Tanzania. It offers a single integrated work that 
analyses the development of the civil services systems, and the political and economic 
context that shaped this development. It addresses what accounts for success of the 
reforms in one country and failure in the other. The conceptual stance of this study is in 
agreement with Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000:2) that “management changes in the public 
sector cannot be satisfactorily understood as some set of free-floating, generic 
phenomena. Instead, they require to be interpreted as one element in a broader shift in the 
pattern of political problems and responses. In short, public management is always part of 
the broader agenda of public governance.” 
 
 1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
According to Shepherd (2003), “civil service reform has proven among the most 
difficult of developmental reforms to sustain, and there is little evidence that nationally – 
or donor-inspired reform efforts have met with much success.”11  The major objective of 
this study is to critically analyze the development and outcomes of the civil service 
                                                 
10 The exception is the study by Clarke, J. and David Wood. 2001. “New Public Management and 
Development: The case of Public Service Reform in Tanzania and Uganda.” In McCourt, W. and Martin 
Minogue (ed) The Internationalization of Public Management: Reinventing the Third World State. 
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
11 Shepherd, G. 2003. “Civil Service Reform in Developing Countries: Why Is It Going Badly? A Paper 
Presented at the 11th International Anti-Corruption Conference held in Seoul, Republic of Korea, 25-28 
May 2003, p. 2. 
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reform programs instituted in Uganda and Tanzania since 1991 and 1993 respectively so 
that knowledge about the performance of the programs can be further enhanced. This 
objective is undertaken by exploring the civil servants’ perceptions of the reform 
program. The study aimed at qualitatively getting their understanding, interpretation, and 
subjective experiences of the reform. It is important to know what changes if any, have 
resulted from the reforms, why, and the implication of such changes. The specific 
objectives of the study are: 
1. to assess whether the size of the civil service systems in both countries have been 
reduced and the pay structures reformed 
2.  to assess whether capacity has been built in both countries’ civil service systems 
3. to analyze whether ethics and accountability have been enhanced since the reform 
programs were initiated 
4. to determine what accounts for the differences and similarities between the CS 
reform programs in Uganda and Tanzania and; 
5. to suggest ways in which the civil service reform programs may be improved to 
keep them on course. 
Over all, the study aims at making a theoretical and empirical contribution to better 
understand the linkages among civil service reform, new public management, and 
governance.   
 
1.4 THE STUDY FOCUS 
The present study focuses on four major aspects of the reform programs 
implemented in the two countries namely; (i) the reduction of the size of the public 
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service, (ii) pay reform, (iii) capacity building, and (iv), ethics and accountability. The 
rationale for focusing on the above four aspects is hinged on the fact that they were 
implemented first. Clarke and Wood (2007) assert that “Initially both countries gave 
priority to reducing and controlling numbers in order to release resources for improving 
salaries and enhancing services.”12 They found that between 1990 and 1995, staff 
numbers had fallen by 23 percent and 55 percent, while average salaries had increased by 
300 percent and 75 percent for Tanzania and Uganda respectively. But while their study 
focused on the years 1990-97, this study extends the analysis to 2006 and establishes 
whether that trend has persisted.  
The research employs a case study method studying four government Ministries. 
Those chosen are the Ministry of Public Service (MPS), Ministry of Education (MOE), 
the Ministry of Finance (MOF), and the Ministry of Local Government (MOLG) in both 
countries. The goal here is to undertake a detailed study of these ministries so that, based 
on the findings, generalization can be made. Rosenbloom (1995) puts it succinctly when 
he asserts that, “Case studies of the implementation of reforms can potentially tell public 
managers what to do and what to avoid; what works and what does not in specific 
circumstances. They can improve understanding of the changes that are under way. Cases 
may also help the field to frame concepts, theories and research in ways that advance 
systematic knowledge about public administration.”13  
                                                 
12 Clarke, J. and David Wood. 2001. Ibid, p. 71. 
13 Rosenbloom, D. H. 1995. “The Use of Case Studies in Public Administration Education in the USA.” 
Journal of Management History, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 33-46.  
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The Ministries of Public Service have been selected because they are in charge of 
implementation of the reform programs. The Ministries of Education have been 
purposively selected for examination because they were cited as the most bloated 
government departments infested with “ghost” workers, drunkards, and the aged. The 
Ministries of Finance have been purposively selected because they are the ones in charge 
of revenue collection and expenditure. And the Ministries of Local Government have 
been selected because they so far represent “successful” implementation of the reform 
program.14 It is therefore believed that the three ministries will give the best picture of 
what is happening and the outcomes so far generated by the reform programs. 
 
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
This study examines the following major question and sub-questions: 
Have the civil service reform programs implemented in Uganda and Tanzania generated a 
small, motivated, efficient, effective, and accountable civil service as originally 
envisaged? If so why? If not, why not? 
Sub-questions 
                                                 
14 See Kjaer Anne Mette. 2004. “Old Brooms can Sweep too!: An overview of Rulers and Public Sector 
Reforms in Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya.” Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 389-
413.  Clarke, J. and David Wood. 2001. “New Public Management and Development: the Case of Public 
Service Reform in Tanzania and Uganda.” In McCourt, W. and Martin Minogue. The Internationalization 
of Public Management: Reinventing the Third World State. Cheltenham, U.K: Edward Elgar. Olowu, D. 
and Wunsch, J. S. 2004. Local Governance in Africa: The Challenge of Democratic Decentralization. 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Nsibambi A.  (Ed.) 1998. Decentralization and Civil Society in 
Uganda: The Quest for Good Governance. Kampala: Fountain Publishers.  Wunsch, J. S. and Ottemoeller, 
D. 2004. “Uganda: Multiple Levels of Local Governance.” In Olowu, D. and Wunsch, J. S. Local 
Governance in Africa: The Challenge of Democratic Decentralization. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers. 
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1. What explains the inability of the Ugandan and Tanzanian civil service to comply 
with western bureaucratic standards that were supposedly left in place at independence? 
2. How have the sizes of the civil service systems in the two countries changed since 
the program was initiated? What explains the changes? 
3. Has the salary structure changed? How and in what areas are the changes 
manifest?  
4. What capabilities have been developed or diminished since the reform was 
initiated? 
5. Have the reform programs led to enhanced ethics and accountability?  
6. Compared to the context before the reform programs were initiated, are the 
Uganda and Tanzanian civil services better performers? What are the indicators? and 
finally, 
7. How can both the similarities and the differences between what has happened in 
Uganda as compared with what happened in Tanzania be explained? 
The above questions were selected in order to get an in-depth description of what the 
civil servants felt about the reform program, hear them describe what it is like to be 
working during the reform, and to get their perceptions about changes they have seen. 
Ultimately, the study shows whether the reforms have succeeded or not, and offers 
reasons why; and provides suggestions for improving implementation. 
 
1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 The current study provides a unique analysis of administrative reforms by 
situating the CS reforms in Uganda and Tanzania in a pre-and post-colonial historical 
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perspective. Existing studies on administrative reform in developing countries base the 
analysis on Structural Adjustment Programs and ignore the influence of the historical 
context. The present study shows that in order to grasp the need for, and the performance 
of, the civil service reforms in the two countries, it is important to understand their 
colonial, economic, and political developments. 
 There are rather a few systematic and empirical comparative administrative 
reform studies that seek to answer the question of why reforms succeed or fail in 
developing countries. The study aims to fill that gap. It does so in a distinctive manner by 
providing an in-depth empirical analysis of the CSRP in the two countries, a first of its 
kind. Therefore, the study generates new literature and fills a gap in comparative 
administration studies. 
 
1.7 OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTERS 
 Chapter one has offered a background to the study and research problem. 
Administrative reform is a complex endeavor and determining success is still a matter of 
contention. The objectives of the study were described, and the main research question 
and subsidiary questions were presented. Chapter one offered the justification for the 
study focus, and described why the study is significant. 
 Chapter two offers a review of the current literature on administrative reforms in 
developed and developing countries. A definition of the term ‘administrative reform’ is 
offered, and a historical analysis of administrative reform is addressed. Chapter two 
discusses the bureaucracy and administrative reform and situates the reforms in Uganda 
and Tanzania within the context of failed bureaucracies. The relationship between 
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administrative reform and governance is explored. It is shown that prior discourse has not 
adequately discerned the linkage between the two concepts. The current study generates 
new data by showing that administrative reforms in the two countries are part of a wider 
quest for good governance.  
 Chapter three describes the methodology utilized in the study. It shows that a 
qualitative methodology was utilized in collecting, analyzing, and interpreting the data. It 
shows that primary data were collected through face to face interviews with subjects that 
were selected purposively and augmented by snowball sampling. The chapter addresses 
other sources of data among them official documents, government reports, news papers, 
and on-line sources. Chapter three also addresses validity and reliability. 
 Chapter four offers a historical account of bureaucratic development in Uganda 
and Tanzania. It describes the nature of the administrative systems that pertained in the 
pre-colonial period and how they were altered and developed by colonialism. A 
discussion of the colonial administrative system is offered and its effect on the post-
independence civil service systems is addressed. Chapter four shows that contemporary 
civil service systems in the two countries have their roots in the colonial administrative 
system. 
 Chapter five describes the political and economic history of Uganda and 
Tanzania. It explores the effects of political instability and economic disequilibrium on 
the civil service in Uganda. The discussion also covers the political and economic 
developments in post-independence Tanzania. Focus is placed on the effects of the 
adoption of African Socialism enshrined in the Arusha Declaration. Chapter five shows 
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that the quest for civil service reform in the two countries is best understood when 
analyzed within the political-economic historical context. 
 Chapter six presents and discusses the results based for Uganda. The analysis 
covers the four major aspects of the study. The findings show that the size of the civil 
service was reduced, salary was increased albeit unevenly, capacity building mechanism 
were put in place, and attempts to enhance ethics and accountability were made. The 
analysis shows that implementation of the four aspects of the reform followed a similar 
trajectory. Initial considerable success was attained, only to be undermined by political 
considerations. Chapter six concludes that while size reduction has generally been 
achieved, in spite of salary raises pay reform has not attained its goal. Capacity building 
is precarious because it is still difficult to hire and retain quality staff, and the 
enhancement of ethics and accountability is far from becoming reality. The study 
contends that the reform has been derailed by poor implementation strategies and gradual 
lack of political will and political legitimacy. 
 Chapter seven presents and discusses the results based on the data on Tanzania. 
The analysis focuses on the reduction of the size of the civil service, pay reform, capacity 
building, and ethics and accountability. The findings show that although the reform 
process started rather at a slow pace, great strides have been made and the program is 
currently vibrant, consistent, and steady. The size of the civil service has been reduced 
and a pay strategy to enhance salary has been formulated and put into effect. However, it 
was found that very little progress has been made in capacity building while ethics and 
accountability have been enhanced. Overall, the reform has generated considerable 
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success. The study contends that the major reasons for the success are viable reform 
strategies and strong political legitimacy. 
 Chapter eight addresses what accounts for the differences and similarities in the 
reform trajectories of the two countries. It is argued that the nature of the political 
leadership, availability of viable political institutions, and the role of international donors 
account for the differences in the implementation of the CSRP trajectories of the two 
countries.  
Chapter nine offers the conclusion and recommendations for future research. The 
main question of the study; whether the civil service reform programs in the two 
countries have generated small, motivated, efficient, effective, and accountable civil 
services is addressed. Chapter nine offers suggestions to improve implementation of the 
reforms, and suggests areas for further research.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW  
2. 1 INTRODUCTION  
Chapter two reviews the literature that is most relevant to the research questions 
raised in the study. A definition of the term ‘administrative reform’ is offered and the 
numerous efforts at administrative reform initiated by both the developed and the 
developing world, and the different forms these efforts take are addressed. The goal here 
is to show how varied administrative reforms are, and how the measurement of success 
depends on the context. The chapter offers an analysis of the development of the 
bureaucratic paradigm and illustrates the linkages between the bureaucracy and 
administrative reform. I contend that the reform programs in Uganda and Tanzania are a 
result of failure to adhere to the traditional weberian bureaucratic norms. A review of the 
linkage between administrative reform and governance, and the linkage between the New 
Public Management and administrative reform is offered. Current literature does not 
discern the linkage among the three concepts. The current review fills that gap by 
situating the reforms in Uganda and Tanzania within the governance paradigm by 
showing that the reforms are not only geared towards efficiency in performance, but good 
governance and poverty eradication.  
  
2.2 WHAT IS ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM? 
The bureaucratic structure, principles, and values of the Ugandan and Tanzanian 
civil service systems are rooted in the western bureaucratic systems that were transferred 
into the two countries and into Africa, in general, in the early twentieth century. 
Correspondingly, the formal political institutions, principles, and processes that were 
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introduced in the two countries at independence were largely a duplication of their former 
colonial masters’ systems. Indeed, at independence, Uganda was bestowed a Westminster 
model of government with a prime minister as the head of government and a traditional 
King as a ceremonial head. Not surprisingly, however, soon after independence, the local 
cultural and socio-political factors exposed the British-derived administrative and 
political systems to tremendous challenges that resulted in radical changes in the western 
bureaucratic and political standards. It can therefore be asserted that the Ugandan and 
Tanzanian administrative and political systems were never complete replicas of their 
colonial masters’ systems. Indeed, the quest for the current administrative reforms 
appears to be a second chance at adopting western administrative, bureaucratic, and 
political ideals. Yet, while the goal is to adopt western, so called “efficient and effective” 
administrative systems, it should be kept in mind that these western systems have 
themselves been undergoing programs of reform.  
Administrative reform, also sometimes known as public management reform, is 
not new. Since the reforms of the early 19th century, it has been argued that 
administrative reform engenders cheaper, more efficient government, facilitates the 
production of high-quality services and more effective programs, frees managers to 
manage, and enhances ethics, accountability and transparency in government (Caiden, 
1991). Yet, in spite of such accolades, governments seem to implement one reform after 
another, signifying that such efforts do not always attain their goals and objectives. 
Studying the reform programs in Uganda and Tanzania becomes imperative in order to 
find out whether the reform efforts have attained their goals and objectives. In any case, 
while it may be that some reforms in some places do attain their aims, administrative 
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reforms are peculiar to each country depending on the local context, priorities of 
politicians, administrative elite, and civil society.  
 The term “administrative reform” has enjoyed great usage in public 
administration for quite some time. As such, it is variously defined.  According to Caiden 
(1991), it is the “induced systemic improvement of public sector operational 
performance.”15 In his view, administrative reform aims at assessing government 
performance and predicting the general public’s expectations of government. He argues 
that administrative reforms are needed to adapt government to the constantly changing 
needs of society and to enable public administration to reshape society. He aptly views 
the process of reform as “visionary, radical, political, risky, contrived, planned, artificial, 
opposed, time-consuming, problematic, elusive - and more.”16 Indeed administrative 
reform is a complex phenomenon whose results are not always predictable and one that is 
often viewed as a means to an end, rather than an end in itself.  
Pollit and Bouckaert (2000) define administrative reform as “deliberate changes 
to the structures and processes of public sector organizations with the objective of getting 
them (in some sense) to run better.”17 In their view, reform efforts potentially serve 
multiple ends among them making savings in public expenditure, improving the quality 
of public services, making the operations of government more efficient and increasing the 
chances that the policies which are chosen and implemented will be effective. Pollit and 
                                                 
15 Caiden, E. G. 1991. Administrative Reform Comes of Age. New York: Walter de Gruyter. p. 1. 
16 Caiden, E. G. 1991, Ibid, p. 31. 
17 Pollit, C. and Geert Bouckaert. 2000. Ibid, p. 8.  
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Bouckaert assert that the reform efforts might also generate “symbolic and legitimacy 
benefits.” They elaborate that this is particularly common with political leaders. “For 
politicians, these benefits consist partly of being seen to be doing something. Announcing 
reforms, criticizing bureaucracy, praising new management techniques, promising 
improved services for the future, restructuring ministries and agencies – all these 
activities help attract favorable attention to the politicians who espouse them.”18 Yet, the 
two offer a word of caution to those who believe that reforms solve all administrative 
problems. In their view evidence abounds that indicates that reforms can fail to attain 
their goals and objectives. “They may fail to produce claimed benefits. They may even 
generate perverse effects that render the relevant administrative processes worse….than 
they were previously.”19  
Haggard (1997) conceives of administrative reform as “a process of re-writing the 
contract between elected politicians and bureaucratic officials.”20 He views 
administrative reform as a political endeavor in terms of the political control of the 
bureaucracy and bureaucratic politics theory. His views are in stark contrast with 
Woodrow Wilson’s and Frank Goodnow’s call for a politics/administration dichotomy. 
Indeed, in many developing countries, reforms are engineered by politicians albeit with a 
huge external push from the international financial institutions like the IMF and World 
Bank. In her recent study of public sector reforms in Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya, Anne 
                                                 
18 Pollit, C. and Geert Bouckaert. 2000. Op Cit , p. 6. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Haggard, S. 1997. “Reform of the State in Latin America.” In Burki, S. J. and Perry Guillermo eds. 
Development in Latin America and the Caribbean. Washington, D. C.: World Bank.    
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Metter Kjaer (2004) found that the country’s political leaders played a critical role in 
garnering support for the reforms and in propping them forward. Similarly, in their recent 
study of administrative reforms in ten developed countries, Pollit and Bouckaert (2000) 
found the reform process required “the acquiescence, and more usually the active support 
of, leading politicians, particularly presidents, prime ministers and ministers of 
finance.”21 They also found that alongside executive politicians, senior civil servants 
were equally crucial actors in the reform program.  
Although administrative reform is not a new phenomenon, contemporary reform 
efforts especially starting since the 1980s are quite different from those in the 19th 
century. As Pollit and Bouckaert (2000) assert, the contemporary reform efforts are 
“distinguished by an international character and a degree of political salience which 
marks them out from the more parochial or technical changes of the preceding quarter-
century.”22  
Civil service reform has been vigorously pursued by both the developed and 
developing countries for quite some time. The last two decades have witnessed numerous 
efforts at emulating private sector managerial and organizational entrepreneurial 
innovations by public organizations. The efforts are a result of the general poor 
performance and in particular the failure of public organizations to deliver services 
effectively and efficiently. To eliminate these difficulties, public organizations have 
embraced administrative reforms and are aggressively seeking both administrative and 
                                                 
21 Pollit, C. Geert Bouckaert. 2000. Ibid, p. 19. 
22 Pollit, C. Geert Bouckaert. 2000. Ibid, p. 24. 
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structural innovations. Most of them rely on market-style practices to root out the 
pathologies of bureaucracy. The quest for the application of entrepreneurial strategies to 
reduce expenditure, enhance revenue, and improve customer service is in line with 
market-style practices. Public organizations’ reform efforts aim at the pursuit of 
innovative ideas and exploitation of opportunities for performance enhancement. The 
pursuit of civil service reform efforts calls for entrepreneurial-like and market-like 
changes. Public organizations are increasingly seeking innovative ways to improve 
performance and service delivery. Many public organizations have adopted new 
leadership and techniques, changed organizational goals and priorities, and reorganized 
their structures. Leaders of public organizations realize the urgent need for innovation 
and are accepting change as an opportunity, not a threat.23  
However, since the 1980s, commitment to restructure and modernize public 
services has reached new heights. In the developed world, public sector reform efforts 
that have taken the form of “privatization, marketization, managerialism, 
decentralization, and agencifiction”24 among others, have been labeled “re-engineering” 
of government, and “reinventing of government.” In the developing countries, the 
reforms have manifested in the form of retrenchment, liberalization, decentralization, and 
privatization among others, and have been labeled “revamping” and “revitalization” and 
“restructuring” of the public service. Because the reforms being undertaken have 
                                                 
23 Morris, M. H. and F. A. Jones, 1999. “Entrepreneurship in Established Organizations: The Case of the 
Public Sector.” Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice, Vol. 24, No.1, pp. 71-86. 
24 Butcher, T. 2003. “Modernizing Civil Services: An Era of Reform.” In Butcher, T. and Andrew Massey. 
Modernizing Civil Services. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, p. 1. 
 24
similarities, it has been asserted that contemporary public administration is witnessing a 
new “global paradigm.”25 There are various reasons why administrative reform has 
become a catchword in the contemporary public sector. According to Caiden (1991), the 
1980s administrative reform efforts in the West “stemmed from the economic and 
financial tribulations confronting governments unable to pay for public sector 
expenditures without increasing taxation, borrowing and inflation, none of which were 
politically acceptable.”26 Pollit and Bouckaert (2000) cite Koning (1996) as propounding 
that “extensive welfare state tasks, reduced financial latitude, economic structural crises, 
and the internationalization of public matters have put state administrations under reform 
pressure.”27 For their part, they offer various reasons for wide spread civil service 
reforms namely; to restrain public spending, lighten the bureaucratic burden and reshape 
social policies that can no longer be afforded; and because of an interplay of global 
economic forces, socio-economic change and the supply of new management ideas.28  
Yet, reforms are marked by diversity. Countries have pursued different aspects of 
the reforms in differing degrees. According to Nunberg (1995) while referring to the 
developed world, country reform efforts can be viewed along a continuum of change 
between two poles of systemic transformation and incremental improvements. The 
United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Sweden are positioned at the reformist end 
                                                 
25 Hood, C. 1995. “Contemporary Public Management: A New Global Paradigm?” Public Policy and 
Administration, Vol. 10, No.2, pp. 104 -117. 
26 Caiden, E. G. 1991, Op Cit, pp. 4-5. 
27 Pollit, C. Geert Bouckaert. 2000. Ibid, p. 27. 
28 For a more detailed description see Pollit, C. Geert Bouckaert. 2000. Ibid, pp. 24-38. 
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of the continuum while USA and Germany are at the incrementalist end. He asserts 
further that Canada, France and the Netherlands are located in the middle of the 
continuum.29 The position of the developing countries is less clear. In some countries like 
Botswana, major reforms have been effected while in others, like Kenya, the reform 
program has not been wholly embraced. Uganda and Tanzania started off with great 
reformist zeal, but have now relapsed into the incremental mode as shall be illustrated in 
the pages ahead. 
In spite of the discrepancy in the place on the continuum a country occupies, it 
can generally be asserted that in all cases, “the long standing assumptions that public 
services should be organized according to bureaucratic principles, and delivered through 
a carrier bureaucracy serving governments of any political persuasion, have been 
seriously challenged.”30 Bureaucratic dysfunctions have necessitated tremendous efforts 
at reversing the initially hailed bureaucratic characteristics like hierarchical structures for 
horizontal ones and deregulation for regulation among others. But while the developed 
countries have sought to “reshape rigid, hierarchical nineteenth century bureaucracies 
into more flexible, decentralized, client responsive organizations,”31 the developing 
countries have been forced to grapple with not only the bureaucratic dysfunctions, but 
also cultural, economic, and political elements that have negatively shaped the 
functioning of the administrative state.  
                                                 
29 Nunberg, B. 1995. “Managing the Civil Service: Reform Lessons from Advanced Industrial Countries.” 
World Bank Discussion Paper No.204. Washington D.C: World Bank, p. 4. 
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Indeed, it would be a stretch to assert that the problems derailing effective 
performance of civil service systems in developing countries are similar to those being 
faced by the developed countries. According to Shepherd (2003), the civil services of the 
developed countries “enjoy merit selection, insulation from undue political influence, and 
to the extent possible – arrangements to promote the productivity of civil servants.” In 
contrast, he asserts further that, “the civil services of the developing countries tend to be 
large, underpaid and politicized.” In his view, “senior cadres lack professional depth and 
often fail to provide any chain of continuity in government over the longer term.”32 
Indeed, in most developing countries, notably in Africa, public services are poorly 
delivered (in some instances rarely or never), corruption is rampant, morale and 
motivation of the workers are low, while resources and equipment are lacking. 
While industrialized countries grappled with size of the service and wage bill, 
developing countries seemed to have lost control over the public service’s overall 
functioning. For instance before the administrative reforms implemented in Ghana in the 
early 1990s, the state was unable to mobilize resources for funding essential expenditure; 
it could not even deliver basic health and education services (Bates and Krueger, 1993). 
In pre-reform Uganda, government employment continued to grow in spite of sluggish 
economic growth and the wage bill became the single largest item of public expenditure 
accounting for 60% of current revenues (World Bank, 1991). The World Bank has argued 
that the public service in developing countries is too big, costs too much, and does not 
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have the capacity to carry out its administrative roles. In such a set-up, even the most 
imaginative structural reform is likely to flounder if it is implemented by the public 
service. So at a minimum, the public service has to be invested with the capacity to 
implement, enforce, and regulate administrative reforms. Hence, “any reform has to start 
with reforming the reformer – the public service.”33  
In 1980s, the World Bank facilitated many developing countries to implement 
structural adjustment programs. In Uganda and Tanzania, the structural adjustment menu 
included devaluation of the currency, liberalization of the economy, privatization, 
decentralization, and civil service reform. These programs came as a response to fiscal 
constraints, and their primary concern was to reduce the size of the public service and the 
wage bill. 
Studies undertaken by the WB assert that there has been a substantial impact in 
reduction of numbers of the civil service but that the impact is not as positive in respect 
of reduction in the wage bill. In a study undertaken in 1993, it was suggested that 
compensation payments were a sizable drain on the exchequer, and the payments were 
often higher than or at least equal to the budgetary gains from staff reduction measures.34 
Such suggestions are validated by a study conducted by Das (1998) in Gambia, Ghana 
and Guinea. He found that the reduction in the public service numbers did not generate 
enough resources to pay for the increases in public service remuneration. Compensation 
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payments to the retrenched staff were a drain on the budget and were higher than or at 
least equal to the savings generated by reduction in numbers in the public service. He 
concluded that the overall impact of the reform programs was limited.35 From his point of 
view therefore, while there were some reductions in public service numbers, the fiscal 
and efficiency impact was negative. Das elaborates further that reduction in the wage bill, 
“either absolute or relative, did not materialize; and attempts to rectify distortions in the 
pay and employment structure by decompression of wages or rationalization of 
remuneration had only limited success”.36  The World Bank re-echoes his woes; “the 
efficiency gains from the reform in the larger context are not visible. The reforms have 
resulted in a `leaner’ state but not in a `meaner’ state – a state which can competently 
formulate policy and implement programs, and deliver services.”37 These findings make 
it critical to evaluate the reform programs in Uganda and Tanzania. It is important to 
know whether they have attained their objectives or not. On the basis of the findings, 
recommendations for changes and improvements will be made. 
While studies show that the impact of administrative reform in the developing 
countries has been close to dismal, studies about the experience of some industrialized 
countries with civil service reform show it has been rewarding (Das, 1998; Light, 1999; 
Kettl et al, 1996; Kim et al, 1995). Das (1998) argues that the experience of the 
industrialized countries, where the reform program has been on-going for some time now, 
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suggests that public service reform could bring about improvements if it is taken up as a 
part of comprehensive changes to the economy and the public sector as a whole. He 
asserts that cutback management yielded substantial gains. “In New Zealand, for 
example, the public service number was reduced from 88,000 to 36,000. In the UK, there 
was a reduction of 22 per cent in the public service numbers between 1979 and 1989. 
Japan managed to cut its public service by 5 per cent between 1986 and 1992.”38 It can 
however be argued that such reforms may have generated some rewards because they are 
internally induced. In most developing countries like Uganda and Tanzania, 
administrative reforms are externally induced and externally funded. It should not be 
surprising therefore that the implementation context, may not be conducive to success. 
However, while Light (1999) acknowledges the improvements made by the public 
service reform program in the USA, he argues that whether the true size of government 
has expanded or contracted depends almost entirely on how one sorts the dates and the 
data. He argues that the federal government may be turning back the clock on the number 
of civil servants, but it continues to need a sizeable shadow to accomplish its mission. 
“These employees may not show up in the public service head counts that allow 
presidents to claim that the era of big government is over, but they are essential 
nonetheless.”39 Light makes a strong point. In practice, publicness and privateness are 
contingent, even slightly artificial categories. If head counts are to be used in measuring 
the true size of government, it only seems reasonable to count every head in the total. So 
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far, no study has been undertaken in Uganda and Tanzania to determine the size of the 
public service both public and the shadow. The current study will fill that gap by 
illustrating whether the true size of the three Ministries as case studies of the public 
service, have reduced or not since the reform program was initiated. 
From the above discussion, it is evident that administrative reform is in fashion 
and all countries, developed and developing alike, are aggressively pursuing it albeit with 
differing results. A look at the development of western bureaucratic ideals will help shed 
more light on the transformation of administrative systems and the persistent quest for 
administrative reform in developed and developing nations alike. 
 
2.3 THE BUREAUCRATIC PARADIGM, ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM, AND 
GOVERNANCE 
 
The origins of the term bureaucracy are not entirely clear. According to Heady 
(2001) while Western bureaucratic development can be traced back to the Roman 
Empire, it is believed that the term was first used in the 18th century France as 
bureaucratie to signify the working of government and later in the 19th century spread to 
Germany as burokratie and eventually entered the English vocabulary.40 It is also 
generally believed that the term became popularized in social science discourse by 
German sociologist Max Weber in his famous “Essays in sociology.” Weber used the 
term to signify an ‘ideal-type’ organization with distinctive characteristics, specific 
structures, processes, and behavior. Weber identifies the following characteristics as 
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essential to the bureaucracy: fixed and official jurisdictional areas ordered by rules, laws, 
and regulations; hierarchical authority and a firmly ordered system of super- and 
subordination; division of labor based on functional specialization; management based 
upon written documents and impersonal rules; and a lifelong career structure based on 
merit and seniority.41   
According to Max Weber, the bureaucracy is technically superior over any other 
form of organization. Such superiority comes from the fact that a bureaucratic 
organization can accomplish large-scale administrative tasks by systematically 
coordinating the work of many people. In his view, a “fully developed bureaucratic 
mechanism compares with other organizations exactly as does the machine with the 
nonmechanical modes of production.”42 He asserts further that “precision, speed, 
unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, 
reduction of friction and of material and personal costs – these are raised to the optimum 
point in the strictly bureaucratic administration, and especially in its monocratic form.”43 
He contrasts his bureaucratic organization with collegiate bodies and other forms of 
administration propounding that the latter’s work generates “friction and delay and 
requires compromises between colliding interests and views.” In his view, such forms of 
administration are less precise, detached from superiors and therefore are “less unified 
and slower.” Max Weber believed that even when tasks were complicated, a trained and 
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paid bureaucracy would be better equipped, more precise, more superior than other forms 
of administration. A bureaucracy therefore is a formal organization that is “rational” in 
Weber’s view, and free of patrimonial tendencies. Peter Blau offers a Weber-supporting 
definition when he asserts that the term bureaucracy “applies to organizing principles that 
are intended to achieve control and coordination of work in large organizations.”44 In his 
view, a bureaucracy is an “organization that maximizes efficiency in administration or an 
institutionalized method of organized social conduct in the interests of administrative 
efficiency.”45  
It should however be noted that Max Weber was not oblivious to the potentially 
negative consequences of bureaucracy. He acknowledged that bureaucracies tend to 
monopolize information and keep knowledge and intentions secret, thereby denying those 
outside the organization capability to understand how decisions are arrived at.46 He also 
acknowledged the permanency of bureaucratic organizations by asserting that “once it is 
fully established, bureaucracy is among those social structures which are the hardest to 
destroy.”47 Indeed in contemporary organizations, personnel maybe replaced should they 
voluntarily choose to leave or otherwise, but the system, its processes and procedures do 
remain intact. Weber, in addition and lastly, recognized that bureaucracies are not 
decisive when it comes to democracy and may even work towards democracy’s 
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detriment. This is a worry that has preoccupied many scholars of democracy and 
bureaucratic theory. Famous public administration scholar and former U.S president 
Woodrow Wilson “also worried considerably that the power of a large civil service 
organized according to bureaucratic principles would be inconsistent with democratic 
governance.”48                           
   It is therefore not surprising that the conceptual definitions of the term 
bureaucracy since its popularization in the late nineteenth century, have been different 
and sometimes antagonistic. While some view the bureaucracy in terms of its capacity to 
generate desirable traits like efficiency, objectivity, precision, consistency, autonomy, 
and structural differentiation,49 others focus on the pathologies of bureaucracy like 
rigidity and inflexibility, inefficiency, red-tape, and bloatedness.50  According to Merton 
(1949), “the very elements which conduce toward efficiency in general produce 
inefficiency in specific instances.” He asserts further that they “also lead to an over-
concern with strict adherence to regulations which induces timidity, conservatism, and 
technicism.” Morstein (1957) for his part argues that “the bureaucratic type of 
organization gives rise to certain tendencies that pervert its purpose. Some of its strength 
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– and in extreme cases all of it – is drained off constantly by vices that paradoxically 
spring from virtues.”51  
Yet, in spite of the critical analysis it has received, the bureaucratic organization 
persists in all modern public service systems. Heady (2001) put it succinctly when he 
asserted that “there seems to be little doubt that a viable polity in the world today must 
have a public service that meets these criteria for a bureaucracy. The necessities of 
government operation require large-scale organization of a bureaucratic type, with a 
definite internal hierarchical arrangement, well-developed functional specialization, and 
qualification standards for membership in the bureaucracy.”52 While this assertion carries 
heavy weight, however, bureaucratic dysfunctions have necessitated tremendous efforts 
at reversing the initially hailed bureaucratic characteristics like hierarchical structures for 
horizontal ones and deregulation for regulation among others. 
 
2.3.1 The Role of the Bureaucracy in Administrative Reform 
Most contemporary countries, developed and developing alike, rely on 
bureaucratically organized public service systems. The rampant reliance on bureaucratic 
administrative systems is attributed to the fact that modern-day nations are enormous in 
organizational set-up, size, and functions, hence the problems posed by large-scale 
administration tend to lead to bureaucratization. In much of the West, bureaucratic ideals 
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were embraced in the late 16th through the 19th centuries. In Western Europe, the drive 
towards bureaucratization was engineered by the need to administer armies and national 
government. In France for instance, the quest for the autonomous power led the 
Monarchy to create a ‘dependent body’ of ‘functionaries’ to carry out specific duties and 
responsibilities.53 With the collapse of feudalism, the monarchical king instituted 
administrative specialization with officers in charge of financial, legal and military 
matters.    
Another example of western European bureaucratic development is the Prussian 
bureaucracy. Just like the French monarchy succession of feudal lords, war 
commissioners succeeded the traditional autonomous provincial governments in Prussia 
by the end of the 17th century. A standing army necessitated administrative and financial 
viability with the latter only possible through an institutionalized system of taxation. It 
should however be noted that in both France and Prussia, monarchical control of the 
nascent bureaucracy generated favoritism and patronage as the monarchy relied more on 
landed aristocrats than on administrative bureaucrats.  
In contrast, in the United States, the bureaucracy emerged to stamp out 
patrimonialism and patronage. According to Blau and Meyer (1987), “Bureaucratization, 
when it occurred, was intended to achieve more centralized control over special interests 
and corrupt bosses to effect political reforms, that is ‘good government.’” They assert 
further that “this meant, in practice, the reduction of the influence of big business and the 
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defeat of old-fashioned bosses and of the ‘spoils system’ that rewarded friends.”54 
Bureaucratization in the U.S public service was geared towards the strict separation of 
public administration from politics. As shall be seen in chapter five, the lack of the 
politics/administration dichotomy is one of the reasons for administrative failure in 
Uganda and Tanzania. In his famous essay “The Study of Administration”55, Woodrow 
Wilson called for a public administrative system separated from politics. In his view, 
politics corrupts bureaucracy and impedes the process of democratic governance. The 
same point was reiterated by Goodnow (1900).56 Yet, for others, the demarcation 
between public administration and politics is a fallacy. According to Waldo (1948), 
“administration is politics”57  and hence accordingly, all administrative actions are 
inherently political. Waldo’s assertion about the fusion of politics and administration is 
highly applicable in developing countries like Uganda and Tanzania. Indeed, as shall be 
seen, it is this politics/administration fusion that led to many of the problems of 
bureaucratic degeneration and civil service decay. 
In the U.S., bureaucratization of the administrative system emerged with the 
institutionalization of the merit system in the civil service administration heralded by the 
Pendleton Act of 1883. It is at this point that the first major administrative reforms were 
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instituted. The goal was to rationalize the government, curb the excesses of the already 
bureaucratized large corporations like railroads and put an end to the patronage-based 
spoils system in the civil service. The administrative reformers of this era not only aimed 
at efficiency and morality in civil service, but they also aimed at generating political 
change. To eliminate patronage administrative appointments, open competitive 
examinations were introduced as the basis of selection of public employees. In addition, 
efforts were made to depoliticize the public service. The Pendleton Act of 1883 aimed to 
create a public service system organized like a business with minimal political 
interference, assessment and coercion. It was urged that public servants’ authority and 
legitimacy ought to flow from their professional and technical competence rather than 
their partisan affiliations.58  
Patronage in politics and administration was not unique to the U.S, France, and 
Prussia or any country. Eighteenth century Britain suffered its fair share of the same. 
Prior to the 19th century, politicians that occupied and carried out responsibilities of high 
offices were appointed by the monarchy. According to Jennings (1954), “They in turn 
appointed the inferior officers, secretaries, assistant secretaries, clerks, writers, 
excisemen, dockyard officials, and so on.” He asserts further that “They could, if they 
pleased, appoint their relatives, friends, and political supporters. What is more, a new 
Minister could make a clean sweep by using the crown’s power of dismissal and filling 
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the vacancies with his own men.”59 It was not until 1855 when the first British Civil 
Service Commission was established that merit was introduced in the administrative 
system. According to Jennings, the Commission “was authorized to grant certificates of 
competence to candidates for junior posts and to hold examinations for persons 
nominated by the department.”60 Indeed, in much of the post 1900 West, bureaucratic 
appointments have been based on professional merit criteria like education, training, and 
expertise instead of patronage. In a bureaucratic civil service, employees are 
compensated for their services by way of a monthly salary rather than in the form of 
prebends while service delivery is based on impartiality, impersonality and unbiased 
provision. The bureaucracy in its rational form in addition, is supposed to ensure honesty 
and accountability. According to Max Weber, public resources and equipment must be 
separated from the private property of the individual officer. 
Max Weber’s rational bureaucracy calls on public officers to be loyal to their 
offices and the ‘impersonal and functional purposes’, rather than to patrons. In return, 
such officers enjoy security of tenure. In much of the post 19th century West, and in many 
developing countries as well, tenure is based on the competence of public employees and 
not subject to political or partisan consideration. According to Weber, “where legal 
guarantees against arbitrary dismissal or transfer are developed, they merely serve to 
guarantee a strictly objective discharge of specific office duties from all personal 
                                                 
59 Jennings, I. 1971. “The achievement of British Bureaucracy” In Dalby, M. T. and Michael S. Werthman. 
Bureaucracy in Historical Perspective. London: Scott, Foresman and Company, pp. 24-25. 
60 Jennings, I. 1971. Ibid, p. 25. 
 39
considerations.”61 It can therefore be argued that the 19th century administrative reforms 
aimed at shaping a public service bureaucracy based on professionalism and autonomy 
from partisan politics. At this point, bureaucratization of the public service was the goal 
of administrative reform.  
In much of the developing world, a semblance of bureaucratic ideals was planted 
by the colonial masters during colonialism. Notably, the post 19th century western 
bureaucratic system was introduced in most of the colonies, and Uganda and Tanzania 
were no exceptions. Yet, because of differing contexts political, economic, and cultural, 
civil service systems in neither country adhered to western weberian bureaucratic ideals 
as shall be illustrated further in due course. Indeed, in most of Africa, the dichotomy 
between the civil service and politics has been lacking thereby fostering rampant 
patronage with public officials serving their own interests and those of their kin rather 
than those of the public, and utilizing public monies and equipment as personal property. 
It is partly because of this state of affairs that African states have had their development 
goals derailed. The current drive for administrative reform holds that replacing patronage 
systems for state officials by a professional, well trained and well paid bureaucracy is 
critical for African states to pursue development.  
It should however be noted that Uganda and Tanzania do have entrenched 
centralized rules and procedures. Polidano (2001) points out quite correctly that “The 
problem in many developing countries is not absence of centralized rules and procedures. 
Rules and procedures are there aplenty, with all the disadvantages that adherents of the 
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new public management would point to – rigidity, delays, duplication, bottlenecks, and so 
on….Centralization is no panacea for governments in developing countries.”62 Indeed, 
while bureaucratic centralization and formal rules and regulations abound in both 
countries, those who are keen to get around the rules for wrong and often self-interest 
reasons are able to somehow do so, while committed and ardent managers find 
themselves snarled in red tape. The cultural and political practices in both countries and 
in Africa generally are not conducive to the fruitful usage of the Weberian bureaucratic 
model because rules and regulations are easily “bent” in a patrimonial manner. 
Commenting on bureaucratic management in Africa, Leonard (1987) asserted that 
“Africans are unusual among the world’s elites in the extent of their patronage obligation 
to the poorer people and the strength of the moral pressures they fulfill. For these reasons, 
and for selfish ones that are far more universal, state organizations in Africa are 
extensively used to pursue informal, personal goals of their managers rather than 
collectives ones that are formally proclaimed.”63 In Leonard’s view, Africa’s managerial 
values are at crossroads with those of the Western countries and the problem that most 
afflicts African bureaucracies is “bureaucratic hygiene.”64 
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It can be argued that the relationship between bureaucracy and administrative 
reform is a paradoxical one. On one hand, the 19th century public administration 
reformers relied on the introduction of bureaucratic ideals as a way of engendering 
efficiency, professionalism and better civil service performance. Yet, the twentieth 
century reformers and NPM agitators, believe that the bureaucracy has outlived its 
usefulness and is at odds with human needs, societal needs and even organizational 
performance needs, and aim at altering most of its basic ideals like strict adherence to 
rules, hierarchy, and formalism. Most of these called-for changes are enshrined in what is 
has come to be known as New Public Management (NPM). Yet, while western 
bureaucracies are searching for ways to become more entrepreneurial and less 
constrained by bureaucratic red tape, many governments in developing countries like 
Uganda and Tanzania face a more complicated challenge. One of the major problems is 
how to create the Weberian legal-rational directed bureaucracy while at the same time 
embracing the demands for good governance that call for debureaucratization. Indeed, the 
calls for bureaucratic change in Uganda and Tanzania seem to be an oxymoron. On one 
hand, evidence shows an existence of bureaucratic rules and regulations but further 
evidence shows that they are disregarded with impunity hence the calls for their 
abandonment since they do not serve any useful purpose. On the other hand, the CS 
reform program aims at strengthening those rules and regulations so that they may not be 
“bent”.   
Before proceeding with an analysis of NPM and administrative reform, it is 
important to discuss how bureaucracy relates to governance. In a somewhat similar 
 42
paradoxical way discussed above, bureaucracy was supposed to generate good 
governance, yet it has also hindered its progress. 
 
2.3.2 Administrative Reform and Governance 
 The term “governance” is relevant to this study because Uganda and Tanzania 
view civil service reform within the broader context of governance. Efficient, effective, 
responsive, and accountable services are viewed as prerequisites for good governance. 
The term governance gained unprecedented momentum in both its quest and usage in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Towards the end of the twentieth century however, 
the term governance more than ever gained prominent attention of donor agencies, social 
scientists, philanthropists, and civil society. Its popularity stems from the fact that it can 
be applied to a wide range of issues, relationships, and institutions involved in the process 
of governing and administration because it enlarges and better illustrates what actual 
governments should be focusing on. In addition, the demise of the cold war revitalized 
the usage of the term as donor agencies notably the WB and IMF and Western countries 
urged the countries of the former Soviet Union and the rest of the developing world to 
practice good governance in the form of economic and political reforms. However, the 
conceptualization of the term does not seem to be consistent. In a highly dynamic 
environment – politically, socially, economically, and culturally, the term means different 
things in different contexts thereby generating various definitions and meanings shown 
below.  
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According to Jon Pierre (2000), “governance refers to sustaining co-ordination 
and coherence among a wide variety of actors with different purposes and objectives.”65  
Such actors may include political actors and institutions, interest groups, civil society, 
nongovernmental and transnational organizations. Jon Pierre’s definition illustrates on 
one hand that the traditional state government has to cope with internal challenges and 
external challenges from the above actors, while on the other it illustrates that some of the 
functions previously the preserve of government maybe taken over by some of the above 
actors. The definition gives credence to the assertion made earlier that governance is 
broader than government. While Pierre’s definition of governance is society-centric, 
Peters and Pierre (2000) offer a definition of the term that is more state-centric. Even as 
they concede that “governance relates to changing relationships between state and society 
and a growing reliance on less coercive policy instruments” they assert that “the state is 
still the centre of considerable political power” They therefore perceive governance as 
“processes in which the state plays a leading role, making priorities and defining 
objectives.”66 This is in line with the notion of the role of the state as that of ‘steering’ 
society and the economy. Indeed, in Tanzania, attempts are being made to confine the 
civil service to the role of steering; contracting out of non-core functions is under way, 
and various executive agencies have been formed to perform the traditional roles of 
government. 
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Yet governance can be viewed as a response to the decline in state capabilities, 
notably its financial and service resources. It is the economic crisis that has forced the 
state to become less self-reliant and more inclined to operate through networks and other 
forms of public-private partnerships. In this context, the state aims at coordinating these 
public and private endeavors (negotiated social governance) and keeping them congruent. 
Hirst (2000) offers a more general definition of the term. He asserts that “governance can 
be generally defined as the means by which an activity or ensemble of activities is 
controlled or directed, such that it delivers an acceptable range of outcomes according to 
some established standard.”67  
The World Bank (1993) defines governance as the method through which power 
is exercised in the management of a country’s political, economic, and social resources 
for development.68 While the WB has for a long time focused on stabilization and state 
reforms that overwhelmingly focused on civil service retrenchment and privatization, the 
early 1990s saw a change of focus. The Bank came to realize that most of the crises in 
developing countries are of a governance nature. Hence, the contemporary adjustment 
package emphasizes issues like transparency, accountability and judicial reform, issues 
that are believed to enhance governance and civil service performance. In this context, 
the WB introduced a new way of looking at governance; good governance. 
According to the World Bank (1993), there are three major categories of good 
governance; systemic, political, and administrative. Systemic governance is broader than 
                                                 
67 Hirst, P. 2000. “Democracy and Governance” in Pierre, J. (Ed.) Debating Governance: Authority, 
Steering, and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 24. 
68 World Bank. 1993. Governance. Washington DC: The World Bank. 
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government and entails the distribution of both internal and external political and 
economic power. Political governance is attained when a state enjoys both legitimacy and 
authority derived from a democratic mandate. Administrative governance refers to 
efficiency, openness, accountability and audited public service.69 In the context of most 
developing countries, good governance signifies a governmental framework that 
functions in a responsible, accountable, and transparent manner. This governmental 
framework should also be based upon the principles of efficiency, legitimacy, and 
consensus. The CS reform programs being implemented in Uganda and Tanzania are 
being pursued under the broader pursuit of good governance. 
The term governance has gained great usage in the contemporary administrative 
reform field. Many public administration theorists believe that the term governance is an 
organizing concept that guides administrators as administrative practices shift from the 
bureaucratic state to what Milward and Provan (1993) call the “hollow state”70 and what 
Osborne and Gaebler (1993) call “third-party government.”71 This view of government 
makes the connection between bureaucracy, administrative reform and governance. As 
civil service systems embark on administrative reforms geared at freeing the former of 
the pathologies of bureaucracy, governance becomes paramount as an avenue through 
which structures and practices that achieve accountability and equity, while at the same 
                                                 
69 World Bank 1993. Ibid. 
70 For a more elaborate discussion see Milward, H. B. and Provan, K. G. 1993. “The Hollow State: Private 
Provision of Public Service.” In Ingraham, H. and Smith, R. S. (Eds.). Public Policy for Democracy. 
Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
71 Osborne, D and Ted Gaebler 1993. Reinventing Government. Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley 
Publishing Company. 
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time providing government flexibility, responsiveness and participation can be created 
and harnessed. According to Minogue (2001), good governance reinforces the calls of 
NPM. In his view, “Good governance and new public management are regarded as 
mutually supportive reforms, with greater political and social accountability contributing 
to the realization of more efficient government.”72 
Frederickson and Smith (2003), have a similar conception of the term. In their 
view, “Governance refers to the lateral and inter-institutional relations in administration 
in the context of the decline of sovereignty, the decreasing importance of jurisdictional 
borders, and a general institutional fragmentation.”73 Frederickson and Smith assert 
further that with more emphasis on governance, “the administrative state is now less 
bureaucratic, less hierarchical, and less reliant on central authority to mandate action. 
Accountability for conducting the public’s business is increasingly about performance 
rather than discharging a specific policy goal within the confines of the law.”74 
Frederickson and Smith make the relationship between bureaucracy, administrative 
reform and governance even more explicit. In their view, the quest for civil service 
reform is geared towards righting bureaucratic wrongs and governance helps achieve that 
goal. 
                                                 
72 Minogue, M. 2001. “The Internationalization of New Public Management.” In McCourt, W. and Martin 
Minogue. The Internationalization of New Public Management: Reinventing the Third world State. 
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, p. 6. 
73 Frederickson, H. G. and Kevin B. Smith. 2003. The Public Administration Theory Primer. Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, p. 222. 
74 Frederickson, H. G. and Kevin B. Smith. 2003, Ibid, p. 208. 
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In developing countries like Uganda and Tanzania, the relationship between 
governance and the civil service reform is very important given the donor pressure on 
public bureaucratic agencies to become leaner, more efficient, and responsive. In both 
countries, as part of the donor-driven structural adjustment programs, there have been 
attempts to reduce the role of the state in relation to the market, cut back the size of the 
civil service in both personnel numbers and real wages, enhance accountability, and 
improve managerial efficiency. The WB and IMF have pressured both countries to 
pursue good governance asserting that good governance entails sound public sector 
management (efficiency, effectiveness, and economy), accountability, exchange and free 
flow of information (transparency), and a legal framework for development (justice, 
respect for human rights and liberties).75 The 1989 World Bank report also called for 
similar changes. It asserts that “better governance requires political renewal. This means 
a concerted attack on corruption from the highest to the lowest level… strengthening 
accountability..”76 Indeed, the CSRP in the two countries aim at strengthening 
accountability. However, in Uganda, attack on corruption at the highest level is lukewarm 
while in Tanzania, the highest level of political leadership is championing the fight 
against corruption. 
Other donor agencies carry the same stance. The Department for International 
Development (1993), formerly the UK Overseas Development Administration (ODA) for 
instance also defines good governance by focusing on four major components namely 
                                                 
75 World Bank. 1993. Governance. Ibid. 
76 World Bank. 1989. Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth. Washington, D.C: The 
World Bank, p. 6. 
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legitimacy (government should have the consent of the governed); accountability 
(ensuring transparency, being answerable for actions and media freedom); competence 
(effective policy making, implementation and service delivery); and respect for law and 
protection of human rights.77 In this context, governance goes hand in hand with 
administrative reforms focusing on bureaucratic performance including government 
efficacy, responsiveness, and ethics. Indeed the major goal of the civil service reform 
programs in both Uganda and Tanzania is to create a service that is small, motivated, 
accountable, efficient, effective, productive, and responsive.  
It is the contention of my dissertation that governance in Uganda and Tanzania 
goes further to focus on poverty eradication. Recent literature has not made that 
connection. In both Uganda and Tanzania, the Poverty Eradication Action Plans (PEAP) 
emphasize that a functional public service system is critical to combating poverty and 
strengthening the access of the poor to public services. The study does indeed show that 
administrative reforms in Uganda and Tanzania focus on revamping, reinvigorating, and 
revitalizing the public service, so that performance can be enhanced and service delivery 
improved.  
 
2.4 NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM 
New Public Management (NPM) is seen as a paradigm shift in public 
administration and has been in existence for approximately the last two decades. It is 
generally perceived as a global public management reform movement that redefines the 
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relationship between government and society. New public management is a general move 
away from traditional public administration to what has come to be known as the “new 
managerialism”, “market-based public administration”, and “entrepreneurial 
government.” It is thought to have originated from Australia, New Zealand and the 
United Kingdom. Spurred by citizen dissatisfaction with government performance, 
bureaucratic red tape, endemic fiscal problems and seemingly successful restructuring in 
the private arena, calls for public sector reform, the abandonment of traditional public 
administration and reinventing government, became rampant. According to Hughes 
(1994), there are four major reasons why governments have questioned the viability of 
the traditional system to manage public services effectively; 
1. In the late 1970s tax revenues declined and governments faced severe resource 
constraints and at the same time politically could not reduce services provided to the 
public. This meant the public service was asked to provide the same or increased services 
with reduced finance and fewer staff. 
 
2. New governments such as those in Britain, Canada, New Zealand and Australia in the 
late 1970s and 1980s had their own detailed ideas on how to change the management of 
the public service and these ideas were generally similar.  
 
3. There is an explicit link between restructuring economies and improving public sector 
management. Governments could not be seen to be asking the business community to 
improve competitively without being seen to improve its own apparatus, and 
 
4. There was an intellectual climate conducive to a reduction in the public sector and/or 
to make it more efficient.78  
 
Like other theorists disparaging the traditional administrative systems, Hughes is of the 
view that it was rigid and bureaucratic, myopic, and preoccupied with formalism.  
                                                 
78 Hughes, O. E. 1994. Public Management and Administration: An Introduction. New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, pp. 65-66. 
 50
Many scholars and theorists as earlier illustrated have argued that the 19th century 
traditional civil service is out of tune with the contemporary needs. In their popular book 
“Reinventing Government,” Osborne and Gaebler (1993) assert that “the kind of 
governments that developed in the industrial era, with their sluggish centralized 
bureaucracies, their preoccupation with rules and regulations and their hierarchical chains 
of command, no longer work very well… Hierarchical, centralized bureaucracies ….. 
simply do not function well in the rapidly changing, information-rich knowledge-
intensive society and economy of the 1990s.”79 In their view, the solutions lie in NPM, 
which calls on government to focus on achieving results rather than primarily conforming 
to procedures. It also calls on government to adopt market-like competition, innovations 
and entrepreneurial strategies. In order to be market-like, government and public 
administration generally is called upon to be customer-driven and rely on market-based 
mechanisms to deliver public services.  
It can therefore be argued that NPM is inspired by economic and market theories 
and values that call for efficiency, effectiveness, economy, productivity, doing more with 
less, and focusing on the customer. According to Poladino (2001), the key components of 
NPM include “the deregulation of line management; the conversion of civil service 
departments into free-standing agencies or enterprises; performance-based 
accountability…; and competitive mechanisms such as contracting out and internal 
markets.”80 
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80 Polidano, C. 2001, Op Cit, p. 44. 
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According to Rosenbloom and Kravchuk, NPM calls on public administration to 
change its culture, and be “flexible, innovative, problem solving, entrepreneurial, and 
enterprising as opposed to rule-bound, process-oriented, and focused on inputs rather 
than results.”81 New public management advocates charge that civil service has become 
so legalistic that it is too rigid to be effective and that political executives lack the 
flexibility to handle personnel in a productive way. Indeed the NPM views civil service 
bureaucracies as obsessed with procedure but relatively uninterested in achieving results. 
The major argument is that public service bureaucracies are tied up in red tape that they 
cannot respond efficiently to customers. Yet if the US case is considered, this is exactly 
what the 19th century reformers sought. At the time, it was argued that fixed rules, 
however imperfect, are better than arbitrary power. New public management’s contention 
that public administrators should be conceived as entrepreneurs, seeking opportunities to 
create private partnerships and serve customers has come under criticism. Denhardt and 
Denhardt argue that “this perspective of the public administrator is narrow, and is poorly 
suited to achieve democratic principles such as fairness, justice, participation, and the 
articulation of shared interest.”82 
In general how ever, many of the current administrative reforms, especially in the 
developed world are part of NPM. These include privatization, marketization and 
contracting out in which quasi markets are introduced in government agencies with 
independent providers encouraged to compete for contracts, deregulation, 
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decentralization, and employee empowerment and performance measurement. It should 
however be noted that NPM has not been universally applied and even in the Western 
countries its benefits have not been easy to identify. According to Poladino et al. (1998), 
in Britain, Australia and New Zealand, countries with many years of successful NPM- 
driven reform, “much evidence on outcomes remains anecdotal and difficult to verify.”83  
While citing Walsh (1995), they argue that even though contracting out of public services 
to private operators has yielded savings in direct costs, it is not clear whether savings are 
sustainable in the long run, and if transaction costs are included in the savings reports. 
Minogue et al. (1998) argue that its application is less so in the developing 
countries. McCourt et al. (2001) have similar views. Minogue (2001) argues that while 
examples of introduction of NPM reforms in developing and transitional countries 
abound, “empirical evaluations are thin on the ground.” He asserts further that “Even 
where the reforms appear to be unmistakable, as in Malaysia, for example, we still need 
evidence of whether real changes in managerial practice have taken place, as opposed to 
the adoption of a few fashionable but meaningless labels.”84 Indeed while many 
developing countries have attempted to initiate “western’ administrative reforms like 
privatization, decentralization and contracting out, very few if any, have strictly abided 
by NPM ideals. Yet, it is also acknowledged that other non-NPM administrative reforms 
have not attained their goals and objectives either. Minogue (2001) puts it succinctly 
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when he asserts that “the problems of NPM reforms are not more serious than those of 
the non-NPM reforms.”85 This study attempts to show whether Uganda and Tanzania 
have embraced the NPM ideals and what benefits if any, have arisen, while also critically 
assessing the outcomes of the mainstream CS reforms like capacity building and anti-
corruption measures. 
 
2.5 SUMMARY 
 Chapter two has provided a review of the current literature on administrative 
reforms in both the developed and developing countries and shown how it is relevant to 
the study. A definition of the term ‘administrative reform’ was offered and the numerous 
efforts at administrative reform initiated by both the developed and the developing world, 
and the different forms these efforts take addressed. The chapter has offered an analysis 
of the development of the bureaucratic paradigm and illustrated the linkages between the 
bureaucracy and administrative reform. A review of the linkage between administrative 
reform and governance, and the linkage between the New Public Management and 
administrative reform was offered. The review in the present study contributes to current 
literature by situating the reforms in Uganda and Tanzania within the governance 
paradigm. It has been shown that the reforms are not only geared towards efficiency in 
performance, but good governance and poverty eradication. 
                                                 
85 Ibid, p. 11. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In chapter three, a discussion of the methods and procedures that were utilized in 
gathering and analyzing data for the study is provided. I conducted primary data 
collection (the field work) for this study in Uganda and Tanzania in the summer of 2006 
from May to August. Chapter three is divided into seven sections. The next section 
describes the objectives of the study and states the questions that guided the study. The 
third section describes the research design and shows that the qualitative methodology 
was utilized in collecting, analyzing, and interpreting the data. The fourth section focuses 
on data collection techniques, and shows that primary data were collected through face to 
face interviews with subjects who were selected purposively and augmented by snowball 
sampling, and presents other sources of data among them official documents, government 
reports, news papers, and on-line sources. Section five describes the data analysis 
processes, section six illustrates how validity and reliability were ensured, and section 
seven is the chapter summary.  
 
 
3.2 THE OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The major objective of this study was to critically analyze the development and 
outcomes of the civil service reform programs instituted in Uganda and Tanzania since 
the 1991 and 1993 respectively, so that knowledge about the performance of the 
programs can be further enhanced. The objective was attained by exploring the civil 
servants’ perceptions of the reform program. The study aimed at qualitatively getting 
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their understanding, interpretation, and subjective experiences of the reform. The specific 
objectives of the study were: 
1. to assess whether the size of the civil service systems in both countries have been 
reduced and the pay structures reformed 
2.  to assess whether capacity has been built in both countries’ civil service systems 
3. to analyze whether ethics and accountability have been enhanced since the reform 
programs were initiated 
4. to determine what accounts for the differences and similarities between the CS 
reform programs in Uganda and Tanzania and; 
5. to suggest ways in which the civil service reform programs may be streamlined to 
keep them on course. 
Over all, the study aimed at making a theoretical and empirical contribution to better 
understand the linkage between civil service reform, new public management, and 
governance. 
In order to attain the above objectives, the study examined the following major 
question and sub-questions:    
Have the civil service reform programs implemented in Uganda and Tanzania generated a 
small, motivated, efficient, effective, and accountable civil service as originally 
envisaged? 
Sub-questions 
1. What explains the inability of the Ugandan and Tanzanian civil service to comply 
with western bureaucratic standards that were supposedly left in place at independence? 
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2. How have the sizes of the civil service systems in the two countries changed since 
the program was initiated? What explains the changes? 
3. Has the salary structure changed? How and in what areas are the changes 
manifest?  
4. What capabilities have been developed or diminished since the reform was 
initiated? 
5. Have the reform programs led to enhanced ethics and accountability?  
6. Compared to the context before the reform programs were initiated, are the 
Uganda and Tanzanian civil services better performers? What are the indicators? and 
finally, 
7.   How can both the similarities and the differences between what has happened in                       
Uganda as compared with what happened in Tanzania be explained? 
The above questions were selected in order to get an in-depth description of what the 
civil servants felt about the reform program, hear them describe what it is like to be 
working during the reform and what changes they have seen. 
 
3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN  
The current research study was conducted through a non-experimental, 
summative case study. According to Patton (2002), summative evaluation determines a 
program’s effectiveness. He asserts that “Summative evaluations serve the purpose of 
rendering an overall judgment about the effectiveness of a program, policy, or product for 
 57
the purpose of saying that the evaluand86 (thing being evaluated) is or is not effective 
and, therefore, should or should not be continued, and has or does not have the potential 
to being generalizable to other situations.”87 Summative evaluations are typically 
undertaken on programs that have stabilized. The Civil Service Reform programs in 
Uganda and Tanzania have been in place for over ten years and so are ideal for 
evaluation.  
The research employed a case study method focusing on an in-depth analysis of 
four ministries in each country namely the MPS, the MOE, the MOF, and the MOLG. 
According to Neuman (2000), in a case study, a researcher might intensively investigate 
one or two cases or compare a limited set of cases by focusing on several factors. Case 
studies aim at generating detailed, varied, and extensive descriptions of a program or 
policy. He asserts that the “researcher carefully selects one or a few key cases to illustrate 
an issue and analytically study it (or them) in detail.” He agrees with Walton (1992) that 
“The logic of the case study is to demonstrate a causal argument about how general social 
forces shape and produce results in particular settings.”88 According to Berg (2004), case 
studies “involve systematically gathering enough information about a particular person, 
social setting, event, or group to permit the researcher to effectively understand how the 
subject operates or functions.”89  
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The case study methodological approach therefore is the most viable at gaining an 
in-depth understanding of the performance of the CSRP in Uganda and Tanzania. Berg 
(2004) asserts further that the use of case studies enables the researcher “to capture 
various nuances, patterns, and more latent elements that other research approaches might 
overlook.” In his view, “Extremely rich, detailed and in-depth information characterize 
the type of information gathered in a case study.”90 In reference to administrative 
reforms, Rosenbloom (1995) puts it succinctly when he asserts that, “Case studies of the 
implementation of reforms can potentially tell public managers what to do and what to 
avoid; what works and what does not in specific circumstances. They can improve 
understanding of the changes that are under way. Cases may also help the field to frame 
concepts, theories and research in ways that advance systematic knowledge about public 
administration.”91 Schramm (1971) makes a similar point when he asserts that case 
studies “illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were 
implemented, and with what result.”92 In a naturalistic and context sensitive study, a case 
method helps in understanding the complexities of the reform program by gathering 
comprehensive, systematic, and in-depth information about the reform processes in the 
two countries. The present study provides a rich and detailed description and analysis of 
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the reform programs initiated in Uganda and Tanzania based on the perceptions of the 
civil servants in the two countries. 
 The research design employed qualitative methods of data collection. A 
qualitative methodology was used because the study sought to provide an in-depth 
description of the CSRP in Uganda and Tanzania, specifically implementation of four 
major aspects; staff reduction, pay reform and salary enhancement, capacity building, and 
ethics and accountability enhancement using the above mentioned ministries as case 
studies. Most studies that examine administrative reforms tend to be quantitative and 
statistical and not based on the perceptions of those involved in the reform process. 
Because so little is known about the perceptions of the staff and workers of the reform, it 
is appropriate to use a qualitative approach to explore the perceptions that the Ugandan 
and Tanzanian civil servants have about the reform program. Qualitative research is 
useful for examining the experience of participants without making judgments in advance 
as to what results one might find.  
According to Strauss and Corbin (1998), qualitative research is “research that 
produces findings not arrived at by statistical procedures or other means of 
quantifications. It can refer to research about persons’ lives, lived experiences, behaviors, 
emotions, and feelings as well as about organizational functioning, social movements, 
cultural phenomena, and interactions between nations.”93 In agreement with Strauss and 
Corbin, the present study offers a nonmathematical process of data analysis and 
interpretation, carried out for the purpose of discovering themes in raw data which 
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 60
themes are in turn used to offer a thick description and analysis of the civil service reform 
programs. Berg (2004) asserts that “qualitative procedures provide a means of accessing 
unquantifiable facts about the actual people researchers observe and talk to or people 
represented by their personal traces… As a result, qualitative techniques allow 
researchers to share in the understandings and perceptions of others and to explore how 
people structure and give meaning to their daily lives.”94 A qualitative approach was 
favored because it permits a great in-depth inquiry into a selected issue with careful 
attention to detail, context, and nuance. Qualitative research is not constrained by 
predetermined analytical categories and so has the potential to generate a wealth of 
detailed data about a small number of cases. According to Patton (2002), “qualitative data 
in summative evaluations typically add depth, detail, ….and render insights from 
illuminative cases studies…. ”95 Ragin (1994) cautions that qualitative and case study 
research are not identical but adds that “almost all qualitative research seeks to construct 
representations based on in-depth, detailed knowledge of cases.”96 
Neuman (2000) asserts that “Qualitative researchers emphasize the importance of 
social context for understanding the social world.” He asserts further that such 
researchers “hold that the meaning of a social action or statement depends, in an 
important way, on the context in which it appears.”97 Indeed, the current study pays 
special attention to the context of the reform program implementation by critically 
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analyzing the political, economic and administrative contexts prior to the reforms and the 
current context. The context under which a program is executed has great influence on 
the implementation and outcome of a program. As noted earlier, the CS systems in both 
countries took, over time, differing paths and were affected by differing political, 
economic and social issues and hence evolved differently. A qualitative study helps to 
shed light on the impact of the contexts on the reform program. 
The current qualitative study was based on the interpretive/constructivist 
paradigm. The basic assumptions guiding the interpretive/constructivist paradigm are that 
knowledge is socially constructed by people active in the research process, and that 
researchers should attempt to understand the “complex world of lived experience from 
the point of view of those who live it”98 Therefore, the qualitative research perspective 
utilized in the study is phenomenology. Phenomenological research emphasizes the 
individual’s subjective experience. According to Patton (2002), “the term 
phenomenography (emphasis his) was coined by Ulrich Sonnemann (1954) to emphasize 
“a descriptive recording of immediate subjective experience as reported.””99  
In Patton’s view, phenomenology explores “how human beings make sense of 
experience and transform experience into consciousness, both individually and as shared 
meaning. This requires methodologically, carefully, and thoroughly capturing and 
describing how people experience some phenomenon – how they perceive it, describe it, 
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feel about it, judge it, remember it, make sense of it, and talk about it with others.” In his 
view, to obtain such information, “one must undertake in-depth interviews with people 
who have directly (his emphasis) experienced the phenomenon of interest; that is, they 
have “lived experience” as opposed to secondhand experience.”100 The phenomenological 
strategy was therefore the best way to generate the respondents’ subjective experiences, 
perceptions of, and understanding of the reform program. The respondents’ subjective 
experiences were at the center of the research. 
Study Sample: 
It was important to interview people who were involved in the reform process and 
who have been working in the Ugandan and Tanzanian public services prior to and 
during the reform processes. The study therefore used purposive sampling to maximize 
variation and to identify information-rich subjects that would provide in-depth data to 
facilitate inquiry into, and understanding of the CSRP. Patton (2002) asserts that in 
purposive sampling “cases for study are selected because they are “information rich” and 
illuminative, that is, they offer useful manifestations of the phenomenon of interest; 
sampling, then, is aimed at insight about the phenomenon, not empirical generalization 
from a sample to a population.”101  
Key subjects, who were purposefully selected, were asked to recommend other 
people to talk to, based on their perception of who would have rich knowledge about the 
reform process. Snowball sampling worked well here because a good number of the 
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respondents were recommended to me. As a result, although interviews started with a 
short list of informants, the list grew (like a snowball) as names were added through the 
referral of informants. However, not all the people agreed to be interviewed. In the end, 
after reaching theoretical saturation, the study subjects were thirty five respondents 
comprising Commissioners, senior officers and administrators, and departmental heads in 
the three ministries, and the members of the PSRRC. Twenty respondents were Ugandan 
while fifteen were from Tanzania. Because qualitative research “typically focuses in 
depth on relatively small samples, even single cases purposefully,”102 the study sample is 
acceptable. The goal of the study is not to make empirical generalizations, rather, to get 
insight into, and an in-depth understanding of, the performance of the CSRP in the two 
countries based on the perception of the civil servants. Table 3.1 summarizes the 
demographic information for the subjects of my study. 
 
3.4 DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUES 
The study relied on qualitative data collection techniques as are commonly used in case 
study research. Generating data via qualitative methods was preferred because the 
objectives of the study demanded very specific information that could be best generated 
from interviews with specific, albeit many, categories of respondents and personalities. 
The major sources of data for the study entail primary data generated from face to face 
interviews and content analysis of official documents and publications, news papers, and 
online sources. 
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Table 3.1 Demographic Characteristics of the Study Sample. 
  NUMBER NUMBER            PERCENTAGE 
CHARACTERISTIC UGANDA TANZANIA UGANDA TANZANIA 
Gender         
Male 12 11 60 73 
Female 8 4 40 27 
                           TOTAL 20 15 100 100 
       
Rank         
Chief Technical Advisor1 0 1 0 7 
Permanent Secretary 0 1 0 7 
Under Secretary 1 0 5 0 
Director2 1 1 5 7 
Assistant Director 0 1 0 7 
Commissioner 4 1 20 7 
Assistant Commissioner 4 1 20 7 
Head of Department 2 3 10 20 
Middle Level Officers 8 6 40 40 
                           TOTAL 20 15 100 100 
       
Years in the Public 
Service         
Above 20 12 9 60 60 
10-20 6 3 30 20 
Below 10 2 3 10 20 
                          TOTAL 20 15 100 100 
       
Engaged in the PSRRC         
Yes 4 2 20 13 
No 16 13 80 87 
                           TOTAL 20 15 100 100 
1 The Chief Technical Advisor, Public Service Reform Program, President’s Office-Public Service 
Management, Government of Tanzania.     
2 Director Administrative Reform Program, Ministry of Public Service, Government of Uganda.  
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Secondary information from scholarly journals, books, and other publications was also 
utilized. The use of a variety of data sources in a study is what Denzin (1978) called data 
triangulation.103 Triangulation strengthens the study because no single source of data can 
be trusted to generate a complete perspective. According to Patton (2002), “studies that 
use only one method are more vulnerable to errors linked to that particular method (e.g., 
loaded interview questions, biased or untrue responses) than studies that use multiple 
methods in which different types of data provide cross-data validity checks.”104 
Interviews: 
Berg (2004) defines interviews as “a conversation with a purpose” and that 
purpose is “to gather information.”105 Babbie (2004) offers a similar view when he asserts 
that an interview undertaken in a qualitative study is “essentially a conversation in which 
the interviewer establishes a general direction for the conversation and pursues specific 
topics raised by the respondent.”106 Interviews are a favored data generating mechanism 
because they enable the researcher to find out from subjects those things that cannot be 
directly observed. Patton (2002) asserts that interviews “allow us to enter the other 
person’s perspective.” In his view, “Qualitative interviewing begins with the assumption 
that the perspective of others is meaningful, knowable, and able to be made explicit.”107 
Interviews for my study were held in the quest for not only the experience of those in 
                                                 
103 Denzin, N. K. 1978. The Research Act: A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods. New York: 
McGraw-Hill.  
104 Patton, M. Q. 2002. Ibid, p .248. 
105 Berg, B. L. 2004. Ibid, p. 75. 
106 Babbie, E. 2005. The Basics of Social Research. Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, p. 336. 
107 Patton, M. Q. 2002. Ibid, p. 341.  
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leadership positions, but also the experience of ministry personnel, especially their views 
about the size, salary structure, capacity building, and ethics accountability of the 
Ugandan and Tanzanian civil services. The goal was to qualitatively get their 
understanding, interpretation, and subjective experiences of the reform. 
The interviews were based on open-ended questions inquiring about the civil 
servants’ perceptions of the reform program, their experiences with the reform, and what 
changes they have seen since the reform started. Questions were in a semi-standardized 
format (semi-structured format) because I had a number of predetermined open-ended 
questions which I asked all my participants in a fairly systematic and consistent order 
(see appendix 1 for the general interview schedule), but I also digressed, probed, and 
asked some exclusive questions to those subjects that occupied unique positions in the 
reform process. It was rewarding to have flexibility in wording the questions because this 
maximized my goal of generating diverse views from subjects especially bearing in mind 
that many of them played different roles in the reform process. All my subjects signed a 
consent form and were interviewed individually in their offices at their ministry 
headquarters in Kampala and Dar es Salaam. It was anticipated that some of the study 
participants might find the study politically sensitive and thus fail to freely express their 
views. Hence at the start of the interview, participants were assured that the ethical 
principle of subject confidentiality would be strictly observed. According to Babbie 
(2004), “the clearest concern in guarding subjects’ interests and well-being is the 
protection of their identity.”108 Ensuring subject confidentiality relaxed their fears and 
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resulted in candid responses. The request of those respondents that asked for their 
identities not to be revealed has been honored in the text - only code numbers of the 
interviews are used. I am the only person with the key to the code numbers. 
The interview process proceeded as follows: I initiated the conversation with a 
few words of appreciation for allowing me time to talk to the subject and then delved into 
the major questions. Some of the interviews with the permission of the interviewees were 
recorded using a digital recorder while others were not. While most interviews lasted 90 
minutes (one and a half hours), the shortest was 40 minutes and the longest 120 minutes. 
All respondents were asked to detail their experiences and perceptions of the reform 
program, but some were asked specific and unique questions because of their roles in the 
reform process. It was important to listen to their answers attentively and where 
necessary, probe for clarification and more detail. Nonetheless, I was mindful of the fact 
that my presence and form of involvement, for instance how I listened, interrupted, 
digressed, probed, and initiated topics were all crucial to the respondents’ responses. I 
therefore did my best to listen attentively, guide the interview by showing interest in 
responses, and by encouraging elaboration without being overbearing and interrupting 
often. 
According to Patton (2002), “No matter what style of interviewing you use and no 
matter how carefully you word questions, it all comes to naught if you fail to capture the 
actual words of the person being interviewed. The raw data of interviews are the actual 
quotations given by interviewees. Nothing can substitute for these data: the actual things 
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said by real people. That is the prize sought by the qualitative inquirer.”109 In order for 
me to capture the said prize, responses of the respondents were audio recorded and 
recorded by hand as the interview was going on. Responses were abbreviated and written 
down in an informal shorthand that would make it easy for me to remember what the 
main and actual points were. Patton (2002) advises that the “use of the tape recorder does 
not eliminate the need for taking notes, but does allow you to concentrate on taking 
strategic and focused notes, rather than attempting verbatim notes.”110  
The field notes were later within 15 hours of the interview rewritten and typed 
into a coherent format. It took approximately 4 hours to rewrite each interview. The 
digitally recorded interviews were transcribed within one week of the interview. All 
interviews were transcribed verbatim including respondents’ nonverbal expressions like 
laughter, sighs, and long pauses. All typed field notes were edited to check for 
grammatical errors, repetitions, and data that could break the confidentiality of those 
participants that requested to remain confidential. 
To verify the credibility of  the data, I availed the edited versions of the interviews 
to my respondents so that they could ascertain that I did not misrepresent their views. Of 
the thirty five respondents, twenty-seven responded in the affirmative thereby approving 
the interviews while the remaining eight did not respond. I nonetheless used the 
interviews of the latter group as well. 
                                                 
109 Patton, M. Q. 2002. Ibid, p. 380. 
110 Patton, M. Q. 2002. Ibid, p. 383. 
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Documents and Records: 
The present study placed a great amount of focus on documentary sources of data 
like newspapers, government documents, and other official documents through 
qualitative content analysis. According to Neuman (2000), “content analysis is a 
technique for examining information or content, in written or symbolic material (e.g., 
pictures, movies, song lyrics, etc).” He asserts further that in content analysis, “a 
researcher first identifies a body of material to analyze (e.g., books, newspapers, films, 
etc.) and then creates a system for recording specific aspects of it.”111  Patton (2002) on 
the other hand, asserts that “content analysis usually refers to analyzing text (interview 
transcripts, diaries, or documents).” In my study, content analysis is used to make sense 
of qualitative data generated from personal interviews, documents, and records in order to 
identify core consistencies and meanings. 
Patton (2002) asserts that “qualitative data consists of quotations, observations, 
and excerpts from documents.”112 Indeed, documents and records constitute a rich source 
of information that serves to augment data collected via interviews. Documents for this 
study entail official government documents, reports, and publications, the WB and the 
IMF documents and publications, archival material, and newspapers. The resource 
centers and the libraries of the Ministries of Public Service, and other government 
archives in both countries were of utmost help. Many of the study participants generously 
provided their ministerial periodic reports, surveys, development plans, and written 
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speeches of ministers and other high level public service officials. Documents 
particularly provided a wealth of numerical data in the form of tables, figures, and graphs 
that I would not have generated through face to face interviews. The various government 
documents were instrumental in providing background and behind-the scenes data about 
the reform programs progression overtime. 
The Ugandan and Tanzanian current daily newspapers accessed from Makerere 
University in Kampala, Uganda, and University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania while 
undertaking field work were continually studied online when I returned to USA. Both 
universities have strong newspaper archives dating as far back as the colonial period so I 
got access to old newspapers. Old newspapers provided a great historical account of the 
economical, political, and institutional developments of the two countries. The current 
newspapers especially The Daily Monitor and The New Vision in Uganda, and The Daily 
News and The Guardian in Tanzania and The East African that covers news of the great 
lakes region provided a great deal of data not captured in official records. The 
newspapers were also instrumental in providing information regarding the ethical 
improprieties of the public servants. The use of two sets of newspapers for each country 
served as a checking mechanism to verify the accuracy of the stories carried in each 
especially in the Uganda case where the New Vision is deemed to be pro-government and 
the Monitor anti-government. 
The Internet: 
Online data was continually sought by researching the various websites of the 
Ministries covered in the study. The official websites of the IMF and WB, and 
Transparency International were also utilized and provided great data. Use of online 
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sources came in very handy during the dissertation write up since they could be accessed 
anytime for more current information. 
 
3.5 DATA ANALYSIS  
According to Berg (2004), qualitative data analysis “makes sense of the 
information accessed during the getting-in stage.”113 He asserts further that “analysis 
involves creating categories or themes and then sorting answers to questions or 
statements from the fieldwork into these categories.”114 Patton (2002) offers similar 
views but also reveals that analyzing qualitative data is a daunting task: “The challenge of 
qualitative analysis lies in making sense of massive amounts of data. This involves 
reducing the volume of raw information, sifting trivia from significance, identifying 
significant patterns, and constructing a framework for communicating the essence of 
what the data reveal.”115 In analyzing the data I collected, I did not divert from Berg’s 
and Patton’s approach. I utilized an inductive approach to thematic analysis and had a 
prolonged and substantial engagement with the field notes and the documents. Trochim 
(2005) defines the thematic analysis of text as “The identification of themes or major 
ideas in a document or set of documents. The documents can be any kind of text, 
including field notes, newspaper articles, technical papers, or organizational memos.”116 
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Boyatzis (1998) asserts that “a theme is a pattern found in the information that at 
minimum describes and organizes the possible observations and at maximum interprets 
aspects of the phenomenon.”117 In his view, there are five steps in developing inductive 
thematic codes namely; a) reducing the raw information, b) identifying themes within 
subsamples, c) comparing themes across subsamples, d) creating a code, e) determining 
the reliability of the code.118 It is the themes developed in this study that provided insight 
and interpretation of the data generated. 
To undertake thematic development and analytical categorization, I reduced the 
data to manageable levels by use of coding. Neuman (2006) asserts that “coding data is 
the hard work of reducing large mountains of raw data into small, manageable piles.” He 
asserts further that “in addition to making the data manageable, coding allows a 
researcher to quickly retrieve relevant parts of it.”119 It was through coding that themes 
emerged from deep inside the raw data to the surface. Themes derived from coding are 
also known as codes. According to Miles and Huberman (1994), “codes are tags or labels 
for assigning units of meaning to the descriptive or inferential information compiled 
during a study. Codes are usually attached to “chunks” of varying size – words, phrases, 
sentences or whole paragraphs, connected or unconnected to a specific setting.”120 As I 
read and re-read the field notes, major categories developed and certain specific salient 
                                                 
 117 Boyatzis, R. E. 1998. Transforming Qualitative Information. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, p. 4. 
 118 Boyatzis, R. E. 1998 Ibid, p. 45.  
 119 Neuman, L. W. 2006. 6th ed. p. 460.  
120 Miles, M. B. and Michael, A. Huberman. 1994. Qualitative Data Analysis. Thousand Oaks, CA:                            
Sage Publications, p. 56. 
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and similar issues started emerging. The similar issues were grouped together and 
continuously studied until certain patterns and themes emerged. Caution was taken to sort 
and sift through the data to identify similar views, phrases, themes, and differences and 
commonalities between the responses of the different respondents so that credibility is 
ensured. Strauss and Corbin (1998) call this type of data analysis microanalysis. They 
assert that “Microanalysis involves very careful, often minute examination and 
interpretation of data.”121 In their view, undertaking microanalysis enables the researcher 
to “examine the specifics of the data” and to study intently “what the interviewees are 
saying and how they are saying it.” Micro analysis therefore is both a detailed descriptive 
and analytical mechanism for interpreting qualitative data. Strauss and Corbin put it well 
when the asserted that microanalysis helps in “making comparisons along the level of 
properties and dimensions and in ways that allow the analyst to break the data apart and 
reconstruct them to form an interpretive scheme.”122 
The analysis focused on developing patterns and themes that indicate changes 
witnessed as a result of the reform, problems encountered, and future prospects and 
recommendations for positive change. Since mine is a comparative study, focus was also 
placed on those patterns and themes that illustrated similarities and differences between 
the reform programs of the two countries. The overall themes that emerged from the 
respondents’ perceptions of the reform programs were categorized under the following; 
views about the size of the civil service, views about salary structure, views about 
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capacity development, and views about ethics and accountability. The themes that 
emerged from my respondents’ perception of the reform program are: doing more with 
less; improving remuneration; human resources development and capacity building; 
economic recovery and poverty reduction; and enhancing ethics and accountability. 
These themes reveal the study subjects’ perceptions of the reform programs and are 
substantiated by raw data in chapters 6 and 7, the results analysis sections.                                                                    
       
3.6 RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY 
According to Neuman (2006), reliability means “dependability or consistency.” 
He asserts further that reliability in research suggests that “the same thing is repeated or 
recurs under the identical or very similar conditions.” Neuman propounds that validity 
“suggests truthfulness.” In his view, “The absence of validity occurs if there is a poor fit 
between the constructs a researcher uses to describe, theorize, or analyze the social world 
and what actually occurs in the social world.”123Qualitative and quantitative researchers 
view and operationalize the terms reliability and validity differently. In fact, the two 
concepts are most commonly associated with quantitative measurement and research but 
this does not mean that qualitative research does not pay attention to them. Qualitative 
research deploys many data collections techniques in order to “record their observations 
consistently”124 thereby maximizing reliability. When it comes to validity in qualitative 
research, Neuman asserts that qualitative researchers “are more interested in authenticity 
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than in the idea of a single version of truth.” In his view, “authenticity means giving a 
fair, honest, and balanced account of social life from the viewpoint of someone who lives 
it every day.” He asserts further that those who undertake qualitative research “are less 
concerned with matching an abstract construct to empirical data and more concerned with 
giving a candid portrayal of social life that is true to the experiences of people being 
studied.”125 The portrayal of validity fits quite well with my study because I concentrated 
on capturing the public servants’ views and on providing a detailed account of how they 
understand and perceive the reform programs.  
Lincoln and Guba (1985) are in agreement with Newman when they assert that 
qualitative research is not geared towards generalizable truths but rather aims at 
generating meaningful conclusions, deeper understanding, and useful results. They 
proposed four criteria for judging the quality of qualitative research, criteria that 
compares well with that used in judging quality of quantitative work. In the latter, 
according to Cook and Campbell (1979), focus is normally placed on internal and 
external validity, reliability, and objectivity.126 Lincoln and Guba assert that in qualitative 
research credibility is analogous to internal validity, transferability analogous to external 
validity, dependability analogous to reliability, and confirmability analogous to 
objectivity.127 Table 3.2 offers the criteria for judging research quality in qualitative and 
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quantitative studies as advanced by Lincoln and Guba (1985) and Cook and Campbell 
(1979) respectively. 
 
Table 3.2 Criteria for Judging Research Quality in Qualitative and Quantitative 
Studies 
 
Criteria for Judging Quality of 
Qualitative Research 
Criteria for Judging Quality of Quantitative 
Research 
Credibility Internal Validity 
Transferability External Validity 
Dependability Reliability 
Confirmability Objectivity 
Source: Lincoln, Y. S. and Egon G. Guba. 1985. Naturalistic Inquiry. Berverly Hills, CA: Sage 
Publications; and Cook, T. D. and Donald T. Campbell. 1979. Quasi-experimentation: Design and Analysis 
Issues for Field Settings. Chicago, Ill: Rand McNally College Publishing Company. 
 
Credibility in qualitative research means that findings of the study are plausible 
from the viewpoint of the research participants. Trochim (2005) asserts that “since from 
this perspective the purpose of qualitative research is to describe or understand the 
phenomena of interest from the participants’ eyes, the participants are the only ones who 
can judge credibility of results.”128 I sought to enhance credibility of my results by 
offering my research subjects opportunity to vet the interview data and they agreed that 
the themes I developed adequately presented their views and perceptions. The feedback 
did not call for any changes. This process, commonly known as member checks, is 
encouraged by Lincoln and Guba (1985) who are of the view that such a process 
ascertains credibility because the researcher’s depictions of reality are acknowledged as 
valid by the study subjects. To further enhance the credibility of my research, I made sure 
to carefully reflect upon and sort out my own biases and points of view regarding the 
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reform programs in the two countries so that I do not contaminate the findings with my 
biases.  
Quantitative researchers focus on external validity – generalization - of findings 
more than qualitative researchers. According to Lincoln and Guba (1985), “the trouble 
with generalizations is that they don’t apply to particulars”129 and therefore, qualitative 
researchers when dealing with findings are better off focusing on “transferability” and 
“fitness.” According to Trochim (2005), transferability is the “degree to which the results 
of qualitative research can be generalized or transferred to other contexts or settings.” In 
his view, in qualitative studies, “transferability is primarily the responsibility of the one 
doing the generalizing.” This however does not mean that the researcher undertaking the 
study and reporting findings does not carry any responsibility. Indeed he adds that “The 
qualitative researcher can enhance transferability by doing a thorough job of describing 
the research context and the assumptions that were central to the research”130 so that the 
one interested in making the transfer can make a knowledgeable decision to do so or not 
to.  
Lincoln and Guba (1985) offer the same views by asserting that it is the role of 
the researcher to offer a thick description with the “widest possible range of 
information.”131 They warn against seeking generalizations and emphasize that the 
context of the study limits such generalization. In the current study, I acknowledge that 
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“the degree of transferability is a direct function of the similarity between the two 
contexts.”132 Because the contexts in Uganda and Tanzania are unique, transferability can 
only be made to countries with similar contexts, a very rare occurrence. Moreover, it is 
important to keep in mind that the findings are based on the perceptions of those public 
servants that I interviewed which perceptions cannot be ably generalized to those that 
were not interviewed. In essence attempts at transferability or generalization of the 
findings of this study can only be tentative rather than definitive, opening the way for 
future studies. 
Dependability is another criteria used in assessing the quality of qualitative 
research and findings. Substituted for reliability by Lincoln and Guba (1985), 
dependability “emphasizes the researcher’s responsibility do describe the ever-changing 
research context”133 instead of focusing on replicability of findings. My research has 
taken place in a dynamic economic and political context. Uganda held presidential and 
parliamentary elections in February 2006 while Tanzania held her own in December 
2005. These elections had a great impact on the government programs including the civil 
service reform program. In the conclusions offered in chapter nine, effort is taken to 
reiterate the changes in the contexts and to illustrate how these changes affected the 
conclusions drawn. 
The final criterion for the judging worth of qualitative research is confirmability. 
Confirmability is the degree to which research findings can be corroborated and be 
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shown to be unbiased. According to Trochim (2005), one of the strategies for enhancing 
this criterion is to “search for and describe negative instances that contradict prior 
observations.”134 For Lincoln and Guba (1985), confirmability is enhanced by 
triangulation. In this study, the use of triangulation of data sources served to enhance the 
confirmability of the results. It is important to note that my dissertation committee played 
a critical role in examining my data collection and analysis procedures and assessing the 
presence of bias in the study.  
The above analysis shows that the study followed systematic data collection 
procedures, used multiple data sources, and utilized member checks. It has also been 
shown that a systematic search for alternative themes, divergent patterns, and rival 
explanations was engaged. It can confidently be asserted that this qualitative study is high 
quality, credible and trustworthy; and it offers a balanced view of the reform programs.  
 
3.7 SUMMARY 
Chapter three has described the qualitative methodology utilized in collecting, 
analyzing, and interpreting data in the study. Data were collected through face to face 
interviews undertaken purposively and augmented by network sampling. Content analysis 
was also undertaken to supplement the data collected via interviews. Data were analyzed 
inductively by developing themes that reveal the perceptions of the various respondents 
about the civil service reform programs in Uganda and Tanzania. 
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CHAPTER 4: COLONIAL HERITAGE AND BUREAUCRATIC 
DEVELOPMENT IN UGANDA AND TANZANIA: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW    
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Colonialism and its effects on the colonized be they in Africa, Asia, or Latin 
America, have for long captured the attention of political scientists, economists, 
historians, social anthropologists, and other scholars. Controversy abounds the analysis of 
the colonial impact with various scholars emphasizing the destruction unleashed and left 
behind by the colonialists while others focus on the enlightening role that was played. 
When it comes to the administrative and bureaucratic impact, agreement remains elusive 
still, as conflicting schools of thought advance the merits and demerits of the colonial 
bureaucracy. In Africa, the colonialists were confronted with numerous alternatives in 
fashioning local administrative bureaucracies that could ably exercise authority over the 
indigenous peoples and function efficiently by western bureaucratic standards. This was 
basically because different African societies were uniquely organized administratively, 
culturally, politically, and socio-economically in a manner that could lend them to 
colonial adaptation and manipulation.  
In chapter four, I examine the historical development of bureaucracy in Uganda 
and Tanzania. Specifically, the chapter offers a historical background to bureaucratic 
institutionalization in the two countries by focusing on the native systems of 
administration, the colonial impact, and post-colonial developments. It is shown that 
Uganda had a relatively developed traditional system of administration that the British 
used to institute indirect rule. It is also shown that because Tanzania lacked traditional 
institutions, the colonial administrations created tribes which were subsequently used to 
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administer the colony. The discussion addressed the colonial administrative and 
bureaucratic manifestations in the countries. The chapter shows that the British 
introduced a western style system of administration and laid the foundation for efficient 
civil services albeit to only meet the needs of the colonial power. 
It was also shown that the post-independence bureaucracies retained the colonial 
features and in some cases entrenched them. Administrative centralization for instance 
was deepened in both countries. However, Tanzania attempted to break away from the 
colonial legacy by instituting African socialism and a single party system. It should be 
noted that because the two countries were at different stages of development prior to 
colonialism and their indigenous set up was not uniform, the analysis hinges on the 
unique characteristics of each country and how they facilitated/hindered the colonial 
administrative system and subsequent post-colonial bureaucratic development. 
 
4.2 ADMINISTRATION IN INDIGENOUS TERRITORIES IN PRE-COLONIAL 
UGANDA  
  
Traditional societies in pre-colonial Uganda were organized administratively, 
culturally, politically, and socio-economically, and were at varying stages of 
development prior to colonial penetration. Numerous writers, European explorers, 
missionaries, and colonial administrators acknowledged that there was a well established 
and intricate indigenous system of administration in native territories of pre-colonial 
Uganda.135 Indeed much of pre-colonial Africa was characterized by complex traditional 
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societies with high levels of development; for instance, Kingdoms like the Ashanti in 
Ghana, Oyo (Yoruba) in Nigeria in present day Western Africa, and the Southern African 
Kingdoms of Zulu and Monamotapa to mention a few, are examples of traditional 
African societies that had coherent systems of organization that facilitated activities like 
trade, collection of taxes, and the exercise of political authority and leadership. 
Pre-colonial Uganda in contrast to pre-colonial Tanzania had numerous traditional 
kingdoms with clearly articulated administrative and political roles. Among them are the 
Ankole Kingdom, the Buganda Kingdom, Bunyoro Kingdom, Busoga Kingdom, and the 
Toro Kingdom. However, the most notable traditional territories were the Buganda 
Kingdom, found in central Uganda, and Bunyoro Kingdom in western Uganda. 
According to Fleming (1966), “the East African interlacustrine kingdoms and chiefly 
societies possessed a political structure with well-articulated authority roles with varying 
degrees of differentiation from the kinship system.” He adds further that “there is some 
evidence which suggests that in at least two of the Uganda Kingdoms (Buganda and 
Bunyoro) a type of civil service had existed before British intervention.”136  
The Buganda Kingdom is located in the south-central region of Uganda and 
includes most of the area surrounding the northern shores of Lake Victoria. It is estimated 
that the ruling dynasty of kings was established in the mid-14th century AD. The people 
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of Buganda are known as Baganda (Muganda – singular) and their language is Luganda. 
When the early missionaries and later the British colonialists arrived in the Kingdom, 
they found it highly developed with a viable government system centered around the king 
known traditionally as the Kabaka. The kingdom had royal tax collectors, armies, and an 
organized civil society that carried out the King’s directives. The administrative structure 
spanned from the King to the County (Saza) chief, downwards to a Sub-county 
(Gombolola) chief, and further down to a Parish (Muluka) chief. Because the colonial 
officers were few, Buganda system made it easy for the British to manipulate it and use it 
to enforce their administration and hegemony through out the Protectorate.137 According 
to Burke (1964), “British influence and administration in Uganda were first established in 
the Kingdom of Buganda. There the early English explorers, administrators and 
missionaries found a sophisticated political system replete with king, court, and hierarchy 
of chiefs which resembled that with which they were already familiar.”138 Hailey (1950) 
holds a similar view when he asserts that the Kingdom of Buganda “constituted a well 
established organization of rule which could with advantage be permitted to continue in 
the administration of local affairs under the guidance and control of the Protectorate 
Government.”139 Kenneth Ingham (1962) acknowledges the same point when he asserts 
that “the leading part played by the Buganda Kingdom in the affairs of the Protectorate 
                                                 
137 Uganda was brought under Britain’s influence in 1890 but the British government gained direct 
responsibility for its administration in 1893. 
138 Burke, F. G. 1964. Local Government and Politics in Uganda. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, p. 
33. 
139 Lord Hailey, W. 1950. Native Administration in the British African Territories. London: His Majesty’s 
Stationery Office, p. 1. 
 84
was also due to its indigenous system of centralized, autocratic, and bureaucratic 
government.”140   
It is therefore not surprising that Buganda served as the launch pad for the 
entrenchment of British colonial rule and the expansion of this rule to other territories 
outside Buganda. Moreover, the kingdom availed a considerable portion of its military 
and other materials as it vied for a favored and privileged position. Indeed, the Buganda 
Kingdom was viewed as a junior partner of the British in the subjugation of the rest of the 
country. It should be noted that the colonial administrators could not make themselves 
directly responsible to every citizen under their authority hence it was expedient to 
entrust responsibility to African subordinates. This is the essence of indirect rule.141 The 
policy of indirect rule is credited to Sir Frederick Lugard who devised it as an expedient 
method of governing Nigeria. Iliffe (1979) asserts that “Its essence was the complete 
integration of indigenous political systems into the colonial administration so that there 
are not two sets of ruler – British and Native – working either separately or in co-
operation, but a single Government.”142 Iliffe (1979) elaborates that a native 
administration under indirect rule consisted of three parts: “ a native authority – chief, 
council, or some combination of these – with legislative and executive powers; native 
courts; and a native treasury, which collected all taxes, remitting a percentage to the 
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central government and retaining the rest to pay the native authority and finance local 
works and services.”143 
Sir Donald Cameroon, the governor responsible for the implementation of indirect 
rule in Tanzania (then known as Tanganyika) from 1925-1931, asserted that “The policy 
of Native Administration of the indirect character ….is therefore in the first instance a 
measure of expediency. It is impossible for the Administrative Officer to get in touch 
with the whole of a primitive people, and it is impossible for financial reasons.”144 
Therefore, where the colonialists found persons that already commanded authority as in 
Buganda, and who were willing to exercise it in furtherance of the colonial masters’ 
government ideals, the colonial administration naturally chose them as assistants. 
According to Burke (1964), “wherever the British flag was raised in Uganda an 
administrative system patterned on that which the British had first observed and learned 
to admire in Buganda was super-imposed over the traditional polities.” He asserts further 
that “chieftainship posts in these newly subjugated areas were often filled by Baganda, 
and to them went the spoils of domination.”145 The Buganda-imperial British colonial 
rule relationship epitomizes indirect rule at this best. It should be kept in mind that this 
special status enjoyed by the Buganda kingdom not only shaped the system of 
administrative development in Uganda, but also generated a significant effect on the 
country’s political stance. Buganda’s advantageous position complicated political 
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integration and some of the political chaos that has plagued the country in the post-
independence era has it roots in this colonial context. Burke (1964) reiterates the same 
point when he asserts that “the use of Baganda mercenaries and the export of the 
Buganda system of government through out Uganda is in part responsible for the general 
suspicion and distrust with which the Baganda are more or less held by most of their 
neighbors.” He adds that, “the implementation of the Baganda system of chieftainship led 
to the institutionalization of a universal system of administration which in northern and 
eastern Uganda was in sharp contrast to the traditional local political systems.”146 
It should however be noted that the Buganda Kingdom was not very powerful at 
its founding and during its early years. It is has been documented that at its founding, it 
had a small territory and was considerably smaller and weaker than its rival Kingdom of 
Bunyoro.147 The Kingdom of Bunyoro previously known as Bunyoro-Kitara is what is 
traditionally known as the Babito dynasty. This kingdom is believed to have been the 
dominant political power among the pre-colonial societies in Uganda for several 
centuries. The kingdom’s website asserts that its ancestors are “credited with the 
introduction of the unique, long horned Ankole cattle, coffee growing, iron smelting, and 
the first semblance of organized and centralized government under a king.”148 It has also 
been asserted that by 1800, the Kingdom’s strength was at its zenith as most of present 
day Uganda, Kenya, the Democratic Republic Congo, Tanzania, and Sudan were under 
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its control. According to Wrigley Christopher (1996), there was immense rivalry between 
the Buganda and Bunyoro kingdoms characterized by constant fighting over territory but 
gradually and with the help of the British, Buganda was able to appropriate large chunks 
of territory from Bunyoro and ultimately grew in strength both economically and 
militarily.149  
Prior to colonialism, authority in Bunyoro Kingdom was held by the Omukama 
(King). He ruled over many clans and tribes and held the power of life and death over his 
subjects. He among other things appointed as he pleased, the chiefs, who presided over 
the various divisions within the Kingdom, and granted land rights to subordinate chiefs 
who leased it to the masses for tribute. The Kingdom had a sophisticated system of 
justice based on a commonly shared and accepted knowledge of a set of sanctioned 
norms (native and custom laws) and coercion procedures when needed to ensure 
compliance. The Bunyoro traditional administrative system was hierarchically organized 
and the masses had recourse to appeal to the various stages of the hierarchy and in some 
cases to the King himself. Unlike the Buganda Kingdom which did not offer resistance to 
the British colonizers, the Bunyoro Kingdom under the leadership of King Kabalega 
fiercely resisted colonial domination. According to Ugandan historian Semakula 
Kiwanuka, “For nearly ten years, 1891-1899, Kabalega resisted British rule, hounded 
from one part of his kingdom to another, until he was overcome by armed violence in 
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1899 and deported to the Indian Ocean islands.”150 But it was in 1893, with the help of 
the Buganda Kingdom, that Kabalega was effectively deposed from the throne though it 
was not until 1896 that the British extended the Ugandan Protectorate to include Bunyoro 
and transferred two big counties from the Bunyoro to Buganda as a gesture of 
appreciation for Buganda’s collaboration and support.151 Britain’s alliance with the 
Buganda Kingdom was concretized in the Agreement of 1900 in which Great Britain 
legalized Buganda’s political institutions and practices. Moreover, when conflict arose 
between the colonial government and Buganda, Buganda’s laws seem to have been given 
the liberty to take precedence over Her Majesty’s laws. The following paragraph from the 
1900 Agreements illustrates:  
“The laws made for the general governance of the Uganda Protectorate by Her 
Majesty’s Government will be equally applicable to the Kingdom of Buganda 
except insofar as they may in any particular conflict with the terms of this 
Agreement, in which case the terms of this Agreement, will constitute a special 
exception in regard to the Kingdom of Buganda.”152 
 
It is because of such actions that British imperial rule has been characterized as 
one that deployed a policy of divide and rule. From 1896, Bunyoro Kingdom was 
reduced to a “toothless bull dog” with subsequent kings enthroned by the British ruling as 
titular heads over what was to all intents and purposes a conquered and occupied 
kingdom. The local chiefs were replaced by Baganda chiefs, all important decisions were 
made by the British colonial administrators and even the most minute functions, had to be 
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approved by the District Commissioner. It was not until 1933, that the British deemed it 
appropriate to grant the Omukama (King) Tito Winyi IV and the people of Bunyoro an 
agreement almost similar to the ones granted more than thirty years earlier to other 
kingdoms. Even then, the agreement was not as liberal as the one offered the Buganda 
Kingdom. While the Omukama was granted back some of his powers, he was required to 
obtain the approval of the central government before he could exercise authority. For 
instance he had to seek permission from the colonial administration before he could 
appoint or discharge major chiefs and officials. In effect, the Bunyoro King was rendered 
a powerless monarch. According to Semakula Kiwanuka (1970), “the aftermath of the 
imposition of colonial rule led to the emergence of two types of Africans: first, were the 
defeated who resigned themselves to the rule of the imperial conquerors; second, were 
the collaborators. The latter ….. were the men who read the signs of the times correctly 
and willingly jumped on the colonial bandwagon, thereby reaping the fruits of 
collaboration.”153 The Baganda clearly fit the latter group while the Banyoro belong in 
the first group.  
The British Colonial government therefore realized that it was prudent to 
appropriate and establish local native authorities to act as extensions of the colonial 
service bureaucracy and used brute force to do so in some instances. In the kingdom 
areas, various agreements,154 ordinances, and regulations were enacted establishing roles, 
responsibilities, and scope of authority for the appointed chiefs. In such areas, the 
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colonialist’ dilemma was how to increase the bureaucratic efficiency of the chiefs while 
at the same time allowing them means of retaining traditional authority. Cameroon, the 
firm believer in indirect rule warned that: “Experience has shown so often that to turn a 
chief into a placement of the government, a servant of the government, …. is to destroy 
his natural authority over his people…. If the chief is ignored or if he becomes a servant 
of the government, … his people rapidly lose their respect for him and all he represents in 
their life founded on their own institutions handed down to them through the ages; his 
authority gradually dwindles and ultimately perishes.”155 In such instances, Fleming 
(1960) asserts that the District Commissioner’s role “approached the ‘indirect rule’ ideal. 
He would be concerned with a close supervision of the chief’s work with his poll tax 
receipts, and with his judicial records, i.e., with improving his efficiency as a bureaucratic 
administrator.”156 According to Spear (2005), “The colonial administration was thus 
forced to rely on African auxiliaries to implement its rule, which it then claimed was 
based on the ‘free choice of the people’, the ‘natural authority’ of the chiefs, and the 
established customs of the people.”157 
Prior to British penetration, the non-kingdom parts of traditional Uganda had 
some form of administrative order organized around the indigenous clans, lineages, age-
sets, headsmen, and chieftainship system as well. Indeed the societies in northern and 
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eastern Uganda while lacking in traditional kingdomship replete with king, had viable 
clan systems and local consensual decision making mechanisms loaded with traditional 
authority. It is in these areas that the British found the greatest difficulty in 
superimposing their authority because such diffusely organized indigenous systems did 
not lend themselves to indirect rule. It is not surprising therefore that colonial occupation 
and extension of its authority to the northern and eastern parts of Uganda was not swift 
but gradual and it is in such instances that the Baganda were called upon. Fleming (1966) 
asserts that “The British mistakenly believed that all of the tribes in Uganda had chiefs, 
so at first organized administration throughout the Protectorate on the pattern of 
Buganda. This practice had deleterious consequences in the northern and eastern part of 
the country where few of the indigenous societies possessed clearly articulated political 
systems.”158 Indeed, it was not until 1921 for instance, that civil administration was 
introduced to the Karimojong in northeastern Uganda. 
According to Burke (1964), “when the colonial administration was extended into 
areas where an indigenous political system capable of providing a basis for indirect rule 
did not exist or could not be determined, the principle ran into considerable difficulty.” 
He cites the Ugandan Nilotic north and Nilo-Hamitic northeast as areas lacking in 
Buganda-like hierarchy of chiefs. He reveals that what the British found in such areas 
was “either a confusing array of clan leaders, some of whom appeared to hold sway over 
considerable areas and lesser clan leaders, or a system of political authority built about 
institutionalized age-grades. Who were they to recognize as the indigenous authority and 
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subsequently to hold responsible for law and order and for the collection of taxes?” Burke 
answers his own question by observing that “As the Baganda already had an admirable 
system in operation, it followed that the solution to the impasse of ruling territories 
characterized by political anarchy was to superimpose a similar chiefly hierarchy over 
Buganda’s “unorganized” neighbours. Thus “indirect rule” in its original sense was 
replaced by an indirect style of indirect rule.”159 Fleming (1966) is in agreement when he 
contends that “in the northern areas of Uganda, the development of a chiefly bureaucracy 
had little basis in indigenous systems and the British used Buganda African agents as 
rulers there.”160 It should however be noted that a combination of Baganda administrative 
chiefs, agents, and mercenaries were recruited to subdue the areas in addition to localized 
military forces and agreements with petty chiefs and clan leaders. An area was considered 
to be under British rule when levy and collection of taxes was successfully enforced. 
It is apparent that the above mentioned colonial coping strategies altered the local 
social structures of the so called ‘unorganized’ societies in the northern and eastern parts 
of Uganda. British colonialism radically transformed the local cultural, social, and 
political structures by implanting an alien system of hierarchical chiefs to preside over all 
decision making in those areas. The chiefs were equipped with wide ranging powers and 
their authority was unquestionable. Lange (2004) asserts that “The chiefs were given 
executive, legislative, and judicial powers to regulate social relations in their chiefdoms, 
vast authority which was supposed to be grounded in preexisting tradition or custom, not 
                                                 
159 Burke, F. G. 1964. Ibid, p. 34. 
160 Fleming, W. G. 1966. Ibid, p. 394. 
 93
bureaucratic rules.”161 However, according to Fleming (1966), the chiefs were trapped 
between conflicting roles and responsibilities. “Each chief or headman endowed with 
“legal” power by the colonial administration was frequently faced with a difficult 
dilemma. In any given task – collecting taxes, growing cash crops, repairing roads, 
enforcing local laws and others – the African leader was often forced to choose between 
distasteful and incompatible courses of action.”162 In his view, the chief was placed 
between the proverbial rock and hard place any time he enforced directives from the 
district officer regardless of their basis in tribal tradition because by doing so, he lost 
“respect of his tribesmen and diminished his own customary authority” while if he 
refused to do so, whether through “subterfuge or outright insubordination”, he would be 
labeled “inefficient and unreliable” or be dismissed from the service.  
In the diffused traditional societies of northern and eastern Uganda, the colonially 
instituted officers and chiefs and the roles they played were in stark contrast with their 
clan-elder-based consensual decision making systems. Moreover, in the traditional 
norms, a chief was part of the society and not above it, his powers defined by tradition 
and not by the dictates of foreign superiors. For Ugandan historian Samwiri Karugire 
(1980), the colonial administrators introduced into those societies a “one-man rule”163 
which was met with resentment and resistance. Yet for the colonizers, the chief’s role 
was very critical not only for ensuring law and order and the collection of taxes, but for 
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offering a buffer against native insurrection thereby ensuring the overall maintenance of 
the colonial system of political control. “While the colonial officer could use the chief for 
implementing unpopular policy, he was himself shielded from the opposition which 
might be aroused.”164 
It can therefore be asserted that the system of indirect rule that was applied to the 
Ugandan Protectorate was not consistent. The colonial administration expeditiously 
utilized traditional processes, laws, and procedures when they served the colonial 
purposes and relied on expediency and coercion to exact obedience when the traditional 
norms became cumbersome or irrelevant. Although indirect rule supposedly worked 
through only pre-colonial systems and channels, the local institutions used by the British 
were to varying extents colonial constructs themselves as the domination efforts pursued 
in the northern and eastern parts of the country illustrate and in so far as native systems 
were manipulated to primarily serve the colonial government’s interests. It should also be 
kept in mind that indirect rule was not pursued in order to keep the local Ugandans 
involved in the administrative process, but rather, it was adopted as an administrative 
convenience. Indeed, the colonial administration did not do much to preserve native 
authority, values, and norms. If anything, traditional authority was surrendered to the 
British Crown. Fleming (1966) is in agreement when he asserts that “The system of 
‘indirect rule’ was devised, not so much out of philosophical concern for the maintenance 
of African tribal structure as out of practical necessity.” 
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The colonial coping strategies not only altered the local social structures but also 
sowed the seeds that eventually germinated into some of the current problems afflicting 
Uganda. For instance, “the establishment of districts based wherever possible on tribal 
residence has contributed to a sense of district nationalism and separatism that in many 
cases did not exist prior to the arrival of the British and subsequent amalgamation of the 
parochial segments into districts.”165 More so, in the kingdom societies, nationalism and 
feelings of separatism run high as these societies still strive for federal status, especially 
in Buganda. Such factors have not facilitated the quest for peaceful national integration. 
From the above discussion, it is clear that traditional indigenous Ugandan 
societies were organized administratively, culturally, politically, and socio-economically, 
and were at varying stages of development prior to colonial penetration. It is partly 
because of this context that the British colonial administration pursued the policy of 
indirect rule by exercising power through the various traditional institutions and 
structures.  Where such institutions were not viable, the context was radically altered by 
introduction of the chieftainship. Yet, the Ugandan traditional systems should not be 
romanticized. While they served the purposes of the time, they lacked the capacity and 
attributes necessary for the functioning of a modern state. Nonetheless, the colonial 
masters were not interested in modernizing the country and equipping it with the critical 
capacities beyond what was necessary for their operations. Rather, they realized that to 
reach their goals they had to manipulate or do away with the traditional systems, and 
replace them with bureaucratic organizations styled after the systems in their own 
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countries.  British imperial rule therefore shaped the political, economic, and socio-
cultural structures as well as the administrative institutions of the country. Indeed, 
colonialism heavily influenced and fashioned state institutions and developmental 
trajectories of the post independence era. Before delving deeper into the legacy of 
colonialism on Uganda’s bureaucratic development, it is crucial to take a historical look 
at Tanzania’s indigenous administrative set up. The historical analysis is crucial for the 
eventual comparison of the bureaucratic functioning in the two countries. 
 
4.3 ADMINISTRATION IN INDIGENOUS TERRITORIES IN PRE-COLONIAL 
TANZANIA  
 
In Tanzania, the traditional administrative and political systems were not 
articulated as well as they were in Uganda. According to Illife (1979), “Tanganyika was 
not composed of tribes. Its groups and identities were formed in other ways…. 
identification was totally relative to the spatial position of the speaker. By moving his 
home and adapting to a new environment a man changed his identity.”166 In his view, 
identity categorizations developed as people moved around and adapted to specific 
environments in their search of pasture, cultivatable land, and other forms of livelihood.   
He asserts further that, “In pre-colonial Tanganyika, each individual had belonged to 
several social groups: nuclear family and extended family, lineage and chiefdom, and 
perhaps clan and tribe. Circumstances had led some to emphasize one identity.”167 It can 
therefore be said that, both political and administrative authority were scattered, and there 
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were few power centers that could ably make binding decisions for the community. Even 
though different kinship groups were in existence, “what political power did exist in these 
tribes was neither concentrated nor highly visible, and limited powers of decision making 
were variously distributed between lineage and clan heads, village elders, and religious 
leaders.”168 It is therefore not surprising that tribal rivalry was not as pervasive in pre-
colonial Tanganyika as it was in pre-colonial Uganda and even “where contrasting 
environments and cultures were juxtaposed, antagonism co-existed with a lively 
exchange of goods.”169  But after colonial penetration, identities and loyalties became 
more complex and tribal divisions rigidified as people identified themselves as “Muslims, 
Christians, Protestants, Catholics, clerks or workers, Africans, or even 
Tanganyikans…Men devoted as much energy to consolidating and advancing tribes as 
their children would later devote to creating a nation.”170 In Iliffe’s view, the people in 
Tanganyika gained tribal consciousness as a result of socio-economic change and 
colonial government policies.  
Colonial interest in Tanganyika was first developed by Germany prior to the 1884 
Berlin Conference on the partition of Africa and it is a state of semi-statelessness that the 
German colonialists encountered upon arrival. While it might be easy to conquer stateless 
societies, in the case of Tanganyika, being stateless did not mean that it was a walk-over 
for the Germans and even after conquest, reigning over stateless societies can be quite a 
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daunting task as the Germans discovered. They met great resistance from the Arabs at the 
Indian Ocean coast, and from the clan heads in the grassland interior. It has been asserted 
that African responses to colonial invasion fall into three major categories namely armed 
resistance, negotiation, and collaboration.171 But according to Iliffe (1979), the situation 
was different in Tanganyika: 
“Many peoples reacted in different ways at different times. Machemba, most 
persistent of opponents, negotiated at intervals. Sina began by fighting and ended 
as a reliable ally. Armed resistance was not especially common among the most 
militarized societies. The Masai were in no position to fight. Unyanyembe had a 
less warlike past than Urambo. Nor was it less enlightened peoples who 
fought….Rather, armed resistance, negotiation, and collaboration were tactical 
choices, alternative means of achieving the same end: the greatest possible 
independence and power.”172 
 
It can therefore be asserted that the German experience was quite different from the one 
the British encountered in Uganda. Clearly, in the Ugandan case, the Baganda were 
outright ardent collaborators through out the colonial period while the Banyoro and other 
areas remained colonial adversaries or reluctantly subservient at best. 
 In 1891, the German government took over direct administration of the 
Tanganyika territory with the appointment of a governor in Dar es Salaam but it was not 
until 1898 that the Germans claimed control over most of Tanganyika. Because of 
Tanganyika’s large size, diverse terrain, population distribution, and poor communication 
networks, it was difficult to reach remote villages. According to Iliffe (1979), “to the end 
of their occupation, German rule was spread most unevenly over Tanganyika. Many 
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Grenzwildnisse
173 remained almost entirely ungoverned.”174 In his view, early German 
rule over Tanganyika “used its bands of gunmen to maintain authority over compliant 
local leaders … and its ‘conquest’ was often an extension of tribal war in which the 
Germans shared the plunder.”175 
The Germans endeavored to extend and entrench their authority and control over 
the territory by establishing administrative systems in areas that were densely populated 
and economically viable. Administrative districts were established, each headed by a 
district officer; by 1914 there were 22 administrative districts.176 Like his British 
counterpart in Uganda, a German administrative officer wielded a lot of power and 
authority. But because of the size of the Tanganyikan territory and poor communication, 
districts officers enjoyed more autonomy and decision making powers and were more 
authoritarian than their Ugandan counterparts. “No provincial commissioners supervised 
district officers. A remote station could expect a visit from a senior official only once a 
decade…. In 1914 seven of the twenty district officers had held their posts for seven 
years or more. Their rule was openly based on force and few traveled without armed 
escorts…. With their brutal soldiers and police, German officials inspired great terror.”177 
Unlike Uganda therefore, Tanganyika under Germany experienced an overwhelmingly 
direct rule with elements of indirect rule.  
                                                 
173 Grenzwildnisse is a German word for Tanganyikan wilderness, generally tsetse-fly infested woodland. 
174 Iliffe, J. 1979. Ibid, p. 118. 
175 Iliffe, J. 1979. Op Cit, p. 117. 
176 For a detailed description of the consolidation of German rule in Tanzania, see Iliffe (1979) chapter 3, 
“German Conquest”. 
177 Iliffe, J. 1979. Ibid, p. 119. 
 100
In spite of the brute force used by the Germans, some economic development was 
realized, an administrative system was established, and many natives were offered 
education. It has been argued that “Despite some British propaganda to the contrary, the 
Germans had not in fact deliberately set about the destruction of all forms of indigenous 
authority, and had in places incorporated cooperative local chiefs into the 
administration.”178 The local bureaucracy was administered through agents known as 
‘akidas’ and ‘jumbes’. The ‘jumbes’ were headmen or leaders of clans or small groups of 
people and a number of them would be under the authority of an ‘akida’.179 ‘Akidas’ 
were “government-appointed agents whose duty was to assist the European officials with 
the collection of the tax and the enforcement of the law on a day-to-day basis.”180 
Frequently, the ‘akidas’ were coastal Arabs and people of Arabic descent that spoke 
Swahili. They were not particularly well liked by the inland natives because of their 
eagerness to harass and intimidate the local natives181. But it has been argued that not all 
‘akidas’ were “foreign”. According to Willis (1993), “Some of the akidas appointed by 
the Germans were local village headmen, and others were coastal people who through 
trade and raiding had succeeded in building a position for themselves as local patrons in 
the pre-colonial period.”182  
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It has been asserted that there were two major phases of district administration 
under the German colonial government. The first phase was initiated in the 1880s and its 
focus was military security and political control of the colony. In this phase, there was 
heavy reliance on coercive means and coalition with cooperative natives. Peoples with 
out recognized chiefs (stateless peoples) had headmen forced upon them, while some 
chiefdoms were altered and reconstructed. The colonial demands included “recognition 
of Germany paramountcy, provision of labor and building materials, and use of 
diplomacy rather than force in settling disputes.” In turn, the Germans would provide 
“political and military support for their allies.”183 The second phase was characterized by 
“the collapse of the local compromises established in the 1880s”184 mainly because of the 
imposition of the hut tax in 1898, a policy that was not palatable to the natives. 
According to Iliffe (1979), another reason for the collapse of the local compromises was 
the “tension between the needs for political control and the needs for efficient 
administration. Control required powerful allies with obedient followings. Administration 
required efficient agents who could impose uncongenial innovations. Only rarely could 
one man fulfill both functions successfully as the Germans began to make more extensive 
demand on their subjects.”185 As the collaboration buckled and as administrative demands 
imposed intensified, the natives increasingly felt disenfranchised and began agitating 
against colonial rule. 
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The ‘akidas’ administrative system functioned fairly efficiently for some time but 
gradually became a barrier between the natives and the colonialists. The Germans were 
unable to make real contact with, and to understand the native peoples, but rather 
hastened to establish their authority and reshape the economy by introducing extensive 
agricultural developments. It should be kept in mind that the main reason for German 
interest in Africa just like all other colonialists was to generate economic wealth. The 
natives however were not keen to embrace sudden changes in their livelihoods and railed 
against the changes forced upon them. Such disgruntlement resulted in what came to be 
known as the Maji Maji rebellion of 1905-1907 in which the natives in the southeast of 
Tanganyika refused to abide by the government’s directive to grow cotton. What ensued 
was a bloody and tumultuous period in which the Germans ruthlessly used brute force to 
quell the wide-spreading African rebellion. According to Were and Wilson (1984), the 
government had to call in reinforcements and once they arrived, the Africans were 
defeated. “Their leaders were “executed, crops destroyed, houses burned, and many 
people were imprisoned or hanged….The number of Africans killed is not known but it 
could have been between 75,000 and 120,000.”186 The Maji Maji uprising has been 
depicted as “a unique and exceptional primary response to colonial oppression. The 
unprecedented unity of different ethnic groups attributed to the maji ideology has become 
an icon of anti-colonial protest in Africa.”187 Iliffe (1979) asserts that the Maji Maji 
rebellion “was an explosion of African hatred of European rule. It was a final attempt by 
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Tanganyika’s old societies to destroy the colonial order by force, and its failure made the 
passing of the old societies inevitable.”188 
After the rebellion was defeated, the Germans attempted to reform the 
administrative system by incorporating more native Tanganyikans in the bureaucracy and 
by fashioning the system on traditional patterns of African society. However, as they 
attempted to put their colonial house in order, an international crisis that culminated into 
the First World War (1914-1918) was brewing. Germany and her allies were defeated and 
the victorious European powers usurped her colonies. Under the Mandate system put in 
place by the League of Nations, Tanganyika became a British territory in 1920. The 
Mandate accorded Britain full powers of administration over Tanganyika.  
Upon assuming control over Tanganyika, the British initially retained German 
established administrative structures. Iliffe (1979) asserts that “Until 1925 Governor 
Byatt preserved the German administrative structure, with 22 district officers reporting to 
the secretariat in Dar es Salaam and using chiefs or akidas as agents.”189 This 
administrative system, dysfunctional under German rule, did not improve under British 
rule. It was therefore soon decided that in order to have administrative efficiency, some 
form of decentralization to the native authorities had to be effected so that local areas 
gain some administrative autonomy to make laws, collect taxes, and have local leaders. A 
Governor that was very familiar with the functioning of indirect rule, having exercised it 
in Nigeria for seventeen years, was brought into Tanganyika to straighten the system. The 
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new governor, Sir Donald Cameron is said to have been ‘appalled by the lack of 
administrative policy’. Iliffe cites him lamenting to his superior Lugard thus; “I found 
each District Officer doing just as he pleased. There are no general instructions on any 
question of native policy… Administrative Officers are engaged in every task except 
Political work which is neglected…. Indirect rule is a fiction…. The people are out of 
hand because the Chiefs can no longer punish them.”190 The British therefore decided that 
just like Uganda, and Nigeria, the territory must be “primarily a Black man’s country” 
and hence hastened to introduce indirect rule.  
According to Mair (1977), British colonial theory held the principle that “the 
indigenous political system, whatever it was, must be utilized as the starting-point for any 
development.” She asserts further that “In Uganda the organization of the Ganda 
kingdom so much impressed the early Protectorate officials that after streamlining it a 
little they made it a model for the whole of the territory.”191 However, the situation was 
drastically different in predominantly stateless Tanganyikan societies which rendered the 
establishment of indirect rule complicated. According to Mamdani (1996) Cameron 
sought to overcome the obstacle of stateless societies through three alternatives. “One 
option, as pursued with the Sagara, was to subordinate them to a neighboring chiefdom. 
A second option was to convert religious leaders into administrative chiefs, as was indeed 
done with the Masai. A third option, almost always disastrous, as with the Makonde, was 
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to elevate one of several village headmen into a chief. In the process, however, several 
successes were registered in creating tribes where none had existed before, the most 
outstanding being the case of the Nyakyusa around Lake Victoria.”192 The British 
therefore invented chiefs in most of the stateless societies in Tanzania as they did in the 
non-kingdom areas in Uganda. Spear (2005) asserts that “Chiefs were inventions in two 
senses: first, the men colonial authorities appointed lacked traditional legitimacy, and 
secondly, the positions to which they were appointed were either creations of the colonial 
administration or had been so corrupted by their incorporation into the colonial 
administrative hierarchy, with its unpopular demands to collect tax, raise labor, …that 
they no longer represented established patterns of authority at all.”193  
It can therefore be argued that, in their quest to establish an efficient bureaucracy 
that is based on indirect rule, the British set about to not only “discover the tribal 
authority structures and endow them with legal powers as local “native authorities””194 
but to manufacture some where none existed. Iliffe (1979) asserts that the indirect rule 
policy as was implemented in Tanganyika “Although conservative in origin it was radical 
in effect because it rested on historical misunderstanding. The British wrongly believed 
that Tanganyikans belonged to tribes; Tanganyikans created tribes to function within the 
colonial framework.” In his view, “Europeans believed Africans belonged to tribes; 
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Africans built tribes to belong to.” 195 The implementation of indirect rule and the 
creation of Native Authorities in colonial Tanganyika provide what may be viewed as the 
most prominent example of the ‘creation of tribes’196 in Africa. Nonetheless, indirect rule 
did not become the norm across all the societies in Tanganyika. Willis (1993) asserts that 
“In Bonde the introduction of indirect rule, and the creation of tribal authorities, was for 
many years resisted by local officials.”197 Just like in the non-kingdom areas in northern 
Uganda, local circumstances dictated whether or not, and how, indirect rule was 
implemented.  
While in the Ugandan case, the situational constraints did not deter the British 
from crafting the system, in Tanganyika it was not only the context that mitigated against 
the policy, but local British officers too, seemed not too keen to adopt it. In Willis’s view, 
British officials at the local level “were extremely skeptical of the efficiency of indirect 
rule” and viewed the “direct control of the local administration as the only way to ensure 
local law-enforcement and the collection of tax.”198 In his view, they were more 
concerned with efficient direct rule than with the restoration or invention of an 
incompetent indigenous authority. In his study of the administration of Bonde, an area 
located at the north east coast of Tanzania, he found that introduction of indirect rule and 
the creation of tribal authorities was resisted for many years by local colonial officials. 
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He asserts that “The history of indirect rule in Bonde would suggest ….the invention of 
chiefs and the creation of tribes were not considered by the local administration to be 
effective or efficient adjuncts to the colonial government… the district administration 
was able for a number of years to avoid not only the invention of a chief for the area, but 
also the implementation of any meaningful degree of indirect rule.”199 
In the areas where it was successfully implemented however, indirect rule gave 
rise to the position of the chief, an intermediary authority that was used as means of 
social control over the masses. As in Uganda, these chiefs acquired extensive 
administrative, economic, and legal powers. They collected taxes, recruited labor, 
presided over and adjudicated disputes, while at the same time catering to their self 
interest by accumulating wealth in the form of land, cattle, and even wives. In their bid to 
attain administrative effectiveness and legitimacy, they had to adhere to the colonial 
directives while at the same time being sensitive to the interests of ‘their’ people. This 
was a difficult balance to attain.  
It is therefore evident that pre-colonial and colonial contexts in Tanzania are 
significantly different from Uganda’s. The differences played a significant role in shaping 
the contemporary states’ administrative, economic, and political functioning. The next 
section focuses on the colonial heritage and bureaucratic manifestations in both countries. 
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4.4 COLONIAL HERITAGE AND BUREAUCRATIC DEVELOPMENT IN 
UGANDA AND TANZANIA 
 
 Recent research indicates that colonialism reversed levels of development in most 
of the colonies whether in the western world or in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In 
some colonies, the reversal was progressive while in others, it was regressive. In 
particular, the developmental legacies of British colonial rule have come under great 
scrutiny.200 Many of the studies focus on the effects of colonialism on economic 
development, democratization, and general political development but the major focus of 
this section will be the colonial legacy and it effects on the post-independence 
bureaucracy in Uganda and Tanzania.  
It has been asserted that the type of colonial system imposed on the colony –
settlement or extractive, direct or indirect, had a profound effect on the post-colonial 
developments. According to Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), the different 
types of colonization policies generated different sets of institutions. On one side are the 
extractive institutions set up in states like Congo under Belgian rule. They assert that 
such institutions “did not introduce much protection for private property, nor did they 
provide checks and balances against government expropriation. In fact, the main purpose 
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of the extractive state was to transfer as much the resources of the colony to the 
colonizer.”201 On the other side are the settlement institutions set up in states where big 
numbers of Europeans migrated, settled, and attempted to establish their ‘home 
institutions’ in the colonies “with strong emphasis on private property and checks against 
government power.”202 According to Acemoglu et al. (2001), such colonies include 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the USA. In their view, such colonial states and 
institutions endured through the post-independence period. 
Researchers have also argued that the conditions within the colonized country 
necessitated the establishment of particular institutions. Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) 
assert that the types of climate, soil, and traditional societies associated with pre-colonial 
wealth often led the colonialists to establish extractive institutions that in turn led to 
inequality that persisted to the post-independence era, while those societies that were not 
as well endowed often escaped the extractive colonial tendencies hence prospered after 
independence.203 Acemoglu et al. (2001) while also focusing on the pre-colonial context, 
argue that population density and disease prevalence affected colonial policies. In the 
areas that were sparsely populated and not heavily infested with diseases, the colonialists 
settled in large numbers and established viable and developmental policies and 
institutions that upheld the rule of law and encouraged investment, and strong institutions 
that still prevail. In areas that were densely populated and largely infested with diseases, 
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the colonialists “set up extractive states with the intention of transferring resources 
rapidly to the metropole. These institutions were detrimental to investment and economic 
progress through the post-independence era.204 
When analyzed with in the perspective of the above settlement or extractive, 
direct or indirect dichotomies, and the contexts under which either of them was found to 
be more favorable and feasible over the other, pre-colonial Uganda and Tanzania easily 
fall in the category of extractive and indirectly ruled colonial states. Uganda had a high 
level of pre-colonial political and administrative development and a high population 
density, while Tanzania had a considerably diseased environment that did not favor 
European settlement. Indeed at the time of independence the European population in 
Uganda was less than .1 percent of the national population while in Tanzania it was 
approximately .3 percent. Table 4.1 below offers a comparative view of the population 
statistics of the East African countries at the time of colonial penetration.  
The numbers indicate that while Uganda had a smaller territory in comparison to its 
neighboring countries, it had the highest population density and the least number of 
European settlers. 
Scholars contend that there is a relationship between the level of pre-colonial 
development, the level of colonialism, the population density, and colonial settlement. 
Table 4.2 offers those variables in three Eastern African countries and three Western 
former British colonies. 
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Table 4.1 Population Statistics of the Three Eastern African Countries at the onset of British Colonialism 
 
TERRITORY STATUS YEAR OF SIZE IN NATIVE EUROPEAN PERCENTAGE ASIAN TOTAL DENSITY 
    ACQUISITION SQUARE POPULATION POPULATION OF POPULATION POPULATION   
      MILES     EUROPEANS       
  Colony and (1895)               
Kenya Protectorate 1920 219,730 3,253,689 16,812 0.51 57,135 3,327,636 15.1 
Uganda Protectorate 1894 93,981 3,536,267 2,100 0.06 18,800 3,557,167 37.8 
Tanzania Mandate 1922 360,000 5,214,800 9,345 0.17 33,784 5,257,929 14.5 
Source: Adapted and modified with small changes from Wieschhoff, H. A. 1972. Colonial Policies in Africa. Westport, CONN:  
Negro University Press, p. 10. 
 
 
Table 4.2 Levels of Pre-colonial Development and Colonialism in a few British Colonies 
 
COUNTRY LEVEL OF  LEVEL OF PRE-COLONIAL POPULATION EUROPEAN POPULATION AT THE 
  PRE-COLONIAL COLONIALISM DENSITY (PERSONS PER Km) END OF COLONIALISM (% TOTAL) 
  DEVELOPMENT       
Australia Low High 0.03 98.7 
Canada Low High 0.02 96.8 
Kenya Low Low-Intermediate 5.71 0.5 
Tanzania Intermediate Low 4.53 0.3 
Uganda High Low 15.22 < 0.1 
United States Low High 0.09 81.2 
Source: Adapted and modified with small changes from Lange, M., Mahoney J., and Maththias vom Hau. 2006. “Colonialism and Development: A 
Comparative Analysis of Spanish and British Colonies.” The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 111, No. 5, p. 1434. 
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The data in table 4.2 clearly indicate that the population density at the time of colonial 
penetration in the three East African countries was much higher than that in the Western 
territories and European settlement much less in the African territories. It is also apparent 
that of the six countries, Uganda had the highest level of pre-colonial development, a 
point that reinforces the arguments pointed out earlier. The data also illustrate that the 
areas which were sparsely populated experienced a higher level of colonialism and hence 
more settlement which necessitated the application of the rights, privileges, and 
protection of the metropole, critical elements that were starkly lacking in the African 
territories. It is evident from table 4.2 that the British tended to pursue higher levels of 
colonialism and settled more extensively in the sparsely populated pre-colonial societies 
that also had low levels of pre-colonial development. 
Uganda and Tanzania therefore fit quite well in the category of colonies that were 
ruled indirectly and in which extractive institutions were built by the colonialists as 
described by Lange et al. and by Acemoglu et al. Moreover, both countries are still poor 
and developing, a fact that lends credence to the argument raised by Acemoglu et al. that 
“colonies where Europeans faced higher mortality rates are today substantially poorer 
than colonies that were healthy for Europeans.”205 The colonialists deemed it expedient 
that Uganda and Tanzania remain African countries with very minimal foreign 
settlement. The colonial policies favored a peasant-dominated agricultural economy, 
minimal investment opportunities, and skeletal institutional development only necessary 
for the pursuance of colonial ideals. 
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In spite of the fact that the two East African countries were not extensively 
colonized in terms of colonial settlement with subsequent replication of European 
institutions with strong emphasis on private property and checks against governmental 
power, the British did manage to entrench a considerable number of institutions, 
economic and political policies, and legal procedures that were to endure into the post-
independence period. Indeed, the administrative institutions that were inherited when 
Uganda and Tanzania attained independence on October 9, 1962 and December 9, 1961 
respectively, were in many respects replicas and extensions of the ones utilized 
previously as instruments of coercion by the British colonial masters. Therefore, the 
origins of the contemporary Ugandan and Tanzanian administrative systems can be 
traced to the British colonial service. Moreover, some of the maladies that have affected 
the civil service performance have their roots in the colonial civil service and its 
operation. 
The British Colonial Service bureaucracy, later named Her Majesty’s Overseas 
Service, administered the East African territories with a highly elaborate and hierarchical 
structure of roles. Procedures for dealing with local masses, with Europeans, and with 
Asians were specified, as were processes of recruitment into the bureaucracy. The 
colonial civil service, an instrument of the British imperial policy of indirect rule, was 
mainly concerned with the maintenance of law and order, the collection of taxes, and the 
provision of the necessary framework for trade in the colony. It was not required to deal 
with complex issues of the present day administration like formulation of developmental 
economic and political policies, because such functions were not the immediate rational 
reasons for acquiring the colony.  
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The British established a highly stratified civil service system in which they 
occupied all the administrative and professional positions, the Asians most of the 
executive and a few professional positions, and the natives the clerical, secretarial, and 
generally other subordinate positions. The entire administrative system was designed by 
the British to serve their own interests and its main task was to extract as much wealth as 
possible by enforcing law and order and by collection of taxes. According to 
Rweyemamu and Hyden (1975), “the public administration system was neither 
responsible nor responsive to the will of the people.”206 Boahen (1987) while assessing 
the nature of colonialism in Africa, states the goal of the colonial administration in 
stronger terms when he asserts that “Its main raison d´être207was the ruthless exploitation 
of human and material resources of the African continent to the advantage of the owners 
and shareholders of expatriate companies and the metropolitan governments and their 
manufacturing and industrial firms.”208  
Administratively, Uganda was divided into four provinces namely the Eastern, 
Northern, Western, and Buganda all headed by a Provincial Commissioner. The 
provinces were further divided into districts headed by the District Commissioner aided 
by an assistant district commissioner and some clerical staff. The districts were 
themselves divided into counties (Sazas) and sub-county units (Gombololas) and parishes 
(Mulukas) presided over by the “native” civil service chiefs. All civil servants were 
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directly answerable to the Governor who was appointed in England. Below him were the 
Provincial Commissioner and District Commissioner both Crown appointees and it was 
the District Commissioner that supervised the chiefs and whose supervisory role 
extended “to the conduct of every minor official down to the village clerk or 
constable.”209 The colonial civil service therefore was highly centralized with very few 
elements of deconcentration. According to Burke (1967), “The colonial bureaucracy 
possessed a near monopoly of power in the African territories. Broadly defined directives 
emanated from the Colonial Office in London (or its equivalent in Paris, Brussels or 
Lisbon), but the administrative hierarchy, with Governor at the apex and the native 
chiefs, headmen or functionaries at the base, formulated and executed actual 
administrative policy.”210 Since the major role of the civil service was the maintenance of 
law and order and collection of taxes, the administrative system that was instituted was 
highly legalistic, emphasized loyalty, processes, procedures, and precedents.211  The 
colonial civil service therefore was highly conservative and hierarchical. It repressed 
lower-level participation in decision making, was unresponsive, and not geared towards 
the development of the country. 
Prior to independence, in the period 1940-50, the colonial administration made 
efforts to alter the orientation of the civil service and hastened to train the natives on 
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matters of administration. According to Burke (1967), the colonial bureaucrats 
“conceived of their task as one of passing on an established body of knowledge 
concerning those routines, procedures, and rules which they had successfully employed 
to rule Africans who were about to take over the reins of the state.”212 What the 
colonialists seem to have forgotten however is the fact the above mentioned body of 
knowledge was used to subjugate and exploit the natives, functions that would not favor 
the pursuit of national welfare and development in the post-independence era. The onus 
was therefore on the newly independent natives to modify or do away with those rules, 
routines, and procedures. But as illustrated in the pages ahead especially in the case of 
Uganda, no fundamental change occurred. Rather, the post-independence political 
leadership not only operated an inherited colonial system of government and 
administration but also unwittingly embraced it even as it propelled them along a course 
quite contrary to the demands of nation building. 
The British, also, made efforts to upgrade and change the terms and conditions of 
the civil service by setting up commissions like the 1947 Holmes Commission in Uganda 
whose task was to review the structure, appointment, and pay systems of the civil service. 
Among others, the commission recommended that all positions with in the civil service 
be opened to all qualified persons from all races in order to have equity.213  In 1955, the 
Public Service Commission was established to advise the Governor on the civil service 
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matters and to oversee the appointment into and promotion in the civil service. Therefore, 
civil service positions were opened up to the educated elite based on the principle of 
meritocracy. According to Karugire (1996): 
“It was through the medium of the Public Service Commission that a strong and 
reasonably impartial Civil Service was built in Uganda. This was self-evident at 
the time of independence, when the Public Service Commission’s advisory role to 
the Governor was changed and it was made an independent executive body in the 
discharge of its functions…… After independence, the Ugandan civil service was 
able to attract and retain the country’s best trained manpower.”214 
 
In Tanzania, an efficient civil service of African administrators and clerks 
emerged but resulted in divisions within the society as identities and loyalties shifted. It 
has been argued that colonial policies in Tanzania generated parochial tendencies that 
were not existent in the pre-colonial period. According to Iliffe (1979) it is during the 
colonial period that Tanzanians began to think of themselves as being “Muslim or 
Christian, Protestants or Catholics, clerks or workers, African or even Tanganyikans.”215 
Moreover, socio-economic change generated by colonial rule exacerbated the situation as 
circumstances determined which identity was emphasized for instance “men deeply 
involved in colonial society formed the Tanganyika Territory African Civil Services 
Association, while the deprived often stressed parochial identities.”216  
At independence, the Ugandan civil service was considered one of the best in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.217 It was small, well paid, efficient, motivated, quite neutral and 
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ethical. Others have argued that at independence, Uganda had “a lively and free press 
(soon eliminated), a good university (which became embattled), and an excellent civil 
service cum political administration (slowly undermined), which linked the central 
government with provincial, district, county, and other more local jurisdictions.”218   
However, it has been argued that despite such great attributes, the civil service “was 
devoid of cultural attributes, shared values, and historical traditions which were inherent 
in the Westminster model. It was an artificial institution which did not have any solid 
social foundations.”219 It was therefore not long before the Weberian ideals of loyalty, 
cohesion, and dedication to duty were abandoned falling prey to the inexperience of the 
native civil servants and cultural context that fostered nepotism and patronage instead of 
meritocracy. 
After independence, the Africanization220 policy was introduced in most of 
Africa. Native Ugandans and Tanzanians replaced the Europeans and other foreigners. 
Even when there was a desperate lack of suitable local replacement, the trained foreign 
personnel were relieved of their duties. Africanization policy was implemented in most 
former British colonies. Heady cites a Nigerian as giving the understandable reasons for 
such a policy: 
The decision was taken by our leaders that the British officials should be replaced, 
not because they hated or distrusted them, but because they felt that political 
independence was a sham unless you had also a great measure of administrative 
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independence. You just could not be politically independent and remain 
administratively dependent, over a long period, without misunderstanding and 
tensions arising between the expatriate administrator and his indigenous political 
master.221  
 
It is fair to say then, that replacing the British with the natives soon after independence 
was a political requisite albeit dysfunctional from an administrative and economic point 
of view. Interesting to note however is the fact that the civil service structures were left 
fundamentally unaltered. The beneficiaries of the “Africanization” policy saw no shame 
in arguing for the retention of the privileges and characteristics associated with the 
colonial structure for instance the criteria for selection to higher civil service positions 
placed a major emphasis on the command of English and on a modern western education. 
According to Burke (1967), “Africanization did not normally entail significant alteration 
in role definition, but rather that indigenous Africans were substituted for expatriate 
Europeans in roles already well-defined and already possessed of an established status 
and a highly routinized set of procedures.” He reinforces what has been pointed out 
above when he argues further that “these inherited roles, procedures and rules were not 
designed to achieve the goals of the newly-established polity, but rather worked to 
perpetuate a pre-existing distribution of values.”222 It can therefore be asserted that the 
post-independence civil service ‘started on the wrong footing’ since the colonial 
administrative system was a static structure aimed at the maintenance of law and order 
and collection of taxes. The post-independence bureaucracy envisaged by native elite and 
                                                 
221 Heady, F. 2001. Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective. New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc, p. 
301. 
222 Burke, F. G. 1967. “Public Administration in Africa: The Legacy of Inherited Colonial Institutions.” 
Paper presented at the World Congress of International Political Science Association, Brussels, September 
18-23, p. 22. 
 120
politicians was a dynamic system of administration charged with managing rapid 
economic, political, and social change while at the same time evolving new forms of 
bureaucratic processes and procedures. Yet, partly because the institutional fiber was still 
colonial in nature and especially because of authoritarian politics, the post-independence 
efforts faltered and fell short of realizing the independence ideals.  
Another major legacy of the colonial administration is the politicization of the 
civil service. Under colonial rule, administrative positions were highly politicized, and 
this trend carried on after independence. The power structure during the colonial era was 
hierarchical, centralized, and controlled from above right from England, to the Governor, 
the Provincial Commissioner, District Commissioner, and finally to the local chief.  
Within the colony, the governor, provincial and district commissioners, monopolized the 
powers of hire and fire, allocated roles and responsibilities, and functioned in the 
framework directed to them from the colonial office in London. For instance, The 
Administrative Instructions issued by the Protectorate Government in 1940 directed that: 
“The Provincial Commissioner is, within the limits of his province, the principal 
executive officer of government and is personally and directly responsible to the 
Governor for the peace and good order of the his province and for the efficient conduct of 
all public business therein.”223 It was further instructed that the Provincial Commissioner 
had power to issues orders and directives to any officer serving in the province 
“preferably by word of mouth.”224 If an emergence arose, the Provincial Commissioner 
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had powers to act as “the sole judge” and to issue orders “which must be carried out by 
the recipients without delay.”225 The District Commissioners enjoyed similar powers, 
authority, and general control over the functioning of district matters. Instructions of this 
nature illustrate that the level centralization in the administrative structure was very high. 
Central control greatly constricted the local administration, leaving little room for local 
participation and initiative. 
According to Burke (1967), “It is important to keep this fusion of the 
administrative and political functions in mind when considering the tendency of 
contemporary African politics to ‘politicize their administration.’ For this trend should be 
viewed less as a departure from the metropolitan model than as a return to familiar 
system.”226 Indeed, the post-independence civil service retained the highly centralized 
and hierarchical structure. The power structure started from Kampala and Dar es Salaam 
the capital cities for Uganda and Tanzania respectively where rules, regulations, roles, 
and responsibilities were allocated downwards. All government departments (ministries) 
had their headquarters in the two cities and were headed by ministers that were politically 
appointed. Districts and other lower levels of administration got directives from the 
center. The minister, based in Kampala/Dar es Salaam, had powers to hire and fire 
anyone at the local levels of the administration, and had the powers to determine the 
membership, constitution, and regulations of the local appointments board. The 
centralizing tendencies were entrenched in the political and administrative fiber of the 
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new state via various official documents. For instance, the post-independence Local 
Administrations Ordinance enacted in Uganda in 1962 clearly placed the powers of 
recruitment and regulation of local government staff in the hands of the central 
government.227 Burke (1964), amazed at the level of post-colonial centralization in 
Uganda commented that “The powers of the central government over local staff 
appointment, tenure, and functions is greater than at any time since the introduction of 
modern local government.”228 
Native authority also became highly politicized with the introduction of the 
position of the chief into the colonial bureaucracy. Where as the colonial administration 
personnel was generally recruited and employed along bureaucratic lines, the positions 
held by the chiefs were rooted largely in patrimonialism for they were accorded 
administrative positions based on their lineage in the traditional kingdom areas, and most 
importantly they were appointed principally based on their willingness to collaborate 
with the colonial officials.  The Ugandan 1919 Native Authority Ordinance enumerated 
the powers and duties of the African Chiefs and the manner in which they could enforce 
authority. The duty of the chiefs was specified as that of maintaining “order in the areas 
within which he has jurisdiction.”229 Under this ordinance, the chiefs were accorded 
powers to prevent crimes, to arrest offenders, to prohibit natives from carrying arms, and 
to ensure that the natives provide compulsory and free labor for public ventures. These 
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chiefs were granted wide-ranging powers over the native Ugandans and their authority 
and orders prevailed over the native laws and customs except in Buganda where the 1900 
Agreement ensured that the Kingdom retained some form of independence. Mair (1977) 
argues that the colonial administration had to limit the native chiefs’ authority and 
impose strict rules for its exercise. Hence the chiefs became responsible to a government 
above and beyond their own traditional ruler, and were expected to interfere in all kinds 
of ways in the lives of the natives. Inevitably, their relations with the native population 
changed in numerous ways.230  
It should also be noted that the chiefs were accountable only to the British District 
Commissioner. According to Burke (1964), the 1919 Native Authority Ordinance “gave 
the chiefs of Uganda – both those possessed of traditional authority and those 
superimposed over clan or age-group societies – a degree of authority which greatly 
exceeded anything they held traditionally. Backed by the power of the colonial 
government in the guise of the District Commissioner, the chief’s powers of arrest and 
seizure, and control over the allocation and use of property were nearly unlimited.”231 
The worst case of politicization of the chieftainship was in the non-kingdom areas of 
northern and eastern Uganda. In those places, the chiefs were not restrained by the 
accountability of traditional societies’ norms and values found in the Kingdom areas 
hence the chiefs became highly autocratic with a fusion of powers of arrest, judgment, 
and punishment. Mamdani (1996) however argues that even in the kingdom areas, 
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traditional constraints on the chiefs were eroded by colonialism. He asserts that “By 
undermining both popular (clan) checks on state authority and traditional constraints as 
embodied in traditional chiefs, the colonial state really liberated administrative chiefs 
from all institutionalized constraint, of peers or people, and laid the basis of a 
decentralized despotism.”232 
According to Lange (2004), indirect rule in African British colonies bestowed on 
the chiefs great institutional powers – customary law powers, executive, judicial, and 
legislative powers. Such powers, in his view, “were augmented by their intermediary 
positions, which enabled them to control information and resource flows between the 
colonial administration and the local populations and avoid colonial supervision… Their 
intermediary position allowed chiefs to be rent-seekers extraordinaire whenever 
exchanges between the administration and local population occurred.”233 Indeed by 
independence, chiefs were in complete isolation from ‘their’ people and were generally 
perceived as servants of an external government. In Tanzania, the scenario was not much 
different. According to Spear (2005), “chiefs grew in wealth, influence and powers as 
they became wealthy in cattle, rich in land, and patriarchs of large families. Sambegye 
had ten wives and Sabaya fourteen. Able to distribute cattle and wives to others, they also 
became powerful patrons with expanding numbers of clients.”234  
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A few years to independence, the colonial government initiated deliberate policy 
changes and reforms to increase native participation in both the political and 
administrative processes. These reforms were enshrined in a confidential dispatch from 
the British Secretary of State for the Colonies Mr. Creech-Jones of February 25 1947 to 
the Governors of the African Territories. In that dispatch, he underscored the need to 
develop a “local”, “efficient”, and “democratic” system of administration by asserting 
that “Local because the system of government must be close to the common people and 
their problems, efficient because it must be capable of managing the local services in a 
way which will help to raise the standard of living, democratic because it must not only 
find a place for the growing class of educated men, but at the same time command the 
respect and support of the mass of the people.”235 This appears to be a call for radical 
alterations in the colonial policies. Indeed, reforms were put in place among them, the 
Local Government Ordinance of 1949 that legalized and granted corporate powers and 
responsibilities to local district councils and the District Administration Ordinance of 
1955 that was subsequently amended in 1959. The ordinances however did not attain 
much in the way of administrative reform and did not meet the call made by the 
Secretary’s dispatch. For instance, although local councils were authorized, their laws 
and functions were subject to the approval of the Governor. The chiefs continued to be 
instruments of colonial rule, appointed and accountable to the Governor, they retained 
legislative, executive, and judicial powers; the district commissioner powers were not 
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pruned, and the general bureaucratic structure remained intact in spite of the 1955 and 
1959 amendments.  
Mair (1977) asserts that “In the Uganda kingdoms, the bureaucratic system of 
territorial administration, with its pyramid of chiefs … was maintained after 
independence. It was they, therefore, and not the kings, who bore the brunt of such 
unpopularity as new requirements might provoke.”236 At independence, the powers of the 
chief were slightly reduced and he was made accountable to both the central government 
and local governments. However, the Local Administration Act of 1967 revived and 
entrenched the powers of chief. The chiefs were used to tighten the hold of the central 
government on the ordinary people as their powers enumerated in the Act Section 40 
illustrate: “… to detect and bring offenders to justice and to apprehend all persons whom 
he is legally authorized to apprehend… he may without warrant, enter at any hour of the 
day or night any place in which he has reasonable grounds to suspect that illegal drinking 
or gambling is taking place, or to which dissolute or disorderly behavior are resorting.”237 
It is evident that the powers given to the post-independence chief far exceeded those of 
his colonial predecessor as he appears to have become a law unto himself. Indeed the 
chief’s powers far exceeded any law governing the bureaucracy because no other law 
authorized any public officer to act in a similar manner without check. Just like in the 
colonial period, the chief was used by the Local Government Minister to implement 
unpopular policy and suppress the masses. Mamdani (1996) makes the same point when 
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he asserts that the independence reforms did not weaken the chiefs but entrenched the 
colonial system of “decentralized despotism” which undermined administrative 
efficiency and development goals.238  
In Post-independence Tanzania, politicization of the civil service and native 
authorities was enhanced further by the adoption of the single political party system. The 
upper echelon of the bureaucracy was largely filled by persons long on party service and 
loyalty but frequently short on education and experience. It was also not uncommon for 
skilled and experienced bureaucrats to be brought into the political arena when appointed 
into political positions as junior ministers or party branch chairmen. According to Burke 
(1967), “It was not long after independence that many in the civil service realized that 
bureaucratic advancement “is often as difficult as it was before independence. The major 
positions to which the bureaucrat’s education, experience, and energy led him to aspire 
are more and more filled by young, non-educated, inexperienced, and often corrupt 
revolutionary leaders.”239 Yet in adopting a single party system, Tanzania was trying to 
break away from the colonial shackles and trying to unify the country. For instance while 
in Uganda the hierarchy of local state apparatus from the district commissioner to chiefs 
and headmen was retained, in Tanzania the reverse occurred. The district commissioner 
was replaced by a politically appointed official from the party cadres, the position of the 
chief was abolished, and a single customary law surpassing tribal boundaries was 
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adopted. Most notable, in Tanzania, the new office bearers did not enjoy a fusion of 
power as they predecessors had. Unlike the colonial chiefs, they did not have power to 
enact laws or to adjudicate legal matters. Mamdani (1996) however is not impressed by 
the reforms. In his view, post independence Tanzania’s quest to reform the decentralized 
despotism left in place by the British “reorganized decentralized power so as to unify the 
“nation” through a reform that attended to centralization. The antidote to a decentralized 
despotism turned out to be a centralized despotism.”240  
Generally, when compared to Uganda, Tanzania seems to have appreciated the 
absence of a ‘fit’ between inherited administrative and political systems and the newly 
formulated independence goals and ideals. It proceeded to dismantle the colonial 
administrative structure and build a new one based on what came to be known as African 
socialism,241 a system that emphasized equality, mass participation, national integration, 
and development; and to adopt a one party political system. Yet, both political leaders 
and civil servants emulated and perpetuated the colonial life style. Burke (1967) 
illustrates this heavy contradiction by asserting that in Tanzania  
“where every attempt has been made to build the new nation on a bedrock of a 
revived African culture, and according to the tenets of African socialism, the head 
of state has inherited the Governor’s palace, his upcountry lodges and other 
physical amenities symbolic of authority and status. In greater need of powerful 
symbols of authority for along-suppressed self-esteem and for purposes of 
acquiring mass legitimacy, the new elite is inclined towards greater 
ostentatiousness than its predecessor.”242   
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4.5 SUMMARY 
Chapter four has illustrated that precolonial Uganda had an intricate 
administrative system based on the traditional tribes and kingdoms and that the colonial 
governments utilized the pre-existing structures to administer the colony. In places where 
such were missing as in northern Uganda and much of Tanzania, they were created. It has 
been shown that the colonial legacy has had great influence on the functioning of the 
post-independence administrative institutions in Uganda and Tanzania. The new leaders 
faced the arduous task of establishing national unity and advancing socioeconomic 
development, but with little precedent to aid them, opted to uphold the colonial 
institutions in Uganda, and attempted to reform them in Tanzania. Burke (1967) argues 
the same point when he asserts that “It was problematically evident that the leaders of the 
new African states faced the difficult task of establishing a sense of unity and 
identification and, in the process, re-legitimizing old, and legitimizing new sets of 
political and administrative institutions, with little precedent to assist them. Nation 
building, of course also meant employing these new institutions to systematically and 
rapidly bring about radical social and economic change.”243 Yet, in reality, neither did 
manage to effectively sustain the colonial structure and institutions, nor imaginatively 
frame administrative models capable of absorbing and facilitating the new expectations 
of the Ugandan and Tanzanian populace after independence.  
The fact that the British colonial legacies affected the post-colonial bureaucracy  
cannot be denied. Indeed, the inherited colonial bureaucratic structures strongly 
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influenced the pursuit of newly defined goals. The major challenge of the neophyte 
Ugandan and Tanzanian administrative elite therefore was to adjust an already hybrid 
model to cope with new and additional demands, a challenge that was met only 
abysmally as chapter five ahead illustrates. Burke (1967) put it succinctly when he wrote 
thus;  
“what alternatives are available to the African bureaucrat faced with the 
omnipresence of inherited political and administrative institutions powerfully 
reinforced by an inherited ecology? Three alternatives pertain: one “is corruption 
and other forms of deviation so that the demands of the system can be met – so 
that the new role carriers can secure the resources necessary to maintain the 
establishment in a style to which it is accustomed”, second, is “the general 
acceptance of most elements in the system and its ecology, including status and 
class distinctions.” Third, “requires the formulation of a new ideology, demanding 
vigorous redistribution of existing values and even at great sacrifice and risk to 
the regime, the radical transformation or dismantlement of the system and its 
supporting ecology.”244  
 
 
The discussion presented has made it clear that Uganda opted for the first and 
second options while Tanzania adopted for the third. Chapter five ahead assesses the 
impact of those choices on the political economy and administrative stance of the 
countries. It is important to assess the effect of political and economic choices made 
because they greatly impacted the functioning of the administrative system.  
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CHAPTER 5: STATE COLLPSE IN UGANDA AND ECONOMIC STAGNATION 
IN TANZANIA 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Historical and contemporary analysis of the administrative, socio-economic, and 
political developments in Uganda reveal what Low (1991) termed as a “dislocated 
polity.”245 The development of Uganda’s political history has been a volatile one and the 
main cause of the administrative, economic, and social maladies that the country has 
endured overtime is political instability. Whereas British colonial rule created a mixture 
of direct oppression and a semblance of administrative and political order under the 
policy of indirect rule as illustrated in chapter four, the post-colonial state in Uganda for 
the most part, has been characterized by brutality, chaos, dictatorship, economic 
upheaval, social disorder, and collapse of the administrative, economic, social, and 
political institutions.  
In contrast to post-independence Uganda which has suffered great political strife 
and economic decay, post-independence Tanzania has overall enjoyed political stability. 
According to Kithingi Kiragu (1999), the country is considered to be one of the most 
stable nations in Africa.246 Tanzania’s stability is largely credited to the country’s first 
president, Julius K. Nyerere, who encouraged and nurtured ethnic cohesion, a 
homogeneous language, and smooth political leadership transitions. However, to say 
Tanzania is Africa’s peace nest would be to stretch the reality. Tension between the 
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mainland and the Zanzibar islands has been building and the last few elections have seen 
it escalate to near chaos. Most importantly though, the country has suffered one of the 
most biting economic stagnation resulting from socialist economic ideology and policies 
enshrined in what is commonly known as “African Socialism.” 
Chapter five offers a historical account of the national political malaise that 
affected the development and functioning of post-independence Uganda. It addresses the 
effect of the colonial legacy on post-independence politics, and illustrates how political 
decay, and economic stagnation engineered by the Obote and Idi Amin regimes had 
profound effects on the functioning of the civil service. A discussion of reforms 
attempted to reverse the conditions is offered, and the contextual description of the civil 
service reform program is addressed.  In addition, it offers a retrospective look at the 
political-economic developments in post-independence Tanzania. Focus is placed on the 
factors that led to economic stagnation namely Ujamaa socialism, villagization, and the 
quest for self-reliance. A discussion of how the ensuing crisis affected the civil service is 
offered, and the ways that were adopted to rectify the situation are discussed. The chapter 
shows that the CSRP is part of the wider SAPs reform efforts that were undertaken to 
revamp the dire economic state of affairs. 
 
5.2 UGANDA’S POLITICAL HISTORY: FROM INDEPENDENCE TO STATE 
COLLAPSE 
  
When Uganda attained independence on October 9, 1962, the government was 
guided by a written constitution drafted during the pre-independence negotiations 
between the British colonial masters and members of Ugandan political parties and other 
elite. Like the administrative structures, the political structures were also molded against 
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those of the British with the head of government designated Prime Minister and the head 
of state (president) the Kabaka who was the king of the Buganda Kingdom. Whereas this 
arrangement works quite well for the British, it would not work for the new Uganda. 
Many reasons account for this discordance. Uganda was an artificially created country 
without a shared language or a shared historical growth. At independence, the lack of 
national cohesion was manifest in the different political societal entities that made up the 
country - kingdoms, non-kingdoms, and districts and the political fissures that manifested 
along religious and tribal lines. To complicate matters further, the country opted for a 
federal constitution which accorded one regional kingdom, Buganda, separate and 
significant powers. The Kingdom controlled its own public services and local 
government, had powers of taxation, had its own police force, and elected its 
representatives to the National Assembly through its own mini parliament (the Lukiiko) 
rather than through a popular vote.  
While Buganda enjoyed her considerable autonomy, the other kingdoms in the 
southwest and eastern parts of the country were accorded semi-federal status and the rest 
of the non-kingdom areas fell under the central government rule. It should be kept in 
mind that at independence, Buganda was not only the seat of the government, but also the 
economic hub of the country. Consequently, the kingdom viewed its officious status as 
warranted. Apter (1995) illustrates that “the Baganda were not willing to settle for less 
than a dominant place in the political system. Buganda……. was home to most of the 
country’s elites. It was economically the most prosperous part of the country, the most 
educated, with the best university in Africa, the capital (Kampala), and its own 
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parliament.”247 As a result, it was not politically and economically expedient to 
antagonize it, rather, effort was made to indulge its uniqueness by offering it great 
autonomy.  
The effect of the independence set up was the emergence of two states in one 
country – Buganda and rest of Uganda. The former because its federal status accorded it 
privileges that are tantamount to those of a nation-state, and its leader assumed a nation-
wide leadership position and the latter by encompassing all of Uganda. This political 
configuration proved untenable. The Buganda King and his people did not embrace the 
concept of a ceremonial president subordinate to the Prime Minister especially when the 
latter belonged to the people who during colonial rule were regarded as subordinate. Calls 
for Buganda to secede grew louder and louder while outside Buganda, the rest of the 
country was disenfranchised by the unequal status enjoyed by the kingdom and ultimately 
came to detest its selfishness and parochialism. The Prime Minister (Apollo Obote) too, 
found it increasingly difficult to govern as power struggles between him and the Buganda 
kingdom heightened.  
Prior to independence, various political parties were formed to ‘champion’ the 
independence movement. According to Mamdani (1976), “not one of these parties was 
able to emerge and capture the leadership of the independence movement: nationalist 
parties vied for support against parties that were tribal or religious in their ideological 
                                                 
247 Apter, D. E. 1995. “Democracy of Uganda: A Case for Comparison.” Daedalus, Vol. 124, No.3, pp. 
156-157. 
 135
orientation.”248 It can be argued that it was not only because the parties were based on 
tribal and religious affinities that they failed to capture the national independence 
movement, but because there were no real national issues on which to build a uniform 
national agenda. Each of the different parts of the country had its own unique issues that 
it sought to attain and the parties went about advocating whatever issues were of concern 
to whichever area they sought support in. Four major political parties are worthy of 
mention here; the Uganda National Congress (UNC), the Uganda People’s Congress 
(UPC), the Democratic Party (DP), and the Kabbaka Yekka – King Only (KY).  
Uganda National Congress, the oldest Ugandan political party, was formed in 
March 1952 and it was predominantly Protestant and heavily made up of the Baganda 
from Buganda kingdom. The DP was formed in 1956 and its membership was comprised 
of Catholics and many Baganda as well. The UPC, formed in March 1960, was made of 
up of renegades from the UNC and while dominated by protestants, was essentially an 
anti-Buganda/Kabaka, political party. According to Kasozi (1994) its goal was to 
“address the challenges of Buganda subnationlism and Baganda dominance in an 
independent Uganda.”249 Karugire (1996) concurs by asserting that, “the UPC was 
specifically an anti-Buganda party right from its inception and this was to remain 
throughout its history.”250 The KY was formed in June 1961 “in Buganda to protect the 
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Kabaka’s and Buganda’s position in an independent Uganda.”251 It can therefore be 
concluded from the above that Uganda’s political parties were not formed to advocate 
and advance a specific national ideology, but rather, were formed based on narrow tribal 
and religious loyalties. This was the first hint of the political factionalism that would 
plague the country for years to come.  
When the first national direct elections were held in 1961, they were won by the 
DP notably because the majority of the Baganda boycotted them in protest against what 
they considered anti-Buganda sentiments, but the DP managed to mobilize the Catholics 
from all over the country and some Baganda to hand it a majority in the pre-
independence Legislative Council. Consequently, the first Ugandan native Prime 
Minister was to be a Catholic. The UPC and Buganda kingdom did not take kindly to the 
turn of events and started scheming for ways to change the status quo. According to 
Ugandan historian Karugire, a Ugandan Prime Minister of the Catholic faith “was a 
stunning shock to the Kabaka’s government and the entire Protestant establishment in 
Uganda…..The Kabaka’s government was the most enduring and visible part of the 
Protestant hegemony in Uganda but also was the UPC…the prospect of relinquishing 
power to a Catholic dominated party was an intolerable one to both the UPC and to the 
Kabaka’s government.”252 The British too, were not comfortable with a Catholic national 
leadership leading them to decide that another general election be held prior to granting 
self rule “on the seemingly reasonable grounds that Buganda had not meaningfully 
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participated in the elections of March 1961.”253 It is at this critical juncture that the KY 
party was formed to advance the Buganda kingdom’s interest. 
To ensure the fruition of their common cause – defeating the Democratic Party – 
the UPC and the newly formed KY entered what has come to be known as the “unholy 
alliance.” The alliance entailed a plan to side with each other and take similar positions in 
the pre-independence conference that was to be held to frame the country’s constitution. 
According to Karugire (1996), “the political party whose foundation was specifically an 
anti-Buganda was now entering into partnership with Buganda leadership just as the 
British were burning their files and packing their bags to depart.” He adds, “the only 
explanation for this otherwise inexplicable partnership was the common denominator of 
the Protestant faith, so that beyond ousting the DP from office before granting of 
independence the UPC and the KY had nothing in common, the two parties being 
essentially antagonistic.”254 The DP was defeated winning only 3 votes out of 68 but its 
very existence was not totally shattered as was soon to happen to the Buganda kingdom. 
Indeed, soon after independence the alliance collapsed. 
The unholy alliance that ushered in the Kabaka Presidency and the Milton Obote 
Premiership fell apart in 1964 when Obote in accordance with the new constitution called 
for a referendum that the British had tactfully postponed to the post-independence era. 
The goal was to decide whether the “lost counties” that the British had stolen from 
Bunyoro kingdom and given to Buganda kingdom, should stay in Buganda, or go back to 
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Bunyoro or join with the rest of the country as a district under the central government. 
Not surprisingly, Buganda was against the referendum and attempted influence peddling 
but ultimately, the counties opted to return to Bunyoro and in so doing, confirmed “that 
Ugandans did not regard themselves as a people of one country but as essentially 
belonging to their parochial and sometimes hostile local government units.”255  
From then onwards the unholy alliance quickly disintegrated and the situation 
evolved from bad to worse culminating in the 1966 crisis. It is then that Obote abrogated 
the independence constitution and enacted his own which gave him executive powers and 
turned Uganda into a unitary state. He abolished kingdoms and unleashed military force 
led by Idi Amin to oust the Kabaka of Buganda who was lucky to escape unhurt and flee 
to Britain. It was at this time in Uganda’s political history that the military was directly 
placed into the post independence political arena. Like the colonialists, Obote used the 
military as a repressive and coercive instrument of the state charged with ensuring 
compliance with state directives. Once the precedent was set, the post-independence 
military of the subsequent regimes became heavily politicized, built around personalities 
with total disregard to democratic institutional development.  
Uganda’s post-independence military exhibited quite early divided loyalties and 
manipulative tendencies. While the colonial government army was predominantly 
composed of northerners – the Langi and Acholi, on assuming power, Obote enhanced 
the number of his kinsmen, the Langi, and promoted them to sensitive positions. After 
realizing his own worth after the 1966 crisis, Amin set about recruiting men from his own 
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tribe – the Kakwa – thereby creating a personal army within the national army. Karugire 
cites a Member of Parliament who expressed concern about the recruitment practices of 
the Ugandan army as follows: 
“…when they (recruiting teams) go to the north, they spend there two or three 
months recruiting but when they come to Kampala, they spend here one day and 
they recruit mainly those whom they have directed to come to Kampala because 
they failed to recruit them in the north. When they go to Masaka, they spend half 
a day to recruit only about three people – two of them probably being those 
Northern people who are living in Buganda. When they go to Mbarara, they spend 
there half a day to recruit only three people. This sort of recruitment must be 
stopped. They must give us quotas.”256 
 
Compared to armies in the neighboring countries, the Ugandan army at that 
nascent stage was already peculiar. According to Mamdani (1976) the 1964 army 
mutinies for higher pay and Africanization in the Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania 
encountered different responses.  
“In Tanzania, the state power responded by dismissing the leadership and 
attempting to establish immediate political control over the army by channeling 
recruits through the TANU Youth League (YTL) and giving each soldier a dose 
of political education to fill him with ethos of the ruling class. In Kenya, an entire 
corps of British officers was imported to keep the rank and file in check while a 
group was rushed off to Sandhurst for training. In Uganda, however, the state 
power responded to the mutinous soldiers by granting all their demands. Such a 
response can only be understood in the light of the fact that the army mutiny 
coincided with a serious split within the ruling petty bourgeois coalition.”257 
 
Ibingira Grace, a Member of the Uganda Parliament at the time found the Ugandan 
government reaction to the munity telling. The Parliamentarian revealed that whereas the 
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military mutineers in Kenya and Tanzania were held accountable and even expelled from 
the army, those in Uganda “were publicly dismissed and privately retained because 
nearly all of them came from Obote’s region and their demands were met.”258 He asserted 
that, “Assured of such treatment, discipline steadily went downhill as soldiers felt that 
they could get anything they wanted however unreasonable.”259 It is not surprising 
therefore that immediately after independence the military took on an increasingly 
significant role in running the country and in the course of being used by the politicians, 
it attempted to fashion operational space in the political arena for itself. Karugire put it 
succinctly when he asserted that that army “increasingly saw that the government was in 
office largely because of its support. It did not take a great deal of imagination on the part 
of the army to conclude that instead of propping up quarrelsome politicians who clearly 
had no support of the populace, it could supplant them.”260  It is no wonder that post-
independence Uganda has been characterized by coups and counter coups for it did not 
take long for the army to put its stake on state leadership. 
 
5.3 FROM OBOTE TO AMIN AND BACK TO OBOTE: MILITARISM AND 
STATE COLLAPSE 
 
Upon assuming total executive power in 1966, President Obote attempted to rally 
the country behind him by appealing to different ethnicities while portraying Buganda as 
a feudal oddity in a country that ought to be unified under one leader – himself. To 
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ingratiate himself with the members of Parliament and the populace, he promulgated 
another constitution – the 1967 Constitution – and unlike the 1966 constitution, which 
was inserted in parliamentarian’s pigeon boxes, he this time encouraged members of 
parliament to debate it and even make some amendments. In addition, he tried to fight 
tribalism and ethnic factionalism by introducing a new method of electing members of 
Parliament and declared that general elections would be held in 1971. He deprecated the 
evils of tribal and ethnic divisions thus; 
“If the pull of the tribal force is allowed to develop, the unity of the country will 
be endangered. To reduce it to its crudest from, the pull of the tribal force does 
not accept Uganda as one country, does not accept the people of Uganda as 
belonging to one country, does not accept the National Assembly as a national 
institution but as an Assembly of peace conference delegates and tribal diplomatic 
and legislative functionaries, and looks at the Government of Uganda as a body of 
umpires or referees in some curious game of “Tribal Development Monopoly.”261 
 
To undercut such tribal forces, he proposed that the contending candidates for parliament 
instead of contesting for election in one constituency should do so in four constituencies, 
each in a different region of the country i.e. North, South, East and West. Under this 
format each candidate’s ‘home’ constituency would be his/her basic constituency and the 
other three would be his/her national constituency. The assumption here was that such a 
process would encourage the election of people that are familiar with the problems and 
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issues affecting different areas of the country, and it could possibly “deter ethnic politics 
and promote the success of candidates with a national orientation.”262  
 Ironically, as Obote orchestrated a public anti-tribalism and anti-ethnic 
factionalism crusade, covertly, he was surrounding himself with his kinsmen, appointing 
to higher offices only those that kowtowed his policies. This is because in spite of his 
public rhetoric, he did not gain much popularity in the country. By 1969, his presidency 
was fraught with assassination attempts which heightened his paranoia and need to be 
surrounded by people he could ‘trust’. His reliance on the military increased even more 
drastically as it became apparent that both his political career and life were in peril. 
According to Mamdani (1976), “the importance of the armed forces increased as the 
ruling bureaucracy, ideologically and organizationally bereft, increasingly relied on the 
repressive state apparatus.”263  
Yet, the military was not cohesively behind him and the support he craved began 
to falter as cleavages within became ever more pronounced. By 1970, he had fallen out of 
sync with Amin and shifted his trust unto his kinsmen from Lango and Acholi.  He 
relieved Amin of his duties of chief of the army, demoted or reassigned his loyalists to 
non-strategic positions, and promoted his own kinsmen and trusted officers to sensitive 
posts. Mamdani offers a similar view when he asserts that “Obote proceeded to 
manipulate ethnic divisions within the army in order to control it…Acholi and Langi 
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officers were given promotions while other northerners were excluded.”264 Unfortunately, 
Obote’s ploy did not work as he had hoped it would. 
Administratively, President Obote abandoned the meritocracy system and opted 
for ethnic, regional, and religious concerns in the process of recruitment into and 
promotion within the civil service. The Public Service Commission, left in place at 
independence, was rendered useless as the president took it upon himself to appoint, 
promote, and dismiss civil servants at will. Political interference and strife were the major 
undoing of the civil service once hailed as the best in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the period 
1966-1971, the whole administrative system good standing was eroded. Political 
calculations spearheaded all administrative actions; members of the UPC were rewarded 
with promotions without regard to their skills and capabilities; to the rest, morale 
plummeted as those protected by patronage with impunity started abusing public office 
and embezzling public funds.      
Economically, Obote, attempted to establish a semblance of African Socialism as 
that in Tanzania under Julius Nyerere and in Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah, by putting 
in place several programs most notable among them “the Move to the Left” and the 
“Common Man’s Charter.” He nationalized the major commercial enterprises and 
established agricultural cooperatives and other government parastatal organizations, and 
called for compulsory national service. The policies did not endear him to the Western 
European countries opposed to any socialist/communistic tendencies rather they further 
alienated him from both within and without. At this point, conditions both internally and 
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externally were ripe for his political leadership to implode and so his policies never saw 
light of day. 
Idi Amin deposed Obote from power on January 25, 1971 while the latter was 
attending a Commonwealth Conference in Singapore, and a government, more 
anarchical, brutal, and arbitrary ensued. At first, Ugandans and the international 
community hailed Amin’s assumption of power. He promised to return the country to 
civilian rule via free and fair general elections and denounced his predecessor’s 
dictatorial tendencies, and sectarian politics. He reached out to the Baganda and even 
organized the repatriation of the body of the King he helped banish to Britain, visited 
with the Bishops of both the Catholic and Protestant churches and most notably gave a 
generous donation to the Catholic church to construct the now famous Uganda Martyrs 
Shrine at Namugongo. He visited with the Muslim leaders, and even made effort to 
rehabilitate relations with foreign leaders that Obote had disaffected.  
Administratively, he promised to re-establish rule of law, root out corruption, 
regenerate the civil service, and rekindle public trust in government. To this end, “the 
appointment of a cabinet of technocrats (there were only two soldiers including Amin in 
the first military cabinet) who were conversant with the problems of the civil service 
appeared to mark the beginning of a more competent public administration.”265 Alas, very 
few of the promises were honored and before long, he began to shirk expert opinion, 
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abandoned cabinet meetings, “ruled by personal decree and brought about the ossification 
of political structures.”266  Heady notes that:  
“originally, General Idi Amin adopted a conciliatory stance, engaged in well-
publicized efforts to consult with representatives of divergent groups, encouraged 
political participation by civilians, retained a largely civilian cabinet, seemed to 
rely heavily on the professional bureaucracy, and in other ways seemed intent to 
follow a course of moderation aimed at his own version of a military-intellectual 
coalition. This indicated partnership between the military and intelligentsia soon 
dissipated, however, with military dominance becoming more and more evident 
and being expressed through the personal actions of General Idi Amin.”267  
 
Under Idi Amin, Uganda became a personal fiefdom of a brutal tyrant, within which there 
was no semblance of law and order, adherence to established administration, or set policy 
guidelines. Personal impulses dictated policy, expertise played no role in government and 
administration, and the economy was reduced to a source of plunder for those in power. 
As the whole body politic lost all sense of governance, the country spiraled into an abyss 
of poverty, disease, corruption, theft, looting, murder, and total destruction and 
collapse.268  
                                                 
266 Decalo, S. 1985. “African Personal Dictatorships.” The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 23, No. 
2, p. 225. 
267 Heady, F. 2001. Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective. New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc., p. 
326.  
268 Much has been written about the Amin’s regime. See for instance: Patel, H. H. 1972. “General Amin 
and the Indian exodus from Uganda.” A Journal of Opinion, Vol. 2. No. 4, pp12-22; Glentworth, G. and Ian 
Hancook. 1973. “Obote and Amin: Change and Continuity in Modern Uganda Politics.” African Affairs, 
Vol. 72, No. 288, pp. 237-255; Southall, A. 1975. “General Amin and the Coup: Great Man or Historical 
Inevitability?” The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp.85-105; Woodward, P. 1978. 
“Ambiguous Amin.” African Affairs, Viol. 77, No. 307, pp. 153-164; Gertzel, C. 1980. “Uganda After 
Amin: The Continuing Search for Leadership and Control.” African Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 317, pp. 461-489; 
Martin, D. 1974. General Idi Amin. London: Faber and Faber; Mazrui, A. A. 1975. Soldiers and Kinsmen 
in Uganda: The Making of a Military Ethnocracy. London: Sage Publications; Mamdani, M. 1976. Politics 
and Class Formation in Uganda. New York: Monthly Review Press; Kasfir, N. 1976. The Shrinking 
Political Arena: Participation and Ethnicity in African Politics, with a Case Study of Uganda. Berkeley, 
University of California Press; Gwyn, M. 1977. Idi Amin: death-Light of Africa. Boston: Little, Brown and 
 
 146
 The reign of President Idi Amin (1971-1979), devastated the Uganda civil service. 
Not only did his reign compound the damage left by the Obote regime, it wrecked more 
havoc in ways no one could have anticipated. Like his predecessor he totally disregarded 
the Public Service Commission (PSC) hiring, promoting, and firing workers as he 
pleased. He went further and placed his administrative trust in the paramilitary groups he 
established, groups that lacked the skills, technical know-how, and knowledge and zeal to 
do any public good. The paramilitary groups that Mazrui (1975) called the lumpen 
militariat and technocrat,
269 were only military sycophants incapable of grasping 
complex administrative issues. They simply expected civil servants to carry out their 
directives without question. Before long, life as a civil servant was intolerable. Those 
who could afford, fled the country, the ones that could not, abandoned their positions and 
went back home to till the land, while those that stayed resorted to subservience, scared 
for their very lives. The civil service became a worthless institution. Decalo (1985) notes 
that “The writ of the civil service probably did not extend more than 50 miles form the 
Kampala-Entebbe corridor, except when personally enforced by Amin and especially 
when accompanied by military force.”270  
 The economy was not spared Amin’s destruction and this exacerbated the civil 
service woes. “Amin’s expulsion of the Asians was an attempt to win the support of the 
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national bourgeoisie, but the Asians’ African successors were inexperienced and the 
economy declined still further under their management.”271 Like the majority of the 
Ugandans, civil servants became economically impoverished. Their salaries, depleted of 
value, were paid intermittently if at all. Before long, those without state patronage 
resorted to moonlighting, bribes, theft, and the creation of ghost workers. At this point, 
the mentality of “everybody for him/herself and God for us all” pervaded the country. 
Langseth and Mugaju (1996) summarize the effect on Amin’s on Uganda’s civil service 
thus: 
“For all practical purposes, the civil service ceased to be viable, confident, secure 
and effective public institution. Performance standards, morale and the integrity 
system collapsed almost beyond repair. Offices were converted into business 
premises and points of contact rather than places of official work. Diversion, 
embezzlement, false claims and outright plunder of public resources were 
institutionalized. Public resources were used to build private businesses or 
property (houses and farms). Record keeping and accountability ceased to exist. 
Many civil servants engaged in conflict of interest activities without any 
compunction. Moreover, corruption became an open and pervasive integral part of 
virtually all official transactions.”272 
 
Amin’s reign of terror was finally brought to an end on April 11, 1979 by a 
combined force of Tanzanian soldiers and soldiers of the Uganda National Liberation 
Front. A rapid succession of short-lived governments followed. Yusuf Lule, a former 
prominent civil servant in the colonial government, a former Chairman of the PSC, and 
former Vice Chancellor of Makerere University became president on April 13, 1979 amid 
great jubilation by the masses. Gertzel (1980) asserts that when Amin was overthrown, 
the administrative system was in ruins. “Death and exile had depleted the ranks of the 
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civil service and the lack of resources had by the end of 1978 ground government almost 
to a halt, so that at liberation, Uganda was in some respects a country without a 
bureaucracy.”273 Unfortunately, the new president, installed by the National Consultative 
Council (NCC) did not have much time to rectify the situation. Just two months after 
coming to power the NCC passed a vote of no confidence against him. He fled the 
country and went to Britain.  
President Lule was replaced by Godfrey Binaisa on June 21, 1979 on the 
recommendation of the NCC. However, on May 11, 1980, the intricate ethnic, religious, 
and political divisions that characterized the politics of the Obote and Amin regime 
reared their ugly head. A military commission buttressed by military support staged a 
coup and dismissed the president and his cabinet ministers, and paved the way for 
Obote’s return. Addressing how the change of leadership from Amin did not generate any 
fundamental change, Gertzel indicates that: “Within a matter of weeks, the new rulers 
were submerged in a political debate that produced total paralysis of administration and a 
struggle for power within their ranks which severely constrained decision-making at the 
centre….The inability to achieve a new consensus gave greater encouragement to old 
political divisions…..Their failure was demonstrated by the further intervention of the 
army in May 1980.”274  
It should be noted that the military council that deposed Godfrey Binaisa from the 
presidency was chaired by Obote’s long time friend and confidant, Paulo Muwanga. The 
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latter did not waste time and paved way for Obote’s return on May 27, 1980. In 
December 1980 the now known as controversial elections were held and Milton Obote 
came back into power.275 The controversy was sparked by the general fraudulent way in 
which they were organized and tallied. Both the Democratic Party (DP) and Uganda 
People’s Movement (UPM) publicly proclaimed that the elections were rigged. Obote II 
therefore stood no chance of uniting the country or rectifying the ills that had built up 
through the previous years. Instead, conditions worsened. A guerrila war broke out as 
Yoweri Musevini leader of the UPM took to the bush. The divisions within the army 
multiplied. The economy fell apart, the civil service no longer served the public. Obote’s 
government got consumed with self preservation to the detriment of the administrative, 
economic, and institutional reconstruction badly needed after years of mismanagement. 
By 1984, Uganda had been reduced the Hobbesian state of nature.  
The Oboter II regime was ousted on July 27, 1985 by a military coup organized 
by his kinsmen from Acholi led by Army Commander Tito Okello Lutwa and Brigadier 
Barjilio Olara Okello. The two victors did not have time to implement any changes 
however because Museveni’s guerrilla movement which had been gaining ground was 
now operating in the outskirts of Kampala. A few months later, on January 26, 1986, 
Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Army (NRA) took over the government. 
From the above discussion, it is evident that Uganda has since independence 
suffered what Brett has called ‘accelerated regression’ with military coup after another. It 
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is only since 1986 that the country has managed to experience a coup-less period. Table 
5.1 below illustrates the chronology of military coups in post independence Uganda. 
 
Table 5.1 Chronology of Military Coups and Armed take-over in Post-Independence 
Uganda 
 
Year Coup/Military Take-over Held Description 
1966 Prime Minister Milton Obote backed by the 
military suspended the Independence 
Constitution, took over the presidency, and 
banished the Buganda King and president to 
exile 
1971 General Idi Amin overthrew President Obote 
while the latter was in Singapore and declared 
himself ‘Life President’ of Uganda 
1979 President Amin was overthrown by a 
combined military force from Tanzanian and 
the Uganda National Liberation Front 
1980 President Godfrey Binaisa was overthrown by 
the Military Council headed by Paulo 
Muwanga 
1985 President Obote was overthrown by Army 
Commander Tito Okello Lutwa and Brigadier 
Barjilio Olara Okello 
1986 Tito Okello Lutwa was despoed by a guerrilla 
military force led by Yoweri Museveni 
 
5.4 ECONOMIC COLLAPSE IN POST-INDEPENDENCE UGANDA  
 The Ugandan economic sector suffered the brunt of the political chaos and 
mismanagement that prevailed in the country from the 1970s through the 1980s. By the 
mid-1980s, the Ugandan economy was in a state of critical disequilibrium. Inflation was 
at an all time high, real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) had declined by 14% in 
comparison to the early 1970s. Agriculture, the mainstay of the country and major sector 
of the economy was weakened by gross distortions in the pricing and marketing systems, 
and a paucity of inputs, while farmers abandoned their land in war ravaged places. 
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According to Tumusiime-Mutebile (1995), the country suffered severe macro economic 
imbalances as a result of “inflationary financing of successive budget deficits which 
generated a level of inflation of 161% in 1986.” He asserts further that “an overvalued 
exchange rate discouraged exports, encouraged imports and reduced foreign exchange 
reserves.”276  
 It should however be noted that at independence, Uganda’s economy was 
relatively stable in comparison with other newly independent African countries. Even 
though the country’s economy was peasantry and agricultural, and the government sought 
to implement a dirigisme policy, the economy enjoyed a good export growth and gross 
domestic savings were stable. Inflation was minimal at -6 at independence, while external 
debt was almost nonexistent.277 Shortly after Idi Amin assumed power on January 25, 
1971, the economy suffered a major blow resultant from Amin’s expulsion of the Asian 
business families in 1972. Although it can generally be asserted that the majority of 
native Ugandans resented the administrative and economic wealth and privilege enjoyed 
by Ugandan Asians, it cannot be argued that the expulsion redistributed income and 
wealth. If anything, the economy, especially the formal sector, was put in a precarious 
position. According to Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa (2001), “the expulsion put an end 
to Uganda’s post independence prosperity. Investments dried up, exports declined, and 
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per capita incomes fell continuously from 1973.”278 Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa offer 
three main effects of the Asian expulsion as follows: 
• skilled managers were replaced by largely unskilled people, often drawn from 
the military and with little education 
• the appropriation of the Asian properties earned the county a long-lived 
reputation for lawlessness and property confiscation 
• the manner in which former Asian businesses were acquired created insecurity 
of tenure, leading to asset stripping.279 
By the time Amin was deposed from power by a combined force of Tanzanian troops and 
Ugandan renegade army groups, the country’s economic performance was a miserable 
shadow of the one that prevailed between 1962 to1970. GDP, exports, and domestic 
savings had declined, inflation had skyrocketed, and external debt had expanded. With a 
steady decrease in GDP, export earnings, and employment, and a high rate of inflation, 
the government found itself increasingly incapable of providing even the most basic 
needs. Items like salt, sugar, and soap disappeared from the market, schools lacked basic 
scholastic materials like chalk, and public hospitals barely operated. 
With support from the WB and the IMF, the Obote II regime embarked on some 
economic reforms to bolster efficiency in the productive sectors, establish monetary 
controls to ensure frugal spending, and to create a conducive environment for both 
domestic and foreign investors. According to Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa (2001), 
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Obote floated the Uganda shilling, increased producer prices for export crops, removed 
price controls, rationalized tax structures, attempted to reign in government 
expenditure.280 It should however be noted that these policies only generated measly 
changes mainly because the political context remained volatile. The Museveni-led 
guerrilla war took its toll that by 1984, the government expenditure on the military 
surpassed all other forms of government expenses and left little or very meager resources 
for the operation of the other sectors of the government. When the Obote II regime was 
toppled in 1985 by renegade members of his military, the country was plunged into 
deeper anarchy. Looting, smuggling, insecurity, scarcity of both consumer and produce 
goods, and the total breakdown of the government institutional structures, coupled with 
the rampaging Museveni-led civil war, left the country on the precipice of economic and 
territorial collapse.  
 
5.5 FROM THE BRINK: THE NRM AND STATE RECONSTRUCTION IN 
UGANDA 
 
When the National Resistance Movement (NRM) took over power in 1986, it 
found the country traumatized by civil war, state terror and lawlessness, and the public 
service inefficient, demoralized, unresponsive, and corrupt. In addition, the economy was 
in disarray, having been thrust into a severe macroeconomic imbalance resultant from 
severe inflation, budgetary deficits, and a lack of foreign exchange reserves. The NRM 
government was therefore faced with a myriad of issues that needed immediate attention 
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before the country could be ably placed on the path to recovery and reconstruction. One 
of the contextual imperatives was the establishment of law and order. Before any 
fundamental reforms could be pursued, the government had to restore law and order and 
gain total control of the entire country so that political stability can be ensured. 
Establishing law and order proved a colossal task to accomplish because armed factions 
of the previous government were still at large and new rebellions were forming in the 
northern and eastern parts of the country. According to Langseth and Mugaju (1996), 
from 1987 to 1991 government concentrated its energies and resources on containing and 
defeating rebellions rather than embarking on post-war recovery and reconstruction.281 
Another major contextual imperative that took precedence was stabilization of the 
economy. When he assumed political power, President Yoweri Museveni and his NRM 
government, faced with severe economic and fiscal problems and virtually no internal 
institutional capacity to address them, sought the intervention of multilateral 
organizations like the WB and the IMF to help in the design, funding, and 
implementation of an economic recovery program. The program began effectively in 
1987 with the following objectives: 
• to stabilize the economy 
• to achieve economic growth of 5% per annum  
• to reduce inflation to stable levels, and 
• to achieve a viable balance of payments position and a sustainable 
financing of deficits.  
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The above objectives were to be achieved via a comprehensive economic reform program 
enshrined in what is commonly known as the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). 
According to Van de Walle (2001), many African countries have with the assistance of 
international financial institutions notably the WB and IMF “attempted to implement 
stabilization and structural adjustment programs that seek to return to macroeconomic 
equilibrium in the short term and promote more rapid sustainable economic growth in the 
long term.”282 Indeed, the late 1980s through the 1990s witnessed economic, institutional, 
political, and administrative changes in government functioning aimed at improving the 
socio-economic conditions of the people of Uganda. 
  The basic ingredients of the SAPs adapted in Uganda included among others: 
currency devaluation, raising interest rates to fight inflation, cuts in government 
spending, privatization of government enterprises, civil service reform, deregulation of 
prices of goods and services, and export promotion. Most of these programs involved a 
contraction in the scope of administration. They entailed the withdrawal of government 
from certain functions, reduction of the parastatal sector, and the delegation of power and 
responsibilities to the lower level administrative organs, local government, and to the 
private sector. A quest for financial viability called for more control in spending, 
improved budgeting, and enforcing accountability. 
Notable changes have occurred under the NRM government (1986 to date) 
because it embraced the structural adjustment programs. However, it should be noted that 
positive change was not spontaneous. Indeed, inflation continued to soar in the first few 
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years of NRM rule that by the 1988 financial year, it peaked at 200 percent. In addition, 
the government external debt continued to grow and to date, it remains a very big 
hindrance to economic growth as debt servicing diverts the much needed resources from 
social sectors like education and health. In spite of these drawbacks, the ERP generated 
some key positive changes. For instance, the GDP growth was by the end of 1987 
revitalized and it has since continued to grow. According to Tumusiime-Mutebile, the 
economic recovery program has been quite impressive. He asserts that “the objective of 
5% real economic growth was exceeded in each year from 1987 to 1994, … reflecting not 
only a recovery in agricultural production, but also strong growth in other sectors like 
manufacturing and infrastructure.” He asserts further that “average growth in GDP for the 
years 1986 to 1994 was about 5.6%.” In his view, “prudent fiscal policy, avoiding 
recourse to inflationary financing of budget deficits, and prioritizing expenditure needs 
within accepted resource constraints has meant efforts to achieve price stability have 
largely been successful.”283  Indeed by the 1990s, the economy had become relatively 
stable, inflation had been reduced and budget deficits were being dealt with in more 
economically appropriate ways and basic goods like sugar, soap, and salt were readily 
available, inflation had gone down, real economic growth was on the rise, and the market 
system had become operationally steady.   
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However, like many developing countries, Uganda has had to face the challenge 
of what Kautsy (1972) calls “modernization from without.”284 Hence, although the 
structural adjustment programs aimed at paving the way for socio-economic change and 
reinvigoration, they were largely viewed with skepticism and reservation. Tumusiime-
Mutebile, the Ugandan Permanent Secretary and Secretary to the Treasury, Ministry of 
Finance, for the first fifteen years of NRM rule, also acknowledged that the major reform 
efforts were driven by the requirements of conditionality and that the Ugandan 
government was quite defensive towards the IMF and WB conditionalities.285 Yet, 
because economic reform in Uganda was a necessity and the only viable way to raise the 
country from the doldrums of its miserable past, the conditionalities did not seem to be 
critical impediments. In fact, Uganda embraced the reforms and their conditionalities 
whole heartedly. As a result, Uganda has been hailed as model of the SAPs compliance 
and many critics are pleased with success of economic recovery reforms.286  
The political and institutional contexts were also critical areas that needed to be 
streamlined so that structural and political weaknesses are removed before the 
government could embark on full-scale reform programs. As a result, government 
established a broad-based system of governance in which public participation was 
                                                 
284 Kautsky, J. H. 1972. The Political Consequences of Modernization. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 
Inc. pp. 44-45. 
285 See Tumusiime-Mutebile, E. 1995. “Management of the Economic Reform Programme.” In Langseth, 
P., J. Katorobo, E. Brett, and J. Munene. Uganda: Landmarks in Rebuilding a Nation. Kampala, Fountain 
Publishers, p. 3. 
286 See Tripp, A. M. 2000. Women and Politics in Uganda. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press; 
Bigsten, A. and Kayizzi-Mugerwa, S. 2001. Is Uganda an Emerging Economy? Uppsala: Nordiska 
Afrikainstitutet; Hansen, B. H. and Michael Twaddle, eds. 1998. Developing Uganda. Oxford, James 
Currey; Van de Walle, N. 2001. African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979 – 1999. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 158
crucial. Public participation was practiced through the policy of decentralization and 
through Resistance Councils and Committees (RCs)287 to which the powers that come 
with devolutionary decentralization were given.  
The Resistance Council (RC) system is a hierarchical structure of councils and 
committees that starts at the Village level (RC1), to the Parish level (RC2), the Subcounty 
level (RC3), the County  level (RC4), and the District level (RC5). According to 
Tukahebwa (1998), “this kind of local government structure presents a break with the 
past in that it significantly undermined the hitherto authoritarian tendencies of the 
chiefs.”288  The NRM passed the Resistance Council Committees Statute No.9 in 1987 
which effectively conferred administrative powers and responsibilities on local 
communities while the legal framework for decentralization was provided by the Local 
Government and RCs Statute of 1993. To further enhance the political stability of the 
country and establish democratic norms, the government embarked on constitutional 
reforms that culminated in the enactment of the 1995 Uganda Constitution. 
 
5.6 THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM PROGRAM IN UGANDA 
In 1989, the NRM government with the financial support of the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) set up the Public Service Review and Reorganization 
Commission (PSRRC) by Legal Notice No.2 of 1989, to examine the civil service 
                                                 
287 It should be noted that with the ratification of the 1995 Uganda Constitution, RCs were turned into 
Local Councils (LCs).  
288 Tukahebwa, G. 1998. “Political and Administrative Relations in Decentralization.” In Nsibambi A. (Ed.) 
Decentralization and Civil Society in Uganda: The Quest for Good Governance. Kampala: Fountain 
Publishers, p.15. 
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problems and make appropriate recommendations. According to Langseth and Mugaju, 
the main task of the PSRRC was to “carry out a comprehensive reform of the public 
service; to pinpoint its structural weaknesses; to identify the causes of its poor 
performance; and to recommend ways of restructuring and reorganizing the institution to 
make it cost effective, efficient, and responsive in the management of public affairs.”289 
Specifically, the Commission was to focus on four major issues namely; personnel 
management issues, organization structure, accountability/financial management, and 
conditions of service.290  
The Commission found that the Uganda Public Service was bloated in structure, 
inefficient, and generally a poor performer. It identified the following as major issues 
afflicting the civil service system: a) inadequate pay and benefits b) poor management 
skills c) dysfunctional civil service organization d) inadequate personnel management 
and training. In the Commission’s view, the latter led to abuse of office and government 
property, moonlighting and corruption, lack of discipline, an erosion of rules and 
regulations, obsolete procedures, lack of appropriate systems, thin managerial and 
technical skills, poor public attitudes, and massive bureaucratic red tape.  
The PSRRC made numerous recommendations291 on how to revamp the Service 
namely: 1) Rationalization of Government Structures and Functions including 
                                                 
289 Langseth, P. and Justus Mugaju. 1996. Ibid, p.19. 
290 Government of Uganda, Ministry of Public Service. 1994. Management of Change: Content, Vision, 
Objectives, strategy and Plan. Kampala: Uganda Printing and Publishing Corporation, p. 3. 
291 A total of 255 recommendations were made, but for strategic reasons and the need to prioritize and 
focus on the most critical areas, government focused on the above seven components. See appendix 2 for 
the entire list of the recommendations. 
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Decentralization of power to districts; 2) Reduction of the size of the Public Service; 3) 
Pay Reform through salary enhancement and monetization of non-cash benefits; 4) 
Personnel and Establishment control; 5) Improvement of Records Management; 6) 
Introduction of Results Oriented Management; and 7) Capacity Building.292 These 
recommendations which were accepted by Government and endorsed by the National 
Resistance Council (NRC)293 in Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1991 formed the basis of the 
Civil Service Reform Program (CSRP). The overall objective of the program was to 
create a service that is small, motivated, accountable, efficient, effective, productive, and 
responsive. According to the ministry of Public Service, the above objectives were to be 
realized through a number of measures that include the following:  
• Clear demarcation of the respective roles and responsibilities in general 
and functional allocations, and lines of authority between central 
ministries and field staff working under local authorities 
• Revitalization of decentralized selection, promotion, and disciplining of 
professional staff 
• Management by results operational system incorporating success 
indicators which allow performance to be judged and appropriately 
rewarded/sanctioned 
                                                 
292 The Public Service Review and Reorganization Report, 1989, Kampala: Uganda Printing and Publishing 
Corporation. 
293 The national Resistance Council (NRC) was the legislative body (equivalent to the Parliament) of 
government from 1987-1996. It was abandoned after the ratification of the 1995 Constitution and in 1996, 
new parliamentary representatives were elected into office 
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• A salary and incentive system which provides a ‘living wage’ on the basis 
of appropriate levels of staffing and comparability with similar tasks in the 
private sector, and which contains strong performance-based incentives 
• A systematic capacity and skills development process which relates 
training to function at all levels of the civil service.294 
Although the above discussion indicates that initiative for civil service reform was 
the brainchild of the NRM government, external influence cannot be under estimated. 
Indeed, external initiatives for reform were paramount in providing both the technical and 
financial resources for both the reform program formulation and implementation. Donor 
influence in Uganda has arguably been at its highest during the NRM regime. The IMF 
and WB have notably been at the forefront of pushing the government to reform. The 
government embraced the SAPs as a conditionality for aid. In exchange for financial 
support, the NRM government agreed to establish recommended reforms like market 
liberalization, deregulation, privatization, civil service reform, constitutional reform, and 
judicial reform among others. As shall be illustrated in the pages ahead, donor funding 
has been instrumental in facilitating the different aspects of the civil service reform 
program in Uganda.  
The civil service reform program in Uganda therefore has not been implemented 
in isolation. There have been numerous economic, institutional, and political reforms 
implemented since the NRM assumed power in 1986. In fact, there is a strong linkage 
                                                 
294Government of Uganda, Ministry of Public Service. 1994. Management of Change: Content, Vision, 
Objectives, strategy and Plan. Kampala: Uganda Printing and Publishing Corporation, p. 24. 
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between the various reform efforts and their success depends on effective coordination. 
Although it took the government three years into power to turn its change efforts to civil 
service reform, it was mindful of the fact that the revamping and reorganization of the 
civil service is paramount for long term post-war reconstruction and general revitalization 
of the economic, political, and institutional capabilities of the country. In Figure 5.1 
below I illustrate the contextual framework of the reform programs undertaken by the 
NRM regime soon after attaining political power. It should be noted that these reforms 
work together and their synergy is critical in engendering the administrative, economic, 
and political transformation of the country.  
 
Figure 5.1 A contextual Framework of the Reforms undertaken by the NRM in the 
early 1990s 
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5.7 SUMMARY 
 The discussion above has addressed the political and economic chaos that plagued 
Uganda soon after independence through the 1970s, 1980s and much of the 1990s. 
Throughout that period, the country was characterized by immense political turmoil and 
economic collapse that negatively affected the performance, service delivery, 
management, and financial viability of the civil service. Idi Amin’s military dictatorship 
coupled with Milton Obote’s subsequent authoritarian rule destroyed all mechanisms of 
administrative, political, and financial accountability, thereby eliminating effective 
management, monitoring, and control within the civil service. It has been shown that it is 
only under the NRM government that more serious reform programs have been 
undertaken among them structural adjustment programs comprising administrative 
reforms, economic reforms, and political reforms in an attempt to rectify the situation. 
The Uganda civil service found in a state of disrepair was viewed as a problem rather 
than a solution to the country’s socio-economic and political collapse hence effort was 
made to build it into a better and more professional service. Chapter six is focused on that 
effort. 
  
5.8 ECONOMIC STAGNATION IN TANZANIA 
 
5.8.1 Introduction 
In contrast to post-independence Uganda which has experienced great political 
strife, post-independence Tanzania has overall enjoyed political stability. According to 
Kithingi Kiragu (1999), the country is considered to be one of the most stable nations in 
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Africa.295 Tanzania’s stability is largely credited to the country’s first president, Julius K. 
Nyerere, who encouraged and nurtured ethnic cohesion, a homogeneous language, and 
smooth political leadership transitions. However, to say Tanzania is Africa’s peace nest 
would be to stretch the reality. Tension between the mainland and the Zanzibar islands 
has been building and the last few elections have seen it escalate to near chaos. Most 
important though, the country has suffered one of the most biting economic stagnation 
resulting from the socialist economic ideology and policies enshrined in what is 
commonly known as “African Socialism”. 
The remainder of this chapter provides a historical look at the political-economic 
developments in post-independence Tanzania. Focus is placed on the factors that led to 
economic stagnation namely; Ujamaa socialism, villagization, and the quest for self-
reliance. A discussion of how the ensuing crisis affected the civil service is offered. The 
discussion shows that the CSRP is part of the wider SAPs reform efforts that were 
undertaken to revamp the dire economic state of affairs in Tanzania.  
 
5.9 FROM COLONIALISM TO UJAMAA AFRICAN SOCIALISM 
 Tanzania attained independence on December 9, 1961296 under the umbrella of a 
popular political party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). It championed 
the interests of the masses in the rural areas, the intellectuals and the city dwellers, and 
                                                 
295 Kiragu, K. 1999. “Tanzania” in Public Administration in Africa: Main Issues and Selected Country 
studies. Ladipo Adamolekun ed. Boulder, Co: Westview Press. 
296 At independence, the country was known as Tanganyika. It was renamed the Republic of Tanzania in 
1962 after uniting with the Island of Zanzibar. 
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Muslims and Christians alike. Unlike Uganda and most other African countries, Tanzania 
did not experience post-independence leadership conflicts between personalities, 
religions, or tribes. This unique scenario can be explained by a number of factors. 
Historically dating as far back as the pre-colonial period, the country had various small 
scattered tribal units without overriding power centers that could have vied for national 
dominance. Further, a common language Swahili, helped to unite the populace by 
bridging the gap between the political leadership, the educated and urban dwellers, and 
the masses. Another notable factor is the strong and dynamic post-independence 
leadership. The country’s first President, Julius Nyerere, who was also TANU’s first 
chairman, is known as the father of the nation precisely because he was able to fashion 
and maintain a united nationhood. 
The attainment of independence did not usher in a complete detachment from 
colonial tenets however. British administrative and economic institutions and structures 
remained in place. The Africanization program ensured more African representation in 
government and the civil service, but bureaucratic structures and norms did not alter 
much. Even the political institutions like the cabinet and legislature were molded against 
those in Britain. Whereas the colonial political and administrative systems were more or 
less maintained, the new leadership found it hard to espouse the colonial economic ideals. 
This is because the colonial economic set up created small pockets of growth in a few 
towns and areas that were endowed with fertile soils, and left the rest of the country 
underdeveloped. Moreover, the fruits of economic growth were reaped by the colonialists 
and other foreigners like Indians while the majority of the natives languished in poverty 
and scarcity. Social services like education, health centers, roads, and processing plants 
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were confined to the productive parts of the country. President Nyerere therefore was 
adamant that inequality and class formation be cut in the bud. Yet, during the immediate 
post-independence period 1961-1966, the economy remained steady with per capita 
income growing by 2% per year.297 Table 5.2 depicts trends in select economic indicators 
for the period 1961 to 1967.  
  
Table 5.2 Data for the Pre-Arusha Declaration Period 1961-1967 
  1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 
Per Capita               
Income Growth (%) -7.1 4.3 1.2 3.6 -0.2 9.9 1.8 
Population               
Growth (%) 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.0 
Urbanization (%) 0.8 4.9 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.6 5.9 
Terms of Trade 130 124 137 142 137 137 126 
% of Labor Force               
in Agriculture 92.4 92.1 91.9 91.7 91.4 91.2 90.9 
Monetary Growth (%) − 21.7 25.6 -15.2 31.8 476.7 13.1 
Inflation (%) 7.8 0.6 4.9 2.8 -2.4 9.3 11.5 
Gross Investment               
% of GDP 13.7 11.6 10.7 12.0 13.9 15.1 18.9 
Source: Bigsten, A. and Andres Danielson. 2001. Tanzania: Is the Ugly Duckling Finally Growing Up? A 
Report for the OECD Project “Emerging Africa, p. 15. 
 
Table 5.2 shows that after independence, the country was characterized by economic 
stability. Inflation was generally low and investment was steadily on the increase. The 
table also shows that the majority of the workers found employment in the agricultural 
sector. It should be noted that not long after, the entire country would come to depend on 
the agricultural sector for economic development. Nonetheless, it was argued that the 
                                                 
297 Bigsten, A. and Andres Danielson. 2001. Tanzania: Is the Ugly Duckling Finally Growing Up? A 
Report for the OECD Project “Emerging Africa.” The authors assert that that is the highest rate of any 
period in the post-independence period.  
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Tanzanian economy “developed as an off-shot of the economy of the colonial power,”298 
which made it depend on the unpredictable international capitalist markets. Moreover, 
although the economy was developing steadily and Africanization was filling government 
positions with natives, it was perceived that the benefits accrued to only a privileged few, 
among them; political leaders, senior civil servants, and those in the commercial sector. It 
did not take long therefore, for the new leadership to draft fresh economic and social 
development programs.  
The country’s new economic development program was ushered in by President 
Nyerere when he released the Arusha Declaration National Development Policy 
Statement in February 1967. The policy aimed at making the country socialist and self-
reliant, through the development of an economy based on local agricultural production. It 
was envisaged that an indigenous economy would generate structural changes, promote 
equity, and accelerate rural development. The Declaration asserted that the country was 
to commit itself to build socialism based on African values. In Nyerere’s view, socialism 
meant Ujamaa – Swahili for familyhood – that is rooted in communal involvement of 
family members. He emphasized that this economic philosophy meant that all economic 
endeavors would be based on the traditional patterns of the African society in which the 
common good was valued higher than individual gain. He asserted that:  
“The foundation, and the objective, of African Socialism is the extended family. 
The true African socialist does not look on one class of men as his brethren and 
another as his natural enemies….’Ujamaa,’ then, or ‘familyhood,’ describes our 
Socialism. It is opposed to Capitalism, which seeks to build a happy society on 
the basis of the exploitation of man by man; and it is equally opposed to the 
                                                 
298 Cliffe, L. 1969. “From Independence to Self-Reliance.” In Kimambo, I. N. and A. J. Temu (eds) A 
History of Tanzania. Nairobi: East African Publishing House, p. 241.  
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doctrinaire socialism which seeks to build its happy society on a philosophy of 
inevitable conflict between man and man.”299 
 
His socialist society was to be comprised of workers who would control the tools of 
production and mechanisms of exchange, and where each able member would contribute 
to the total wealth and welfare of the society, and benefit in proportion to his/her 
contribution. He viewed this society as drastically different from an aristocratic one that 
valued social class based on birth or the capitalist one in which individual wealth and 
competitiveness are glorified. He asserted that the virtues of the socialist society are 
unique because: 
“First, both the organization and the teaching will emphasize man’s cooperative 
spirit – his desire to work in harmony with his friends and neighbors – not his 
personal aggressiveness. Second, it will reserve its highest respect and its highest 
prizes for those whose life and work demonstrate the greatest service, not the 
greatest personal acquisitiveness….Success in a socialist society will imply that a 
man has earned the respect, admiration, and love of his fellow citizens, by his 
desire to serve, and by the contribution he has made to the well-being of the 
community.”300 
 
His goal was to have the people mobilized into Ujamaa villages in which they 
would together cultivate communal land and share the produce together as a community. 
It should be noted that traditional communities lived in scattered family groups on small 
land holdings often in a nomadic manner as they searched for fertile land and water. Such 
settlement pattern made provision of services difficult and expensive. In Nyerere’s view, 
if people were encouraged to live in proper village communities, access to services would 
                                                 
299 Nyerere, K. J. 1964. “Ujamaa: The Basis of African Socialism.” In Friedland, W. H. and Carl G. 
Rosberg, Jr. (eds). African Socialism. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, p. 246. 
300 Nyerere, K. J. 1968. Uhuru na Ujamaa: Freedom and Socialism. Oxford University Press. In McDonald, 
D. A. and Eunice N. Sahle (eds). The Legacies of Julius Nyerere: Influences on Development Discourse 
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be improved and development would be attained. Communal settlements therefore were 
perceived to be the avenues through which service provision and new agricultural 
extension services would be availed to the peasant farmers. 
Embedded in Nyerere’s philosophy were self-reliance and egalitarianism. He 
wanted the people to not wait for what the government could do for them, but to focus on 
what they could do for it and for one another. Self-reliance would be generated by the 
combined efforts of the people, proper utilization of land, implementation of good 
policies, and presence of good leadership to provide proper guidance. To this end, the 
contribution from government and other organizations to the development of Ujamaa 
villages would be confined to the following: education to explain as widely as possible 
the underlying principles of Ujamaa villages; promotion of good leadership among the 
farmers and commitment among government leaders and officials; and adequate 
planning.301  
Local initiative and drive were considered paramount while official government 
leadership and bureaucratic involvement were supposed to be minimal so as to “avoid the 
danger of bureaucratic control, coercion and over-capitalization, which would negate the 
very principles of self-help and voluntary cooperation which the villages are intended to 
embody.”302 Nonetheless, a Rural Development Fund (RDF) managed by the regional 
authorities was put in place to promote village development. It has been argued that 
contrary to prescription, the bureaucracy was coercive in its educational and politicization 
                                                 
301 United Republic of Tanzania. 1969. Tanzania Second Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social 
Development, 1969-1974. Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, p. 28. 
302 United Republic of Tanzania. 1969. Ibid, p. 4. 
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programs, and in urging people to move to new villages. By 1974, the aggressiveness had 
paid off for it was estimated that there were 5,000 villages with two and half million 
members (approximately 18% of the national population).303  
In order to advance egalitarianism, President Nyerere promoted income 
distribution through the reduction of the salaries of the civil servants and politicians, 
including his, and directed that no government worker could own a private business or 
employ another person. In addition, free social services including health care and primary 
education were offered. He focused attention on rural development by channeling large 
amounts of the government resources to rural farming and agriculture. The education 
system too was changed to advance the ideals of socialism. The colonial curriculum was 
modified to give more courses in agricultural development, cooperation, self-reliance, 
and other areas that would advance socialism; and prepare the school leavers to build an 
appropriate existence for themselves and their communities in the rural area.  
Self-reliance was supposed to induce a gradual detachment from the hold of the 
international capital markets. Therefore, a lot of resources were injected into developing 
the country’s local industries. National Cooperatives were formed in nearly all sectors of 
the economy, while key industries in manufacturing, commerce, construction, and 
banking came under government control. It was believed that these measures would 
engender fast development without heavy reliance on external support.         
 For some time, Ujamaa socialism seemed to thrive. Agricultural production 
increased, health care and sanitation facilities multiplied even in the remotest villages, 
                                                 
303 Lofchie, M. F. 1978. “Agrarian Crisis and Economic Liberalization in Tanzania.” The Journal of 
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and school enrollment and adult education increased. It has been asserted that the most 
significant achievement of Ujamaa was increase in the country’s literacy rate. Amani et 
al. (2006), note that the rate was 33% in 1970 and by 1980 it had risen to approximately 
90%.304 Further, as the country embraced the import substitution strategy, state patronage 
expanded investment and manufacturing. Not surprisingly, the scope and size of the 
government expanded rapidly. It has been asserted that parastatals increased from 43 in 
1966 to 380 in 1979, and by 1980 they were 425.305 Table 5.3 shows the economic 
performance during the first ten Ujamaa years.  
 
Table 5.3 Data for the Pre-Crisis Period 1968-1978 
  1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
Per Capita                       
Income Growth (%) 2.1 -0.7 3.0 0.8 2.3 0.5 -0.5 2.9 2.3 -2.7 -1.9 
Population                       
Growth (%) 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.1 
Urbanization (%) 6.1 6.4 6.7 7.4 8.1 8.7 9.4 10.1 11.0 12.0 12.9 
Terms of Trade 126 126 137 123 128 146 174 142 152 182 152 
% of Labor Force                       
in Agriculture 90.6 90.3 90.1 89.7 89.3 88.5 88.1 87.7 87.2 87.2 86.7 
Monetary                       
Growth (%) 17.8 9.2 12.0 18.2 17.7 18.2 22.1 24.4 25.1 20.2 12.3 
Inflation (%) 14.5 15.2 3.5 4.7 7.4 9.9 17.9 23.2 6.6 11.0 6.4 
Gross Investment                       
% of GDP 18.4 16.3 22.9 26.8 23.6 22.6 21.3 20.8 29.0 29.4 33.8 
Source: Bigsten, A. and Andres Danielson. 2001. Tanzania: Is the Ugly Duckling Finally Growing Up? A 
Report for the OECD Project “Emerging Africa”, p. 16. 
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Table 5.3 shows that not all aspects of the economy flourished. Per capita income 
declined and external debt started to accumulate. The rise in external debt is attributed to 
the high level of donor support for investment programs. Although the country’s socialist 
policies were viewed with skepticism and some contempt by some western capitalist 
countries, a good number of them were intrigued and impressed by the Tanzania’s 
boldness and motivation. The country’s innovative programs through which it sought to 
provide social services and foster self-reliance and egalitarianism, excited some donors. 
Aid flowed from the USA, Canada, West Germany, and the UK among others; and from 
socialist countries namely China, the Scandinavian countries, and Russia.  Indeed, the 
country’s total aid per capita rose from 2.7 billion dollars in 1970 to 30.6 billion dollars 
in 1978.306  
In spite of the international support and domestic political enthusiasm however, 
by 1975, gains from Ujamaa socialism had started to dwindle. It has been asserted that 
the “road to economic disaster in Tanzania had been paved with the best of intentions: the 
goal there was a conflict-free commonwealth of peasant villages working communally 
with their leaders, a long way from exploitation, big cities, and impersonal industrial 
modernism.”307 What was attained however is far different from the goal. The peasant did 
not work communally among themselves and with their leaders, agricultural productivity 
plummeted, scarcity ensued, inflation rose, and the general economy stagnated. The next 
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section addresses the consequences of Ujamaa socialism on the Tanzanian economy and 
the effect on the administrative system.  
 
5.10 AFRICAN SOCIALISM UNREALIZED: THE TANZANIAN ECONOMIC 
CRISIS 1975 – 1985 
 
 It has been argued that a number of factors undermined the functioning of Ujamaa 
socialism in Tanzania.308 Among them are faulty government policies and programs, 
vagaries of nature and an unstable international market system, and the Uganda war. 
Faulty Government Policies and Programs: 
The Ujamaa socialist economic policy was inherently faulty. At its core was the 
assumption that people would willingly embrace the villages and undertake farm work in 
communal harmony. In reality, voluntary formation of villages was sluggish and the 
government realized that incentives would have to be used to attract people into the 
communes. For instance, certain taxes were levied against those that did not move into 
the villages, those that moved were offered some land rights, and even social services like 
clean water, famine aid, and medical services were selectively offered to those in Ujamaa 
villages. However, resistance persisted and before long, three forms of communal 
villages emerged. According to Coulson (1982), the first form was composed of villages 
                                                 
308 Numerous scholars have articulated reasons why Ujamaa failed to deliver its promises. See for instance 
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that were formulated before the Arusha Declaration. They were small, politically aware, 
and dedicated to communal work. The second form was comprised of villages that 
emerged in order to enjoy government benefits like subsidies and fertilizers but that were 
not driven by the desire for communal work. The third type was composed of larger 
villages that were forcibly formed by government.309 Other than the first group, the other 
groups were not interested in communal farming. The incentive to do so was to gain 
access to amenities like schools, clinics, and sanitation services, but when it came to 
farming, no one wanted the government to take control of their harvest. In essence, 
communal farming never took hold and agricultural production never did significantly 
increase. 
Between 1971 and 1972, agricultural production reduced because peasants 
neglected the call to communal farming. Moreover, during the same period, producer 
prices plummeted causing a fall in export earnings. By 1973, it became increasingly clear 
that not all farmers were interested in Ujamaa. Those in dry and famine-prone areas were 
keen to move into communal villages but those in fertile areas were not. The latter were 
more interested in private agricultural production. In the last quarter of 1973, the TANU 
leadership and President Nyerere announced mandatory villagization and made it clear 
that living in communal villages was no longer a voluntary undertaking. However, the 
call did not entail Ujamaa – communal farming. Rather, peasants would be availed blocks 
of land to grow similar crops but individually. In a bid to increase crop production, 
emphasis shifted from the form production (communal) to production (output). During 
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the same time period, civil servants were decentralized to districts and regions to oversee 
villagization. It was at this juncture realized that political persuasion was not enough to 
get the peasants to move into villages hence the need for administrative and bureaucratic 
coercion. It has been argued that villagization without Ujamaa found favor with some 
civil servants because: 
“It was more in line with bureaucratic thinking and with what a bureaucracy can 
effectively do: enforce movement of the peasants into new ‘modern’ settlements, 
i.e. settlements with the houses placed together, in straight lines, along the road, 
and with the fields outside the nucleated village, organized in blockfarms, each 
block containing the villagers’ individual plots, but with only one type of crop, 
and readily accessible for control by the agricultural extension officer and 
eventual cultivation by government tractors.”310 
 
In spite of the implemented changes, agricultural production continued to decline 
and general economic performance reduced. In 1975 inflation increased to 23% from 
17% the previous year (see table 5.3), and total aid per capita rose from 12% to 19% in 
the same time period.311 It has been asserted that “Agriculture was beset by a disastrous 
combination of forced villagization, accelerated agricultural modernization and 
‘directives’, which significantly reduced agricultural exports and led to major food 
shortages.”312 Lofchie (1978) also asserts that reduction in agricultural production and 
general poor economic performance are attributable to Ujamaa and villagization drives. 
His research findings show that production of food crops like Maize reduced with 
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villagization, and food imports rose during the same period.313 In his view, the economic 
crisis is rooted in the “peasantry’s unwillingness to produce under socialist 
conditions.”314 
Indeed, the economic decline in the mid 1970s was a result of poor government 
policies and programs. For instance, import substitution programs oriented farming to 
food crop growing than production of export crops. Consequently, exports drastically 
reduced at the time that food crop production also reduced. Without any revenue, 
government found itself increasingly relying on donor aid to pay for imports, thereby 
increasing the fiscal deficit. It should also be noted that monopolistic parastatals had an 
adverse effect on crop production and exports. Parastatals especially the marketing 
cooperatives drained government of revenue. They generously offered grants and loans to 
Ujamaa villages but rarely got the money back. Moreover, the monopolization of the 
marketing and distribution of produce opened avenues for corruption, embezzlement of 
funds, and general ineffectiveness in the parastatals. 
Vagaries of Nature:  
Some scholars do not attribute economic failure to government policy. In their 
view, the economic crisis was caused by vagaries of nature.315 Between 1973 and 1975, 
the country experienced a long drought that severely affected agricultural production. It 
                                                 
313 For a detailed account see Lofchie, M. F. 1978. “Agrarian Crisis and Economic Liberalisation in 
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has been asserted that grain production reduced by approximately 30%, and export crops 
like cotton were equally affected.316 However, Lofchie (1978) argues that although there 
was a drought between 1973 and 1974, there was sufficient rain to generate a good 
harvest in 1974 and 1975 and the fact that the reverse happened, means that the problem 
lies with the policies. Nonetheless, in order to encourage food production, and undercut 
the effects of the drought, the government increased producer prices for food crops. This 
proved untenable as cash crop production became marginalized. It has been asserted that 
the “drop in export production prevented the country from capitalizing on the booming 
export prices in 1976-1977.”317 Higher import prices exacerbated the crisis because the 
government deficit increased further.  
The Uganda War:  
 Tanzania accumulated a huge fiscal deficit because of the role the country played 
in ousting Idi Amin from power in 1979. It has been observed that in 1978, government 
spending on defense was 14.6 % of the total budget, but in 1979, the amount rose to 
23.3%. The increase raised the budget deficit from approximately 10% of GDP in 1977 to 
20% in 1979.318 It has been estimated that the total cost of the war was approximately 
500 million U.S dollars.319 This expenditure depleted the government coffers. In addition, 
the oil shock of 1979 left the country with a severe foreign exchange shortage that 
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adversely affected local manufacturing because the import substitution industries were 
highly dependent on oil supply. By 1985, the Tanzanian economy was in disarray. 
Agricultural production had stagnated, the manufacturing industries lacked raw materials, 
exports were almost non-existent, prices were distorted by faulty macro economic 
policies and bureaucratic control, and the fiscal deficit was extremely high. “GDP 
growth, which had averaged more than 5 percent a year from 1970 to 1978, fell to around 
zero between 1978 and 1985.”320 Table 5.4 shows that from 1979 to 1985, per capita 
income fell consistently, and external debt and inflation increased. 
 
Table 5.4 Trends in Select Economic Indicators for the Period 1979-1985 
 
   1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Per Capita               
Income Growth (%) 0.2 -0.2 -3.7 -2.6 -5.6 0.2 1.4 
Population               
Growth (%) 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 
Urbanization (%) 13.9 14.8 15.4 15.9 16.5 17.0 17.6 
Terms of Trade 139 142 129 127 128 131 126 
% of Labor Force               
in Agriculture 86.3 85.6 85.6 85.5 85.4 85.2 85.1 
Monetary Growth (%) 56.9 26.9 18.1 19.5 17.8 3.7 30.3 
Inflation (%) 12.2 26.4 22.8 25.4 23.5 30.9 28.7 
Gross Investment               
% of GDP 33.6 33.1 28.6 26.0 19.3 20.2 18.7 
Source: Bigsten, A. and Andres Danielson. 2001. Tanzania: Is the Ugly Duckling Finally Growing Up? A 
Report for the OECD Project “Emerging Africa”, p. 18. 
 
In spite of these problems, the civil service continued to grow. Without a viable 
private sector, there was only one source of employment, the government. In a bid to 
bring services closer to the people, several administrative offices were opened in the 
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districts and regions under the decentralization programs of 1972-1974. Personnel were 
needed to man the education and health sectors, and other government programs that 
aimed to advance self-reliance and development. Yeager (1989) asserted that Ujamaa 
expanded the size of civil service and the TANU bureaucracy and their involvement in 
the national economy. “Decentralization launched a decade of civil service job creation 
averaging about 11 percent per annum.”321 As parastatals proliferated, government 
employment burgeoned even further. By 1984, parastatal employment alone accounted 
for 302,000 government workers.322 Moreover, the collapse of the East African 
Community in 1977 compelled the government to take in the displaced workers and to 
provide services that had until then been offered by the East African Community, further 
increasing the size of government.  
Not surprisingly, as the economy collapsed, the administrative system 
experienced adverse effects. Salaries lost purchasing power because of run-away 
inflation, absenteeism increased, corruption emerged, and ultimately, civil service 
performance declined.  Faced with mounting disappointments arising primarily from 
declining productivity, shortage of basic goods, poor public services, and high inflation, 
civil servants and large portions of the general population reverted to the clandestine and 
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officially maligned “parallel markets” to carter to their individual subsistence needs and 
to raise personal incomes.323  
It has been observed that capacity for administrative efficiency and sensitivity to 
local needs may have been enhanced through the civil service expansion and 
decentralization process, but democratic participation was marginalized.324 The center 
controlled and allocated development funds and technical expertise, and the local masses’ 
input was rarely taken into consideration. When forced villagization was introduced, the 
bureaucracy took on a more coercive character in the quest to implement the policies 
from above. By 1985, the civil service was viewed as part of the problem; not only was it 
overextended, it was performing poorly, it was corrupt, and it was a financial drain on the 
government’s limited resources. It is against this background that the country with the 
support of the WB embarked on an economic recovery program. 
 
 
5.11 EMBRACING THE MARKET: THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY PROGRAM 
IN TANZANIA 
 
 Tanzania was forced to embrace the market because the economic failures caused 
by Ujamaa socialism and restricted personal accumulation of wealth were blatant. 
Reluctantly, the government reached an agreement with the IMF in 1986 (the Economic 
Recovery Plan -ERP) to enforce macroeconomic stabilization. Immediate attention was 
focused on liberalizing trade so that an appropriate and stable pricing system could be 
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attained. This would in turn induce an increase in production of goods. Focus was also 
placed on reducing inflation. Reducing inflation called for exchange rate adjustment and 
devaluation of the currency. Further, effort was put into increasing the country’s foreign 
earnings. This was to be done by increasing agricultural production especially the 
production of export crops like coffee and cotton. Another immediate way to revive the 
economy was through the rehabilitation of social services. Ultimately, the IMF called on 
the Tanzanian government to adopt structural adjustment programs, limit expenditure, 
liberalize the economy, privatize parastatal agencies, and restore fiscal responsibility. 
 By 1990, winds of change had swept over the Tanzanian economic landscape. 
The currency had been devalued, foreign exchange bureaus were allowed to operate, and 
the private sector actively participated in the economy. However, concrete achievements 
of the economic recovery plan were minor. Increases in agricultural production 
manifested in the food crops, not the cash crops. Consequently, export revenues increased 
only marginally from US$400 million to US$430 million rather than the targeted US$630 
million325, and dependence on donor aid did not diminish. In addition, per capita income 
increased slightly from 1.4% in 1985 to 3.1% in 1990.326   
In order to keep the momentum, the government entered another agreement with 
the IMF under the Economic and Social Action Programme (ERPII). The new program 
proceeded with the former ERP reforms and urged the government to place more effort 
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on controlling the fiscal deficit and domestic credit by reducing recurrent and 
development expenditures. However, more focus was placed on institutional and public 
sector reforms. These included reform of the civil service system, parastatals sector, 
banking system, and public financial management reform. In addition, while the first 
ERP had not paid attention to the costs of adjustment, the second one did include 
measures to protect the rural poor who previously depended on the state for all social 
services but now had to deal with the market.  By 1996, more positive changes began to 
emerge. Real GDP started to grow and inflation started to fall. The establishment of an 
independent revenue authority helped in rejuvenating the tax administration system and 
enhancing revenue collection. Table 5.5 shows trends in some indictors for the years 
1996-2003. Table 5.5 shows a consistent increase in real GDP from 4.2 in 1996 to 5.6 in 
2003. Inflation that was 21% in 1996 had been reduced to 4.4% in 2003. It can therefore 
be asserted that by 2003, the economic reforms had started generating positive changes 
and the economy was on the way to steady recovery. 
It should be noted that in addition to the economic reforms, the country undertook 
major political reforms. The latter entailed a transition from a single party political 
system to political pluralism. In 1995 the first multiparty elections were held and won by 
CCM (Chama cha Mapinduzi) the party that emerged from TANU. It should however be 
noted that although elections have been held every five years since 1995, CCM is yet to 
be defeated (nonetheless free and fair). The challenge that the country now faces is how 
to entrench pluralism and dilute the one party heritage. 
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Table 5.5 Trends in Selected Macroeconomic Indicators: 1996-2003 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Real GDP 
Growth % 
 
4.2 
 
3.3 
 
4.0 
 
4.7 
 
4.9 
 
5.7 
 
6.2 
 
5.6 
Inflation – 
annual 
average % 
 
 
21.0 
 
 
16.1 
 
 
12.9 
 
 
7.8 
 
 
6.0 
 
 
5.2 
 
 
4.5 
 
 
4.4 
Export 
(US$ 
millions) 
 
 
763.8 
 
 
752.6 
 
 
588.5 
 
 
543.3 
 
 
663.3 
 
 
776.4 
 
 
902.5 
 
 
1142.4 
Imports 
(US$ 
millions) 
 
 
1212.6 
 
 
1148.0 
 
 
1382.2 
 
 
1415.4 
 
 
1367.6 
 
 
1560.3 
 
 
1511.3 
 
 
1973.0 
Investment 
/GDP Ratio 
% 
 
 
16.5 
 
 
14.7 
 
 
16.0 
 
 
15.4 
 
 
17.6 
 
 
17.0 
 
 
18.9 
 
 
18.5 
Foreign 
Direct 
Investment 
(US$) 
 
 
 
148.5 
 
 
 
157.8 
1 
 
 
72.2 
 
 
 
516.7 
 
 
 
463.4 
 
 
 
327.2 
 
 
 
240.4 
 
 
 
247.8 
Foreign 
Reserves 
(months of 
imports) 
 
 
 
2.4 
 
 
 
3.8 
 
 
 
3.0 
 
 
 
4.1 
 
 
 
5.8 
 
 
 
6.3 
 
 
 
8.3 
 
 
 
8.9 
 96/97 97/98 98/99 99/00 00/01 01/02 02/03 03/04 
Govt 
Domestic 
Revenue 
(%of GDP) 
 
 
 
13.5 
 
 
 
12.6 
 
 
 
12.5 
 
 
 
11.3 
 
 
 
12.2 
 
 
 
12.1 
 
 
 
12.8 
 
 
 
13.4 
Total Govt 
Expenditure 
(% of GDP) 
 
 
17.3 
 
 
17.4 
 
 
17.6 
 
 
18.3 
 
 
20.6 
 
 
19.1 
 
 
23.4 
 
 
24.9 
Total Debt 
(US$ 
millions) 
 
 
7578.5 
 
 
7384.6 
 
 
7669.7 
 
 
7624.8 
 
 
7482.1 
 
 
7464.0 
 
 
7268.2 
 
 
7890.7 
Source: Rwekaza M. et al 2005. The Political Economy of Tanzania. Dar es Salaam, p. 27. 
 
 
5.12 THE PUBLIC SECTOR REFORMS IN TANZANIA 
 The ERP reforms opened the way for other major reforms including the public 
sector reforms. These reforms include macro-economic reform, public finance 
management reform, sectoral reforms, local government reform, and civil service reform. 
The macro-economic reforms entail every thing that has so far been done to stabilize the 
economy as discussed in the sections above. The public finance management reform was 
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initiated in order to introduce accountability, transparency, and financial discipline in the 
management of the country’s budget. Its major objectives are to attain efficient allocation 
of resources, to generate incentives for performance, and to maximize resource 
allocation. The sectoral reforms aim at generating defined priorities and affordable levels 
of service provision. In addition, these reforms aim at generating strategies for enhanced 
private sector participation. Local government reforms are being undertaken within the 
civil service reform program. They aim at generating efficiency and effectiveness in the 
delivery of services at the local level through decentralization by devolution. The civil 
service reform program was implemented in order to “achieve a smaller, affordable, well 
compensated, efficient, and effective service.”327 It is not only aimed at revitalizing the 
bureaucracy, but also to make it capable of implementing all the above reforms.  
 It should be noted that Tanzanian CSRP has been implemented in phases. Phase 1 
focused on cost containment and covered the years 1991-1995 although its 
implementation spilled over into 1996. Phase 2 focused on institutional and performance 
management and covered the years 1996 to 2000. Phase 3, implemented under the public 
service reform program (PSRP) focused on instituting performance management systems 
and was originally supposed to be undertaken in the period 2000 to 2005, but 
implementation continued into 2007. Phase 2 of the PSRP focused on enhancing 
performance and accountability. It was supposed to cover the period 2005-2007 but 
implementation only began in 2007. The third phase of the PSRP focuses on instituting 
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quality improvement cycles and its implementation began in 2008. Figure 5.2 shows the 
phases. 
 
Figure 5.2 The Phases of the CSRP/PSRP in Tanzania 
 
Source: United Republic of Tanzania, President’s Office-Public Service Management. 2000. The PSRP 1 
Medium Term Strategy. Dar es Salaam. 
 
 
5.13 SUMMARY 
 
The discussion presented above has shown that the adoption of Ujamaa socialism 
was not conducive to economic growth in Tanzania. This is partly because the policy was 
built on a factually untenable premise that traditional African societies were inherently 
socialist. While it is true the traditional African societies communally shared land, and in 
some instances farmed together (for instance offering one’s services in times of harvest), 
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they did not practice communal farming and communal sharing of produce. It is no 
wonder that agricultural production deteriorated and an economic crisis ensued as shown 
above. It is also not surprising that fast development and self-reliance were never 
attained. Ultimately, by the time SAPs were initiated, the country was neither socialist 
nor egalitarian although when compared to Uganda and Kenya, the country was and still 
is, hailed for being more egalitarian and peaceful. Compared with Uganda, Tanzania’s 
political system has been stable and economic failure was not a result of political chaos.  
It has been shown that under SAPs, the economy has been reformed, liberalized, 
and put on a path to better performance. In addition, other reforms have been undertaken 
to revitalize service delivery and put the country on a development path. Among them is 
the civil service reform program. In chapter seven, a detailed analysis of the performance 
of the Tanzanian CSRP is offered. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM PROGRAM IN UGANDA: AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE FINDINGS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 The discussion in chapter five addressed the political and economic turmoil 
Uganda experienced soon after independence and through the 1970s, 80s and much of the 
1990s. It also discussed the various reform programs including structural adjustment 
programs comprising administrative reforms, economic reform programs, and political 
reforms that have been pursued in an attempt to rectify the situation. The Uganda civil 
service was viewed as a problem rather than a solution to the country’s socio-economic 
and political collapse hence effort was made to build a better and more professional 
service. The Ugandan government, as in many others in Africa, embarked on various 
reforms to change the image and functioning of the civil service from an inefficient, 
bloated, corrupt, and unresponsive one, to a smaller, motivated, accountable, efficient, 
effective, and responsive one. More than ten years after the Ugandan civil service reform 
program implementation began, it is useful to assess the impact of the reforms and 
determine whether they are attaining their goals and objectives.  
Chapter six presents the results and analyzes the Ugandan civil service reform 
program based on the data generated from interviews held with officials from the 
Ministries of Public Service, Education, Finance, and Local Government and data from 
official government documents and various websites. The study focused its analysis on 
four major aspects of the reform program namely; (i) the reduction of the size of the civil 
service, (ii) pay reform, (iii) capacity building, and (iv) ethics and accountability. The 
following questions guided this analysis; 1) has the size of the civil service been reduced? 
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to what levels? 2) Are the civil servants well paid and motivated? 3) Is capacity being 
built? In what areas/ways? 4) Are ethics and accountability improving? What are the 
indicators? Chapter six attempts to answer these questions based on realities on the 
ground derived from the interviews held with senior government officials and data from 
the various government documents, published work and the internet. The analysis is 
based on a case study of four ministries; the Ministry of Public Service (MPS), the 
Ministry of Education (MOE), the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Ministry of Local 
Government (MOLG). The discussion offered in chapter three indicated that after careful 
review of the field notes, certain specific salient and similar issues started emerging. The 
issues that emerged were grouped together and continuously studied until themes and 
patterns emerged.  
The overall themes that emerged from my respondents’ perception of the reform 
program are: doing more with less; improving remuneration; human resources 
development and capacity building; enhancing ethics and accountability and economic 
recovery and poverty eradication. These themes are the basis of the analytical discussion 
of results offered below. The discussion is provided in four major sections and each deals 
with one of the four aspects of the reform program. Under each section, subsections 
covering the context before the reform, the goals of the reform, the implementation, and 
the results of the reforms are provided. 
 It should be noted that the Civil Service Reform Program in Uganda was 
undertaken in a phased approach. The first phase was implemented from 1991 to 1997 
and it focused primarily on reducing the size of the civil service and improving the salary 
of the retained civil servants. The second phase guided by the Public Service Reform 
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Strategy and called the Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP) covered the years 
1997-2002. The program name changed to Public Service Reform  in order to be 
consistent with chapter 10 (ten) article 257 (i) of the Uganda Constitution which defines 
the Public Service as the service offered in a civil capacity at national government level 
or at the local government. The second phase focused on reducing further the size of the 
service by restructuring ministries and departments, pay reform, capacity building, and 
introduced Results Oriented Management (ROM) system. The third phase still under 
way, was effected in 2002 to run till 2007. Known as the Public Service Reform Strategy 
2002-2007, it focuses on performance management for sustained implementation of 
Government Programmes especially the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP). 
 
6.2 DOING MORE WITH LESS: THE REDUCTION OF THE SIZE OF THE 
UGANDAN CIVIL SERVICE 
 
 The reduction in the size of the Ugandan civil was one of the comprehensive 
administrative reform endeavors advocated for by the PSRRC. At independence, Uganda 
had a very small civil service with minimal responsibilities, a small cabinet, and virtually 
no parastatal agencies. By the the late 1980s however, the Ugandan civil service was 
overwhelmed by responsibilities, was extremely bloated, and dysfunctional both in 
operation and structurally. The 1991 CSRP program therefore sought to reverse this 
trend. The reduction of the size of the civil service aspect of the reform program focuses 
on the organizational structure and scope of government. This is in line with the NPM 
ideals. Four focal areas are common to NPM reforms; (1) restructuring and re-
engineering of the internal administrative structures, (2) the development of market 
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oriented strategies within the public sector, (3) the emphasis of doing more with less, and 
(4) the emphasis on mechanisms guaranteeing customer service. In Uganda, efforts to 
reduce the size of the civil service have been focused on rationalizing and restructuring 
the cabinet or ministries and districts, and on down sizing the service through 
retrenchment and voluntary retirement.  
 
6.2.1 Rationalization and Restructuring of Ministries and Districts 
In 1990, the Ugandan civil service was comprised of 38 ministries and employed 
approximately 320,000 people. The Director of Administrative Reform at the Ministry of 
Public Service was of the view that this high number of employees was a result of at least 
three major reasons:  
“first, the tradition of providing public sector jobs as a means of safeguarding 
employment; second, the growth of the state sector into areas of activities which 
are beyond the government’s traditional domain; and third, the nature of the 
coalition regime put in place by the NRM and the need to provide a role in 
government for various political allies.”328  
 
Because of the above reasons, she added, the civil service became extremely large and 
expensive to run, duplication and overlap of functions and responsibilities increased to 
the extent that in some instances it became very difficult to ascertain where responsibility 
lay. She was of the view that such ambiguity also led to poor coordination, 
communication and information flow. According to the Ministry of Public Service, 
rationalization of ministries and departments and districts was to be undertaken “through 
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Service, Uganda, held July 21, 2006. Ms Katuramu has been Director of Administration Reform for the last 
10 years. 
 191
ministerial and district reviews to streamline the structures and the staffing levels to 
enable greater efficiency and effectiveness to be achieved in the Service.”329 Nolan 
(2001) asserts that rationalization and down-sizing aim at reduction of the pay rolls of 
public sector organizations and entail moves to flatter organizational structures buttressed 
by staff reductions at both upper and lower tiers of organizations.330 Indeed, the 
rationalization processes was initiated in order to reduce the number of ministries to only 
that necessary to carry out the core functions of government so that financial resources 
can be saved and used for better remuneration of the staff. According to the Director, 
Administrative Reform at the Uganda Public Service Ministry,  
“When the public service reform started in 1991, the size was over bloated, we 
were about 320, 000 workforce across the service. By 1997, it had reduced to 
about 150,000 this was made possible through the various reforms which included 
down sizing and by down sizing we had to remove the personnel that had entered 
the service illegally what we call the illegal entrants …We cleaned the payroll 
which had ghosts particularly in the teachers payroll.......Ministries were reduced 
from 38 to 22 in July 1991, and eventually to 17 as of today.”331  
 
The views provided by Director, Administrative Reform were further supported by the 
Commissioner and acting director for Human Resources and Capacity Building at the 
Ministry of Public Service when she revealed that;  
“There has been a fundamental review of the mission, strategic objectives, 
structure and staffing levels of all ministries and departments of central 
government as well as district administrations. As a result of these reviews, 
several ministries were merged, and the number of established posts in the public 
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service was substantially reduced. The public service is now oriented to do more 
with less people and less expenditure, to work better but cost less.”332  
 
The above view is in line with the NPM prescriptions to public administrative systems to 
adopt management techniques and practices that are prevalent in the private sector, 
practices that aim at resource conservation while maintaining high standards of service. 
According to Hood (1991), NPM puts a stress on greater discipline and parsimony in 
resource use. This means cutting direct costs, raising labor discipline, resisting union 
demands, limiting ‘compliance costs’ to business and it is typically justified by the need 
to check the resource demands of the public sector to ‘do more with less.’333 
An Implementation and Monitoring Board (TIMB)334 was charged with the 
responsibility of rationalizing and streamlining staffing levels and the review of 
retrenchment decisions in order to harmonize them with the new ministerial structures 
and target establishment numbers.335 These tasks were undertaken by conducting 
interviews in the 22 central ministries where personnel was categorized as follows:  
• those recommended to stay in the approved positions 
• those that are good and suitable but lack approved positions in the 
reviewed ministries but could be deployed in other ministries or 
departments and  
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• those declared redundant and no longer required for employment in 
government.336 
According to the Ministry of Public Service, the objective of the ministerial restructuring 
component of the CSRP was “to develop new efficient and effective structures and 
establishments for 28 Government bodies including 21 ministries, 5 agencies and 2 
institutions, to fill positions and to remove surplus staff.” It is asserted further that, “an 
important element of the ministerial restructuring is to update structures to reflect 
decentralization.”337 The restructuring of senior positions in the ministries led to the 
compulsory retirement of ten permanent secretaries.338 Table 6.1 indicates the actual and 
target civil service staffing levels for the years 1990 to 1995.  
From table 6.1, it can be seen that the education sector was to be gradually 
reduced but it should be noted that the above numbers do not include the institutions of 
higher learning staff. The target for the size of the teaching service was based on the 
primary classroom capacity of Ugandan schools which was estimated to be one 
classroom (approximately 50 students) per teacher. The target size for the police and 
prisons staff indicates an increase in the size. It was asserted that a police service of 
                                                 
336 Ministry of Public Service. 1994. Ibid, p. 27. 
337 Ministry Of Public Service. 1996. Uganda Civil Service Reform Programme Status Report 8, January 1 
– March 3,1 1996, Kampala, pp. 3-4. 
338 Ministry of Public Service. 1994. Civil Service reform Program Status Report 2 October – February 
1994. Kampala, p. 6. 
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25,000 implies a police population ratio of 1 to 700, a number considered necessary in 
the current Ugandan circumstances.339 
 
Table 6.1 Actual and Target Civil Service Staffing Levels 1990 – 1995. 
  ACTUAL         TARGET   
  Jul - 90 Jul - 91 Jul - 92 Jul - 93 Sept - 93 Jul - 94 Jul - 95 
Education/               
Teaching               
Service 120,000 120,000 120,000 118,000 100,000 90,000 90,000 
Traditional                
Civil               
Service 70,000 40,000 36,000 32,943 29,475 30,000 30,000 
Police and               
Prisons 20,000 23,000 23,000 21,000 21,000 25,000 25,000 
Group               
Employees 110,000 86,000 50,000 43,000 26,661 0 0 
                
TOTAL 320,000 269,000 229,000 214,943 177,136 145,000 145,000 
Source: Government of Uganda, Ministry of Public Service. 1994. Management of Change: Content, 
Vision, Objectives, strategy and Plan. Kampala: Uganda Printing and Publishing Corporation, p.32. 
1Group employees are casual workers who could be hired and fired by the line Ministries. They were not 
permanent or pensionable, although they did contribute to the Social Security Fund.  
 
The Group Employees scheme was slated for complete removal and the table indicates it 
was going to be done drastically and quickly. 
In addition to ministerial reviews, district reviews were also undertaken. 
According the Director of Administration Reform,  
“The purpose of the district reviews was to prioritize objectives and core 
functions and rationalize organizational structures and staffing requirements of 
the system of local authorities in thirty nine districts that were to be created by the 
decentralization policy.”340  
 
                                                 
339 Government of Uganda, Ministry of Public Service. 1994. Management of Change: Content, Vision, 
Objectives, strategy and Plan. Kampala: Uganda Printing and Publishing Corporation, p. 31. 
340 Interview held with Ms. Deborah Katuramu, the Director , Administrative Reform, Ministry of Public 
Service, Uganda, held July 21, 2006. 
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The District reviews were undertaken by a task force composed of representatives from 
the Decentralization Secretariat of the Ministry of Local government, Ministry of Public 
Service, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of Education. The review process was divided 
into three phases where the first phase was to produce discussion drafts setting out the 
macro structure for each type of district and for Kampala City Council (Kampala is the 
only City with District Status), while phase two and three were to produce the detailed 
structure and staffing plans for each of  the decentralized districts. As a lead up to phase 
one, in January 1994, the District Review Task Force (DRTF) organized four regional 
workshops for all District Executive Secretaries, the Resistance Council Five 
chairpersons and councilors (RC5s) and Resistance Council Four (RC4s)/Town Clerks 
and Councilors in Gulu (Northern Uganda), Mbale (Eastern Uganda), Mbarara (Western 
Uganda) and Mukono (Central Uganda). The aims of the workshops were to identify the 
key issues for decentralization; to propose the main functions, activities and structures for 
Districts; and to generate a framework to guide District reviews so similar structures and 
staffing levels could be evolved.341 By the end of the year, all 39 districts were 
reviewed.342 
According to the Principal Personnel Officer in the Ministry of Local 
Government, the district reviews were integral parts of the reform program and were 
critical in preparing ground for the decentralization process. He asserted that the district 
                                                 
341 Government of Uganda, Ministry of Public Service. 1994. Civil Service reform Program Status Report 2 
October 1993-February 1994. Kampala,  p. 3. 
342 Government of Uganda, Ministry of Public Service. 1994. Management of Change: Content, Vision, 
Objectives, strategy and Plan. Kampala: Uganda Printing and Publishing Corporation p. 27. 
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reviews helped in clarifying the district responsibilities and their relationship with the 
central ministries for each function.343  Rationalization and downsizing in this case 
therefore entailed a split between a more strategic core, the ministry, and a large 
operational periphery, the district. The district reviews were a comprehensive and 
expensive exercise that cost approximately U.S. $326,940.344 
 
6.2.2 Down Sizing the Civil Service through Retrenchment and Voluntary 
Retirement 
 
Retrenchment:  
 
The PSRRC recommended a reduction of the Uganda civil service staff by 34,000 
employees.345  Focus was to be placed on removal of “overdue leavers” such as who had 
reached the then mandatory retirement age of 55 years, those who entered the service 
irregularly, and the non performers who would otherwise have been long let go if the 
system had been functioning properly. In addition, more reductions were to be effected 
by removal of ghost workers, the abolition of the group employee346 scheme, compulsory 
retirement resultant from the ministerial reviews, and a voluntary retirement scheme. 
According to the Ministry of Public Service, the objective of the downsizing component 
of the CSRP was “to achieve a staffing level within the civil service which is consistent 
                                                 
343 Views expressed by Mr. Ssonko, Principle Personnel Officer, Ministry of Local Government in an 
interview held on August 10, 2006. 
344 Government of Uganda, Ministry of Public Service. 1994. Civil Service reform Program Status Report 2 
October 1993-February 1994. Kampala, p. 5. 
345 The Report of the Public Service Review and Organization Commission Report 1989-1990. Kampala, 
Government Printer. 
346 Group Employees are casual workers who could be hired and fired by the line ministries. They were not 
permanent or pensionable, although they did contribute to the Social Security Fund. 
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with the service delivery objectives, the need for salary enhancement and financial 
constraints.”347 The TIMB and Ministry of Public Service were charged with the 
responsibility of sorting out the employees that would qualify for redeployment in the 
newly restructured ministries and departments. It was planned that between July 1992 
and May 1994, a total reduction of 63,000 employees would be achieved348 under the 
categories outlined in Table 6.2349 below, which also provides the estimated cost of the 
exercise as well as the source of the funds. 
Table 6.2, below indicates that by the end of 1993, 27,000 group employees had 
been let go. It was anticipated, however, that the abolition of the group employee scheme 
would result in the retirement of approximately 30,000-35,000 employees by the year 
1994 and the non existence of such employees by the end of the same year.350 Another 
notable reduction is the removal of 15,000 ghosts from the teaching service payroll by the 
end of September 1993. The existence of ghosts on the payroll is indicative of the 
consequences of the total break down of accountability, institutional, and procedural 
mechanisms necessary for managing the civil service. 
                                                 
347 Government of Uganda, Ministry of Public Service. 1996. Civil Service reform Program Status Report 8 
January 1 – March 31 1996. Kampala, p. 7. 
348 Government of Uganda, Ministry of Public Service. 1994. Management of Change: Content, Vision, 
Objectives, strategy and Plan. Kampala: Uganda Printing and Publishing Corporation, p. 28 
349 The table has been reproduced with minor changes. 
350 Government of Uganda, Ministry of Public Service. 1994. Management of Change: Content, Vision, 
Objectives, strategy and Plan. Kampala: Uganda Printing and Publishing Corporation, p. 29 
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Table 6.2 Planned Action for Fast Retrenchment 
CATEGORY NUMBER COST FUNDED DEADLINE STATUS** 
    (USHS Billion) BY   FEB. 94 
Group Employees   15,000       
(First 5 reviewed ministries) 15,000 *Ushs 0.12 mill. = 1.8 bill. GOU Sept. 1, 93 Done 
Teaching Service           
(Overdue Leavers    3,000       
Approved by TIMB) 3,000 *Ushs 0.6 mill. = 1.8 bill. GOU June 30, 93 Done 
Group Employees   15,000     12,000 
(First 17 remaining Ministries) 15,000 *Ushs 0.2 mill. = 1.8 bill. GOU Dec. 31, 93 Done 
Voluntary Retirement   5,000       
(Established Staff) 5,000 *Ushs 1.6 mill. = 12 bill. Donors Feb. 31, 94 In Progress 
Remove Ghosts From Payroll           
(From Teaching Service) 15,000 Nil − Sept. 31, 93 Done 
    5,000       
Terminate Licensed Teachers 5,000 *Ushs 0.5 mill. = 2.5 bill. Donors Dec. 31, 93 Done 
Retrenchment of Redundant   5,000       
Established Staff 5,000 *Ushs 1.5 mill. = 7.5 bill. Donors May 1994 In Progress 
          Reduction 
Total Reduction         Feb. 1994 
by May 1, 1994 63,000 Ushs 17.9 Billion − − 45,000 
1 
Total to be funded           
by Donors − US $15.6 Million − − − 
Source: Government of Uganda, Ministry of Public Service. 1994. Management of Change: Content, 
Vision, Objectives, strategy and Plan. Kampala: Uganda Printing and Publishing Corporation p. 28 
1 The retrenchment strategy for the remaining 18,000 staff to be removed from the payroll by July 1, 1994 
was as follow: 1) 4,000 - 5,000 through the Voluntary Retirement Scheme; 2) 5,000 – 9,000 group 
employees; 3) between 1,000 -  5,000 ghosts from the Teaching Service; and 4) between 1,000 – 5,000 
established staff moved out on compulsory basis. ** By Dec. 94, all categories were completed. 
 
Indeed the PSRRC found that whole structure of the civil service had ‘ghost workers’ but 
pointed out that the teaching service had the greatest number of them. An official in the 
Ministry of Education revealed that until recently, the teaching service was one of the 
most poorly paid government departments and that since prior to the reform program 
there was no centrally coordinated payroll system, it was easy for Headmasters to 
fabricate data.351 
                                                 
351 Interview with Mr. J.B Ssemakula, Assistant Commissioner for Personnel, Ministry of Education held 
August 18, 2006. 
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It is however not surprising that such non-existent “workers” were prevalent. It is 
general knowledge that as the country started to crumble both economically and 
politically, Ugandan civil servants endured unspeakable hardships resultant from very 
meager, erratic, and unequal salaries. While some resorted to peddling their skills by 
taking on three to four jobs - for instance, university lecturers started teaching in high 
schools, and selling food items like pancakes to university students - others sought for 
ways to steal from the system and hence the creation of ghost workers. Until the early 
1990s, civil servants would take months without receiving their salaries sometimes 
because it took very long for the government to release the money, but mostly because 
some influential person was trading with the money or slicing away some chunk for 
himself or herself in the form of “ghost payment”. 
As a result of the reform initiatives, by the end of the year 1994, an estimated 
42,000 ghost workers had been removed from the payroll and a payroll monitoring unit 
was established to verify the entry and exit from the payroll. The removal of ghost 
workers was particularly successful in the teaching service where the payroll was reduced 
from 120,000 in 1990 to 100,400 in September 1993 and cleaned further to 95,289 in 
1994.352 However it has been observed by the World Bank that the payroll monitoring 
was not fully effective and the problem of ghost workers reemerged in 1996 prompting 
the MPS to conduct an ad hoc investigation that resulted in the removal of about 2,000 
ghost workers from the payroll between October 1996 and February 1997. The World 
Bank asserts that “an improved monitoring system was established in January 1997 in 
                                                 
352 Government of Uganda, Ministry of Public Service. 1994. Management of Change: Content, Vision, 
Objectives, strategy and Plan. Kampala: Uganda Printing and Publishing Corporation, p. 30. 
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order to prevent the reoccurrence of ghost workers.”353 The Assistant Commissioner for 
Personnel in the Ministry of Education had a similar view when he asserted that it is 
currently very hard for head teachers to create ghost workers because of the presence of 
restraint mechanisms. He mentioned the computerization of the payroll system as one of 
the measures used to monitor the personnel numbers.354 
Voluntary Retirement: 
 
Another major way through which the CSRP intended to reduce the numbers of 
the civil servants was through the voluntary retirement scheme. The voluntary retirement 
scheme targeted 5,000 employees as indicated in table 6.4 above, including those whose 
posts were declared redundant as a result of the ministerial reviews and the TIMB 
assessments. However, civil servants were free to apply for voluntary retirement so long 
as they were not on temporary employment terms or had not reached the mandatory 
retirement age of 60 years.355 In addition, employees in departments that suffered 
desperate shortage of staff were not allowed to voluntarily retire for instance doctors and 
nurses, police and prisons officers, and some qualified primary school teachers were all 
denied a chance to retire early. The Ministry of Public Service advanced four major 
reasons to justify the introduction of the voluntary retirement scheme namely: 
                                                 
353 Source: Adapted with minor changes from the IMF Staff Country Report No. 98/61, International 
Monetary Fund. Uganda: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, p. 19. 
354 Interview with Mr. J.B Ssemakula, Assistant Commissioner for Personnel, Ministry of Education held 
August 18, 2006. 
355 The official retirement age used to be 55 years but it was raised to 60 by an Act of Parliament on 
December 19, 1993 when the NRC passed the Pensions Act. 
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• it is a quick and equitable way of achieving rapid reductions in staff and 
maintaining the fast pace of civil service reform to enable the government 
to move quickly towards the payment of a living wage 
• it provides a more humane way of removing staff and limits the level of 
resentment and grievance of those who leave the service 
• as it is optional, those who leave may be more willing to explore 
opportunities elsewhere and to contribute towards private sector 
development 
• a voluntary scheme should have a lower overall cost, as it avoids most the 
extensive process of review necessary for compulsory retirement and 
retrenchment.356 
Civil servants that were retrenched and those that retired voluntarily enjoyed 
generous financial packages from the government. According to Director Administrative 
Reform, the retrenches and retirees were offered a standard safety net payment 
amounting to 1,000,000/= (one million Uganda shillings – at that time the exchange rate 
was 1 US $ to 400 Uganda shillings) as a “golden-hand shake” to assist them establish 
income generating activities.357 More than two thousand dollars was a fairly high amount 
to the civil servants who were used to earning as little as 30 dollars per month because of 
the long economic and political crisis the country endured. In addition, those who were 
                                                 
356 Government of Uganda, Ministry of Public Service. 1994. Management of Change: Content, Vision, 
Objectives, strategy and Plan. Kampala: Uganda Printing and Publishing Corporation, p. 31. 
357 Interview with Ms. Deborah Katuramu, Director, Administrative Reform, Ministry of Public Service, 
Uganda, held July 21, 2006. 
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let go were offered a one month basic salary in lieu of annual leave; a severance pay (for 
permanent and pensionable staff) equivalent to three months basic pay for every one 
completed year of service up to a maximum of twenty years; committed pensions, 
gratuity, and monthly pension to those 45 years old and above who were confirmed in the 
service and served continuously for the last ten years; and transportation (monetary 
equivalent) to their home districts; while those that used be contract staff were offered 
twenty five percent of gross emoluments.358 The retrenchment costs for both voluntary 
and mandatory retirement were largely financed by foreign donors, partly the reason why 
the package was generous especially in the first three years (1994-1996). Table 6.3 below 
indicates average retrenchment packages for the years 1995-97. 
 Because of the generous compensation package, the number of applicants for 
voluntary retirement far exceeded the number set by the reform program. For instance by 
July 1994, 152,718 applications had been received, yet the target number was 
approximately 7,000.359 Some analysts have asserted that the Ugandan “financial 
compensation appeared relatively good,”360 while some have also argued that the package 
was well received by the retirees. Langseth and Mugaju (1996) assert that some civil 
                                                 
358 Government of Uganda, Ministry of Public Service. 1994. Management of Change: Content, Vision, 
Objectives, strategy and Plan. Kampala: Uganda Printing and Publishing Corporation, pp. 33-34. 
359 Government of Uganda, Ministry of Public Service. 1994 Civil Service Reform Status Report 2, October 
1993-February 1994. Kampala. 
360 See McCourt, W. 1998. “Civil Service Reform Equals Retrenchment? The experience of ‘Right-sizing’ 
and Retrenchment in Ghana, Uganda and the U.K.” In Minogue, M et al Beyond New Public Management: 
Changing ideas and Practices in Governance. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, p. 178. 
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servants when asked what they thought about the package revealed that “even if I had 
stayed in the service, I would never have handled that kind of money at a go.”361 
 
Table 6.3 Uganda Retrenchment Packages, 1995-1997. 
 1995 1996 1997 
Jan. - June 
Established Employees 
     Number of retrenched employees1 
     Retrenchment cost (in millions of U.S. dollars 
     Package per employee (in U.S. dollars) 
 
950 
2.57 
2,705.26 
 
4,891 
5.46 
1,116.34 
 
1,968 
1.12 
569.11 
     Central government 
           Number of retrenched employees1 
           Retrenchment cost (in millions of dollars) 
           Package per employees (in U.S. dollars) 
 
708 
2.24 
3,163.84 
 
12 
0.02 
1,666.67 
 
0 
0.00 
0.00 
     District Governments 
           Number of retrenched employees1 
           Retrenchment cost (in millions of dollars) 
           Package per employees (in U.S. dollars) 
 
242 
0.33 
1,363.64 
 
4,879 
5.44 
1,114.98 
 
1,968 
1.12 
569.11 
Support employees 
     Number of retrenched employees2 
     Retrenchment cost (in millions of U.S. dollars 
     Package per employee (in U.S. dollars)  
 
6,037 
0.98 
162.33 
 
6,840 
1.02 
149.12 
 
3,360 
0.50 
148.81 
Source: Adapted with minor changes from the IMF Staff Country Report No. 98/61, International 
Monetary Fund. Uganda: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, p. 19. 
1 Financed by donors. 
2 Financed by the government of Uganda. 
 
It is partly because of the above generous compensation packages that 
retrenchment and down-sizing efforts did not generate any social turmoil in the country. 
Harvey and Robinson (1995) equally assert that retrenchment did not meet resistance 
because of the attractive severance packages.362  Brown et al. (1995)363 observe the “lack 
                                                 
361 Langseth, P. and Justus Mugaju. 1996. Post-Conflict Uganda: Towards an Effective Civil Service. 
Kampala: Fountain Publishers, p. 72. 
362 See Harvey, C. and Robinson, M. 1995. Economic Reform and Political Liberalization in Uganda. IDS 
Research Report 29, Brighton: Sussex, p. 15. 
363 See  Brown, K. Kithinji Kiragu, and S. Villadsen. 1995. Uganda Civil Service Reform Case Study: Final 
Report. UK-ODA and Danida.  
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of popular uproar” against massive retrenchments in Uganda and it seems this situation is 
not unique to Uganda. Therkildsen (2001)364 asserts that in five eastern and southern 
African countries, there was typically no protest against down-sizing efforts. Yet, while 
conducive retirement packages might have had a role to play in this seemingly docile 
reception towards retrenchment and other down-sizing efforts, it should be kept in mind 
that generally civil servants are not well organized in terms of collective bargaining 
efforts. In Uganda in particular, the trade unions are very weak, poorly organized, and not 
cohesive. It is therefore not surprising that a significant reduction was effected without 
protest in the CS from 1992-1996. 
In July 1998, another special voluntary retirement scheme was launched. The 
applicants were 2,896 and of that number, 1,179 were approved for retirement. 560 
received their due severance packages by December 31 of the same year and the rest in 
1999. Table 6.4 below shows the cases that were handled in 1998. It is evident from the 
table above that more public servants preferred to leave their positions than those actually 
let go. From 2, 896 applicants, only 1, 879 were approved for early retirement. The 
generous package is again the reason offered for the “rush” to retire but it has been noted 
that the economic situation and private sector in the country were beginning to improve 
and many civil servants were eager to leave public service for the private sector 
employment.365  
                                                 
364 Therkildsen, O. 2001. “Efficiency, Accountability, and Implementation: Public Sector Reform in East 
and Southern Africa.” Geneva: UNRISD Programme Paper 3. 
365 Interview with Mr. Paul Bogere, Assistant Commissioner Human Resources and Development, Ministry 
of Public Service, held July 19, 2006. 
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Table 6.4 Summary of the Cases handled under the Special Voluntary Retirement 
Scheme  - 1998. 
 
MINISTRY/ DEPARTMENT NUMBER NUMBER NOT 
  RECEIVED APPROVED APPROVED 
Office of the President 187 40 147 
Health 113 49 64 
Mulago Complex 33 − 33 
Foreign Affairs 17 12 5 
State House 26 18 8 
Gender Labor and Social       
Development 140 41 99 
Finance Planning and       
Economic Development 79 33 46 
Works, Housing, and       
Communications 592 462 130 
Water, Lands, and Environment 349 117 232 
Agriculture, Animal Industry,       
and Fisheries 616 101 515 
Education and Sports 189 42 147 
Judiciary 77 20 57 
Tourism, Trade, and Industry 128 92 36 
Audit 6 − 6 
Judicial Service Commission 2 2 0 
Local Government 42 20 22 
Internal Affairs 20 11 9 
Police 57 − 57 
Prisons 6 − 6 
Office of the Prime Minister 64 45 19 
Public Service 37 21 16 
Education Service Commission 15 7 8 
Public Service Commission 7 4 3 
Justice and Constitutional Affairs 18 3 15 
Energy and Mineral Development 48 24 24 
Defense 28 15 13 
TOTAL 2,896 1,179 1,717 
Source: Government of Uganda, Public Service Reform Programme. Report for the Year 1998. 
Administrative Reform Secretariat, Ministry of Public Service, Kampala, Appendix E. 
 
It has been asserted that “the applicants that were not approved were mainly persons 
whose services Government considered were still necessary.”366 
                                                 
366 Government of Uganda, Public Service Reform Programme. Report for the Year 1998. Administrative 
Reform Secretariat, Ministry of Public Service, Kampala, p. 6. 
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The down-sizing efforts in the Ugandan CSRP generated a tremendous reduction 
in the staffing levels of the civil service especially between the years 1992- 1996. By the 
end of 1998, the civil service which in 1990 had 350,000 was reduced to 165,724 
persons. Table 6.5 and figure 6.1 show how the workforce was reduced. 
 
Table 6.5 The Size of the Civil Service (old definition) for the Years 1990-1998 
  Jun - 90 Jun - 92 Jun - 94 Jun - 95 Jun - 96 Jun - 97 Jun - 98 Dec - 98 
Police and                 
Prisons 31,000 26,826 26,390 26,894 19,679 19,341 18,441 18,232 
Teaching                  
Services 148,500 114,000 99,190 92,633 90,494 91,759 99,036 105,482 
Traditional                 
Civil Service 140,500 94,800 51,675 37,276 48,796 46,089 43,379 42,010 
                  
TOTAL 320,000 235,626 177,255 156,803 158,969 157,189 160,856 165,724 
Source: Government of Uganda, Public Service Reform Programme. Report for the Year 1998. Ministry of 
Public Service, Administrative Reform Secretariat, Kampala, Appendix F. 
Note: The old definition of the civil service excludes districts’ locally hired staff. 
 
On the basis of table 6.5 and figure 6.1 offered below, it can be asserted that the 
first phase of the CSRP did indeed achieve its goal of reducing the size of the civil 
service. From 320,000 in 1990 to 165,724 in 1998, the size of the service was reduced by 
almost 50 percent. Many scholars and analysts applauded the staff reduction efforts. 
Langseth (1995) asserted that “the achievements of the CSRP have been impressive.” He 
asserted that the size of the civil service had been reduced dramatically in four years from 
320,000 to 150,000. In his view, the CS was streamlined by redefining the role of 
government and by reducing the number of ministries and departments from 38 to 21.367 
                                                 
367 Langseth, P. 1995. “Civil Service Reform in Uganda: Lessons Learned.” In Public Administration and 
Development, Vol. 15, pp.365-390.  
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Figure 6.1 The Size of the Civil Service for the Years 1990-1998 
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Source: Government of Uganda, Public Service Reform Programme. Report for the Year 1998. Ministry of 
Public Service, Administrative Reform Secretariat, Kampala, Appendix F. 
 
 McCourt (1998) also believes that Uganda has been a “right-sizing success” but 
questions whether civil service reform simply equals retrenchment.368 Clarke and Wood 
(2001) also applaud Uganda’s efforts at staff reduction by asserting that the main 
achievement of the CSRP has been significant staff reductions.369  Kjaer (2004) added her 
voice to the many cheerleaders of the Uganda CSRP staff reduction efforts by asserting 
that “The Uganda government was able to cut its public service by half …. And most 
retrenches were well compensated with considerable retrenchment packages.”370  
                                                 
368 See McCourt, W. 1998 Ibid, pp. 172-187. 
369 Clarke, J. and David Wood. 2001. Ibid, pp. 70-89. 
370 Kjaer, A. M. 2004. “Old Brooms can Sweep too! An Overview of Rulers and Public Sector Reforms in 
Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya.” In the Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 389-413.  
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The above positive appraisals of the first phase of Uganda CSRP are indeed 
credible because the size of the service did fall, but from table 6.5 and figure 6.1 above, it 
can be clearly seen that while the total number of the staff in the traditional civil service 
and police and prisons has declined consistently, the reverse has happened with the 
teaching service. Estimated at 148,500 in 1990, the teaching service was at its lowest 
level in June 1996 at 90,494. However, during the presidential election held the same 
year, the incumbent pledged during the campaign to offer free universal primary 
education (UPE) for all school going children six years old and above. The fulfillment of 
his pledge necessitated an increase in the number of primary school teachers and by the 
end of the year 1998 the number had risen to 105,482.  
 
6.2.3. Challenges in the Reduction of the CS Size 
Many of the participants interviewed in the study were of the view that the gains 
generated by reducing the size of the CS in the first five years of reform implementation 
are gradually being eroded by the growth of the overall number of public servants. Some 
of the reasons identified as causing the increase in staff numbers include UPE, formation 
of agencies, establishment of new districts, and increase in the number of ministries. 
According to the Director Administrative Reform, Ministry of Public Service,  
“In the middle of 1997, the number began to rise again as a result of other policy 
developments particularly by UPE which necessitated getting more primary 
teachers, the plan for modernization of agriculture which necessitated more 
extension workers, and other areas that came in as and when government made 
other policy changes. So those contributed to the increase in number. Then like 
two years ago, we had new districts coming on board which have also contributed 
to increasing the numbers and of course the costs, so the intentions which we had 
in 1991 we have had factors militating against them and therefore the number has 
gone up and certainly the cost has gone up especially the administrative cost.” 
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The UPE program is perceived as a major government mission to “eradicate 
illiteracy, while equipping every individual with the basic skills and knowledge with 
which to exploit the environment for both self and national development.”371 The 
Assistant Commissioner Planning and Budgeting, Ministry of Education, viewed the UPE 
program as a great achievement for the country thus; “It is gratifying that since 1997, 
when UPE was launched, the total primary school pupil enrollment has risen from almost 
3 million to a phenomenal 7.6 million as of 2003. Not surprisingly UPE has generated an 
equally big increase in the number of teachers required and in turn an increase in the 
government expenditure on education, something that the reform program had not 
anticipated. The number of teachers on the payroll increased from 81,564 in 1996 to 
122,904 by June 2003.” He added, “Out of the total education sector budget of 505.17 
billion shillings for financial year 2002/2003, the primary education sub-sector alone was 
allocated 336.18 billion shillings, representing a share of the 66.5 percent of the total 
budget for recurrent expenditure.”372 All the participants I interviewed appreciated the 
importance of the UPE program but they also indicated that it was introduced in haste, 
the administrative reform secretariat and Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic 
Development were not given enough time to prepare for the implications of the 
implementing such a big program on the over all reform process, and one person 
                                                 
371 Government of Uganda, Ministry of Education and Sports. 2004. Enhancing UPE: A Stakeholders 
Handbook. Kampala, p. 3. 
372 Interview with Mr. Godfrey Arnold Dhatemwa, Assistant Commissioner Planning and Budgeting, 
Ministry of Education, Uganda. Held July 26, 2006. 
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indicated that UPE had  worked against the reform efforts geared towards pay increases, 
a point I elaborate further on under the pay reform section.   
Because the education sector was notorious for “ghost workers” prior to the 
reform implementation, I was keen to know how massive recruitment of teachers was 
being handled. The Assistant Commissioner for Personnel in the Ministry of Education 
and Sports revealed that the number of teachers has indeed increased but systematically, 
based on total pupil enrollment. He said; “Before we were growing any how, currently 
we grow by formula. We utilize the student teacher ratio which is scientifically 
determined and as long as you have that, it becomes easy to monitor the teacher payroll 
and keep abreast with the numbers. Currently the teacher student ratio is one to fifty so a 
school with 500 pupils should have ten teachers and nothing less or nothing more…”373 
  The size of the Uganda CS has also increased because of the establishment of 
semi-autonomous public service agencies. The rationale for establishing the agencies was 
to that allowing them autonomy would foster efficiency, income generation, and better 
service delivery. International financial institutions and donor agencies have all 
advocated the establishment of agencies. Caulfield (2006) agrees when she asserts that 
“one widely held view among the donor community is that the executive agency is good 
for developing countries in that it can manage its affairs in a businesslike way, free from 
political interference in day-to-day operations.”374 There are over one hundred 
                                                 
373 Interview with Mr. J.B. Semakula, Assistant Commissioner for Personnel, Ministry of Education and 
Sports, Kampala. Held  August 18, 2006. 
374 Caulfield, J. 2006. “The Politics of Bureau Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Public Administration and 
Development, Vol. 26, p. 22. 
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autonomous and semi autonomous public bodies and public enterprises in Uganda – see 
Appendix 3 for the list as of 2006. Generally, these agencies have their own statutes, have 
their own boards, their own salary scales, but get funds from the government 
consolidated fund in addition to the ones they raise on their own.375 Although they are 
divested from the ministries, they operate under the framework of principle-agent 
relationship between the agency management board and the parent ministry.  
While the government may have been optimistic in establishing the agencies, 
many of the participants I interviewed did not have a good perception about their 
establishment, functioning, and over all effect on the CSRP. They decried the manner in 
which the agencies instead of being self sustaining depend on government, recruit staff 
without regard to the CSRP ideals, and worsen salary disparity in government 
employment.376 The participants did not challenge the potential usefulness of the agencies 
but asserted that their set up was not properly done. It was indicated that issues pertaining 
to performance measurement were not accorded due attention, and that effort was not 
made to ensure that duplication of roles and responsibilities did not arise.377 Therefore, in 
the pursuit of other programs, the Uganda government has diverted from the original 
goals of the reform with various consequences some detrimental to staff reduction, pay 
reform, and even overall efficiency of the service. The views reinforce the fact that while 
                                                 
375 Many of the study participants interviewed were of the view that most of the agencies do not have 
income generating activities to sustain themselves and so are a burden to the government. 
376 Interview with Ms. Deborah Katuramu, Director, Administrative Reform, Ministry of Public Service, 
Kampala, Uganda, held July 21, 2006. 
377 Interview with Mr. Kenneth Mugamba, Commissioner Budget Policy and Evaluation, Ministry of 
Finance, Planning and Economic Development, Kampala, Uganda, held July 17, 2006. 
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initial success was realized in staff reductions in the first few years of the reform, 
intervening programs have gradually undermined that success and generated unforeseen 
problems. 
 Another reason that size has continued to grow is because of the establishment of 
more and more Districts at the local level. The Districts were established under the 
decentralization policy framework initiated in 1991. The policy aimed “to make local 
governments effective centers of local and democratic decision making for planning, 
implementation and management of development services.”378 According to the 
Undersecretary, Finance and Administration, Ministry of Local Government, prior to 
decentralization, the Ministry of Local Government was the epitome of government 
centralization. 
“It was a huge ministry which used to handle almost everything that used to take 
place in the local governments but then from the center for example they used to 
handle primary education, there was a department of primary education here, 
there was a department of feeder roads headed by an engineer, there was a 
department of primary healthcare, essentially all ministries’ offices currently at 
the local level had offices here. When they decentralized, they left skeleton staff 
at the headquarters and also streamlined all the other services to the ministries 
where they belong…. They left primary healthcare to health, education went to 
education, so the ministry of local government remained with a skeleton staff to 
handle administration of local governments.”379 
Although Districts under the decentralization program, are supposed to generate 
their own funds, hire and fire their staff, and carry out their duties with reasonable central 
government support but free of its interference, in reality many of them rely on 
                                                 
378 Government of Uganda, Joint Annual Review of Decentralization 2004. Ministry of Local Government, 
Kampala, p. 1. 
379 Interview with Mrs. Monica Kalemba, Undersecretary, Finance and Administration, Ministry of Local 
Government, Kampala, Uganda. Held July 25, 2006. 
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government funding for their functioning. At the start of the CSRP Uganda had 39 
districts, in 1997 they increased to 44, in 2000 twelve more were created raising the 
number to 56, in 2005 twenty two more were created to reach a total of 78 and as of July 
2006, the number had risen to 80 Districts. At face value, one might think that the 
creation of districts is good for governance and service delivery since it means more 
services are brought closer to the people. Yet in administrative and economic terms, the 
creation of more Districts leads to expansion of the public service because a district 
bureaucracy has to be established.  
In general, a district bureaucracy is composed of the District Service Commission 
headed by a Chairperson that hires the staff. The District is headed by the Chief 
Administrative Officer who works hand in hand with the various district heads of 
departments. Every ministry in Uganda has a department at the district level. In effect, 
every district established necessitates more fiscal expenditure, more staff, and even more 
politicians. In Uganda, every District is divided into a County, Sub-county, Parish and 
Village. All the five levels have elected politicians, and career public servants are found 
at the district level and county level. In addition as per the Uganda Constitution, every 
district has to have a woman member of Parliament and every county has a 
parliamentarian. An observer lamented in one of the daily newspapers in Uganda about 
the reckless establishment of districts. In his article “Can Uganda’s Economy Support 
More Districts?” Denis Ocwich asserted that “in 2005, it costs government between 
sh685m and sh1.031b to pay wages of district civil servants (excluding teachers), 
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annually depending on the size of a district.”380 It was similarly revealed that in the year 
2003/2004 the local government transfers constituted about 38.5 percent of the total 
national budget as compared with 18 percent for the years 1997/98.381  
 The formation of districts has been criticized as a political ploy to garner popular 
support for the local masses. Indeed, all the new districts seem to be awarded just prior to 
national presidential elections – 1996, 2000, 2005. An officer from the Ministry of Local 
Government who spoke to me in confidence said that;  
“The manner in which districts are being formed is simply ridiculous. Many of the 
new districts have been curved from mere counties without any income 
generating capabilities. What is the point of forming a district with a population of 
less than 30,000 people that has no property to boast of, even no trading center? 
The way I see it politicians create districts in order to appease their constituencies 
so that they can be reelected. They make empty promises of more health clinics, 
more schools etc… In reality, all that cannot be realized because these new 
districts have to start from scratch and rely on government grants which are often 
conditional. In my view, its time we started another reform to reform the current 
civil service reform.”382 
 
The above discussion shows that there is back-tracking and politics is trumping the 
reform goals. It can therefore be asserted that political commitment to adhere to the 
original goals of the reforms has waned. Indeed both the UPE and establishment of 
districts are viewed by many civil servants as political tools used to popularize the 
Museveni government.  
                                                 
380 Denis Ocwich. 2005.  “Can Uganda’s Economy Support More Districts?” In the New Vision, Monday, 
8th August, 2005.   
381 Interview with Mrs. Monica Kalemba, Undersecretary, Finance and Administration, Ministry of Local 
Government, Kampala, Uganda. Held July 25, 2006. 
382 Interview No. DW 0010, held August 10, 2006. 
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 Efforts to keep the size of the service low have also been sabotaged by the 
establishment of new ministries and appointment of what has been termed a political 
bureaucracy. According to Robinson (2006)  “There has been marked growth in recent 
years in what might be termed the political bureaucracy, comprising officials and 
advisors in the State House (Office of the President), the Office of the Prime Minister 
(OPM), the Movement Secretariat, central government ministers and district resident 
commissioners….There has been a large expansion in the number of presidential 
advisers, currently estimated to be 72”383 In his view, it is no wonder that the overall 
number of the public servants has grown. Here again it is evident that political 
considerations are undermining the reform program. 
 
6.2.4 The Reduction of the Size of the Ugandan CS: Rhetoric or Reality? 
 
The analysis presented above shows that the CSRP was committed to reducing the 
size of the Uganda CS. It has been shown that the reduction was effected through various 
ways among them; rationalization and restructuring of ministries and districts, 
retrenchment, and voluntary retirement. It has been shown that from 1991 to 1995, the 
CSRP was rigorous, had great momentum, and managed to drastically reduce the size of 
the civil service. Ministries were reduced from 38 in 1991 to 17 in 2006, and the 
traditional CS which was 140,500 in 1990 was reduced to 41,730 in 2004. These findings 
confirm Robinson’s (2006) assertion that “success in the civil service reform resulted 
from downsizing and rationalizing the bureaucracy, reflected in a reduction in the number 
                                                 
383 Robinson, M. 2006. “The Political Economy of Governance Reforms in Uganda.” IDS Discussion Paper 
386, p. 18. 
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of civil servants and ministries.” 384 However, after the introduction of the UPE program 
in 1996, the control over size loosened and the subsequent political machinations 
manifest in the creation of more districts and incessant hiring of political staff have made 
it even harder to sustain the positive trend set in the early 1990s. Table 6.6 below shows 
the growth trend in the size of the public service from 1999 to 2004.  
 
Table 6.6 The Size of the Public Service June 1999 - June 2004.  
  Jun - 99 Jun - 00 Jun - 01 Jun - 02 Jun - 03 Jun - 04 
Traditional             
Civil Service 42,557 41,176 41,260 41,282 40,328 41,730 
Teaching              
Services 106,396 108,438 122,530 139,947 146,848 150,534 
Local              
Governments 37,682 38,054 38,609 39,303 41,049 41,049 
              
TOTAL 186,635 187,668 202,399 220,532 228,225 233,313 
Source: Government of Uganda, Ministry of Public Service. 2003. Public Service Reform Program Annual 
Report for the Financial Year 2002/03. Kampala, p. 59 
 
Table 6.6 shows that while the traditional public service numbers have been relatively 
steady, those of the teaching service and local governments have been increasing. The 
study participants agreed that the increase in the number of teachers is justified and 
commended government efforts to increase literacy, but they perceived the increase in the 
local government staff as unnecessary. Figure 6.2 below shows the reduction and growth 
pattern of the civil service. 
 
                                                 
384 Robinson, M. 2006, Ibid, p. 31. 
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Figure 6.2 Size of the Ugandan Civil Service 1990 – 2004 
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From the above figure the dramatic reduction and gradual increase of the total 
number of the civil servants is evident. It can therefore be asserted that the initial 
momentum of the reform has not been sustained and civil service is once again 
expanding. Yet, when compared to the one prior to the reform in 1990, the current size 
shows that the reduction has been successful. Indeed, the rhetoric has been turned to 
reality. 
 
6.3 IMPROVING REMUNERATION: THE POLITICS OF PAY REFORM IN 
THE UGANDA CSRP 
 
 Salaries and wages are among the many terms and conditions of civil service 
employment under review in various countries. While pressure has been brought to bear 
on many developing countries to reduce the cost of administrative systems with emphasis 
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placed on size and expenditure reduction, it is recognized that reducing government 
expenditure should not be at the expense of enticing qualified and experienced people to 
seek and retain government employment. In many developing countries, civil service 
salaries were high in the period immediately before and after independence. In Africa, an 
ILO study found that this trend was reversed between 1975 and 1985 during which period 
the average basic salary fell by about 30 to 40 percent.385 The CS in Uganda which at 
independence was lean, efficient, well-paid and highly motivated, was by 1970 in total 
disarray as chapter 5 illustrated and had one of the poorest pay in Africa. In 1990, the 
PSRRC reiterated what was already common knowledge, that the civil service 
bureaucracy was extremely dysfunctional with “abysmally low salaries and wages.”386  It 
was recognized that improving worker incentives was critical for a more effective civil 
service.  
The commission therefore recommended that government improve the salary and 
morale of government workers by following four reinforcing steps; 
• Government should pay a Minimum Living Wage (MLW) to its employees to 
enable the worker to afford a basket of goods and services “needed to keep the 
body and soul together”. 
• Pay a Living wage that exceeds the MLW to enable the worker to produce such 
other basic needs as health, children’s education, transport and appropriate 
clothing 
                                                 
385 See Robinson, D. 1990. “Civil Service Remuneration in Africa.” International Labour Review, Vol. 
129, No. 3, pp. 371-386. 
386 The Public Service Review and Reorganization Commission Report, 1990, Kampala, Uganda. 
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• Pay an appropriate national wage that is commensurate to the qualifications, 
experience, job responsibilities, and performance of the employee. This wage 
would enable employees to save and invest; and  
• Finally the entire service should be accorded at a regional (Africa-Wide 
Preferential Trade Area) appropriate wage that would place Ugandans at par with 
their counterparts in the region.387 
However, the PSRRC found that there were many pertinent issues that needed to be 
streamlined in pay reform before a MLW could be offered. One of the issues was the pay 
and grading system. The entire CS pay and grading system consisted of 64 different 
grades, which made the grade range extremely narrow. As a result, the incentive scope of 
the structure was severely limited since progression through the pay points was almost 
worthless to salary increases. Second, progression through the salary scale at grades 
below U1 which is the highest grade in the CS was based on length of service which did 
not allow scope for rewarding those that performed above average. Third, the overall 
grade structure was too compressed with a ratio of 1:6. The compressed ratio prevented 
the system from adequately differentiating among the real value of the various service 
jobs such that even promotion could not improve prospects for better pay. Lastly, pay 
distortions were exacerbated by 76 different types of allowances paid to civil servants. 
Among them are housing allowances, transport allowances, lunch allowance and 
professional allowances. The multitude of allowances generated many problems ranging 
from when they should be paid, to whom, through which methods, administrative 
                                                 
387 Ibid. 
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intricacy and leeway for abuse. Pay reform therefore had to deal with all the above issues 
and proceed to implement the recommendations of the PSRRC.  
 According the Ministry of Public Service, the objective of pay reform within the 
CSRP was “to rationalize the pay structure of civil servants, reduce or eliminate the non-
cash elements of remuneration and achieve a living wage. In the longer term, when 
resources permit, the objective is to introduce a motivational, performance related 
“optimal” pay structure.”388 The pay reform component of the CSRP sought to attain a 
LW for the workers by dealing with the incongruent aspects of the salary structures and 
procedures. Particular focus was placed on elimination of distortions in the pay grading 
system and the elimination of allowances and benefits. Table 6.7 shows the major 
problems that pay reform was to address and the manner in which they were to be 
handled. 
 
Table 6.7 Major Problems in the Civil Service Pay and Envisaged Solutions 
PROBLEM HOW IT WAS ADDRESSED 
Inadequate Pay Across the CS Pay Enhancement Across the Board 
Design Weakness in Pay and  Job Evaluation and Rationalization 
     Grading System      of the System 
Compressed Salary Structure Decompression and Pay Differentials 
Ad hoc Allowances Monetization and Consolidation 
Incongruence Between Pay   
     and Performance Performance Related Pay 
                                                 
388 Government of Uganda, Ministry of Public Service. 1993. Civil Service Reform Status Report 1. 
Kampala, Uganda, p. 16.  
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Pay reform is a critical component of civil service reform program in Uganda and 
remains the most challenging. Little progress has been attained in improving the civil 
servants’ salaries. Compared with the reduction of the size of the CS component, 
evidence shows that the success attained in reducing the CS size has not been as 
forthcoming in improving salaries and wages. When the reform was initiated in 1991, it 
was envisaged that the savings made from reducing the size of the service would be used 
to offer better remuneration packages. And for a while, salaries were enhanced as 
depicted below. However, the increases have not been consistent and the gains of size 
reduction have been reversed with the increase in the teaching primary school staff, an 
issue that has negatively impacted the pay reform program. Evidence generated from the 
interviews and government documents indicates that while some progress has been made, 
the major goal of pay reform, the payment of a living wage, has not been attained. 
 
6.3.1 Salary Enhancement: The Pursuit of the Minimum Living wage 
The Minimum Living Wage (MLW) recommended by the PSRRC was based on a 
cost of living survey undertaken in 1989-1990 (also known as the food basket survey that 
included food, shelter, transport, and school fees expenditures) which provided that the 
lowest grade junior civil servant (U7) should be paid 70,000 Uganda shillings per month 
(The Uganda shilling/dollar exchange rate was 800/1). According to the Director of 
Administrative Reform in the Ministry of Public Service, “the government accepted the 
PSRRC recommendations for improving the remuneration structure and is committed, as 
resources permit, to a phased progression towards a level of total emoluments that is 
commensurate with the qualifications, experience, and responsibilities of civil 
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servants.”389 Indeed, Government was keen to show commitment to enhance the salaries 
that in the financial year 1991/92 civil service salaries were increased by 43% across 
board, in the 1992/93 financial year an 85% increase on basic pay was awarded, and in 
the 1993/94 financial year, a 37% increase in the overall wage bill was approved. 
Government was able to offer such salary increments because of the savings of 
approximately ten billion Uganda shillings (UShs) saved as a result of retrenchment of 
group employees and the cleaning up of the payroll.390 In spite of such efforts, the salary 
levels remained very low and far from the recommended MLW. Langseth and Mugaju 
(1996) lamented that “after these salary increases, Uganda’s wage bill was still only 1.2 
percent of GDP – one of the lowest wage bills in Africa.”391 During the period from 1990 
to 1994 the national economy was steadily recovering with a growth rate of 10% per 
annum. Based on the revenue projections and further reductions in the size of the CS 
workforce, it was anticipated that the MLW would be attainable by July 1996. The 
anticipation was also based on the assumption that monetization of benefits and 
consolidation of all allowances would be incorporated into the wage bill. Table 6.8 below 
illustrates the projected take home salary for the lowest salary scale level from 1993 to 
1996 when the MLW would be offered. The salary is predicated on the continued 
reduction of the number of CS workers. In 1996, the US dollar/Uganda shilling exchange 
                                                 
389 Interview with the Director of Administrative Reform Secretariat, Ministry of Public Service, held July 
21, 2006. 
390 Government of Uganda, Ministry of Public Service. 1994. Management of Change: Context, Vision, 
Objectives, Strategy and Plan. Kampala, Uganda.  
391 Langseth, P. and Justus Mugaju, 1996. Post-Conflict Uganda: Towards an Effective Civil Service. 
Kampala: Fountain Publishers, p. 73. 
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rate was 1 to 1,000, hence the junior officer would earn 70 dollars per month. The 
compression suggested was 10:1 and so the highest paid officer (U1) would earn 700 
dollars per month (700,000 Uganda Shillings).  
 
Table 6. 8 Projected Minimum Living Wage (Uganda Shillings) 
  Apr - 93 July - 93 July - 94 July - 95 July - 96 
Minimum Wage 19,000 27,000 45,000 60,000 70,000 
(Scale U7) Monthly Ushs Ushs Ushs Ushs Ushs 
  65 89 120 150 180 
Wage Bill Billion Billion Billion Billion Billion 
(Annual) Ushs Ushs Ushs Ushs Ushs 
Staff in the           
Civil Service 218,141 214,943 145,000 145,000 145,000 
Source: Government of Uganda, Ministry of Public Service, Personnel Monitoring Unit (PMU) in Ministry 
of Public Service. 1994. Management of Change: Context, Vision, Objectives, Strategy and Plan. Kampala, 
Uganda, p. 36. 
  
In reality however, by 1996, salary did not increase as planned. While 
considerable pay increases were enjoyed by all civil servants and the MLW target was 
attained, those in the higher echelons of the civil service hierarchy benefitted the most. 
The junior officer at U8 received at 930 percentage salary increase by 1997, but the 
permanent secretary at U1 enjoyed a far higher 4,246% increase in his/her salary. With 
this increase, the compression ration was approximately 22:1 pointing to the fact that 
although sweeping salary increases were advocated, an egalitarian pay structure was not 
yet attained and employees with scarce skills, especially in the middle level grades, were 
not getting the pay they deserved. Moreover, despite continued economic growth, 
Uganda’s wage bill as a percentage of GDP still did not compare favorably with other 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. In 1996, the average wage bill for Sub-Saharan Africa 
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was over 6.5% of GDP whereas the Ugandan wage bill was only 4.9% of GDP but 
noticeably, an increase from 1.2% in 1993. Indeed, the increase is quite remarkable even 
for the junior officers. Table 6.9 below shows the real salary increases for select 
categories of civil servants.  
 
Table 6.9 Civil Service Salaries for the Years 1993 and 1997 (select civil servants) in 
US Dollars Equivalent. 
 
CIVIL SERVANT MONTHLY PAY MONTHLY PAY PERCENTAGE 
  IN 1993 (US$) IN 1997 (US$) INCREASE 
Primary Teacher (U7) 7.41 68.90 930 
Nurse 7.41 87.05 1,175 
Policeman (UP8) 6.61 66.39 1,004 
Permanent       
Secretary (U1) 36.51 1,550.36 4,246 
Source: Government of Uganda, Ministry of Public Service. 2002. Public Service Reform Programme 
1997-2002. p. 3. 
 
In their study of public service reform in Uganda and Tanzania, Clarke and Wood 
(2001) also found that there was a dramatic increase in pay levels in Uganda and they use 
the teachers’ salaries to illustrate their point. “The monthly wage of a primary school 
teacher rose from US$3 in 1990 to US$66 in 1997.”392 Indeed, all my interviewees 
agreed that salaries have since the initiation of the CSRP improved. One interviewee 
from the Ministry of Finance said that;  
“Over all, I think salaries have improved…. Salary for me has improved and in 
fact actually to be frank in the traditional civil service we don’t hear, we hear less 
and less people being desperate. Like the kind of situation that was there when I 
                                                 
392 Clarke, J. and David Wood. 2001. “New Public Management and Development: The Case of Public 
Service Reform in Uganda and Tanzania.” In  The internationalization of Public Management: Reinventing 
the Third World State.  McCourt, w. and Martin Minogue (eds), Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, pp. 71-
72. 
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joined the public service in 1990 is not the same as it is today. We have in a way 
been consistent in increasing pay annually because on average we have been 
putting in an additional between ten to fifteen billion shillings on an annul basis 
specifically for pay reform. There is an improvement and from what I see, people 
are not as desperate.”393  
 
Others voiced similar sentiments. “Salaries are actually being enhanced for all public 
servants on an annual basis. We have come from far.” Another; “Before the reforms, the 
pay was terribly low now it has been enhanced.” An officer from the Ministry of Finance 
revealed her personal story; “Of course salary has improved. When I joined the ministry 
as a personnel officer at grade level U4 I was earning 180,000 per month. In five years it 
has gone up to 660,000 so it has more than tripled and since increments come every 
financial year then maybe in some time, in ten years we will be getting a good amount of 
money.” 394 Official documents convey similar views. In the Public Service Reform 
Strategy 2002-2007, it is asserted that “Although the feeling among public officers is that 
pay is still very low, the trend shows that there have been progressive efforts every year 
to increase pay. For Example, in the FY91/92 the minimum pay was Ug. Shs. 7,148 (then 
equivalent to about US $8) per month for an office attendant and in the FY01/02 it is Ug. 
Shs. 70,585 (US$40) per month. The pay for a Permanent Secretary was Ug. Shs. 39,027 
(about US$45) per month in the FY91/92 and is now Ug. Shs. 1,794,742 (US$1,020).”395 
 Yet, in spite of the positive views and appreciation of the pay rise, all my 
interviewees had a caveat to their pay rise songs of praise. It was revealed that when 
                                                 
393 Interview with Mr. Kenneth Mugamba, Commissioner Budget Policy and Evaluation Dept. MFPED, 
Held July 17, 06. 
394 Interview with Ms. Muhumuza Susan, Senior Personnel Officer, MFPED. Held July 18, 2006. 
395 Ministry of Public Service. 2002. Public Service Reform Strategy 2002-2007. Kampala, Uganda, p. 7 
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looked at in terms of quantum, salary has indeed gone up, but when inflation and the 
general cost of living are factored in, the increases lose value. Indeed the general 
agreement was that the salary is still not enough to cater for their basic needs. There was 
also a general view that government is not abiding by the salary targets. It was asserted 
that the government has on a number of times diverted money for salary to other areas 
like defense and health. Other scholars have also argued that the pay reform is not 
meeting its objectives.  Langseth and Mugaju (1996) are of the view that pay reform is 
moving slowly and civil servants are becoming impatient. They argue that “the civil 
service is getting restless” because reform measures such as retrenchment and ministerial 
restructuring have not generated savings that should improve pay conditions. From the 
above discussion, it is apparent that the while great strides have been made, the LW is 
still elusive for most of the civil servants.  
 
6.3.2 Elimination of Allowances and Monetization of Non-cash Benefits 
 Allowances are commonly offered in many administrative systems depending on 
the nature of work and the expenses incurred in the course of duty. In the developing 
countries, they also play a role of supplementing low pay and are in some instances 
boldly called top-up allowances. In Uganda prior to the CSRP, many civil servants relied 
on allowances to augment their salaries and relied on government housing to offset costs 
of living. The multiplicity of allowances created numerous problems among them 
distortions and inconsistencies in pay, unclear guidelines on eligibility, when to be paid, 
and lack of uniformity in defining and honoring the pay in different ministries, agencies, 
and even parts of the country. When the allowances are as many as 76, the scope for 
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abuse increases. Needless to say, those in the higher levels of the bureaucracy enjoyed 
most of the benefits and allowances. It was therefore decided that all allowances be 
consolidated into a single basic pay and all non-cash benefits be monetized. 
The elimination of many of the allowances and monetization of non-cash benefits 
like housing was therefore intended to generate greater transparency and fairness in the 
pay structure, enhance equity for employees in same pay grades, reduce the possibility of 
abuse, and give employees opportunity to use their income as they desired. It was also 
envisaged that consolidation of allowances into basic pay, and monetization of benefits, 
would help government to better assess how much is spent on individual emoluments.  
By the end of 1997, all allowances were consolidated into basic pay. Transport 
benefits and housing benefits were monetized, and government completely divested itself 
from providing houses (except for the army, prisons and police), and a consolidated 
salary package was offered to all civil servants. The consolidation enhanced the take-
home salary for approximately 70% of the civil servants. Those who after consolidation 
had salaries higher than the minimum living wage level did not get further increases. This 
was mainly the case with senior civil servants who in prior years benefitted from various 
allowances. According to one study participant who gave his views in confidence, the 
monetization of non-cash benefits and elimination of allowances did not create equity. He 
asserted that “In my view, monetization advantaged certain grades of staff but 
disadvantaged others. The evidence is in the compression ratio that rose from 1:20 to 
almost 1:100. A midlevel officer that previously had government housing now has to find 
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a house on market value when the salary is not enough to rent a decent house”396 Hence, 
although elimination of allowances and monetization of benefits are essentially good 
reforms, the fact that equity and egalitarian concerns were not paid attention to, raises 
serious concerns. However, pay reform was never intended to generate equity. If 
anything, the goal was to decompress the salary structure so that professional and 
technocrats can be better rewarded. The major problem therefore is not decompression, 
but rather, ensuring that mid-level officers get the necessary pay rises to motivate their 
stay in the civil service. Currently, salaries for personnel in the higher echelons of the 
civil service exceed the MLW targets whereas for the ones in the mid-levels they do not. 
Table 6.10 shows this disparity.  
 From table 6.10, it is evident that after consolidation benefits and allowances, 
personnel in pay levels U5 through U1 did not attain a MLW. There is no doubt that their 
salaries went up, but their expectations were dashed. It has been acknowledged that “At 
the senior/middle level of the service, it was found necessary to increase pay to a level 
approximately 25% less than the living wage target, in order to meet other demands on 
the wage bill.”397 The biggest demands were salary increases for primary school teachers 
and military expenditure. In the period 1997-1999, the effort was shifted to rationalizing 
the structure in order to make it more transparent and easy to administer. Consequently, a 
rational basis for grading jobs to determine their relative worth was developed through a 
job evaluation exercise. 
                                                 
396 Interview Number UG 0018, held August 18, 2006.   
397 Government of Uganda, Ministry of Public Service. 1996. Uganda Civil Service Reform Programme 
Status Report 9. Kampala, p. 33. 
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Table 6.10 Consolidated Civil Service Pay (Ug. Shs. gross per month). 
GRADE BASIC PAY CONSOLIDATED MINIMUM LIVING 
  1995/1996 PAY 1996/1997 WAGE TARGET 
  (Ushs) (Ushs) (Ushs) 
Permanent       
Secretary 162,029 1,627,884 1,099,269 
Director 152,441 1,095,197 771,366 
U1 162,092 617,244 771,366 
U2 100,034 396,782 534,254 
U3 96,458 265,440 361,194 
U4 92,788 194,911 270,034 
U5 78,928 142,034 155,527 
U6 54,157 93,157 91,028 
U7 49,788 75,204 70,515 
U8 35,744 53,473 58,941 
Support       
Staff 23,292 46,138 48,711 
Source: Government of Uganda, Ministry of Public Service. Uganda Civil Service Reform Programme 
Status Repot 9, Kampala, Uganda, p. 34. 
 
 
6.3.3 Rationalization of the Pay and Grading System 
 To streamline the pay and grading system, the Ministry of Public Service (MPS) 
undertook a job evaluation exercise. According to the Ministry of Public Service, the 
objective of the exercise was to “evaluate all jobs defined in the ministerial structures and 
allocate grades to these jobs, and to develop a new rational salary structure for the civil 
service taking into account restructuring.”398 The exercise accomplished the following: 
• Comparatively graded jobs across the various public service groups on the 
basis of qualifications, training, knowledge and weight of responsibilities 
                                                 
398 Government of Uganda. Ministry of Public Service. 1996. Uganda Civil Service Reform Programme: 
Status Report 10. Kampala, p. 18. 
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• Gauged the disparities in pay among the jobs of the same grade, and  
• Objectively indicated what adjustments in pay among the various jobs grades 
and across staff are needed to ensure fair and transparent compensation for 
everyone in the service.399 
The exercise has been hailed as a great effort in rationalizing and removing 
inconsistencies from the salary structure. One interviewee revealed that “the exercise was 
important in addressing pay disparity for comparable jobs and selective pay awards.” 400 
The exercise addressed distortions in what is commonly known as the traditional civil 
service which includes the ministries, teaching service, the medical staff, police and 
police and prisons, and culminated in what is known as the “single spine salary 
structure.” The single spine salary structure is one where employees in the same pay 
grade are paid equally. It was asserted that job grading helped to establish incentives in 
the salary structure based on the contribution and performance of individuals, and helped 
to improve equity in pay for employees in the same salary grade. 
  The evaluation generated salary targets for both the medium term and long term. 
The medium term (approximately five years) target salaries under the single spine 
structure ranged from Ug. Shs. 103,000 for support staff grade to Ug. Shs. 2,225,199 for 
the Head of the Public Service. In the long term “Uganda market” (equivalent to market 
rates) rates were proposed with target salaries for the lowest and highest grades ranging 
                                                 
399 Government of Uganda, Ministry Of Public Service. 2001. Medium Term Public Service Pay Reform 
Strategy. Kampala, p. 10 
400 Interview with Ms. Goretti Ssendiyona, Assistant Commissioner, Human Resources Department, 
Ministry of Public Service, held July 18, 2006. 
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from Ug. Shs. 282,507 to 2,700,000 respectively.401 Table 6.11 shows the target salaries 
for select jobs under the single spine structure. For the 2002/2003 financial year, 
personnel in managerial grades were to get an average salary increase of 18-23 percent. 
The transition to target pay levels over the years was to be accomplished by allocating the 
resources available for pay reform each year according to the shortfall between target pay 
and actual pay for each job grade.  
In determining priorities for year to year increases, focus was to be placed on 
those jobs particularly in managerial/professional grades, where motivation and retention 
problems severely inhibit civil service performance. However, the low level workers 
were not ignored. Rather, it was envisaged that low level salary grades that have glaring 
gaps between the current pay and the job evaluation grade pay would be rationalized 
accordingly. All these changes were considered under the assumption that funds would 
be forthcoming from the Ministry of Finance.  
If the approved changes in the table above were effected, civil servants would 
have benefited from a fairly generous remuneration boost. The reality of the 
implementation of the strategy however proved to be quite different from the aspirations. 
It has been reported that “The 2002 Strategy has achieved significant, but insufficient 
progress in enhancing pay levels for middle level professionals and managers.” 402 
 
                                                 
401 Government of Uganda, Ministry of Public Service. 2002. Public Service Reform Strategy 2002-2007. 
Kampala, p. 32. 
402 Government of Uganda, Ministry of Public Service. 2005. An Update of the Public Service Pay Reform 
Strategy. Kampala, Uganda, p. 3 
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Table 6.11 Illustration of the Civil Service Median Pay, Job Evaluation Median Pay, 
and Market Median Pay Levels 
 
BENCHMARK CIVIL JE DIFFERENCE MARKET DIFFERENCE 
JOB SERVICE MEDIAN BETWEEN JE MEDIAN BETWEEN MKT 
  MEDIAN SINGLE AND (UShs) AND 
  2001/2002 SPINE PS MEDIAN   PS MEDIAN 
  (UShs) (UShs) 2001/2002(Ushs)   (UShs) 
Managing Director 1,794,740 1,816,152 21,412 2,700,888 906,148 
Personnel Manager 925,130 1,462,387 537,257 1,787,812 862,682 
Medical Doctor 541,300 715,842 174,542 941,808 400,508 
Lawyer 530,250 560,112 29,862 991,397 461,147 
Senior Personal           
Secretary 371,850 391,787 19,937 581,033 209,183 
Engineer 370,040 560,112 190,072 851,689 481,649 
Graduate Teacher 370,040 560,112 190,072 397,084 27,044 
Accountant 370,040 560,112 190,072 721,246 351,206 
Auditor 370,040 560,112 190,072 741,382 371,342 
Economist 370,040 560,112 190,072 756,932 386,892 
Systems Analyst 279,500 560,112 280,612 1,056,121 776,621 
Clinical Officer 275,580 391,787 116,207 392,625 117,045 
Registered Nurse 212,100 391,787 179,687 300,473 88,373 
Teacher Grade 5 156,150 281,400 125,250 202,500 46,350 
Accounts Assistant 125,580 188,150 62,570 376,266 250,686 
Engineering           
Assistant 125,580 188,150 62,570 452,932 327,352 
Teacher Grade 3 101,090 188,150 87,060 157,000 55,910 
Driver 65,345 139,942 74,597 282,507 217,162 
Source: Government of Uganda, MPS Payroll Monitoring Unit. In Public Service Reform Strategy 2002-
2007, Ministry of Public Service. 2002 Kampala, p. 33. 
 
Indeed only one pay grade met the strategy pay guide – U8. This is the lowest pay 
grades comprising of support staff. Table 6.12 below shows the target salary levels for 
2003 and the actual pay. Table 6.12 shows that pay levels were higher in the 2003/04 
financial year than those in the 2001/02 year. Nearly all grades got an increase except 
U1SE and U1E (Permanent Secretaries and their Deputies). It can therefore be said that 
progress was made. However, pay levels set by the pay strategy were not met. Indeed in 
2004, the reform is behind its target by between 3% and 35 %. According to my 
respondents, they were still not met in 2006. 
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Table 6.12 Performance of Pay Reform Strategy on Public Service Salary based on 
the Median Monthly Salary in Uganda Shillings 
 
GRADE PLAN PLAN ACTUAL SHORTFALL % % TO REACH 
  YEAR 1 YEAR 3 2003/04 Vs PLAN SHORTFALL TARGET 
  2001/02 2003/04   2003/04   (YR 10) 
  (Ushs) (Ushs) (Ushs) (Ushs)     
U1S 1,965,707 2,125,182 1,965,760 159,422 8 27 
U1SE 1,928,804 2,025,244 1,313,000 712,244 35 49 
U1E 1,142,175 1,294,466 1,039,043 255,423 20 45 
U2 709,701 878,677 841,855 36,822 4 41 
U3 557,118 689,765 650,675 39,090 6 42 
U4 398,623 493,533 480,880 12,653 3 40 
U5 233,707 289,352 252,160 37,192 13 47 
U6 164,029 203,084 188,365 14,719 7 43 
U7 122,707 151,923 113,565 38,358 25 54 
U8 72,242 80,498 85,616 -5,118 -6 38 
Source: Government of Uganda, The law and Development Partnership Limited. 2004. “A Study on 
Remuneration and Pay Policies for Public Service Institutions and Government Agencies.” Kampala, p. 27. 
 
The Assistant Commissioner Human Resources in the MPS noted that “the salary targets 
set by the job evaluation exercise have not been achieved to date.”403  
Participants decried the lack of government commitment to abide by the pay 
strategy. They asserted that they believe government no longer considers pay increase a 
priority. It was argued that government is quick to increase employment in some sectors 
like education and health without adequate planning for impacts on salary. Some laid the 
blame on the government’s Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF). It was 
asserted that the MTEF does not provide for adequate growth in the wage bill in 
comparison to other programs like defense. In addition, participants revealed that it has 
been difficult to abide by the single spine pay strategy because government had 
                                                 
403 Interview with Ms. Goretti Ssendiyona, Assistant Commissioner, Human Resources Department, 
Ministry of Public Service. Held July 18, 2006. 
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increasing resorted to non-institutionalized award of salary increases to certain segments 
of civil servants like judges, doctors and teachers. There therefore general consensus that 
in spite of the progress made, the rationalization and pay and the job grading exercises 
had not attained their goals. Ultimately, pay reform has stalled and failed to meet set 
targets.  
 
6.3.4 The Politics of Pay Reform in Uganda 
 The first few years of the CSRP witnessed tremendous progress in both size 
reduction and pay increase because there was consensus between the bureaucratic 
leaders, government leaders, and especially the president, that the civil service crisis 
needed to be addressed. To motivate workers, encourage better performance, and curb 
corruption, pay reform was embraced by the government leadership. When the crisis 
eased, pay reform was relegated to a low priority by the political leadership. A number of 
reasons account for the shift in priorities. Politically, the country was witnessing an 
aggressive military insurgence in the northern part of the country that necessitated the 
president to refocus his attention in the military. It was not uncommon for resources 
budgeted for salary enhancement to be allocated to military force. For instance in the 
1999/2000 financial year, “18 billion Uganda shillings was diverted from salaries to the 
military to combat the insurgence. In addition, the economy slumped during the same 
period.”404  
                                                 
404 Interview Number UG0018 , held August 18, 2006.  
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 Public administration structures have been on the increase in Uganda since 1996. 
Numerous autonomous and semiautonomous agencies have been created and a number of 
districts have also been created (section 6.2). The introduction of UPE in 1996 also led to 
an increase in primary school teachers. All of the above increases have had an impact on 
the civil service wage bill. The creation of agencies has been on the rise in numerous 
administrative reform programs in both developed and developing countries because it is 
believed independent agencies perform better, generate revenue, and the autonomy they 
enjoy fosters innovativeness.  
In Uganda, while some agencies have indeed improved performance and revenue 
generation for instance the Uganda Investment Authority (UIA) and Uganda Revenue 
Authority (URA), many have not done so. More over, even those doing well are riddled 
with internal managerial problems and corruption claims.405 With regard to pay reform, it 
has been argued that agencies were created “without a clear link to mainstream traditional 
civil service pay terms and conditions of service.”406 Generally agencies are supposed to 
raise their own funds through user fees like sale of permits, and pay better salaries based 
on the funds raised, but according to one study participant, some agencies depend nearly 
completely on the government consolidated fund. “The problem is that there are quite a 
                                                 
405 see for instance Odd-Helge Fjeldstad,. 2005. “Corruption in Tax Administration: Lessons from 
Institutional Reforms in Uganda.” CMI Working Papers. 
406 Government of Uganda, Ministry of Public Service, 2005. An Update of the Public Service Pay Reform 
Strategy, Kampala, p. 17. 
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number of agencies that still depend on government consolidated fund but they are 
paying better so they actually bring distortions in terms of public service pay reform.”407  
It was argued that since some agencies draw salaries from the consolidate fund, unless 
they are able to demonstrate the value they are adding, they should not get the money to 
offer better salaries.  
Indeed, considerable disparity exists between the traditional civil service and the 
public autonomous agencies and such disparities are widest at the low pay grades with 
the traditional civil service paying significantly less. In a study on remuneration and pay 
policies for public service institutions and government agencies in Uganda commissioned 
by the MPS, it was found that “at the lowest end of the pay scale, i.e., at U8, the 
minimum salary offered with in the Service represents only 15% of that offered by the 
highest payer, to the same category of employee. The gap is narrowest at Permanent 
Secretary or Heads of Organization level, where the lowest pay stands at 25% of the 
highest on offer within this category.”408 Table 6.13 below illustrates the disparity in pay 
levels between the traditional public service and government agencies.  
 It is evident that some government agencies pay significantly higher salaries than 
the traditional civil service (Table 6.13). A Permanent Secretary in a Ministry earns more 
than three times less than the highest paid Head of Government Agency – 2,731,760 and 
8,596,100, respectively. 
                                                 
407 Interview with Mr. Kenneth Mugamba, Commissioner Budget Policy and Evaluation, Ministry of 
Finance, held July 17, 2006. 
408 Government of Uganda, The law and Development Partnership Limited. 2004. “A Study on 
Remuneration and Pay Policies for Public Service Institutions and Government Agencies.” Kampala, p. 16. 
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Table 6.13 Pay Disparity within the Public Service (Gross Pay) 
GRADE POSITION TYPICAL TRADITIONAL MINIMUM MEDIAN MAXIMUM 
    TITLE PUBLIC (Ushs) (Ushs) (Ushs) 
      SERVICE (Ushs)       
  Permanent Heads of         
U1S Secretary Organizations 2,731,760 2,200,000 3,797,680 8,596,100 
    
Heads of 
Functions         
U1SE Directors Deputy MDs 1,879,000 1,320,000 2,241,468 7,000,000 
    Heads of         
U1E Commissioners Departments 1,230,043 1,020,000 1,939,985 5,112,500 
  Principal           
U2 Officers Heads of Sections 1,032,855 688,242 1,405,000 3,131,120 
U3 Senior Officers 
Assistant 
Managers 841,675 555,946 1,200,000 2,487,475 
U4 Officers Officers 579,880 401,201 874,436 1,984,117 
U5 Technicians/ Technicians/         
  Supervisors Supervisors 351,160 238,694 685,000 1,465,367 
U6 Senior Clerks/ Senior Clerks/         
  Senior Nurses Secretaries 287,365 205,078 562,051 1,159,070 
U7 Clerks, Nurses,           
  Teachers, and Clerks, Typist         
  Police Officers Receptionist 212,565 184,185 398,675 944,541 
U8 Cleaners and Cleaners and         
  Drivers Drivers 184,615 112,500 317,506 736,596 
Source: Government of Uganda, The law and Development Partnership Limited. 2004. “A Study on 
Remuneration and Pay Policies for Public Service Institutions and Government Agencies.” Kampala. p. 16. 
 
The incredibly large disparity in pay levels reinforces demands for unaffordable pay 
increases within the traditional public service and greatly inhibits motivation among the 
staff. In reality, there may be only a few people in the government agencies that earn such 
a higher salary, but that does not deter civil servants from using the highest pay for a 
specific job category as an indicator for “the appropriate” pay for that category in the 
traditional civil service. In their view, the gap between the top pay and their own is 
evidence of their underpayment. One officer that spoke to me in confidence said that;  
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“If government is committed to paying public servants what they deserve, then a 
market-based single spine salary structure has to be implemented and abided by. 
You see these agencies pay market level salaries yet they depend on government 
funds to do so. So why should their workers earn more than us? In my view 
compulsory pay limits linked to the traditional public service pay structure should 
be set for these agencies. If any discrepancy is to pertain, then the salaries should 
reflect the ability of the agency to be self-financing such that the greater the extent 
to which they are capable of generating their own revenues, the more the freedom 
to set their pay levels.409  
 
The gradual increase in the size of government has therefore had significant 
implications for pay reform. While the increasing the number of primary school teachers 
has increased the traditional civil service wage bill, the teachers’ wage bill is very 
minimal compared to what autonomous agencies pay their staff. It can therefore be said 
that the creation of districts and autonomous agencies, and the increasing number of 
teachers have all had the effect of exerting more expenditure pressure on government to 
the detriment of salary enhancement. There is need to rationalize the number and 
functions of agencies and districts while guaranteeing their functionality so that due 
attention is paid to abiding by the recommendations of the pay reform strategy.  
Ultimately, the increase in the size of the service is largely at the expense of 
increased pay. At stake therefore is how to deal with annual recruitment, salary 
enhancement and maintaining a balanced budget. There are those who are skeptical about 
that happening soon. Robinson (2006) asserts that “the slowing down of progress in pay 
reforms and the untrammeled growth in the political bureaucracy since the late 1990s is 
the product of a deliberate political strategy. Many of the appointees to statutory and ad 
hoc commissions and autonomous agencies are known supporters of the Movement with 
                                                 
409 Interview Number UG 0018, held August 18, 2006.  
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strong kinship ties to the president’s family, and were placed in positions of authority 
with approval at the highest level. Such positions can thus be considered as sinecures for 
loyal followers, as a form of patronage dispensed in return for political support.”410 
Another major reason why pay reform has faltered is because of the inadequate 
wage bill releases from government. The financial resources for implementing the pay 
reform strategy have been declining while civil service numbers have been rising. In the 
2002/2003 financial year, 17 billion Uganda shillings was availed. This is because effort 
was made to abide by the job evaluation pay strategy recommendations. Between the 
years 2003 through 2005 however, in spite of continued growth in staff numbers, the 
amount stagnated at 15 billion as presented in the table below. 
 
Table 6.14 Pay Reform Wage Bill provision for the Period 2001/02 – 2005/06 (Billion 
Uganda Shillings) 
 
 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 
Pay Enhancement 
(Reform) Wage Bill 
 
15.6 
 
17.0 
 
15.0 
 
15.0 
 
15.0 
Source: Government of Uganda, Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development. 
 The pay target levels set by the pay reform strategy are still a long way from 
being attained. If the issue of salary is not rectified, it will be difficult to recruit and retain 
adequate numbers of technical and professional workers. Trained professionals with 
essential skills are needed to advance public service. The Uganda government 
persistently claims that revenues are limited; overall government expenditures are on the 
increase, and therefore adequate resources to implement the living wage are scarce. Yet, 
                                                 
410 Robinson, M. 2006, Ibid, p. 19. 
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resources seem to be always available for military expenditure. In the 2000-2004 Uganda 
was involved in military altercation with the Democratic Republic of Congo at a very 
high financial cost. It therefore seems apparent that political priorities constitute a 
superseding factor in government allocation of resources and in determining the whether 
pay targets will be honored. 
 As the pay strategy flounders and the workers get restless about not getting a 
living wage, ministries have found themselves looking for ways and means of motivating 
their workers, alternatives that in reality work against the reform process. It is therefore 
not surprising that there has been recourse to non-salary benefits. Non-salary benefits 
cloud the actual remuneration levels and works against all the effort that was expended in 
consolidating benefits into one single salary. Some of the common allowances have 
mushroomed back into the public service include lunch allowance, entitlements, 
compassion benefits and honoraria.  Lunch allowance in 2006 was four thousand 
shillings per day for officers in the grades U1-U7 (approximately 2.5 US dollars). The 
support staff those at U8 were paid three thousand Uganda shillings (approximately 1.8 
US dollars). Lunch allowance is not an entitlement and hence cannot be claimed in 
arrears when not paid on time. Entitlements, generally enjoyed by political appointees 
and entitled officers include telephone allowances, fuel allowance, and entertainment 
allowance among others. These allowances can be claimed in arrears when funds are not 
released on time. Compassionate allowances are those funds given discretionally to 
officers to deal with personal needs like death in the family or illness, and honoraria is 
given to those workers that spend time beyond working hours on official duty.  
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 Allowances negate the goals of the pay reform strategy and work against equity, 
transparency, and sustainability. Allowances may prop up the salaries of workers hence 
motivate them but the workers that are not receiving them will be demoralized. 
According to MPS, this trend has created competition in the allocation of resources to 
either the wage bill or non-salary allowances. Since allowances benefit only a few people 
and no tax is paid against them, the resources would be better used in augmenting salaries 
which are taxed. It is been asserted on the other hand that “while allowances and non-
salary benefits introduce degrees of opaqueness and inequities, and may encourage tax 
avoidance, they may be preferred to salary increases in the short term due to pension 
constraint.”411  
 No issue illustrates the politics of pay reform in Uganda as much as selective pay. 
When it became evident that progress towards the living wage had stalled, various 
professional groups started agitating for higher pay and threatened to “down” their tools. 
Among these groups are the judicial officers, the medical doctors, and university 
lecturers. Soon evening and night meetings were being held between the group’s 
representatives and the president, and before long, higher pay award promises were being 
made. In 2005, the MPS complained that “Recent intervention by H.E the President in 
support of select salary enhancement for health workers epitomizes the potential and 
                                                 
411 Government of Uganda, Ministry of Public Service. 2005. An Update of the Public Service Pay Reform 
Strategy. Kampala, p. 19 
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significance of political interventions in pay policies implementation.”412 In the report of 
the pay reform update, the MPS asserts that; 
“This selective pay award for health workers has contradicted the prevailing pay 
reform strategy in four particularly significant respects. First, it reintroduces the 
disparities and inequities in pay that the JE and “single spine salary structure” 
implementation had targeted to remove. Secondly, the public service pay level 
considerably exceeds that of most employees in the same grades in the NGO 
health sub-sector, which account for at least 30% service delivery in the sector. 
Thirdly, implementation of the selective pay award for health workers implied an 
annual increase of Ushs 38.6 billion (or some 5%) in the annual Government 
wage bill just for one sector. Fourthly, other public sector groups including 
teachers and university staff have started agitating for Presidential pay award. 
This situation could result in spiral of selective salary awards and may not be 
politically tenable. The end result would be a reversal of most of the pay strategy 
reform gains.”413 
 
Indeed, university lecturers have gone on strikes numerous times; in 1989, 1994, and as 
recently as 2005. In all instances, the government gave the lecturers an ultimatum and 
ordered them back to the lecture rooms or to vacate university premises, but in the end, it 
was the government that capitulated and negotiated pay increases. Their salaries have 
significantly increased although they have not reached the LW level and they do not 
compare favorably with those of the workers in the autonomous agencies.  
 Many of the study participants perceived selective pay to be unfair and arbitrary. 
The Assistant Commissioner, Human Resources in the MPS revealed that selective pay 
awards persist and present a big challenge to pay reform. “Here at the ministry we did all 
work and came up with a single spine salary structure for all civil servants but politics is 
                                                 
412 Government of Uganda, Ministry of Public Service. 2005. An Update of the Public Service Pay Reform 
Strategy. Kampala, p. 19 
413Government of Uganda,  Ministry of Public Service. 2005.Ibid, p. 21. 
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undermining it. Contrary to our suggestions, you find doctors, lawyers and university 
professors being politically awarded selective pay increases.”414  
Another participant observed that; 
 
“We have had problems with the political directives saying you give the doctors, 
and now when you give those the others are somehow disadvantaged. When the 
president gives directives increasing salaries of specific career groups, it upsets 
the pay strategy we had set. This is one of the most challenging things under the 
pay reform.”415  
 
Indeed the pay strategy that emerged from the job evaluation exercise recommended a 
single spine structure which if abided by, would have ensured that the pay targets for all 
civil servants are met. This would have taken place over a long time frame – 
approximately ten years – but it would have ensured consistency and equity in pay raises. 
However, politics have been infused in the pay process rendering pay reform a failure. 
This is one of the major differences between Uganda’s program and Tanzania’s as shall 
be seen in the chapters ahead.  
 
6.3.5 Improving Remuneration in the Uganda CS: Rhetoric or Reality? 
The analysis in this chapter has illustrated how challenging pay reform in the 
Uganda CSRP has been. Pay reform as advocated by the PSRRC was intricate and 
elaborate. The reform process set out to enhance pay for all civil servants and at the 
outset impressive increases were offered across board. Further, salary decompression was 
                                                 
414 Interview with Ms. Goretti Ssendiyona, Assistant Commissioner, Human Resources Department, 
Ministry of Public Service. Held July 18, 2006. 
415 Interview with Director Administrative Reform, Ministry of Public Service, Ms. Deborah Katuramu, 
held July 21, 2006. 
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attained, and allowances and benefits were monetized. In addition, a job grading and 
evaluation exercise was undertaken rationalize the pay structure. It is generally accepted 
that proper remuneration is essential for the attraction, retention, and motivation of 
qualified personnel in the civil service, but the mechanisms of attaining it have been 
derailed by the many factors discussed above.  
It has been shown that there is a general view that despite the progress made, pay 
is still very low. The general view is that when at the start of the reform pay increase was 
viewed as an urgent matter – the need to enhance performance, reduce corruption, and 
attract skilled workers could not be denied. However, when the crisis eased, government 
priorities veered a way from pay reform. The wars in the northern and western parts of 
the country took precedence as did the war in Congo. The creation of more districts, the 
increase of employees in social sectors like education and health, and the increase in the 
‘shadow government’ have all contributed to the strain on the government budget which 
has in turn adversely affected pay reform. Most important though, is the effect of political 
interference. Presidential directives have interfered with the pay strategy and made it 
difficult for the MPS and MOF to abide by the single spine pay structure. It is therefore 
contended here that in spite of initial progress, pay reform is generally still rhetoric. 
The findings here reinforce the study undertaken by Kiragu and Mukandala 
(2005) who assert that “The post – 1996 period is marked by the abandonment by the 
Government of generous across-the-board salary increases. Instead, there has been: (a) 
pay rises for the lower grades of the public service, the so called frontline workers; (b) a 
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generous increase for top civil servants, and (c) selective salary increases for those public 
servants serving in critical areas, including the judiciary and medical services.”416 
 My study contends that civil service pay will not reach the living wage envisaged 
by the PSRRC for quite some time and CS will continue to be adversely affected. While 
enhanced pay is not commensurate with improved performance, it is undeniable that 
good pay is crucial to sustaining worker morale, motivation and zeal. It is therefore not a 
stretch to assert that inadequate pay is derailing civil service performance and this in turn, 
has negative consequences for service delivery. Poor pay and poor civil service 
performance negate the PEAP vision of enhancing performance and improving service 
delivery in order to reduce poverty, and produces corruption.  
 
6. 4 CAPACITY BUILDING AND THE UGANDA CSRP 
In the Ugandan civil service, all ministries, departments, local governments, and 
public agencies have the responsibility to train and develop their staff. Each of them has 
the obligation to formulate training plans based on need and within the defined 
guidelines. Yet, in 1990, the PSRRC noted that the existing human resource base was 
characterized by shortages in technical, professional, and managerial fields, was too weak 
to perform in the effective reform efforts; and had low productivity levels. It was further 
noted that the low productivity levels were in part due to inadequate training. The 
PSRRC pointed out that training was not among the top national priorities and that if any 
training was undertaken, it was haphazard and not based on need and not guided by a 
                                                 
416 Kiragu, K. and Rwekaza Mukundala. 2005. Politics and Tactics in Public Sector Reforms: The 
Dynamics of Public Service Pay in Africa. Dar es Salaam:Dar es Salaam University Press Ltd, p. 275. 
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training policy. The Commission emphasized that if the civil service was to perform 
better, capacity had to be enhanced. It recommended that professional and technical in-
service goal-oriented training be encouraged and enhanced to increase productivity, and 
advised that such productivity be the determinant of promotional possibilities of 
individual employees. 
 
6.4.1 Capacity Building: Training and Infrastructure Development 
The fourth component of the CSRP was capacity building, entailing training and 
retooling of personnel, and enhancing institutional and structural capacities. According to 
the Secretary Administrative Reform Commission, “capacity building is the creation of 
conditions in which technically informed labour can be deployed effectively for increased 
productivity.” It was asserted further that capacity building “is a deliberate attempt to 
develop the existing pool of technical and managerial manpower by the provision of 
sound training interventions”417 that are necessary to meet the challenges of reform and 
development. As the MPS prepared to effect the recommendations of the PSRRC, it was 
recognized that the reform process calls for “civil servants with renewed energies, 
knowledge, skills, and commitment.”418 Initial capacity building efforts focused on 
developing skills necessary to carry out the reform program through sensitization 
workshops and training. By June 1994, a number of workshops had been held with 
                                                 
417 Wangolo, A. M. 1995. “Uganda Civil Service Reform Programme: Implementation of the Reform 
Measures and Lessons Learned.” In Langseth, P, Sandile Nogxina, Daan Prinsloo, and Roger Sullivan (eds) 
Civil Service Reform in Anglophone Africa. Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, p. 157. 
418 Ibid. 
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Ministers and Permanent Secretaries, Heads of Departments and Commissioners, 
Chairpersons of District Service Committees, Senior Managers Health Personnel, 
Personnel Officers, Teaching Service Personnel, Accounting Personnel, and all District 
Education Officers and Headmasters. These workshops were crucial in generating 
enthusiasm and positive response to the reform program. Immediately after the district 
review, Action Planning and Implementation Workshops were also organized in the 
remaining 39 Districts. District officials were offered training necessary to work out 
district development plans, priorities, objectives, and other programs under a 
decentralized system of administration.  
 The Ministry of Public Service developed a training plan to provide skills in 
information technology, communication, office records management, staff and team 
performance appraisal, public relations, and results-oriented management By the end of 
1993, new computers and other office equipment worth US$300,000 were installed in the 
Ministry, senior staff were trained in records management and systems control, personnel 
management and information system, and other control systems.419  
Although great effort was placed on undertaking training of the personnel at the 
MPS, capacity building in the first phase of the reform program – 1991-1997 fell short of 
addressing the human resource development needs of the entire civil service. Training in 
the different ministries remained erratic, underfunded and largely on an ad hoc basis. In 
1997, with the initiation of the second phase of the reform program, now called the 
                                                 
419 Langseth, P. 1995. “Civil Service Reform in Uganda: Lessons Learned.” In Langseth, P, Sandile 
Nogxina, Daan Prinsloo, and Roger Sullivan (eds) Civil Service Reform in Anglophone Africa. Washington 
D.C.: International Monetary Fund. 
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Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP) 1997-2002, new emphasis was placed on 
enhancing the capacity of the human resources of the entire civil service.  
To deal effectively with training and career development, the MPS mandated a 
British international consultancy firm – Crown Agents, to undertake a training needs 
assessment study of the entire civil service in October 1997. In September 1998, the firm 
released its findings in a document entitled “Report, Policy and Plan for the Development 
of Human Resources in the Public Service of Uganda.” The report revealed various issues 
that hampered training and development and made recommendations about how to best 
streamline training to make it congruent with the reform efforts. Table 6.15 details 
situation found during the study (current status) and the proposals that were 
recommended to re-orient training to make it useful to the reform and growth of the CS.  
 Many of the issues found to be derailing training efforts identified in the training 
needs assessment study were espoused by the civil servants I interviewed. The Director 
of Administrative Reforms in the MPS revealed that “the legitimate goals of training 
have for a long time been subverted.” She added; “Training was perceived by some staff 
and even their superiors as a means of compensating for poor salaries rather than as an 
avenue to better ones performance. You see, whenever one went for a training program, 
they got allowances and in some cases good amounts of money especially on the donor 
funded training courses.”420 
                                                 
420 Interview with Director Administrative Reform, Ministry of Public Service, Ms. Deborah Katuramu, 
held July 21, 2006. 
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Table 6.15 Issues in Training and Recommended Policy Shifts 
CURRENT STATUS NEW POLICY PROPOSAL 
Training provision on an ad hoc 
basis 
Training provided to meet systematically 
identified needs 
Training to meet individual 
wants 
Training to meet agreed organizational 
performance improvement needs 
The desired output of most 
training has been to provide 
qualifications 
Training to be provided to improve performance in 
the job (even when it is through academic courses) 
Training is often long-term 
(sometimes abroad) 
Training more often short or modular and in-
country 
Training awarded to those 
already well trained/qualified 
Training awarded only to those most in need of 
performance improvement 
Training has mostly emphasized 
theory 
Emphasis to be on practice and performance 
Training provided to isolated 
individuals has not changed 
procedures and practices back in 
the work place 
Where possible, training to provided to teams of 
people from the same organization, to achieve a 
critical mass that can support the application of 
learning in the workplace 
Scholarships have been accepted 
even where they do not meet the 
needs of the Public Service 
Scholarships to be accepted only when they are 
clearly relevant to identified needs, and then only 
awarded to appropriate staff 
Training has often been treated,  
as a reward or supplement to 
salary 
Training to be provided only when it is needed to 
improve competence and performance 
Formal training has often been 
the first or only option 
Managers to be given training in developing 
themselves and the staff they supervise, on the job 
Training function in the public 
service lacks co-ordination 
Clear division of roles and responsibilities and 
regular liaison between Ministries and other organs 
responsible for training in the Public Service 
A few cadres have career  
development milestones 
Cadre development committees to be formed to set 
career milestones for all cadres 
Emphasis has been put on  
knowledge first, then skills 
Emphasis to be put on competence (i.e. knowledge, 
skills and attitude) required to drive performance 
improvements in the workplace 
Training is often low down  
on a Ministry’s list of priorities 
and therefore is underfunded 
Priority for training to be increased and sustained to 
ensure continuous ‘learning’ and development in 
the Public Service 
Training budgets have often 
been re-allocated 
Training budgets to be protected against  re-
allocation 
Training is largely supply driven Training to be driven by demand/need 
Source: Government of Uganda. Report, Policy and Plan for the Development of Human Resources in the 
Public Service of Uganda, p. v. 
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Another participant noted; 
“Generally we have not been having a training policy, like training was ad hoc, 
that is, before we got a training policy in place, you found people chasing their 
own training, was driven by the person not by the department or the need of the 
ministry. Someone would just see something abroad not bothered whether it is 
beneficial to you or the ministry, you chase it as long as there is some money on 
it, you go train, come back and some how it will not be useful to the ministry”421 
 
The training needs assessment study recommended a three year training plan for short 
courses for junior and middle level staff and some for senior personnel. However because 
of limited resources, only a handful of courses outside the training plan were offered for 
only 600 personnel. The courses offered in 1999 include the following:422  
General Management Skills (Middle Managers) 
Introduction to ROM 
Project Management Skills 
Facilities Management 
Internal Consultancy Skills 
Developing and Managing Information Systems 
Skills Upgrading for Finance Staff 
Career Planning, Job Analysis, Performance Appraisal 
Organizational Skills for Personal Assistants 
Human Resource Development 
Induction Course for newly Appointed Permanent Secretaries 
 
From 2000 to 2001, the First Year Training plan was implemented with a grant from the 
Netherlands Government, and all training was undertaken in Uganda using domestic 
training institutions. The courses covered include the following: 
 
                                                 
421 Interview with Ms. Muhumuza Susan, Senior Personnel Officer, Ministry of Finance, held July 18, 
2006. 
422 Government of Uganda, Ministry of Public Service. 1999. Public Service Reform Programme: Report 
for the Year 1999. Kampala, p. 13. 
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Courses Covered in 2000 
 
-Word Processing  
- Information Technology  
-Statistics and Surveys  
-Operating a switchboard 
-Accounts 
-Managing the Training Function 
-Policy Formulation and Implementation 
-Achieving Results 
-Managing for Results 
Courses Covered in 2001 
 
-Financial Management for supplies and 
stores staff 
-Corporate Values for Senior Managers 
-Records Management for Records Staff 
-Strategic Leadership for Administrative 
Officers 
-Managing Human Resources for 
Personnel Officers 
 
In 2002-2003, more training was provided to the civil service staff in Integrated 
Financial Management System and Staff Appraisal System. A notable improvement in 
capacity building was “the introduction of Results Oriented Management (ROM) in 23 
Urban Authorities, the National and Regional Referral Hospitals, the Service 
Commissions and other Constitutional Bodies and; provision of support for the 
implementation of ROM in the Ministries and Local Governments where it had already 
been introduced.”423 In addition, “A total of 10, 708 public servants attended 
training/sensitization workshops on the new Staff Performance Appraisal Instrument, of 
whom 982 were from Central Ministries/Departments, 5,170 from Local Governments 
and 4,656 from the Education Sector. 168 Copy Typists also completed the skills up-
grading course.”424 It is only in 2003 that the implementation of the First Year Training 
Plan was completed. 
 
                                                 
423 Government of Uganda, Ministry of Public Service. 2003. Public Service Reform Programme: Annual 
Report for the Financial Year 2002/2003. Kampala, p. iv. 
424 Government of Uganda, Ministry of Public Service. 2003. Public Service Reform Programme: Annual 
Report for the Financial Year 2002/2003. Kampala, Ibid, p. v. 
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6.4.2 The Uganda Public Service Training Policy 
 The public service training policy was released in 2006. It provides guidelines for 
training civil servants and aims at “building and maintaining the Public Service as an 
efficient, effective, and professionally competent administrative machinery of 
Government, capable of originating and implementing Government programmes.”425 Its 
specific objectives include providing a strategy to keep civil servants abreast with current 
professional knowledge and skills, ensuring that training funds are effectively utilized, to 
ensure fairness in the management and administration of training opportunities, and instill 
a learning culture with in the civil service among others.426 
The policy provides for training committees in each of the above to approve 
training proposals and to oversee their implementation while ensuring strict adherence to 
the policy. The policy also requires every Ministry/Department/Local Government to 
designate one officer as “Training Liaison Officer”, to coordinate the implementation of 
all training decisions. Many of the study participants were aware of the training policy 
and had positive perceptions about it. It was observed that the training policy provides a 
practical framework within which all government officials will acquire the necessary 
competencies to perform their duties with creativity, efficiency, effectiveness, and due 
diligence.427 An officer from the Ministry of Education welcomed the training policy 
saying that the ministry for a long time did not have a training program. “The big 
                                                 
425 Government of Uganda, Ministry of Public Service. 2006. The Republic of Uganda Public Service 
Training Policy. Kampala, p. ii. 
426 Ibid, p. 3.  
427 Interview with Ms. Ada Kabalokile, Commisssioner, and Acting Director Human Resources and 
Capacity Building, held July 19, 2006.  
 253
challenge as far as skills development is concerned is that we did not have any skills 
needs assessment. People sought out training opportunities individually, those motivated 
to look got more chances, and in some cases those with the right connections also get 
chances to train. The whole thing was not streamlined.”428 It was observed that training is 
currently the preserve of the personnel sections within Ministries a mechanism that 
ensures that training is undertaken in a systematic and coordinated manner. Therefore, 
while in the past, a relatively high percentage of staff would be away from duty for 
prolonged periods, pursuing training in an incoherent manner, the new training policy 
ensures that all comes to an end.429 
Capacity building efforts in the Uganda public service reform program have 
predominantly focused on training personnel to acquire better skills, what one of the 
participants called “performance improvement courses.”430 A lot of training in 
information technology was offered to the majority of the public servants. In all the 
ministries covered by the study, it was revealed that almost all staff are computer literate. 
Different performance improvement courses have been offered in different ministries. 
For instance the Ministry of Education has offered training to Boards of Governors, 
School Management Committees, and school Head Teachers training in Education 
Planning and Administration, Management, Time Management. The Ministry of Finance 
                                                 
428 Interview with Mr. Godfrey Arnold Dhatemwa, Assistant Commissioner, Planning and Budgeting, 
Ministry of Education, held July 28, 2006.  
429 Interview with Mr. J.B Ssonko, Principal Personnel Officer, Ministry of Local Government, held August 
10, 2006.  
430 Interview with Mr. Paul Bogere, Assistant Commissioner Human Resources and Development, Ministry 
of Public Service, held July 19, 2006. 
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has offered training to its personnel in diverse fields including planning, policy analysis, 
corruption and fraud detection, and integrated financial management system. There was a 
general perception that training has improved the capacity and performance within the 
civil service. Participants cited better performance in time management and report 
writing, in budget formulation and budget accounting, and in the in production of annual 
performance reports.  
The above discussion illustrates that capacity building efforts in the public service 
reform program have been dominated by training. My study findings confirm views 
advanced by Cheema (2005) who also illustrates how capacity building efforts have 
focused on training by asserting that Ugandan public servants have received training in 
“information technology, communication, office record management, performance 
appraisal, and result-oriented management.”431 The focus on training lends the reform 
program to some of the criticisms advanced by scholars like Cohen (1995) who notes that 
most capacity building efforts are limited to training. He goes further to say that in most 
developing countries capacity building tends to be synonymous with training, a tendency 
that ultimately leads to failure to address the various constraints to effective public sector 
performance in a holistic way.432 Yet when the Uganda CSRP is analyzed using Cohen’s 
framework for capacity building, a good number of issues he focuses on appear to have 
been addressed. Salaries have been improved, organization structures have been 
                                                 
431 Cheema, G. S. 2005. Building Democratic Institutions: Governance Reforms in Developing Countries. 
Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, p. 158. 
432 Cohen, J. M. 1995. “Capacity Building in the Public Sector: A focused Framework for Analysis and 
Action.” International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 61, No. 3, pp. 407-422. 
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modified, and training institutions have been upgraded. For instance the Uganda 
Management Institute which was upgraded from a small institute offering refresher 
courses and certificates to a full fledged higher education organization offering 
postgraduate diplomas, and masters degrees.433  
Nonetheless, it is training that has received the bulk of the capacity enhancement 
resources and this tendency is not unique to Uganda. In their study of the public service 
reform in Uganda and Tanzania, Clarke and Wood (2001) found that “efforts to build 
capacity in Tanzanian and Ugandan civil services focused on conventional methods, 
including the provision of in-country training in a range of basic skills for middle 
managers and professionals.”434 Similar findings are offered by Honadle and Hannah 
(1982) in the study of capacity building in Jamaica where they propose an action oriented 
and organization capacity development intervention rather than mere training435; and 
Grindle and Hilderbrand (1995) who found that opportunities for meaningful work, 
shared professional norms, teamwork, and promotion based on performance may be 
better at building capacity rather than training in specific skills.436 Healy (2001) also 
                                                 
433 In the 2005/2006 financial year, the Uganda Management Institute conducted training for 144 masters 
students, 560 post graduate diploma students, 154 diploma participants, 294 certificate participants and 
1241 short course participants. 
434 Clarke, J. and David, Wood. 2001. “New Public Management and Development: The Case of Public 
Service Reform in Tanzania and Uganda.” In McCourt, W. and Martin Minogue (eds) The 
Internationalization of Public Management: Reinventing the Third World State. Cheltenham, UK: Edward 
Elgar. 
435 Honadle, G. H. and John P. Hannah. 1982. “Management Performance for Rural Development: 
Packaged Training or Capacity building” Public Administration and Development, Vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 295-
307. 
436 Grindle, M. S. and Mary e. Hilderbrand. 1995. “Building Sustainable Capacity in the Public Sector: 
What Can be Done?” Public Administration and Development, Vol. 15, No. 5, pp. 441-463. 
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advocates a holistic approach to capacity building437 while Wubneh (2003) asserts that 
capacity building should be multidimensional to include such things like value systems 
and beliefs, depoliticizing decision making, and a focus on institutional and resource 
factors.438 
 In spite of its seemingly narrow focus, capacity enhancement in the Uganda 
CSRP seems to be on the right path and some of the study participants revealed that 
capacity enhancement has not only focused on skills development but also on retooling 
and equipment development, and on hiring staff with the necessary skills. They revealed 
that most offices have the requisite equipment to carry out necessary functions especially 
computers and vehicles. However, it was also revealed that it is mainly Ministries that 
have donor sponsored projects that have had their equipment upgraded. Such Ministries 
include MPS, MOF, MOLG, Ministry of Agriculture, and Ministry of Health. Ministries 
without any projects like the Ministry of Labor lack modern amenities like computers and 
internet connection.  
It can therefore be argued that currently, to acquire modern tools and equipment, a 
Ministry has to be proactive and come up with programs that have a retooling 
component; two, donor facilitation must be available; and three, government funds must 
be available and released in a timely fashion. The first two points imply that most of the 
infrastructure capacity development is hinged on donor-funded programs which have a 
                                                 
437 Healy, P. 2001. “Training and Public Sector Reform: An Integrated Approach.” Public Administration 
and Development, Vol. 21, pp. 309-319. 
438 Wubneh, M. 2003. “Building Capacity in Africa: The Impact of Institutional, Policy and Resource 
Factors.” Africa Development Bank, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, pp. 165-198. 
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specific life span. In essence, once donor funding terminates, capacity may soon 
deteriorate and even be lost entirely. Such a predicament calls for mechanisms to 
institutionalize capacity development to make it sustainable.  
One of the major challenges mentioned was the attraction and retention of 
workers with professional and technical skills. It was observed that efforts to enhance 
capacity through the hiring of staff who have the necessary skills have faltered mainly 
because of inadequate pay. However, a project initiated under the auspices of the WB is 
helping in meeting that need. In 2003, a Capacity and Performance Enhancement Project 
(CAPEP) was initiated under the World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Support Credit 
(PRSC). The PRSC is for a public sector-wide capacity building intervention to assist 
programs and approaches geared towards poverty reduction. The major goal of this 
initiative is to ensure that the civil service has the capacity to support the realization of 
the PEAP goals. Emphasis is placed on increasing the number and quality of professional 
staff among other things.  According to the Ministry of Finance, the CAPEP “also seeks 
to foster and reinforce linkages and complementarity between the ongoing public sector 
reform initiatives, primarily the PSRP, the sector development programs (SDPs) and 
other reforms embedded in the PEAP and supported by the PRSCs.”439 CAPEP was 
aimed at strengthening the implementation of the reforms via the linkages depicted in the 
figure below. The figure below shows that capacity building is viewed as a critical 
component of the different reforms and ultimately is a vital prerequisite for the poverty 
alleviation action plan. 
                                                 
439 Ibid, p. 9. 
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Figure 6.3 Linkages between CAPEP and Ongoing Public Sector Reform Programs 
 
Source: Government of Uganda, Ministry of Finance. 2004. Uganda Capacity and Performance 
Enhancement Project (CAPEP). Kampala, p. 9 
Key: SDP – Sector Development Programs, PRSC – Poverty Reduction Support Credit, PSRP – Public 
Service Reform Program, PRSP – Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, PEAP – Poverty Reduction Action 
Plan. 
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a result of the lack of resources. Since training enhances the skills of public servants, 
influences their attitudes and motivates them to perform, it is critical that resources are 
identified for training and staff development.”440 Moreover, without adequate financial 
support, it will remain difficult to attract and retain qualified staff. 
 In spite of the having the training policy in place, it was found that civil servants 
still pursue individual training and skill development without regard for the 
organizational needs. This is because training is still viewed as an avenue to generate 
extra income. One participant said that “Another problem with training is that people feel 
that training is a way of either motivation or a way of getting some extra money. So you 
find some people want to train all the time whether it is relevant or not. When you don’t 
approve it someone gets so angry with you.”441 Not only do civil servants pursue any 
available opportunity to train, they seem to be more interested in training out side 
Uganda. It was observed that most people want to train abroad and not in-house because 
outside training offers a higher per diem and it is more prestigious. In such instances, 
training is more about visiting a foreign country than about acquiring new skills. This is 
what is commonly known as “training tourism.” It is anticipated that the newly adopted 
training policy will rationalize training by striking a balance between time spent on 
training and on official duty, so that implementation of government programs is not 
undermined by training.  
                                                 
440 Government of Uganda, Ministry of Public Service. 2004. Public Service Reform Programme: Annual 
Report for the Financial Year 2003/2004, Kampala, p. 13. 
441 Interview with Ms. Muhumuza Susan, Senior Personnel Officer, Ministry of Finance, held July 18, 
2006. 
 260
 Finally, it can be asserted that much focus has been placed on staff development 
at the expense of the wider institutional context. Little attention has been paid to the 
organizational framework, and institutional environment. The latter include the incentive 
systems, rules and regulations, and accountability. It is contended here that developing 
skills while ignoring the operational context may negate the goals of reform, and even 
render the whole process futile. 
 Yet despite the above criticisms, capacity building efforts in the Uganda CSRP 
have generated some success. A training needs assessment was undertaken in the entire 
civil service and the findings helped Ministries to prioritize training opportunities. In 
general, Ministries attempt to organize training by focusing on the critical areas. Training 
has been undertaken in important areas like ICT, financial management, and records 
management to mention a few. In addition, a training policy was developed to guide 
training. Ministries have training committees and so training is better planned and aligned 
to Ministerial requirements. It should also be noted that most of the participants were of 
the view that performance has improved due to the capacity enhancement programs that 
have been undertaken. It can therefore be asserted that capacity building in the Uganda 
CSRP has generated considerable success and is becoming a reality. 
 
6.5 ETHICS AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UGANDA CIVIL SERVICE 
REFORM PROGRAM 
 
Ethics and accountability are public service values that many administrative 
systems strive to integrate in their structures, processes, and systems because they are 
vital to democratic governance and efficient management of public service systems. In 
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many countries, the lack of ethics and accountability manifest themselves in not only 
abuse of office for self aggrandizement and total disregard for rules and regulations, but 
also in failed governance at the national level. Such was Uganda’s predicament from the 
1970s through much of the 1980s.  
The PSRRC found that the Ugandan public service was characterized by lack of 
accountability, embezzlement of public funds, nepotism, favoritism, and other vices that 
made service delivery impossible. The Commission observed that corruption was 
rampant and institutionalized. Scholars agree with this assessment for instance Flanary 
and Watt (1999) assert that “the NRM inherited a public service characterized by 
wholesale institutionalized corruption.”442 The Commission recommended that 
supervisory, inspection and audit systems be strengthened, and that transparency be 
encouraged by the free flow of information. It advocated more stringent sanction and 
penalties against the corrupt, suggested that whistleblowers be protected and rewarded, 
and urged the government to increase remuneration. 
In the Uganda civil service reform program long term vision, it is asserted among 
other issues that the goal of the reform is to create a civil service with “reduced level of 
corruption backed by an effective police and prosecution function”, a civil service where 
the civil servants will “be fully accountable and responsible for the output of their jobs, 
and will be committed to achieving clearly identified individual objectives.”443 Ethics and 
                                                 
442 Flanary, R. and David Watt. 1999. “The State of Corruption: A Case Study of Uganda.” Third World 
Quarterly, Vol. 20 No. 3, p. 521. 
443 Ministry of Public Service. 1994. Civil Service Reform: Context, Vision, Objectives, Strategy, and Plan. 
Kampala, p. 23. 
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accountability barely manifest in the vision of the civil service reform program in spite of 
the emphasis accorded the issues by the PSRRC. Indeed the two cannot be categorically 
found in the major components of the reform program, but they are inherent and implied 
in some of them. For instance, the Results Oriented Management (ROM) system is 
viewed as necessary to ensure efficiency, effectiveness, accountability, and 
responsiveness.  
However, neither  does the Public Service Reform Programme 1997-2002 nor the 
Public Service Reform Strategy 2002-2007 specifically mention ethics and 
accountability. Indeed, one of the study participants confirmed that “The reform program 
does not directly focus on ethics,” 444 but she hastened to add that nonetheless the reform 
focuses on areas that can facilitate ethics and integrity. She mentioned ROM, the review 
of the code of conduct, and implementation of the performance appraisal instrument so as 
some of the ways ethics and accountability are being addressed. The influence of NPM is 
evident in the manner in which ethics and accountability are being handled in the 
Ugandan CSRP. New public management calls for strategic plans with a mission, vision, 
and measureable outputs. It calls for accountability for the financial resources used, the 
results achieved, and focuses on customer satisfaction. The following views illustrate;  
“To enhance accountability, we are also focusing on clients as a priority so now 
the focus is on how can we handle our clients better? Client satisfaction has 
become an issue….. Also the introduction of results oriented management to 
make sure that we focus on the performance appraisal system. We are looking at 
                                                 
444 Interview with Director Administrative Reform, Ministry of Public Service, Ms. Deborah Katuramu 
held, July 21, 2006. 
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outputs. Can you account for what you have done? If you were given money, how 
have you used it?”445 
 
While the public service reform program does not specifically address ethics and 
accountability, various government initiatives indicate that the issues were paramount on 
the government’s reform agenda. Since 1986 when the NRM government assumed 
political power, effort was made to revamp the public service and rid it of the informal 
systems of behavior that buttressed unethical and corrupt tendencies. Point seven of the 
NRM Ten-Point Programme asserts that government would focus on “the elimination of 
corruption and misuse of power.”446 Some of the major initiatives geared towards 
enhancing ethics, integrity and accountability in the public service included the 
strengthening of preexisting institutions among them the Office of the Auditor General, 
Directorate of Public Prosecutions, and Public Accounts Committee; the establishment of 
the Office of the Inspector General of Government, the establishment of the Directorate 
of Ethics and Integrity; and the encouragement of a free press. All my study participants 
were aware of the institutional frameworks put in place to enhance ethics and 
accountability in the public service. 
Office of the Auditor General and Public Accounts Committee: 
The 1995 Uganda Constitution Article 154 provides for the office of the Auditor 
General (AG) and Article 163 offers the functions of the office. The AG is responsible 
for overseeing withdrawals from public funds and auditing government public accounts. 
                                                 
445 Interview with  Ms. Monica Kalemba, Under Secretary Finance and Administration, Ministry of Local 
Government. Held July 25, 2006. 
446 The Ten-Point Programme is a small document detailing the goals that the NRM intended to achieve. 
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Overseeing withdrawals involves ensuring that all government public funds are secured 
with parliament’s approval and auditing public accounts entails writing a report about all 
public accounts of all public services and agencies. The report is then submitted to 
parliament for review by Parliament’s Public Accounts Committee. The AG is appointed 
by the President and can be fired by the latter on grounds of misconduct or incompetence. 
The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of the Ugandan Parliament just like the AG is 
charged with ensuring that all public revenues and expenditures are accounted for. The 
PAC is supposed to examine and discuss the AG’s reports and where necessary order 
investigations or call for legal proceeding against culprits.  
The efficacy of the AG and PAC in enhancing ethics and accountability was cast 
in doubt by the study participants. It was revealed that the AG for a long time lacked the 
equipment and human and financial resources to analyze public expenditures and produce 
reports. As a result, since the AG office was reconstituted in 1986, it has been 
overwhelmed by the work, and constrained by limited staff and resources. The PAC is 
experiencing similar problems. It was only after the first Presidential and Parliamentary 
elections of 1996 (sixth parliament) that a new PAC was instituted and found a huge 
backlog of reports from the AG’s office to scrutinize. It was observed that the PAC was 
in 2006 reviewing documents submitted in 2003. Moreover, the office does not have the 
staff and resources commensurate to what needs to be accomplished. A discussion with 
many of the study participants gave the impression that despite the gains made, they felt 
that the AG and PAC will not be able to enhance ethics and accountability. Other than 
lack of personnel and financial resources, it was also revealed that both organs were 
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susceptible to political manipulation, interference, and frustration which rendered them 
ineffective.  
Office of the Inspector General of Government: 
The establishment of the Office of the Inspector General of Government 
commonly known as the IGG is one of the most acknowledged achievements of the NRM 
government’s push to enhance ethics, accountability and integrity in public service. An 
equivalent of the ombudsman, the IGG was established in 1987 and embedded in the 
1995 Uganda Constitution (Chapter 13). Article 225 entrust the office with the following 
functions: 
(a) to promote and foster strict adherence to the rule of law and principles of natural 
justice and administration; 
(b) to eliminate and foster the elimination of corruption, abuse of authority and of public 
offices; 
(c) to promote fair, efficient and good governance in public offices; 
(d) subject to the provisions of this Constitution, to supervise the enforcement of the 
Leadership Code of conduct;447 
(e) to investigate any act, omission, advice, decision/ recommendation by a public officer 
or any other authority to which this article applies, taken, made, given or done in exercise 
of administrative functions; and 
                                                 
447 The Leadership Code requires political leaders and public officers to declare their wealth including 
assets, income, and liabilities. The code prohibits the public officers from engaging in unethical conduct. 
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(f) to stimulate public awareness about the values of constitutionalism in general and the 
activities of its office, in particular, through any media and other means it considers 
appropriate.448 
Although the IGG is responsible to parliament, he/she is appointed by the president but 
can only be removed from office by the president on the recommendation of a special 
parliamentary tribunal. IGGs office deals with a lot of cases among them the following: 
• Bribery and extortion 
• Mismanagement of public projects and public funds or property 
• Neglect of duty 
• Causing financial or property loss to the Government 
• Making false claims 
• Embezzlement 
• Abuse of office or authority 
• Influence peddling 
• Theft or diversion of public funds or assets 
• Fraud 
• Forgery or uttering false documents 
• False accounting 
• Conflict of interest 
• Victimization 
• Delay in public service delivery 
• Non-payment of entitlements e.g. salaries, benefits such as pension etc. 
• Breach of the Leadership Code449 
 
According to one participant, the Inspectorate of Government is one of the institutional 
mechanisms best placed to enhance accountability in government but like many of the 
reform efforts, it has not attained the goals it was set out to achieve. He lamented thus; 
                                                 
448 Government of Uganda. 1995. The Uganda Constitution.  
449 Inspectorate of Government. “The Inspectorate of Government and the Fight against Corruption in 
Uganda” www.igg.go.ug accessed October 3, 2008. 
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“The IGG was a good innovation but it has not been equipped with the requisite 
human, financial, technical or physical means to carry out its mandate. It has 
difficulty in retaining skilled personnel particularly professionals because of 
noncompetitive emoluments and many of its activities are not carried out due to 
insufficient funds.”450 
 
Moreover, the IGG lacks the capacity to enforce the leadership code especially if the 
culprits have high level political connections. The inability of the IGG is affirmed by 
other scholars. Larbi (2007), in his study of disclosure practices in African public 
services, found that Uganda’s IGG suffered “weaknesses in the institutional and 
organizational arrangements and frameworks for declaration, monitoring and 
enforcement.” Larbi states that the IGG has met challenges in the bid to enforce the 
Leadership Code – “in some cases officials have refused to file completely, thus 
challenging the authority of the IGG.” He asserts further that the IGG has a “weak 
investigative capacity” which undermines capacity to collect ample evidence for 
prosecution.451 Tangri and Mwenda (2006) claim that the IGG has failed to exercise fully 
“its powers of investigation and prosecution.” Flanary and Watt (1999) argue that the 
problems faced by the IGG are evident in the “apparent impotence when implementing 
the Leadership Code.”452  
 In spite of the critical problems the IGG faces, many of the study participants 
were of the view that the IGG has made tremendous strides in publicizing the importance 
of ethics in the public service. Most of them mentioned the national integrity survey as a 
                                                 
450 Interview with the Director of Ethics, Directorate of Ethics and Integrity, Mr. Ashaba Aheebwa, held 
July 27, 2006. 
451 Larbi, G. 2007. “Between Spin and Reality: Examining Disclosure Practices in Three African 
Countries.” Public Administration and Development, Vol. 27, p. 212. 
452 Flanary, R. and David Watt. 1999, Ibid, p. 525. 
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landmark undertaking that has involved the general public in the discussion of ethics, 
accountability and integrity. The IGG’s office was instrumental in undertaking two major 
national integrity surveys in 1998 and 2002, and the third one implemented in 2007 is 
still underway. The surveys generated information based on household and institutional 
perceptions, and experiences of corruption in the public service. In the 1998 survey, it 
was found that only 32% of the household respondents were aware of the work of the 
IGG but in 2002, the number had increased to 70%. In the 1998, those identified as the 
most corrupt government institutions were the police, URA, Magistrate courts, and the 
local government administrations. The incidence of reported bribes for each of them was 
63%, 40%, 50% and 39% respectively. In 2002, there was significant reduction in the 
reported incidence of bribery in the same institutions to 46%, 31%, 29% and 16% 
respectively. The reduction was attributed to the vigilance of the IGG’s office and general 
public awareness and increasing intolerance of corruption.453 
Directorate of Ethics and Integrity: 
The institutions mentioned previously work in close contact with the Directorate 
of Ethics and Integrity (DEI). Established in 1998, the Directorate is headed by a Minister 
of State in the Office of the President and is responsible for the formulation, coordination 
and the implementation of the national anti-corruption policy. It has the mandate to 
strengthen ethics, accountability and integrity in all sectors of public life. It is credited 
with drafting the Leadership Code and putting together the Anti-Corruption Bill that was 
enacted by Parliament in 2003. The Directorate has been instrumental in undertaking 
                                                 
453 Government of Uganda, Inspectorate of Government. 2003. Final Report: Second National Integrity 
Survey. Kampla: K2-Consult Uganda Limited, p. 18. 
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ethics training in Ministries, Agencies and Local Governments. According to the Director 
of Ethics at the Directorate, “Training of trainers workshops have been organized for 
government officials, and regional workshops have been held to sensitize District 
chairpersons, CAOs and District Planner on ethical decision making in the public 
office.”454 Yet in spite of such efforts, it was revealed that public servants are not keen to 
attend training on ethics and accountability. It was observed that ethics and accountability 
are the least demanded training modules in the local governments.455 
  Discussions with various participants revealed that ethics and accountability are 
still highly elusive in the public service. Indeed, the majority of the study participants 
were of the view that in spite of the above institutional mechanisms, the area remains a 
big challenge and one the most difficult to deal with in the public service.456 Civil 
servants are guided by the standing orders of public service but there was a predominant 
perception that civil servants are not familiar with the code of ethics and conduct.  One of 
the reasons for this state of affairs is because ethics and accountability are not viewed as 
“major issues.” Ethical values like integrity, and accountability, are still looked upon as 
foreign and a hindrance to rapid personal development. Moreover, the culture that values 
quick wealth is still widely entrenched. It should also be noted that lack of political will 
to hold those found guilty of corruption accountable has made it difficult to 
                                                 
454 Interview with the Director of Ethics, Directorate of Ethics and Integrity, Mr. Ashaba Aheebwa, held 
July 27, 2006. 
455 Interview with Ms. Monica Kalemba, Under Secretary, Ministry of Local Government, held July 25, 
2006. 
456 Interview with Director Administrative Reform, Ministry of Public Service, Ms. Deborah Katuramu, 
held  July 21, 2006. 
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institutionalize ethical behavior. For instance, two ministers were recently censured by 
Parliament only to be reappointed to other Ministries by the President.  
The study found that procurement and contract management are areas in which 
accountability remains a critical challenge. Currently, procurement is done in-house, 
ministry by ministry but there is weak capacity in procurement management, accounting, 
and auditing systems both at the central ministerial level and at local districts. Such 
phrases as “procurement is very problematic”, “there is great need of training in 
management of tenders and contracts” were offered by many participants. Indeed, in 
2005, the WB observed that Uganda loses about US$ 300 million through corruption and 
procurement malpractices per year.457 It was asserted that at the District and Regional 
Workshops held in different areas in preparation of the joint annual review of 
decentralization in 2004, long lists of different manifestations of corruption, ranging from 
influencing the operations of the district service commission, to irregularities with 
procurement, to embezzlement of funds, and forging of documents were yielded.458 
Indeed it is safe to say that decentralization did not only devolve roles, functions, and 
resources to the local level, but devolved the maladies that afflicted the center as well.  
There was a general consensus that despite the increase in government salaries, it 
was not enough to surmount the potential gains from unethical behavior like taking 
bribes, embezzlement, and corruption. Moreover, the decline in salary value as a result of 
increasing inflation did not make matters any easier. Even in the semi-autonomous 
                                                 
457 The World Bank. 2005. Uganda: Country Report. Washington D.C. 
458 Interview DW – B0013. 
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agencies, which when compared to the traditional public service earn higher salaries the 
situation is not any different. The case of the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) is 
illustrative. Established in 1991 to oversee tax administration in the country, the URA 
depicts the internalization of the NPM ideals by the Ugandan government. Following 
NPM prescriptions, the URA was designed in such a way that management would have 
autonomy and would enjoy freedom over staffing and resource use. It was envisaged that 
highly skilled workers would be hired and paid very well to ensure hard work, 
motivation, discipline, and accountability. Indeed in the first few years following its 
establishment, URA performed well increasing revenue generation from 7 percent to 12 
percent in five years but in 1998, the IGGs national integrity survey found that 40 percent 
of its respondents reported incidents of bribery with the URA officials. By 2000, there 
was widespread public outcry about corruption in the URA and in 2002, government put 
in place a commission of inquiry into corruption in the URA.459  
The URA case shows that increasing salaries per se, may not be enough to ensure 
ethics and accountability. Corruption was not deterred by salary increases in the case of 
the URA. In their study of bureaucratic corruption, Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) found 
that despite a statistically significant relationship between civil service pay and 
corruption, it is not a given that corruption can be eradicated solely by raising wages. In 
                                                 
459 For a detailed analysis of corruption in the URA see Tangri, R. and Andrew M. Mwenda. 2006. 
“Politics, Donors, and the Ineffectiveness of Anti-corruption Institutions in Uganda” Journal of Modern 
African Studies, Vol. 44, No. 1 pp. 101-124; Fjeldstad, Odd-Helge. 2005. “Corruption in Tax 
Administration: Lessons from Institutional Reforms in Uganda.” CMI Working Paper; Therkildsen, O. 
2004. “Autonomous Tax Administration in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case of the Uganda Revenue 
Authority” Forum for Development Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1 pp. 59-88. 
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their view, other mechanisms must be put in place, notably, “strengthening the rule of 
law.”460 
Although high pay is generally considered as an incentive to not be vulnerable to 
corruption, in instances where corruption benefits are very high and the chance of being 
caught and held accountable are low, corruption will prevail. In the URA case, that seems 
to be the scenario. So far there are very few people that have been held accountable as a 
result of commissions of inquiry and other investigations into corruption in URA or the 
Uganda Police. This sends the wrong message to public servants and undermines any 
efforts towards ethics enhancement. As one participant observed;  
“ethics and accountability also start from the leaders and the managers. If you 
have a ministry where the chief executive is not bothered about ethics and 
accountability, it will follow through, if you have political leaders who are not 
doing that, it will follow through. So it is a wider problem that you have to look 
at, at organization, you can work on your part but if the environment around you 
is not, it becomes difficult.”461 
 
 
6.6 CHALLENGES IN ENHANCING ETHICS AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE 
UGANDA CS    
 
The analysis offered above shows that ethics and accountability remain a 
challenge and the reform program has attained minimal success. In spite of government 
efforts to build and facilitate watchdog agencies, more needs to be done. Lack of 
financial and human resources have rendered the agencies ineffective in carrying out their 
mandates of monitoring, enforcement, and execution. Therefore the study contends that 
                                                 
460 Rijckeghem, C. V. and Beatrice Weder. 2001. “Bureaucratic Corruption and the Rate of Temptation: Do 
Wages in the Civil Service affect Corruption, and by how much?” Journal of Development Economics, 
Vol. 65, pp. 307-331. 
461 Interview with Director Administrative Reform, Ministry of Public Service, Ms. Deborah Katuramu, 
held July 21, 2006. 
 273
the reform initiatives to enhance ethics and accountability have had a limited impact in 
institutionalizing ethics and accountability in the civil service. Indeed, Uganda is rated 
among the most corrupt nations in the world by Transparency International. Table 6.16 
below indicates Uganda’s corruption perception index ranking for the years 1998-2008 
by Transparency International. 
 
Table 6.16 Uganda’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) Ranking, 1998-2008 
YEAR FROM TOP FROM BOTTOM CPI SCORE 
1998 73 out of 85 8th 2.6 
1999 87 out of 99 12th 2.2 
2000 80 out of 90 10th 2.3 
2001 88 out of 91 3rd 1.9 
2002 93 out of 102 9th 2.1 
2003 117 out of 133 19th 2.2 
2004 102 out of 145 43rd 2.6 
2005 117 out of 158 41st 2.5 
2006 105 out of 163 58th 2.7 
2007 111 out of 179 68th 2.8 
2008 126 out of 180 54th 2.6 
Source: Transparency International. www.transparency.org. Accessed November 3, 2008. 
Table 6.16 indicates the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public 
officials and politicians in Uganda. The trend shows that the country has consistently 
scored poorly with the worst score attained in 2001. The gradual improvement since then 
could be attributed to the various commissions of inquiry into corruption in the police and 
the Uganda revenue authority. The various institutions discussed above could also claim 
some of the credit. Nonetheless, ethics and accountability in the public service remain 
weak. The major problem in the CSRP and the quest for ethics and accountability is not a 
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lack of institutional mechanisms to enhance ethics, but rather, it is the lack of monitoring, 
investigative, enforcement and prosecution capabilities by those institutions. Moreover, 
respect for the rule of law has not yet been entrenched, a fact manifested in the loud 
public outcries about corruption. 
 Yet, all is not lost. Some study participants were highly optimistic about the 
efforts being made to ensure ethics and accountability in the public service and some 
articulated what they perceive as real achievements that have been generated by the 
reform process. It was revealed that civil servants observe working hours better, and 
handle office equipment better. The revelation shows that even the smallest achievements 
that should be norm in any functional administrative system are in this case, applauded. It 
must be recalled that not too long ago, absenteeism and moonlighting, were the order of 
the day, public property and equipment were appropriated, and people reported for and 
left work anytime they pleased. Therefore, while it is evident that a lot still has to be 
done, it is important to not lose sight of the achievements so far attained however minor.  
Nonetheless, instituting ethics and accountability in the Uganda Civil Service are still 
predominantly rhetoric than reality.  
 
6.7 SUMMARY  
 
Chapter 6 described the major findings of the study. The government of Uganda 
has in the last 17 years sought to achieve major administrative, institutional, and 
structural reforms. The public service reform was geared towards not only revitalizing the 
public service, but also to engender good governance. Through a thick description based 
on the perceptions of Ugandan public servants, the chapter has demonstrated that a lot 
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has been achieved. The size of public service was drastically reduced in an attempt to do 
more with less. The size of traditional civil service that was 140,500 in 1990, was 
reduced drastically that in it was only 41,730 in 2004. This reduction was attained 
through the removal of ghost workers, retrenchment of nonperformers and overdue 
leavers, and voluntary retirement. Government Ministries were also reduced from 38 in 
1991 to the current number of 17. Generally, the public sector structures were 
rationalized, modernized, and strengthened. 
The results show that improvements were made through the pay reform. The pay 
structure and payroll were standardized and computerized, allowances and benefits were 
monetized and consolidated into basic salary, and salary was enhanced in real terms. The 
results also show that capacity building efforts have generated benefits. A training needs 
assessment was undertaken in all Ministries, and training policy was formulated to guide 
training of staff. Various training programs have been undertaken and personnel skills 
have been enhanced. In addition, efforts to recruit professional and technical workers 
with the necessary skills are being made.  
The results also show that ethics and accountability are still lagging behind 
expectations. Where as government watchdog bodies have been instituted or reenergized, 
there is a strong perception that corruption and lack of accountability are still on the rise. 
Despite the achievements attained, a number of problems were found to still 
beleaguer CSRP implementation. Although the traditional size of the civil service 
reduced, it is increasing again. The main cause is the hire of primary school teachers to 
cater to the increase in primary school enrollment. Although this increase is justified, the 
fact that it was not planned for in the reform strategy means that unforeseen problems 
 276
have emerged. For instance the pay reform slowed down because of this increase. In 
addition, the number of districts has increased as has the “shadow government” in the 
form of presidential advisors. 
Pay reform that initially generated impressive success has stagnated. Failure to 
abide by the single spine salary structure as prescribed by the pay strategy is one of the 
reasons for the stagnation. The major problem in this area however, is political influence. 
Presidential directives to increase salary for certain groups of civil servants has disrupted 
pay reform and caused inconsistencies. The gradual increase in the size of the civil 
service too, has negatively affected pay reform. There is evidence that political will to 
increase pay has over time waned. It is not uncommon for money budgeted for salaries to 
be reallocated to other areas like defense. Low salaries in turn make it difficult to attract 
and retain skilled workers. Inadequate remuneration and sometimes inappropriate 
incentives and work tools exacerbate the deficiencies in the public service capacity and 
performance. 
Capacity building has also suffered some set backs, notably lack of financial 
resources. Civil servants are eager and willing to get better training and acquire modern 
and relevant skills, but are incapacitated by limited financial support. Ethics and 
accountability have also lagged behind because of lack of human and financial resources 
to enable watchdog agencies to carry out their mandates. Because so few public servants 
have been executed for unethical conduct, there is no urgency for change of behavior. 
Needless to say, corruption and lack of viable accountability and conduct rules 
enforcement mechanisms undermine performance and service delivery. 
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It can therefore be asserted that as the reform process progressed, apparent loss of 
strategic focus and inertia in the implementation process began to emerge. The overall 
cause is lack of political legitimacy. Although elections are periodically held, there is a 
general view that they are not free and fair. As a result, civil wars have been raging in the 
eastern and northern parts of the country. Not surprisingly, political enthusiasm for civil 
service reform has overtime diminished. The political leadership is preoccupied with 
survive to the detriment of the reform program. For instance, the share of government 
expenditure on defense has consistently exceeded that of the other sectors; to garner 
political support, selective pay enhancement is offered; and corrupt officials from areas 
that provide critical votes are not punished and in some instances they are rewarded with 
ministerial positions. Such occurrences generate resentment in the civil service and open 
avenues for corruption.    
My study contends that, lack of political legitimacy, reactive leadership, and poor 
reform strategies underlie the reform’s weaknesses. The Uganda civil service remains 
weak and fragile to effectively discharge its mandates. Much remains to be done to have 
in place a workforce that is well-trained, competent, motivated, and able to efficiently 
deliver high quality services to the public.  
It can therefore be concluded that the reform program has not yet rebuilt the 
public service to the level where it can champion sustained economic growth and 
development, and consistent poverty eradication. Until the goals and objectives of the 
reform program namely; the creation of a small, motivated, efficient, effective, and 
accountable civil service are fully attained and put on a steady path, good governance 
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will remain a mirage and the reality of the civil service reform program in Uganda will 
remain in deep contrast with the rhetoric.   
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CHAPTER 7: THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM PROGRAM IN TANZANIA: AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE FINDINGS 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The discussion in chapter five addressed the nature of the political-economic 
systems adopted by the Tanzanian government soon after independence and showed that 
the single party system of government and the socialist economic orientation were not 
conducive strategies to national development. Contrary to expectations, economic decline 
ensued and generated adverse effects in all sectors of government. The civil service 
performance rapidly deteriorated as salaries plummeted and grim working conditions 
became the norm. Chapter five also addressed the various efforts that were undertaken to 
curtail the decline and noted that most of the reform focused on the economy. It was not 
until 1990 that direct attention was paid to the administrative system. In 1991, the 
government of Tanzania launched the Civil Service Reform Program (CSRP). The 
objective of the reform was to attain a “smaller, affordable, well-compensated, efficient 
and effectively performing civil service working to implement redefined policies and 
strategies for national economic development and delivery of public services.”462  
Chapter seven presents the results and analyzes the Tanzanian civil service reform 
based on the data generated from interviews held with officials from the President’s 
Office – Public Service Management (PO-PSM), the Ministry of Education (MOE), the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF), the President’s office – Regional Administration and Local 
Government (RALG) and data from official government documents and various 
                                                 
462 United Republic of Tanzania, President’s Office - Civil Service Department. 1999. Civil Service Reform 
Programme: Implementation Status Report (1993-1999). Dar es Salaam, p. 5. 
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websites. The current study focused its analysis on four major aspects of the reform 
program namely; (i) the reduction of the size of the civil service, (ii) pay reform, (iii) 
capacity building, and (iv) ethics and accountability. The following questions guided this 
analysis; 1) has the size of the civil service been reduced? To what levels? 2) Are the 
civil servants well paid and motivated? 3) Is capacity being built? In what areas/ways? 4) 
Are ethics and accountability improving? What are the indicators? Chapter  seven 
attempts to answer these questions based on the realities on the ground derived from the 
interviews held with senior government officials and data from the various government 
documents, published work and the internet.  
The analysis of the findings is based on the themes that categorize the perceptions 
of the study participants about the four major aspects of the reform program that the 
study focuses on. The overall themes that emerged from my respondents’ perception of 
the reform program are: doing more with less; improving remuneration; human resources 
development and capacity building; enhancing ethics and accountability; and economic 
recovery and poverty eradication. The themes are the basis of the analytical discussion of 
results offered below. The analysis is provided in four major sections and each deals with 
one of the four aspects of the reform program. Under each section, subsections detailing 
the context before the reform, the goals of the reform, the implementation, and the 
whether the goals were attained are offered.  
 
7.2 REDUCTION OF THE SIZE OF THE TANZANIAN CIVIL SERVICE 
At independence in 1961, the Tanzanian civil service was small and worked quite 
well until 1973 when the economy began a downward spiral as a result of the world-wide 
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oil shocks, and poor domestic policies. The economic crisis had an adverse effect on all 
sectors of government but the CS in particular came under great financial strain; salaries 
deteriorated and overstaffing ensued as private sources of employment disappeared. In 
1966 there were 65,708 established CS positions and in 1972 the number had increased to 
101,181. By 1976, the number had increased to 191,046, in 1980 it was 295, 352, and in 
1992, the number of civil servants was 354, 612.463  
The rapid increase in the size of the CS was justified by government as a 
consequence of increased duties and responsibilities resultant from the Arusha 
Declaration of 1967. However, scholars attributed the increase to tribalism and nepotism. 
Mutahaba (1975) asserted that the rapid increase was due to recruitment of relatives by 
senior civil servants. “They cannot support them for too long on the incomes they are left 
with after taxes, so they do what seems the most logical thing to do, have them placed in 
jobs either in their institutions or in the institutions of their friends.”464 Hyden (1983) 
argues that it is “the economy of affection”465 in which individuals invest in reciprocal 
relations with other individuals as a means of attaining goals that would otherwise be 
unattainable through formal channels that led to high growth rates of the civil service. 
Both arguments are quite valid. The control of the economy’s commanding heights by the 
government and the creation of numerous parastatal agencies expanded government 
                                                 
463 United Republic of Tanzania. President’s Office – Civil Service Department. 1999. Civil Service Reform 
Programme Implementation Status Report (1993 – 1999). Dar es Salaam. 
464 Mutahaba, G. 1975. “The Effect of Changes in Tanzania Public Service System Upon Administrative 
Productivity, 1961-1972.” African Review, Vol. 5 No. 2, p. 206. 
465 Hyden, G. 1983. No shortcuts to Progress: African Development Management Perspective. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
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services and activities and necessitated more staff. Mutahaba’s and Hyden’s arguments 
hold some truth as well because in most of Africa and many other countries, patronage 
obligations pervade the administrative system. It is the contention of this study however 
that it was not only the developmental state and primordial tendencies that led to the 
increase of the CS numbers. Rather, it was in addition, the failure to abide by the 
Weberian bureaucratic ideals left in place by the colonial administration at independence. 
Failure to abide by establishment and payroll controls, political interference in 
appointments, distortions and inequities in promotion and compensation, and corruption, 
led to overstaffing in the CS.  
As the CS numbers were steadily increasing, the economy was quickly 
backsliding. Consequently, budgetary allocations dwindled, inflation skyrocketed, the 
debt burden increased, and civil service salaries lost value. These conditions created a 
negative chain reaction on administrative performance. Civil servants neglected their 
duties and took on other jobs to supplement their meager incomes, rules and regulations 
were ignored, accountability mechanisms collapsed, corruption blossomed, and the civil 
service became increasingly bloated with very many people doing very little work.   
It is in response to this context that the CSRP was initiated.  With assistance from 
the WB and IMF, Tanzania implemented stabilization and SAPs to return the country to 
macroeconomic equilibrium and economic growth. It was however quickly realized that a 
bloated, nonperforming civil service would be detrimental to the economic reform that 
was underway. The country therefore committed itself to reduce the size of the CS in 
response to fiscal deficits and donor pressure. 
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7.2.1 Doing More with Less: The Reduction of the Size of the Tanzanian Civil 
Service 
 
In 1989, a WB assessment of public expenditure in the country found that in the 
period 1970-1984, government employment grew twice as much as government 
revenues. Approximately 72% percent of all formal employment in the country was 
provided by the public service.466 The Tanzanian CSRP therefore was launched in 1991 
and put into effect in 1993 with the assistance of the WB and IMF under the SAPs 
framework to rectify the situation. The Civil Service Department (CSD) in the office of 
the President was charged with the implementation and execution of the CSRP. It was 
envisaged that the reform program would cost US $25.8 million and an additional US 
$15 million would be required to cover the reform of local government. The major 
financial donors were the WB, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the 
European Union (EU), and the British Overseas Development Agency (ODA).  
During the first phase of the reform program, 1993-999, focus was placed on the 
reduction of the size of the service. The government realized that if it was to improve 
civil service performance and service delivery, the numbers had to be drastically reduced. 
According to the former Permanent Secretary for the PO-PSM, the civil service had to be 
reduced in size because the required budgetary expenditure was not feasible. “The budget 
crisis called for the redefinition of the role and function of government. Rationalization of 
government employment was pursued because vital functions and services were 
                                                 
466 McCourt, W. and Nazar, Sola. 1999. “Using Training to Promote Civil Service Reform: A Tanzania 
Local Government Case Study.” Public Administration and Development, Vol. 19, pp. 63-75. 
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underfunded.”467 The goal here was to retain a small, affordable service that is skilled, 
well paid, and motivated. According to the former Permanent Secretary, PO-PSM, the 
vision of the reform was to “evolve a smaller but more efficient and effective civil 
service…..a service characterized by meritocracy, professionalism, high integrity, 
transparency, accountability, as well as impartiality and objectivity in decision 
making.”468 
The quest to reduce the size of the service was undertaken through three major 
ways namely; organization and efficiency reviews, personnel control and management, 
and rationalization of government employment. 
 
7.2.2 Organization and Efficiency Reforms  
 The objectives of the Organization and Efficiency (O&E) reforms were to 
streamline the government structure and to rationalize its functions and systems in order 
to increase efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery. In addition, they were aimed 
at reducing government operations by relinquishing to private agencies those functions 
that did not form the core business of government but which were critical to the delivery 
of services. Organization and efficiency reforms were in line with the WB and IMF 
prescription that government divests from direct production and delivery of services that 
could be ably provided by the private sector so that it focuses on facilitation, regulation, 
                                                 
467 Interview with Mr. Joseph Rugumyamheto, former Permanent Secretary, The President’s Office-Public 
Service Management, held June 29, 2006. 
468 Interview with Mr. Joseph Rugumyamheto, former Permanent Secretary, The President’s Office - Public 
Service Management, held June 29, 2006. 
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and monitoring of private operations. The organization and efficiency reforms were 
undertaken in three phases by a Task Force that was comprised of the Deputy Principal 
Secretaries from the Treasury, the President’s Office, the Prime Minister’s Office, the 
Planning Commission, the Director of Management Services in the CSD, and the CSRP 
Secretariat. The Task Force reviewed the background information and previous reports, 
held interviews with high level management officers in each ministry, and came up with 
recommendations. Figure 7.1 shows the phases of the Ministerial Organization and 
Efficiency Review. 
 
Figure 7.1 Phases of the Ministerial Organization and Efficiency Review 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                   
                                                                                                                        VISION 
 
                          Phases:    1                       2                                     3 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                        
 
                                                                                                       
 
                                                                                                        FUNDAMENTAL 
                                                                                                       GOALS 
I 
M 
P 
R 
O 
V 
E 
D 
 
S 
E 
R 
V 
I 
C 
E 
S 
Source: Ntukamazina, D. A. 1998. “Civil Service Performance in Tanzania: A Strategic Perspective.” In 
Severine M. Rugumamu (ed) Civil Service Reform in Tanzania: Proceedings of the National Symposium. 
Dar es Salaam: University Consultancy Bureau, p. 49. 
 
The first phase of the review of the ministerial structures and functions was 
implemented in the Civil Service Department, the Planning Commission, the Ministry of 
Finance, and the Prime Minister’s Office. These are essential ministries responsible for 
the planning, coordination, resource allocation, and monitoring functions of government. 
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By 1996, all the 23 government ministries had been reviewed. The diagnostic reviews 
which constituted the first phase of the O&E generated data regarding various issues 
including pay and motivation, personnel levels, training, and training needs. The reviews 
provided a clear description of the functions and organizational structures of the 
ministries and indicated their roles and functions. For instance, the Task Force 
recommended divestiture of revenue collection from the Ministry of Finance to an 
autonomous Revenue Authority – the Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA). The TRA is 
among the many autonomous executive agencies that were recommended by the O&E 
reforms and later established by the Executive Agencies Act of 1997.  
The second of phase of O&E reforms shifted the review process from being a 
preserve of the Task Force to Ministerial Reform Committees (MRC) set up in each 
government Ministry to oversee internal restructuring. Every Ministry formed a 
Technical Task Group (TTG) to address the specific issues including rationalization of 
functions and structures, determination of personnel levels, rationalization of planning 
and budgeting systems, staff development, job description, establishment of management 
information systems, and legal and regulatory frameworks. It is the reports of the various 
Ministries that guided the ministerial reductions and the creation of additional executive 
agencies. In 1993 when the Organization and Efficiency reforms were started, the 
Tanzanian CS was comprised of 23 ministries and by 1997 they had been reduced to 
18.469 At the time of field data collection in 2006, restructuring of Ministries, 
                                                 
469 Ntukamazina, D. A. 1998. “Civil Service Performance in Tanzania: A Strategic Perspective.” In 
Severine M. Rugumamu (ed.) Civil Service Reform in Tanzania: Proceedings of the National Symposium. 
Dar es Salaam: University Consultancy Bureau. 
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Departments, and Agencies (MDAs) was still underway. The process is guided by a 
demand-driven approach arising from MDAs internal organization and efficiency 
assessment.  
During the third phase of the ministerial organization and efficiency reviews, the 
medium term implementation agenda was considered. The phase focused on restructuring 
the local government and implementing decentralization, contracting out of non-core 
functions among them security, cleaning, and grounds maintenance, and the creation of 
executive agencies. The reform of the local government was outlined in the Local 
Government Reform Agenda which was formulated in 1996 and endorsed by the 
Government in 1998. The major objective in reforming the local governments was to 
improve service delivery to the general public by transferring power, functional 
responsibilities, and resources from the central government to local government 
authorities (decentralization by devolution). The specific objectives of the reform were: 
• to improve the autonomy of local authorities  
• to improve the responsiveness of local authorities to local priorities as 
expresses through democratic organs 
• to improve council resource mobilization from all sources 
• to improve the operational efficiency of councils.470 
It was envisioned that after the reform local government authorities would have the 
following characteristics:  
                                                 
470 Therkildsen, O. 1998. “Challenges of Local Government Reform.” In Severine M. Rugumamu (ed.) 
Civil Service Reform in Tanzania: Proceedings of the National Symposium. Dar es Salaam: University 
Consultancy Bureau, p. 120. 
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• Largely autonomous institutions free to make policy and operational decisions 
consistent with the laws of the land and government policies 
• Strong and effective institutions underpinned by possession of resources (both 
human and financial) and authority to perform their roles and functions 
• Institutions with leaders who are elected in a fully democratic process 
• Institutions which will facilitate participation of people in planning and executing 
their development plans and foster partnerships with civic groups 
• Institutions with roles and functions that will correspond to the demand for their 
services and  
• Institutions which operate in a transparent and accountable manner.471 
Implementation of the Local Government Reform Program (LGRP) began in 
2000 and was to be undertaken in three one-year phases. The first phase involved 38 
Councils and it was estimated that in one year, 35 Districts would be restructured such 
that at the end of the third phase, all Districts (96) would be fully functional within a 
decentralized system. Under the decentralization by devolution framework, Tanzanians 
directly elect representatives to a District Council, the local government governing body. 
A District Council is typically made of twenty members, one from each ward (a typical 
District has about twenty wards), who in turn elect the Council Chairperson. Urban areas 
are organized in Town Councils, Municipal Councils and City Councils depending on 
their populations. The ultimate goal of the LGRP is to have viable Councils that raise and 
                                                 
471 United Republic of Tanzania. 1998. Policy Paper on Local Government Reform. Dar es Salaam.  
 289
manage their finances, hire and fire their own staff, and provide such services as 
agriculture, education, and health to the people. 
 According to the Program Manager for the LGRP, the reform has not yet helped 
to decongest the center. Confining Ministries to policy making, regulation, monitoring, 
performance assessments, and interventions to ensure the legality of public service 
provision while actual program implementation is undertaken by local governments was 
among the reasons decentralization was adopted. He revealed that the implementation of 
the LGRP as initially designed was too ambitious and generated minimal progress. 
Consequently the implementation timeframe was extended to five years.472 In 2006, 
restructuring was still going on in the initial 38 Councils and an additional 52 had just 
embarked on the reform. The slow progress in restructuring the local governments has 
meant that the staff reduction at the center has not progressed as originally envisaged. 
Consequently, decline in operational staff within the central Ministries has been very 
slow. Figure 7.2 shows the percentage of public servants who are operational staff for the 
years 2000 to 2006 operating within Ministries at the national level.  
The restructuring of Ministries, Departments and Agencies, the creation of 
executive agencies, and contracting out of non-core services coupled with 
decentralization should all contribute to the reduction of the number of the civil service 
staff especially, the operational staff.  However, as long as the decentralization program 
stalls and operational staff remain at the center, staff reduction will not be effected. 
                                                 
472 Interview with Mr. Alfred Kamugile, Program Manager, Local Government Reform Program, held 
August 1, 2006. 
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Indeed from the year 2000 when the LGRP was initiated, only a small decline in the 
percentage of operational staff at the center (from 16% to 13.5%) has been attained. 
 
Figure 7.2 Percentage of Public Servants who are Operational Staff in Central 
Ministries at the National level for the Years 2000 to 2006 
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Source:  United Republic of Tanzania, President’s Office – Public Service Management. 2008. PSRP Phase 
1 End of Programme Report: A Summary of Results 2003-2007. Dar es Salaam, p. 26 
 
It was revealed that in addition to the fact that LGRP has not progressed on course, only a 
small number of Ministries have ceded minimal power to the restructured districts. It is 
anticipated however that as decentralization efforts take root, operational staff that 
undertake direct job performance and responsibilities will shift in greater numbers to the 
local level thereby reducing the number of staff in the traditional public service.  
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Contrary to the little success that has been attained in decongesting the center and 
relieving it of functions that deal with local government, similar efforts at the regional 
governments have fared better. Under phase 1 of the LGRP, regional administration roles 
and structures were reduced to technical secretariats and the functions of regional tiers of 
government were limited to co-ordination and technical support to local authorities. As a 
result, “staffing numbers at the regional level has been reduced from an average of 700 
per region to 83. Total Staff numbers have been reduced approximately from 14,000 to 
2,000.”473 
If success in reducing the CS size by restructuring local governments has not been 
forthcoming, contracting out non-core functions and the creation of executive agencies 
under the organization and efficiency reviews have had better luck. It was revealed that 
by contracting out services, the number of lower cadre staff was reduced. 
“We have cut back staff numbers by contracting out many services. Fifty non-
core services have been contracted out. For instance messengers, tea people, and 
those security people you saw at the gate are contract workers. We just hire 
companies and offload the problem. We want to only worry about teachers, 
doctors, surveyors, economists etc. We are even reducing the number of personal 
secretaries because most of our staff are now computer literate and have personal 
computers. So why have secretaries?”474 
 
 
At the time of data collection, 68 contracts had been signed with private sector 
suppliers to provide non-core services and 128 were under formation to be finalized in 
2007. Table 7.1 below shows some of the contracts for services that are being provided 
                                                 
473 Interview with Mr. Alfred Kamugile, Program Manager, Local Government Reform Program, held 
August 1, 2006. 
474 Interview with Professor Gelase Mutahaba, Chief Technical Advisor, President’s Office – Public 
Service Management, held June 29, 2006. 
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by the private sector. In addition to contracting out non-core services, executive agencies 
were established to enable the Ministries to relinquish functions that could be carried out 
independently from Ministerial Headquarters. 
 
Table 7.1 Private Sector Participation in the Provision of Non-core Services 
  
                                    
A.  COMPLETED         B.  IN PROGRESS            C. TOTAL 
CONTRACTS SERVICE 
NAME NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % 
Aircraft Cleaning 0 0.0 1 0.8 1 0.5 
Canteen 0 0.0 1 0.8 1 0.5 
Catering or Cafeteria 3 4.4 11 8.6 14 7.1 
Cleaning and grounds 
Maintenance 27 39.7 36 28.1 63 32.1 
Estate Management 0 0.0 1 0.8 1 0.5 
Gravel Pack Supply 0 0.0 1 0.8 1 0.5 
Housing Maintenance 0 0.0 1 0.8 1 0.5 
Laundry 0 0.0 3 2.3 3 1.5 
Maintenance of Motor 
Vehicles 0 0.0 2 1.6 2 1.0 
Maintenance of Office 
Machines and Equipment 4 5.9 15 11.7 19 9.7 
Messenger Services 1 1.5 3 2.3 4 2.0 
Photocopy and Binding 1 1.5 2 1.6 3 1.5 
Preparation and Conduction 
of Weights and Measures 
Exam 0 0.0 1 0.8 1 0.5 
Secretarial Services 2 2.9 0 0.0 2 1.0 
Security and Reception 29 42.6 40 31.3 69 35.2 
Student and Staff 
Accommodation 0 0.0 2 1.6 2 1.0 
Supply of Goods and Works 
Services 1 1.5 1 0.8 2 1.0 
Tailoring 0 0.0 1 0.8 1 0.5 
Transport of Staff 0 0.0 5 3.9 5 2.6 
Utility Repair and 
Maintenance 0 0.0 1 0.8 1 0.5 
TOTAL 68 100 128 100 196 100 
Source: United Republic of Tanzania, President’s Office – Public Service Management. 2008. PSRP Phase 
1 End of Programme Report: A Summary of Results 2003 -2007. Dar Es Salaam, p. 24. 
Notes: “Number” = Number of Contracts.  
According to the Assistant Commissioner of Budget in the MOF, agencies were 
designed to relieve Ministries of unnecessary responsibilities so that they could 
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concentrate on their major roles of policy development, setting standards, monitoring, 
and evaluation of implementation.475 Agencies were to be guided by private business 
financial management systems of operation and were individually designed to deliver 
specific services. It was envisaged that such an arrangement would not only generate 
efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of public services, but would also contribute 
to revenue generation. At the time of data collection, there were 21 fully operational 
autonomous executive agencies while another 15 were in advanced stages of formation. 
Appendix 4 provides the list of the agencies and their responsibilities.  
The study interviewees were in agreement that the formation of agencies has not 
only reduced traditional civil service numbers, but has also improved revenue generation. 
“Revenue collection has significantly improved” said the Commissioner of Budget in the 
MOF. “On average, agencies collect 25% more revenue than they did when they were 
Ministerial departments. In 7 of the 11 agencies in which we have undertaken time series 
data collection, revenue collection trends improved rapidly once departments became 
agencies.”476 It was revealed that agency performance has improved because of the 
numerous capacity development initiatives the agencies have undertaken. Recruitment of 
Senior Managers, Service Delivery Surveys, Commercialization of Accounts, Client 
Service Charters, and Open Performance Review Appraisal Systems (OPRAS) are some 
of the innovative initiatives undertaken. Training has also been offered in such areas as 
                                                 
475 Interview with Mr. Ramadhani, S. Hamisi, Assistant Commissioner of Budget in the MOF, held   July 
31, 2006. 
476 Interview with Mr. Magambo Nashon, B. S., Commissioner of Budget, MOF, held July 31, 2006. 
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Asset Valuation, Integrated Financial Management Systems (IFMS), and Results 
Oriented Management.477   
 Overall, the Organization and Efficiency reviews have generated a decrease in 
the number of civil servants through ministerial rationalization and restructuring. The 
number of line divisions within Ministries was reduced by 25% while the Ministry 
sections were reduced by 35% (see Table 7.2 below). Within the central Ministries, the 
Ministry of Finance had the highest reduction of 36 units from an original 72, followed 
by the Civil Service Department which got rid of 14 units of the original 30. Combined, 
the central Ministries reviewed in the period 1994-1997 underwent a 76% reduction in 
their Divisions and Sections. The other major reduction was effected in the 
Economic/Productive Sector, notably in the Works Division and Section which was 
reduced from 26 to 6 respectively. Extra staff reductions were generated by contracting 
out of non-core services and by establishing executive agencies.  
However, despite the achievements indicated above, it is important to note that 
Organization and Efficiency reform efforts have not accomplished the complete 
restructuring of the Tanzanian CS. At present, all the potential executive agencies have 
not been identified and formed, and not all non-core services have been outsourced. In 
addition, the Ministries, Departments, and Agencies do not focus all their activity solely 
on policy and regulatory functions because the decentralization program stalled. The 
central government is still directly involved in the delivery of services and direct job 
performance, functions that require large numbers of operational staff. Consequently, the 
                                                 
477 Ibid. 
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role and functions of government have been reduced only minimally and staffing levels 
are still high. Ultimately, the implementation of the O&E component will remain 
partially successful.  
 
7.2.3 Personnel Control and Management 
 
 The reduction of the size of the Tanzanian CS was also undertaken via personnel 
control and management reforms. Prior to the reforms, “there was uncontrolled growth of 
the CS, employment rules and regulations were ignored, and appointments did not target 
requisite skills.”478 The objective of the personnel control and management reforms 
therefore was to institute policy and systematic control to monitor the numbers and 
quality of the personnel recruited into the CS. According to the Chief Technical Advisor, 
PO-PSM, personnel control and management entailed “setting minimum standards for 
entry into the civil service, establishing a management audit unit, streamlining the flow of 
information from the Ministries to the CSD, producing job descriptions for all civil 
servants, and putting in place performance assessment measures.”479 To ensure that 
personnel control and management mechanism are put on place, the Tanzanian 
government passed the Human Resources Management and Employment Policy in 1999 
and supplemented it with a new Public Service Act in 2002. Both documents have been 
crucial in guiding the restoration of meritocracy in the management of personnel in the 
CS. 
                                                 
478 Interview with Professor Gelase Mutahaba Chief Technical Advisor, President’s Office - Public Service 
Management, Government of Tanzania, held June 29, 2006. 
479 Ibid. 
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Table 7.2 Impact of Organization and Efficiency Review (O&E) 1993-1997 
 
    
LINE 
DIVISIONS     SECTIONS   
MINISTRIES   Approved     Approved   
  Pre O & E New Reductions Pre O & E New  Reductions 
    Structures     Structures   
CENTRAL MINISTRIES             
Finance 13 8 5 59 28 31 
Planning Commission 10 5 5 18 12 6 
Civil Service Department 4 4 0 26 12 14 
Prime Minister's Office 5 5 0 17 14 3 
Sector Totals 32 22 10 120 66 54 
Percentages 100 69 31 100 55 45 
SOCIAL SERVICES SECTOR             
Education 5 4 1 13 10 3 
Science, Technology, and             
Higher Education 3 3 0 8 6 2 
Health 6 3 3 25 13 12 
Community Development,             
Gender and Culture 5 3 2 8 10 2 
Labour and Youth             
Development 3 3 0 11 9 2 
Sector Totals 22 16 6 65 48 21 
Percentages 100 73 27 100 74 32 
ECONOMIC/PRODUCTIVE SECTOR           
Lands and Human Settlements             
Development 4 3 1 17 12 5 
Industry and Commerce 3 2 1 5 7 2 
Works 8 2 6 18 4 14 
Communications and Transport 2 1 1 7 4 3 
Water 3 3 0 12 8 4 
Energy and Minerals 2 2 0 8 8 0 
Natural Resources and Tourism 3 4 1 10 15 5 
Agriculture and Co-Operatives 4 4 0 13 11 2 
Sector Totals 29 21 10 90 69 35 
Percentages 100 72 34 100 77 39 
ADMINISTRATIVE SECTOR             
Home Affairs 5 5 0 19 20 1 
Foreign Affairs and International            
Cooperation 5 5 0 14 15 1 
Justice and Constitutional Affairs 4 4 0 14 10 4 
President's Office(State House) 3 3 0 11 10 1 
Vice-President's Office 2 2 0 5 4 1 
Defense (reviewed outside CSR) n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Sector Totals 19 19 0 63 59 8 
Percentages 100 100 0 100 94 13 
TOTALS 102 78 26 338 242 118 
PERCENTAGES 100 76 25 100 72 35 
Source: United Republic of Tanzania, President’s Office – Civil Service Department. 1999. Civil Service 
Reform Program Implementation Status Report (1993-1999). Dar es Salaam, p. 14. 
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Personnel control and management reforms generated an effective personnel information 
system that has streamlined civil service employment. All positions and employment are 
tracked by the integrated human resources control mechanism known as the Human 
Capital Management Information System. “This system is controlled by the President’s 
Office – Office of Public Service Management and the Ministry of Finance jointly. It is 
difficult to tamper with.”480 In addition, entry into and exit from the CS is handled 
systematically across all Ministries. All new employment has to be authorized by the 
Chief Secretary to the Government who also occupies the positions of Secretary to 
President, Secretary to Cabinet, and Head of the Public Service.  
In a bid to ensure strict personnel control and management, payroll control 
measures were instituted in the MOF. The measures were put in place to monitor whether 
the wage bill expenditures were consistent with the staff numbers. An official from the 
Ministry of finance revealed that: 
“A fully integrated human resources and payroll management system was 
installed. At its heart is a computerized human resources database that contains all 
the personal, professional, and career information for the country’s 286,000 
public servants. This system has enhanced our human resource management 
information and made it possible to control and predict payroll costs. It has 
brought back into the civil service payroll integrity and helped us get rid of ghost 
workers.”481 
 
Data from government documents and views from the participants confirm that the above 
measures have generated reductions in the size of the civil service by not only 
                                                 
480Interview with Professor Gelase Mutahaba Chief Technical Advisor, President’s Office - Public Service 
Management, Government of Tanzania, held June 29, 2006. 
481 Interview with Mr. Ramadhani, S.S. Hamisi, Assistant Commissioner, Budget, MOF, held July 31, 
2006. 
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rationalizing employment procedures but also by ensuring that the problem of ghost 
workers was solved. A participant revealed that “radical measures were taken where all 
public servants instead of getting salaries straight in our accounts we had to go physically 
to the bank cash office with our identity cards to get our salaries and that is how lawful 
workers were identified.”482 By 1998, 20,000 ghost workers had been removed from the 
payroll saving the country at least Tshs. 7.2 billion per year.483 It was observed that in 
2006, the ghost workers phenomenon was almost zero.484  
  
7.2.4 Rationalization of Government Employment  
In addition to above reform efforts, the reduction of the size of the Tanzanian civil 
service was sought through the rationalization of government employment. 
Rationalization entailed the retrenchment of non-performers, overdue leavers, and 
implementation of the voluntary retirement scheme. Retrenchment, perceived as a  major 
way to reduce the size of the Tanzanian CS, was one of the conditions for attaining credit 
set by the Bretton Woods Institutions. The WB and IMF were of the view that the large 
number of civil servants was one of the major causes of the country’s budgetary 
imbalances. Accordingly, they recommended that a functional review and an analysis of 
civil service personnel levels be undertaken. The studies identified and recommended 
                                                 
482 Interview with Mr. Samuel Kiondo, Economist – Regional Administration and Local Government 
Authorities, Ministry of Finance. held July 4, 2006. 
483 Ntukamazina, D. A. 1998. “Civil Service Performance in Tanzania: A Strategic Perspective.” In 
Severine M. Rugumamu (ed) Civil Service Reform in Tanzania: Proceedings of the National Symposium. 
Dar es Salaam: University Consultancy Bureau, p. 51. 
484 Interview with Professor Gelase Mutahaba Chief Technical Advisor, President’s Office - Public Service 
Management, Government of Tanzania, held June 29, 2006. 
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50,000 civil servants for retrenchment. The actual retrenchment exercise commenced in 
1993 and by January 31, 1994, 2,122 poor performers were retrenched from different 
Ministries. More civil servants from both the central government and local government 
were let go through the voluntary retirement scheme. At the start of 1995, 47,000 civil 
servants had been retrenched. In 1997, the civil service staff number had been reduced to 
260,000 from 360,000 in 1992, and the traditional civil service had been reduced to 
approximately 50,000 personnel. 485  
However, it did not take long for the number of civil servants to start to rise again. 
The Chief Technical Advisor, President’s Office – Public Service Management, revealed 
that “between the years 2000 to 2004, the number of public servants increased from 
approximately 263,000 to 286,000. Most of the increase was in the Ministries of 
Education, Health and Internal Affairs. Approximately 65% of all public servants are 
teachers, doctors, medical officers, nurses, police, or prison officers.”486 He revealed 
further that nearly two thirds – approximately 64% of all public servants are employed at 
the local government level but the majority of them are still on the national government 
wage bill because the decentralization program is not yet complete. Less than 4% are 
paid at the local level. Table 7.3 shows the major job classes in the CS. 
 
                                                 
485 The United Republic of Tanzania, President’s Office – Civil Service Department. 1999. Civil Service 
Reform Programme Implementation Status Report (1993-1999). Dar es Salaam. 
486 Interview with Professor Gelase Mutahaba Chief Technical Advisor, President’s Office - Public Service 
Management, Government of Tanzania, held June 29, 2006. 
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Table 7.3 Major Job Classes 
JOB CLASSIFICATION NUMBER % of TOTAL 
Teacher 123,573 43.1 
Medical Worker (Doctor, Nurse, Medical Officer) 32,215 11.2 
Police Officer 22,309 7.8 
Education Officer (Inspector, Administrator) 12,907 4.5 
Prison Officer 9,390 3.3 
Technician/ Craftsman 7,502 2.6 
Watchman 7,397 2.6 
Office Supervisor/ Attendant 6,844 2.4 
Agricultural Field Officer 4,260 1.5 
Accountant 4,168 1.5 
Driver 3,338 1.2 
Livestock Field Officer 2,915 1.0 
Typist/ Secretary 2,868 1.0 
Village/ Ward/ Division Officer 2,494 0.9 
Forest Officer 2,245 0.8 
Judicial Officer (Judge, Clerk, etc) 2,010 0.7 
Registry Clerk (Records Management) 1,997 0.7 
Community Development Officer 1,600 0.6 
Kitchen Worker 1,543 0.5 
Game Officer 1,152 0.4 
Stores/ Supply Officer 1,125 0.4 
Public Health Officer 1,058 0.4 
Immigration Officer 753 0.3 
Telephone Operator 306 0.1 
Others 30,866 10.8 
TOTAL 286,817 100 
Source: United Republic of Tanzania, President’s Office – Public Service Management. 2005. State of the 
Public Service Report 2004. Dar es Salaam, p. 46. 
 
The above table indicates that the teaching sector generates the highest number of 
government workers. According to the Head of Planning, Budgeting, Monitoring and 
Evaluation at the Ministry of Education, “between 2000 and 2004, the number of teachers 
increased by 23,812. The increase in the number of teachers is roughly equivalent to the 
net increase in employment in the public service of 23,485 in the same period.”487 In his 
view, the teaching service has witnessed a greater need for teachers because of two major 
                                                 
487 Interview with Mr. Mwaimu, A. S. M., Head, Planning, Budgeting, Monitoring and Evaluation, Ministry 
of Education, held July 31, 2006. 
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programs, namely the Education Sector Development Program (ESDP) and the Primary 
Education Development Program (PEDP). The Education Sector Development Program 
covers basic education which includes pre-primary, primary, adult, secondary, teacher 
education, higher education, and vocational education. The goal of the ESDP is to ensure 
that the education sector provides equitable and quality education for all Tanzanians. The 
Primary Education Development Program guides the implementation of free primary 
education. Evidence shows that the increase in primary school teachers is a direct result 
of the increase in pupil enrolment. “Enrolment in primary education has been expanding 
at a fast rate. In 1999, there were 4,189,816 pupils and in 2003, they had increased to 
6,562,772. The net enrolment rate increased from 57.1% in 1999 to 88.5% in 2003. There 
has also been an increase in gross enrolment rate from 77.1% in 1999 to 105.3 in 
2003.”488  The increase in the size of the Tanzanian CS resulting from the increase in the 
number of teachers is therefore justified and is in line with the government program to 
eradicate poverty through literacy.  
 
7.2.5 The Reduction of the Size of the Tanzanian Civil Service: Rhetoric or Reality? 
 The analysis offered above illustrates that at the start of the CSRP in Tanzania, 
priority was focused on reducing and controlling the size of the civil service. It has been 
shown that size reduction was achieved through three major way; Organization and 
Efficiency reviews, personnel control and management, and through rationalization of 
government employment. The Organization and Efficiency reviews rationalized the 
                                                 
488 The United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Education. 2004. Medium Term Strategic Plan, 2004 -
2007. Dar es Salaam, p. 5. 
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MDAs roles, functions, and organizational structures by getting rid of the unnecessary 
ones, merging some, contracting out non-core functions, divesting functions to executive 
agencies, and by restructuring the local government. The personnel control and 
management reforms set standards for gaining employment into the CS. An employment 
policy was put in place and a Public Service Act was passed to guide the employment 
procedures. Records on employment and staff management are now managed by the 
Human Capital Management Information System, an initiative that has made it possible 
to rid the civil service of ‘ghost’ workers. Rationalization of government employment 
entailed retrenchment of nonperformers and overdue leavers, and voluntary retirement. 
 The above efforts generated a big reduction of the civil service size. MDAs were 
reduced by 25% and the civil servants from 360,000 in 1993 to 260,000 in 1997, a 28% 
percent decrease. However, by 2000, the number started to rise as a result of the 
increasing numbers of staff in service sectors like education and health. The universal 
primary education program in particular enhanced the need for teachers for primary, 
secondary, and technical schools. All the study participants commended government 
effort to offer free basic education and agreed that the increase in the size of the civil 
service is justified. Figure 7.3 shows the reduction and growth pattern of the Tanzanian 
civil service from the year 1993 to 2004. 
 The dramatic decrease in the number of civil servants from 360,000 in 1993 to 
260,000 in 1999 is evident in figure 7.3. The gradual increase from 1999 is also apparent. 
The major goal for reducing the size was to make it smaller, affordable (reduce fiscal 
pressure), well paid, and efficient. The first aspect has been attained. The rhetoric has 
been turned to reality - the civil service is smaller. My conclusion is in agreement with 
 303
Clarke and Wood (2001) who assert that the size of the government workforce was 
considerably reduced. Whether the reduction led to an affordable and well paid service 
are the subject of the next section and whether it is efficient, will be determined after 
analysis of the four aspects of the study. 
 
Figure 7.3 Size of the Tanzanian Civil Service, 1993-2004 
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Source: United Republic of Tanzania, President’s Office – Public Service Management. 2008. PSRP Phase 
1 End of Programme Report: A Summary of Results 2003-2007. Dar es Salalam. 
 
7.3 PAY REFORM AND THE TANZANIAN CIVIL SERVICE REFORM 
PROGRAM 
 
 Pay reform is a critical component of the Tanzanian civil service reform program 
and remains the most challenging. The Tanzanian government placed significant focus on 
reforming the pay of the civil servants because it was aware that reducing the number of 
civil servants and government expenditure alone would not generate effectiveness and 
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efficiency in performance if the retained workers were not adequately paid and 
motivated. It should be noted that at independence, the Tanzanian civil service pay was 
enough to meet the minimum living standards of the employees. The economy was 
relatively strong, the number of civil servants small, and because the colonial pay policies 
were not altered. In addition, the difference between the highest paid and lowest paid 
workers was wide reflecting both experience and educational achievement.  
 Soon after independence, the civil service under went major changes. The 
government took on an increasingly leading role in national development that 
necessitated an increase in the number of civil servants. Africanization of the civil 
service, an expanding education and health care network, and the self imposed 
responsibility to offer employment to all that graduated from primary school increased 
the size of the civil service. The salary structure also witnessed some changes. Salary 
differentials were reduced in order to make pay scales inherited from the colonial 
government more egalitarian. African socialism and self-reliance programs adopted in 
1967 also changed the civil service as focus was placed on providing a decent income to 
all citizens irrespective of job classification. “Equity was pursued very vigorously and the 
differences between the lowest and highest paid employees shrunk very significantly.”489  
For a short time, the post-independence changes worked well. Government 
employment expanded rapidly, the quest for fast economic development through self-
reliant socialism seemed to be on course, education, health care, and clean water were 
available to the people. However, it was not long before the socialist economic policies 
                                                 
489 Kiragu, K. and Rwekaza Mukandala. 2005. Politics and Tactics in Public Sector Reforms: The 
Dynamics of Public Service Pay in Africa. Dar es Salaam: Dar es Salaam University Press Ltd. 
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failed. By the mid 1970s, the economy started to collapse, government employment and 
expenditure outpaced government revenue, working conditions deteriorated, and pay 
plummeted. In response to the budgetary pressures, the government carried out staff 
reductions between 1975 and 1977. The reductions attained proved temporary however. 
Because the country did not have a viable private sector and other non-government 
employment alternatives the civil service doors could not be shut for too long. In 1978 
the number increased again and by 1984, government employment had grown twice as 
much as the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The dwindling domestic revenue, coupled 
with high inflation made it extremely difficult for the government to adequately cater for 
basic services and to provide civil servants with adequate working conditions. It is not 
surprising therefore that the salaries continued to plummet. Figure 7.4 depicts the sharp 
increase of the size of the civil service in contrast to the stagnating (GDP).  
To compensate for the inadequate pay, the government provided a multitude of 
benefits, subsidies, and allowances to civil servants. Transport, food (breakfast, lunch, tea 
and snacks), child support (up to four children), housing, medical care, clothing 
(uniforms), paid leave, and hardship loans were provided. By the mid 1980s, in the 
majority of the salary scales, the allowances were on average more than 400% of the 
basic salary.490 Such non-salary benefits caused difficulties in budgetary accountability 
and transparency, and generated distortions and inequities in the salary structure.
                                                 
490 United Republic of Tanzania – Civil Service Department. 1999. Civil Service Reform Programme 
Implementation Status Report (1993 – 1999). Dar es Salaam. 
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Figure 7.4 Civil Service Expansion and Stagnating GDP, 1970-1984 
Government Employees and GDP, 1970-1984
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
220
19
70
19
71
19
72
19
73
19
74
19
75
19
76
19
77
19
78
19
79
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
Government Employees GDP
 
Source: Steven, M. “Public Expenditure and Civil Service Reform in Tanzania.” In Rehabilitating 
Government: Pay and Employment Reforms in Africa. Lindauer, D. L. and Barbara Nunberg (eds.) 
Washington, D.C: World Bank, p. 66. 
 
In addition, allowances promoted tax evasion since they were tax free thereby denying 
government the much needed revenue, and since they were not included in the salary 
structure, civil servants’ pension suffered.  
In spite of government egalitarian efforts to shore up civil servants’ income, a 
deepening economic crisis generated a sharp decline in government revenues that in turn 
caused further erosion of salaries. In 1990, it was estimated that the public servants’ 
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salary level was 25% of the level paid in 1972.491 Poor pay levels and narrow salary 
differentials had a profound negative effect on performance. Not surprisingly, civil 
servants lost morale, absenteeism and moonlighting increased, the highly skilled left the 
civil service for greener pastures, managerial responsibility suffered, and corruption 
became widespread.  
When the government embarked on the IMF/WB driven economic recovery 
programs in 1986, little attention was paid to the civil service. Kjaer (2004) has asserted 
that the president at the time, Ali Hassan Mwinyi (1985-1995), focused only on over 
turning the economic system and disregarded the dire situation the administrative system 
was in. According to Kjaer, although “Mwinyi was committed to overall economic 
liberalization, he did not seem determined to introduce longer-term reform of 
administrative structures.”492 By 1990, it was evident that the public service lacked the 
requisite competence to support and implement economic change. One of the major 
causes of poor CS performance was low pay. When the CSRP was finally initiated, pay 
reform became a vital part of the reform process. According to the former Permanent 
Secretary PO-PSM, “it was obvious that the salary structure had become grossly distorted 
and the pay did not meet the minimum living requirements. The correlation between poor 
                                                 
491 United Republic of Tanzania – Civil Service Department. 1999. Civil Service Reform Programme 
Implementation Status Report (1993 – 1999). Dar es Salaam. 
492 Kjaer, A. M. 2004. “Old Brooms can Sweep too!: An Overview of Rulers and Public Sector Reforms in 
Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya.” Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 42, No.3, p. 399. 
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pay and poor performance was quite obvious. Pay reform therefore assumed a crucial and 
integral role in the civil service reform program.”493  The objective of pay reform was:  
“to rationalize and enhance civil service pay by eliminating the distortions and 
anomalies that have crept into the system, and by improving total compensation at 
all levels so that it meets the minimum household living requirements and is 
commensurate with the qualifications, skills, experience, and responsibilities of 
individual civil servants.”494  
 
Evidence from the interviews and documents shows that enhancement of civil 
servants’ salaries has had two phases. The first phase, under President Mwinyi did not 
generate dramatic changes in pay. With less than two years remaining on his term of 
office, the president seemed content to let the situation be, and wait for the next leader to 
take care of it. It was after President Mkapa assumed office in 1995 that major changes 
began to occur. Figure 7.5 below shows the trend of real civil service pay in Tanzania for 
the years 1969-1998; salaries were quite high in the period following independence until 
the mid 1970s when a downward trend ensued. The negative economic growth resulted in 
the decline in the wage bill. It was not until 1986 that pay increases were put in place and 
although the trend is not consistent, it is clearly an upward trend. In the period 1993 to 
1999, pay reform efforts focused on addressing the structural weaknesses in the grading 
and salary schemes through two major ways: rationalization of the pay structure which 
entailed reduction of pay grades and consolidation of the allowances into a basic pay; 
and, development of an appropriate remuneration system that would enhance the civil 
                                                 
493 Interview with the former Permanent Secretary President’s Office - Public Service Management, Mr. 
Joseph Rugumyamheto, held June 29, 2006. 
494 United Republic of Tanzania – Civil Service Department. 1999. Civil Service Reform Programme 
Implementation Status Report (1993 – 1999). Dar es Salaam, p. 6 
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servants’ salary. What follows below is an analysis of how they were carried out and to 
what effect. 
 
Figure 7.5 Real Civil Service Average Pay Trend, 1969-1998. 
Real Civil Service Average Pay Trend, Tanzania: 1969-1998
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Source: United Republic of Tanzania, President’s Office – Public Service Management,. 2005. State of the 
Public Service Report 2004. Dar es Salaam, p. 52. 
 
 
7.3.1 Rationalization of the Pay Structure 
Pay reform efforts were geared towards the rationalization of the pay structure in 
order to make it transparent, equitable, and efficient. The rationalization process targeted 
the reduction of pay grades and elimination of allowances. Prior to the reform, there were 
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196 pay grades.495 The salary structure was highly compressed to the disadvantage of 
those in the upper grades. In the context of diminishing revenue, salary structure 
compression was the most practical means through which the Tanzanian government 
could maintain the offer employment. Kiragu (1998) asserted that in 1969 before the 
economic downturn, the highest salary earned in the CS was about 30 times higher than 
the lowest earned salary, but in mid 1980s, the compression ratio was very small at 6 to 
1.496  
It should however be noted that the salary compression effects were not felt by the 
civil servants equally. Top and high level civil servants diminished the effects by 
awarding themselves numerous non-cash benefits. It is the technical and professional 
personnel in the middle level that suffered the brunt of the compressed salary structure. In 
a comparative salary study carried out in 1996, it was found that for the non-skilled and 
semi-skilled staff, payment levels were more or less the same in the parastatals, NGOs, 
and private sector as those in the civil service. For the technical and professional 
personnel however, payment levels were between two to five times higher in the other 
sectors than those in the civil service. Table 7.4 below illustrates this disparity. 
                                                 
495 Interview Mr. Ramadhani, S. Hamisi, Assistant Commissioner of Budget in the MOF, held July 31, 
2006. 
496 See Kiragu, K. 1998. “Civil Servie Pay Reform Issues and Options.” In Rugumamu, S. (es.) Civil 
Service Reform in Tanzania: Proceedings of the National Symposium. Dar es Salaam: University 
Consultancy Bureau. 
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Table 7.4 Comparative Sector Compensation Levels for Select Job Categories 
(November 1996) 
 
Category Civil Service Private Parastatals NGOs 
Doctor        100%    240%     167%   157% 
Chief Executive        100%    280%     337%   362% 
Engineer        100%    779%     303%      - 
Legal Officer        100%    754%     398%      - 
Accountant        100%    325%     251%   337% 
Economist        100%    878%     293%   596% 
Personnel Officer        100%    637%     237%   232% 
Purchasing/Supplies Officer        100%    310%     226%   309% 
Assistant Engineer        100%    951%     186%      - 
Technician        100%    284%     231%   315% 
Driver        100%    288%     277%   216% 
Source: Kiragu, K. 1998. “Civil Servie Pay Reform Issues and Options.” In Rugumamu, S. (es.) Civil 
Service Reform in Tanzania: Proceedings of the National Symposium. Dar es Salaam: University 
Consultancy Bureau, p. 142. 
 
By 1998, the pay grades were reduced to 45. This reduction helped to decompress 
the salary structure and generate a larger variation between high and low salary earners 
within the civil service. The pay disparity between the civil service and other sectors 
however has not reduced significantly although civil service pay has been increased 
considerably as shown in the discussion under salary enhancement.  
When pay reform was initiated, 36 in-kind and monetary allowances 
supplemented the civil servants’ salary. Monetary allowances constituted approximately 
76% of the total wage bill.497 After reform implementation, the allowances, many of 
which were only offered to senior civil servants in an opaque manner, were reduced to 7 
and consolidated into taxable basic pay. The changes reduced the wage bill expenditure. 
                                                 
497 Interview with Interview with Mr. Ramadhani, S. Hamisi, Assistant Commissioner of Budget in the 
MOF, held August 2006. 
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In 1994/1995, wage bill expenditures exceeded the budget by 40% but in 1996/1997 the 
wage bill was only 2% over the budget. 498  
  Study participants expressed the view that while elimination of allowances made 
the pay structure more transparent, high level staff suffered higher reductions in their pay 
because the bulk of their take-home was based on the eliminated allowances. Clarke and 
Wood (2001) also found that there was an adverse effect on the salary scale of some key 
professional and middle management personnel due to consolidation of allowances into 
basic pay. They assert that “recent estimates suggest that real salaries may actually have 
declined for this group over the period 1995/96 1998/99.”499 By the end of 1999 however, 
benefits like housing assistance and maintenance allowances, and other incidental 
allowances covered under what is known as “Other Charges Budget” for instance per 
diems, were brought back into the pay system and are increasingly serving as individual 
salary supplements. Kiragu and Mukandala (2005) note the same occurrence when they 
assert that the government is falling back to allowances and the pay reform program is 
“working in reverse gear.”500 One study participant observed that staff spend a lot of time 
attending workshops or training regardless of relevance to their duties and careers and vie 
                                                 
498 United Republic of Tanzania, President’s Office – Public Service Management. 1999. Civil Service 
Reform Programme Implementation Status Report (1993-1999). Dar es Salaam, p. 13.  
499 Clarke, J. and David Wood. 2001. “New Public Management and Development: The Case of Public 
Service Reform in Tanzania and Uganda.” In McCourt, W. and Martin Minogue (eds.) The 
Internationalization of Public Management: Reinventing the Third World State. Cheltenham, UK: Edward 
Elgar, p. 73. 
500 Kiragu, K. and Rwekaza Mukandala. 2005. Politics and Tactics in Public Sector Reforms: The 
Dynamics of Public Service Pay in Africa. Dar es Salaam: Dar es Salaam University Press Ltd, p. 243. 
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to serve on numerous committees, taskforces, and boards in order to get allowances.501 
Needless to say, allowances undermine performance because in their pursuit, staff are 
diverted from their core responsibilities. In order to control the continued growth of 
allowances, in the financial year 2006/2007, the government capped the proportion of the 
budgeted resources for incidental allowances.  
Table 7.5 below shows the increase in the expenditure on allowances covered 
under “Other Charges Budget.”  
 
Table 7.5 Some Fast Growing Components of the Other Charges Budget 
ITEM 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 % INCREASE 
Utilities 0.65 0.95 1.75 169 
Training - Domestic 3.58 7.00 25.22 604 
Training - Foreign 0.61 3.82 3.79 521 
Sitting Allowances 0.97 1.65 4.26 339 
Per Diem Domestic 15.00 26.70 35.7 138 
Per Diem Foreign 0.91 2.84 6.27 589 
Others 36.13 47.13 58.83 63 
TOTAL 57.85 90.09 135.82 135 
Note: all Value in Billions of Tanzanian Shillings 
Source: United Republic of Tanzania, President’s Office – Public Service Management. 2004. Annual 
Progress Report 2003/04. Dar es Salaam, pp. 3-15. 
 
The other charges budget is separate from the personal emoluments budget, a technicality 
that may lead to unfairness and lack of transparency, problems that will surely negate the 
gains made by trimming allowances at the start of pay reform. In a bid to ensure that does 
not happen, President Kikwete appointed a taskforce in 2006 to review the issue and 
                                                 
501 Interview with Interview with Mr. Ramadhani, S. Hamisi, Assistant Commissioner of Budget in the 
MOF, held July 31, 2006.  
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make appropriate recommendations. The findings of the taskforce were expected to be 
released in 2007. It is therefore safe to contend that the rationalization of the pay structure 
by consolidation of pay and monetization of noncash benefits has not yet entirely attained 
the goal of eliminating allowances to make the pay system equitable, transparent, and 
efficient.  
 
7.3.2 Salary Enhancement: Designing an Appropriate Remuneration System 
Although the rationalization of the pay structure is still problematic due to the 
reemergence of allowances, efforts to increase the civil servants’ pay have generated 
some positive changes. According to the reform reports, a 75% increase in average civil 
service real salaries was offered between the years 1993 and 1997. “In nominal terms, 
average civil service salaries increased from TShs. 12,000 in 1992 to TShs. 54,000 in 
1997.”502 The cash increase however was not synonymous with an increase in purchasing 
power especially since inflation levels were still high at 26.6% in 1996.503 It is therefore 
not surprising that calls for higher pay did not abate. 
Major initiatives to enhance remuneration occurred during the implementation of 
phase one of the Public Service Reform Program (PSRP) initiated in the year 2000. The 
Government adopted a Medium Term Pay Policy (MTPP) to guide the pay enhancement 
process and implementation of the policy was guided by a Medium Term Pay Reform 
Strategy (MTPRS). The strategy consisted of three main elements: the first was the 
                                                 
502 United Republic of Tanzania, President’s Office – Public Service Management. 1999. Civil Service 
Reform Programme Implementation Status Report (1993-1999), Dar es Salaam, p. 13. 
503 United Republic of Tanzania, MOF, 1996/97 Budget. 
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adoption of a medium term target salary structure that would systematically enhance pay 
for all public servants. Annual salary adjustment plans were proposed for its 
achievement. The second element entailed undertaking a Job Evaluation and Re-grading 
exercise to facilitate improved links between pay and performance. It was anticipated that 
the exercise would result in improved pay for all staff but most especially for the 
professional and technical staff. The third element was the adoption of a Selective 
Accelerated Salary Enhancement (SASE) scheme. The scheme directed salary 
enhancements to special categories of professional, technical, and managerial personnel 
thought to be critical to service delivery improvement, those involved in managing the 
reform process, and those in positions that produce strategic government output.504 
The Medium Term Target Salary Structure: 
The adoption of a Medium Term Pay Policy (MTPP) with a medium term target 
salary structure is viewed as one of the major innovations of the pay reform process. 
Before its adoption, even though the government recognized that civil service pay was 
low, it would increase pay only by utilizing the residual of the budget after financing 
sectors like education, roads etc. After the adoption of the MTPP, government committed 
itself to every year increase the pay of all civil servants by a certain percentage based on 
the medium pay policy targets. This was a fundamental change that indicated that salary 
increase would not be dealt with after taking care of everything else in government. It 
was appreciated that “pay increase is also an important consideration which sits on the 
                                                 
504 United Republic of Tanzania, Public Service Management. 2005. State of the Public Service Report 
2004. Dar es Salaam. 
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table along with other demands in the budget framework, not a residual issue.”505 It was 
observed that the long term goal of the pay policy is to reach parity in real terms with the 
pay that the government paid the civil servants in 1976 when it was offering a living 
wage.506   
The Medium Term Pay Policy (MTPP) establishes a series of pay targets to 
increase the civil service pay. In order not to lose focus, the targets are reviewed and 
updated annually to reflect pay reform experience, and attempts are made to align them 
closely with levels found in the private sector. Despite the meticulous planning, 
implementation of the MTPP did not generate immediate tremendous gains. In 2003, it 
was found that although actual salaries increased, the MTPP targets were not met. 
Differentials ranged from 13% in the lower salary grades to 21-32% in the middle and 
upper salary grades. The major reason offered for failure to meet the set targets was the 
increase in the number of teachers and an unexpected reduction in the wage bill/GDP 
ratio.507 The MTPP was based on faulty MTPRS assumptions regarding employment 
growth and government revenue and expenditure trends. Table 7.6 shows these 
assumptions. In spite of not meeting the set targets, there is a general view that the MTPP 
is generating positive changes. It was asserted that within two years of its implementation 
actual salaries were within 84 to 86% of their planned levels. 
 
                                                 
505 Interview with Professor Gelase Mutahaba, Chief Technical Advisor, President’s Office – Public 
Service Management, held June 29, 2006. 
506 Ibid. 
507 United Republic of Tanzania. President’s Office – Public Service Management. 2004. Public Service 
Reform Programme Annual Progress Report 2003/04. Dar es Salaam. 
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Table 7.6 Assumptions in the Medium Term Pay Reform Strategy 
  MTPRS ACTUAL 
ITEM ASSUMPTION VALUE 
Employment Growth -14.70% +5% 
Wage Bill/GDP (01/02;02/03) 4.6%; 4.7% 2.4%; 4.4% 
Source: United Republic of Tanzania. President’s Office – Public Service Management. 2004. Public 
Service Reform Programme Annual Progress Report 2003/04. Dar es Salaam, pp. 3-14. 
 
There was a general view that the mere existence of the pay targets and the ability of the 
government to come consistently close to attaining them should be considered an 
achievement rather than a failure.  
By 2006, more strides were made in salary enhancement. The Chief Technical 
Advisor President’s Office – Public Service Management observed that there have been 
major improvements in salaries based on the medium term pay targets and the increase is 
most notable at the lower and middle levels. He asserted that “74% of all civil servants 
now receive salaries in excess of their targets.”508 A 2007 study that used a sample of 34 
salary bands also noted that salary targets have largely been met at the lower to middle 
levels than at upper management levels. It was found that using unweighted averages of 
the actual to targeted salary levels, “lower bands met their targets by 104% (TGS A to 
TGS C), middle bands met their targets by 108% (TGS D to TGS I), while higher bands 
met their targets by 67% (TGS J to TGS Q).”509  
                                                 
508 Interview with Professor Gelase Mutahaba, Chief Technical Advisor, President’s Office – Public 
Service Management, held June 29, 2006. 
509 United Republic of Tanzania, President’s Office – Public Service Management. 2008. PSRP Phase 1 
end of Programme Report: A Summary of Results 2003-2007. Dar es Salaam, p. 32. 
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Salaries for the Tanzanian civil servants have therefore increased significantly 
since second phase of reform program was started in the year 2000. While the average 
gross salary (excluding allowances) during the financial year 2000/2001 was Tanzania 
Shillings (TShs.) 74,183, the average salary by 2007/2008 was TShs. 234,000. This is a 
total increase of 215.7% or an average annual compound increase of 17.85%. Once 
inflation is taken into account, increases remain significant reaching a total of 122.1% or 
an average annual compound increase of 12.1%.510 Figure 7.6 below shows the average 
pay levels for the years 2000 to 2008. Figure 7.6 shows that the salary followed an 
upward trend especially from the year 2001 and for the next five years increases were 
sustained. A big jump appeared between 2005 and 2007 showing the commitment to 
increase pay by the new president who in his inaugural speech said: “I am aware that pay 
levels in the public service remain a concern. We will look at it. I intend, as soon as 
possible, to establish a Commission on Public Service Remunerations that I will task to 
produce short, medium, and long term strategies to improve pay levels and other 
benefits.”511 At the time of data collection, the Presidential Commission on Pay was 
undertaking its mandates. Its findings are expected to be the basis for pay reform efforts 
in the PSRP phase II (2008-2012). 
 Yet, in spite of the rosy picture painted above, an interview with a professional 
staff indicated that not everyone is impressed by the achievements. “Our salaries are still 
                                                 
510 Ibid. 
511 President H. E. Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete inauguration address 2005. Cited in United Republic of 
Tanzania, President’s Office – Public Service Management. Public Service Reform Programme Phase II 
2008-2012. Dar es Salaam, p. 24.  
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very very discouraging…. Until the threshold is reached, we can’t say there is 
improvement. People are not happy, motivation is very low”512 a participant observed. 
There was general agreement that low pay continues to bedevil the reform efforts 
including capacity building and performance management. Low pay was also cited as the 
major single factor responsible for the rise in petty corruption. 
 
Figure 7.6 Average Pay Levels (Tanzanian Shillings) 2000 – 2007 
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Source: United Republic of Tanzania, President’s Office – Public Service Management. 2008. PSRP Phase 
I end of Programme Report: A Summary of Results 2003-2007. Dar es Salaam, p. 31. 
 
It can therefore be argued that the mechanisms put in place to enhance salary namely the 
MTPP and the MTPRS have had significant impact. Since the year 2000 the government 
                                                 
512 Interview with Mr. Samuel Kiondo, Economist – Regional Administration and Local Government 
Authorities, Ministry of Finance, held July 4, 2006. 
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has remained steady in pursuing pay reform through the medium term target salary 
structure and some positive changes have been achieved but more still needs to be done.  
Selective Accelerated Salary Enhancement (SASE): 
 The Selective Accelerated Salary Enhancement (SASE) scheme was introduced 
under the MTPRS as an incentive to key public servants in managerial, professional, and 
technical positions with reform implementation responsibilities. It was also implemented 
in recognition of the fact that the MTPP targets were not being met. The goal was to give 
the workers motivation to perform optimally and to retain them in the service. Salary 
scales under SASE were pegged to target levels contained in the MTPRS and the 
intention was that in the medium term (six years), donors would on a declining scale 
finance the gap between current and target salary levels. At its inception, SASE was 
supposed to cover all the 36 Ministries and Departments. The scheme was linked to 
performance agreements – Open Performance Review Appraisal System (OPRAS) – in 
which an individual outlines targets and objectives that will be met in a year and signs a 
contract with his or her immediate boss. The latter would undertake a mid year and end 
of year review to assess the performance. Failure to meet the set targets would mean loss 
of SASE benefits.513 Ministries seeking eligibility were required to demonstrate that 
objective and transparent criteria were used in selecting candidates for SASE and OPRA 
agreements were signed. However, SASE was implemented in only four ministries; the 
President’s Office – Public Service Management, President’s Office – Planning and 
Privatization, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Health from the financial years 
                                                 
513 Interview with Mr. Magambo, Nashon, B. S., Commissioner for Budget, Ministry of Finance, held July 
31, 2006.  
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2003/2004 to 2006/2007 following a cabinet decision that ruled against implementation 
in all 36 ministries.  
 A study to assess the impact of the SASE scheme on performance and staff 
retention carried out by Crown Management Consultant in 2005 found that there was 
strong anecdotal evidence that the scheme had had a significant positive impact on 
performance of the beneficiaries at both individual and ministerial levels. It was also 
observed that the MOF and the President’s Office – Planning and Privatization, 
Ministries that had experienced significant turnover of professional and technical staff in 
the past, indicated that SASE top-ups had assisted in enhancing capacities to attract, 
retain, and adequately motivate their personnel.514  
 The study participants however observed that SASE was an unfair mechanism of 
improving pay because it was benefiting only four ministries. It was also asserted that the 
selection criteria were not transparent because many ministries had met the criteria for 
selection and yet the scheme was restricted to only four. The selection of benefiting 
individuals was also identified as one of the shortcomings of the scheme. It was observed 
that some recipient staff were not bound by OPRAS, some were not critical employees,515 
and in some instances recipients were about to retire.516  It is therefore not surprising that 
by 2006, calls for its abandonment were rife. Yet some viewed the scheme as a viable 
                                                 
514 Crown Management Consultatnts. 2005. In United Republic of Tanzania, President’s Office – Public 
Service Management. 2008. PSRP Phase I end of Programme Report: A Summary of Results 2003-2007. 
Dar es Salaam.  
515 One participant observed that Secretaries received SASE. 
516 Interview with Mr. Magambo, Nashon, B. S., Commissioner for Budget, Ministry of Finance, held July 
31, 2006. 
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transitional strategy to salary enhancement. According to the former Permanent Secretary 
PO-PSM, SASE has a built in exit strategy which means that once government can meets 
the medium pay targets, the scheme would be terminated. In his view, it is the legacy of 
egalitarianism and the general perception that salary enhancement for particular 
ministries is unfair that have eroded the government’s will to continue with the 
scheme.517 Ultimately, the scheme was abandoned in the 2007/2008 financial year. The 
reason offered for its abandonment is that “pay targets were met on the aggregate.”518    
 
7.3.3 Enhancing Civil Service Remuneration in Tanzania: Rhetoric or Reality? 
The above discussion has shown that the pay reform in the Tanzanian CSRP has 
been a gradual but steady process. The reform process focused on rationalizing the pay 
structure and designing appropriate remuneration systems. During the first phase of the 
CSRP 1993 – 1999, emphasis was place on the rationalization of the pay structure and 
payroll system. Pay grades were reduced from 196 to 45, allowances from 36 to 7, and a 
computerized payroll and human resource system was put in place. During the same time 
frame, civil service real salaries were increased by 75%.  
Efforts made in the first phase of the PSRP 2000-2007 generated impressive 
increases in remuneration. The Medium Term Pay Policy and the Medium Term Pay 
Reform Strategy are radical innovations that have consistently driven the remuneration 
                                                 
517 Interview with former Permanent Secretary President’s office-Public Service Management, Mr. Joseph 
Rugumyamheto, held June 29, 2006. 
518 United Republic of Tanzania, President’s Office – Public Service Management. 2008. PSRP Phase I end 
of Programme Report: A Summary of Results 2003-2007. Dar es Salaam. 
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closer to pay targets. Although the progress was slow between 2000 and 2002, the 
increase after 2003 is quite remarkable (see figure 8.6). However, the adoption of the 
SASE scheme undermined equity concerns that are still deeply embedded in the 
Tanzanian social fabric. It therefore proved untenable although enforcement and 
sustainability concerns contributed to its demise. Over all, there is general agreement that 
civil service salaries have been enhanced substantially in real terms and the pay structure 
has been rationalized and simplified.  
My findings are in agreement with those expressed by other scholars. Mwapachu 
(2005) asserted that: “the salaries of public servants, much as they are still lower than 
those in the neighboring countries such as Kenya and Uganda, have improved a lot.”519 
Similar views were expressed by Kiragu and Mukandala (2005) and Clarke and Wood 
(2001). Indeed the budgetary trends indicate an increase in the wage bill. For instance 
between 2000 and 2004 monthly personal emoluments increased from roughly 24 billion 
shillings to almost 64 billion shillings. This is a 17.3% increase in shillings equivalent to 
9.5% increase in U.S. dollars.520 Yet, the increase in itself is not an indication that salaries 
were enhanced. The increase in the number of civil servants especially the teachers could 
account for the rise in the wage bill. Moreover, the wage bill to GDP ratio did not 
dramatically rise between 2000 and 2004. It was only after the 2004/2005 financial year 
that an increase was registered. Figure 7.7 below shows that the wage bill to GDP ratio 
                                                 
519 Mwapachu, J. V. 2005. Confronting New Realities: Reflections on Tanzania’s Radical Transformation. 
Dar es Salaam: E&D Limited, p. 296. 
520 United Republic of Tanzania, President’s Office – Public Service Management. 2005. State of the Public 
Service Report 2004. Dar es Salaam. 
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remained almost constant until the dramatic increase in 2006/2007 to 5.8% from 4.8% in 
2005/2006. The increase is attributed to three major factors. First, the new president 
exhibited his goodwill and prevailed over the MOF to increase allocation to the wage bill. 
Second, the GDP grew by 6.7 which made it easier for the MOF to mobilize resources for 
salary enhancement, and third, the increase in the number of civil servants meant an 
increase in the wage bill.  
 
Figure 7.7 Wage Bill / GDP Ratio 2000-2008. 
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Source: United Republic of Tanzania, President’s Office – Public Service Management. 2008. PSRP Phase 
I end of Programme Report: A Summary of Results 2003-2007. Dar es Salaam, p. 31. 
 
It is my contention that while pay levels have increased the size of the service has also 
increased. It is therefore not a stretch to assert that the increase in the wage bill/GDP ratio 
is largely due to the increase in the size of the service rather than enhanced pay levels. 
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The analysis offered above showed that the increases in remuneration have not 
followed the set targets. When implementation of the reform program commenced, it was 
envisaged that the savings made from reducing the size of the service would be allocated 
to pay enhancement. However not much was saved partly because government revenues 
did not increase during the same time period and because an increase in primary school 
teachers raised the wage bill expenditures. It is therefore not surprising that civil service 
pay is still considerably less than that offered in the private sector. It has been reported 
that civil servants’ wages are about 39% of those in the private sector performing similar 
functions.521 Figure 7.8 below shows the civil servants’ average salaries as a percentage 
of private sector average salaries for similar jobs. 
 The figure strengthens the argument that pay reform in Tanzania has not yet 
attained the set goal of ensuring that public service salaries are adequate to recruit and 
retain the best available skills and to ensure that public servants are motivated. The salary 
of non-skilled workers normally found in the lower pay grades in this case at TGS A, at 
78% is more competitive with that in the private sector than the salary for a middle level 
officers between TGS D and TGS I. This reinforces the point that the pay reform process 
has favored more those in the lower pay grades than those in the middle and upper 
grades. In addition, it can be asserted that in as long as the private sector offers better 
salaries, the government will run the risk of losing the best skilled staff. It is recognized 
that the Tanzanian private sector is meager; nonetheless, the risk cannot be 
underestimated. For instance between 2004-2007, 11% of civil servants with masters and 
                                                 
521 United Republic of Tanzania, President’s Office – Public Service Management. 2008. PSRP Phase I end 
of Programme Report: A Summary of Results 2003-2007. Dar es Salaam. 
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doctorate degrees left the service for greener pastures.522 While 11% is a relatively low 
percentage, approximately 3.5% per year, it is critical in a country where such 
qualifications are very hard to come by. 
 
Figure 7.8 Civil Servants’ Average Salaries as a Percentage of Private Sector 
Average Salaries for Similar Jobs in 2006. 
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Source: United Republic of Tanzania, President’s Office – Public Service Management. 2008. PSRP Phase 
I end of Programme Report: A Summary of Results 2003-2007. Dar es Salaam, p. 35. 
 
In a nutshell, progress has been made in the rationalization and enhancement of 
pay in the Tanzanian civil service. The pay reform process is guided by clearly set goals 
and targets for the medium term and the long term vision is in place. Compared to the 
                                                 
522 United Republic of Tanzania, President’s Office – Public Service Management. 2008. PSRP Phase I end 
of Programme Report: A Summary of Results 2003-2007. Dar es Salaam. 
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pre-reform period, the civil service is smaller, more affordable and better paid. The 
rhetoric is becoming reality. Yet, there is general agreement that the success attained has 
fallen short of the set targets. Civil servants pay remains uncompetitive and below the 
living wage. Recruitment and retention of qualified and experienced technical and 
managerial professionals remains precarious. An interviewee put it succinctly: “If you 
were to ask any civil servant what their major problem is they would say low salaries.”523 
 
 
7.4 CAPACITY BUILDING IN THE TANZANIAN CIVIL SERVICE REFORM 
 
 One of the major hindrances to effective and efficient administrative performance 
is lack of capacity. In 1990, a study commissioned by the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) to assess factors hampering the execution of economic reforms in 
Tanzania found that the Tanzanian CS lacked the capability to carry out the reforms. The 
CS had few well trained and qualified staff to oversee and carry out implementation. The 
lack of capacity is manifested in the civil service census carried out in 1988 which found 
that approximately 2% of the civil servants had higher education (diploma and university 
degree), another 2% had secondary education at Advanced Level (High school), 24% had 
Ordinary Level secondary education (Junior High), and the remaining 72% had primary 
education (Elementary school).524 Hence, that the majority of the civil servants were 
carrying out duties and functions for which they lacked or had inadequate skills.  
                                                 
523 Interview with former Permanent Secretary President’s Office-Public Service Management, Mr. Joseph 
Rugumyamheto, held June 29, 2006. 
524 Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation. 1995. Nordic Initiative for Assistance to Civil 
Service Reforms, Restructuring and Institutional Development. NORAD, Oslo. 
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 The Structural Adjustment Programs implemented between 1985 and 1990 did 
not address capacity however. Rather, emphasis was placed on cutting down costs by 
reducing the scope of government, its size, and budgetary expenditure including 
personnel costs. Because local capacity was very limited, the WB and IMF relied heavily 
on foreign expertise to carry out implementation. Mechanisms and institutional 
arrangements geared towards local capacity and skills development were not devised and 
budget containment meant that the training budget was starved of resources. According to 
one participant, “whatever was done was counteracting the capacity building efforts.”525 
The budget freeze left many training institutions in decay and some collapsed. Trainers 
and educators left the country in search of greener pastures. In 1990, rather belatedly, it 
was realized that without capacity competence reform would not take root. When the 
CSRP was framed in 1991, capacity building was among the major components. 
The Tanzania CSRP emphasized training as the mainstay of capacity building. A 
draft civil service training policy was to be developed to provide guidelines for all 
capacity building initiatives. It was anticipated that by 1996, it would be ready for 
Cabinet approval. By the end of 1999 however, the policy was still in draft form. This is 
because the CSRP phase (1993-1999) focused on cost-containment and reduction of the 
size of the CS and did not give much attention to the development of the civil servants’ 
competence. Indeed implementation relied heavily on foreign expertise with minimal 
local personnel contribution. It should however be noted that some training was offered 
for the high level officials. For instance, training in the Management of Change was 
                                                 
525 Interview with former Permanent Secretary President’s Office - Public Service Management, Mr. Joseph 
Rugumyamheto, held June 29, 2006. 
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offered to Directors in the Civil Service Department and Administration and Personnel in 
the different Ministries by the UK Civil Service College. Permanent Secretaries and 
Ministers were also offered training in Strategic Leadership and Change Management. In 
addition, a workshop on the management of training was conducted for 26 training 
officers from the civil service in early 1996, and 295 civil servants were offered training 
in reform interventions and change management, basic computing skills, and time 
management.526 Nonetheless, these efforts were not sufficient to carry forward 
implementation of the reform program. It was left to the second phase of the reform, the 
PSRP 2000 – 2007, to pay the needed attention to civil service capacity development.  
 
7.4.1 Public Service Reform 2000 – 2007 and Capacity Building 
During the second phase of the administrative reforms, capacity building efforts 
were placed on strengthening leadership management capacities and staff development. 
The two components had the following planned targets: undertaking a survey of training 
needs assessment in all MDAs; preparing Staff Development Plans in MDAs; training 
civil servants in Leadership, Management, and Customer Service; implementing the Civil 
Service Training Policy; and enhancing the capacities of the Tanzania Public Service 
College (TPSC), and the Tanzania Global Distance Learning Centre (TGDLC). The goal 
was to develop the skills of the civil servants and to instill in them attitudinal and 
behavioral change. 
                                                 
526 United Republic of Tanzania, President’s Office – Civil Service Department. 1999. Civil Service Reform 
Programme: Implementation Status Report (1993 – 1999). Dar es Salaam. 
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 The study found that modest progress was made in meeting the above targets. The 
training Needs Assessment Survey, conducted by the PO-PSM was in 2006 completed in 
only 10 MDAs.527 With the realization that in-house assessment might be more fruitful, 
responsibility to carry out the assessment was handed over to the MDAs. As of June 
2008, it was not clear how many MDAs had completed the assessments.528 Moreover, the 
training policy, which was originally supposed to be approved by cabinet in 1996, was in 
2006 still incomplete. 
Human Resource Staff Development Plans were to be prepared by all MDAs with 
facilitation from the PO-PSM. In the summer of 2006, preparation was completed in only 
5 MDAs.529 The PO-PSM later that year relinquished all the responsibility for preparation 
to the MDAs. The latter were supposed to assess their training gaps, create their own 
training selection criteria, train and monitor their training impact. If any plans have since 
been developed, it is not clear which MDAs have prepared them and the quality and 
implementation of the plans is not monitored.530  
The training of civil servants in different short term and long term career 
development areas important to performance improvement was offered by PO-PSM. 
Courses were offered in such areas as Leadership, Customer Care, Information 
                                                 
527 Interview with Professor Gelase Mutahaba Chief Technical Advisor, President’s Office - Public Service 
Management, held June 29, 2006. In 2006 there were 24 Ministries, 14 Departments and 2 Agencies. 
528 United Republic of Tanzania, President’s Office - Public Service Management. 2008. PSRP Phase 1 
End of Programme Report: A Summary of Results 2003 – 2007. Dar es Salaam. 
529 Interview with Professor Gelase Mutahaba Chief Technical Advisor, President’s Office - Public Service 
Management, held June 29, 2006. 
530 United Republic of Tanzania, President’s Office - Public Service Management. 2008. PSRP Phase 1 
End of Programme Report: A Summary of Results 2003 – 2007. Dar es Salaam.  
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Communication Technology (ICT), and Open Performance Review Appraisal System 
(OPRAS). By 2006, training was offered to 5,122 civil servants. Between 2006 and 2008 
an additional 2,079 staff received training bringing the total to 7,201, roughly 6.85% civil 
servants.531 Table 7.7 below shows the training offered. 
 
Table 7.7 Training Supplied by PO-PSM 
TRAINING 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 TOTAL 
OPRAS − − 900 615 1,179 − 2,694 
Leadership − 61 361 129 202 − 753 
ICT − 24 420 100 108 − 652 
Other 185 578 680 1,069 337 253 2,664 
TOTAL 185 663 2,361 1,913 1,826 253 7,201 
Source: United Republic of Tanzania, President’s Office - Public Service Management. 2008. PSRP Phase 
1 End of Programme Report: A Summary of Results 2003 – 2007. Dar es Salaam, p. 39. 
 
 The study participants were in agreement that the training was useful to job performance. 
It was asserted that different thought processes have been developed leading to a positive 
change in mindset and attitudes. It was also asserted that training has generated the 
awareness that to attain effective performance, emphasis must not only be placed on 
inputs but outputs and outcomes as well.532  
Because the training policy is not yet operationalized, the training has not been 
undertaken systematically in Tanzania. It was found that there are some weaknesses and 
lack of transparency in the criteria for selection of those to undertake training. For 
                                                 
531 United Republic of Tanzania, President’s Office - Public Service Management. 2008. PSRP Phase 1 
End of Programme Report: A Summary of Results 2003 – 2007. Dar es Salaam. 
532 Interview with Mr. Nassor Mnambila, Assistant Director, Ethics Promotion Department, held July 4, 
2006. 
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instance training was offered to some nearing retirement age, while in some cases 
training was not useful to the trainee’s job description. Failure to complete the training 
needs assessment has also made planning the courses and the selection of participants 
more incoherent.  
The pursuit of training by civil servants was found to be influenced by getting 
allowances than knowledge acquisition. It was found that while workshops, seminars, and 
conferences enhance capacity building, many of them are viewed as an avenue for 
indirect salary supplement. To some participants, workshops and seminars have reached a 
saturation point and negate capacity building as civil servants spend a lot of time away 
from their daily duties.533  
National training capability was strengthened by establishing a Public Service 
College to operate as an executive agency in charge of offering training and refresher 
courses to civil servants. In addition, the Tanzania Global Distance Learning Center was 
inaugurated in 2000 to enhance acquisition of current knowledge and skills in a cost 
effective and flexible manner without incurring costs for overseas training. Performance 
of both institutions has increased; enrollment rates have risen, more courses are being 
offered, and revenue has gone up. Some of the courses offered to civil servants include 
Ethics, Finance and Procurement, Human Resources Management, and ICT. ICT and 
management information systems capacity have improved in all MDAs. Most of them 
have modern web-sites and are equipped with computers, while seven MDAs have stand-
alone management information systems departments.  
                                                 
533 Interview with Professor Gelase Mutahaba Chief Technical Advisor, President’s Office - Public Service 
Management, held June 29, 2006. 
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7.4.2 Capacity Building in the Tanzanian CSRP: Rhetoric or Reality? 
The analysis offered above shows that few of the targets for capacity building 
have been met. Capacity building in the Tanzania CSRP aimed at increasing the skills 
and competency of civil servants so as to improve performance. Although some 
participants indicated that training resulted in enhanced knowledge and skills, and viable 
application of knowledge to duties and functions, lack of a training policy and failure to 
complete the training needs assessment exercise cast the applicability of the training in 
doubt. Without a training needs assessment to use as a benchmark, it becomes difficult to 
ascertain whether the civil servants are getting the right training and becoming more 
competent. The Chief Technical Advisor to the reform program provided an overall 
verdict when he observed that capacity building efforts have been very slow; “we have 
not done very well in this area. We are trying but we have not really had a purposeful 
effort.”534 At this point therefore, capacity building is still more rhetoric than reality.  
 
7.5 ETHICS AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE TANZANIAN CSRP 
 Ethics, accountability, transparency, and integrity are essential elements of 
administrative institutions and processes. The ethical stance of public officials especially 
the civil servants, and the availability of, and abidance by accountability mechanisms and 
codes of conduct all have significant impact on civil service performance. The economic 
stagnation and administrative inefficiency of the 1970s and 80s led to gross decline in 
ethics and accountability in the Tanzanian CS. Mismanagement, corruption, 
                                                 
534 Interview with Professor Gelase Mutahaba Chief Technical Advisor, President’s Office - Public Service 
Management, held June 29, 2006. 
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embezzlement of funds, and disregard for civil service rules and regulations became the 
norm as CS performance degenerated to low levels and service delivery all but ceased. 
Yet, in spite of this dire state, ethics and accountability were not given attention at the 
inception of the CSRP. Indeed, between 1990 and 1995, government efforts to deal with 
corruption and lack of accountability were largely ineffective. Formulated outside the 
CSRP framework, they mainly consisted of anti corruption squads which emphasized 
enforcement while ignoring the context that fostered unethical behavior. 
It was not until January 1996 after President Mkapa assumed office that ethics 
and accountability gained prominence in the reform rhetoric and a strong determination 
to fight corruption in government ensued. The President appointed a special Commission 
to investigate corruption in government which in December 1996 reported that corruption 
was rampant in all sectors of the economy, public services, and the politics in the country. 
According to the report, corruption was widespread in the civil service because of low 
wages and poor benefits. Civil servants, dissatisfied with their working conditions, 
resorted to bribes, embezzlement, and other unethical means of income generation. The 
Commission believed that the situation could be improved if better salaries and wages 
were offered.535 
At the launch of the PSRP in June 2000, President Mkapa proclaimed that the 
country was at a threshold of a new era of national prosperity and honor that demanded a 
transformed public service. He asserted that such a service would be “truly transparent 
and accountable to the public. The service will have zero-tolerance for corrupt 
                                                 
535 Presidential Commission of Inquiry against Corruption. 1996. 
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behavior.”536 Ethics and accountability were therefore included in the PSRP with the 
objective of “reinstating ethical conduct through inculcation of values and standards of 
performance to public servants.”537 It was anticipated that by 2005, a strong Ethics 
Division would be in existence at the Civil Service Department, capacity for ethics 
management would be established in MDAs, citizen involvement in public service 
accountability would be enhanced, and public servants would be more ethical and 
accountable.  
The Ethics Division: 
An ethics division was formed and charged with promoting ethical behavior 
within the public service in conjunction with other watchdog bodies like the Prevention 
of Corruption Bureau (PCB) and the Good Governance Coordination Unit (GGCU). The 
Division is responsible for building internal capacity of MDAs, enabling them to 
undertake ethics monitoring, inspection, and enforcement. Between 2000 and 2004, it 
focused attention on policy and regulation formulation, capacity building, and awareness 
creation efforts. It developed a Public Service Code of Ethics and Conduct that was 
widely disseminated in all MDAs. A complaints handling strategy operational manual for 
MDAs was also designed to facilitate the handling of internal and public complaints. All 
the study participants were familiar with the code and asserted that it was helpful in 
specifying the areas that are pertinent to ethical performance and in offering guidelines 
for dealing with ethical dilemmas.  
                                                 
536 New Utumishi, Journal of the Tanzania Public Service Reform Programme, p. 1. 
537 United Republic of Tanzania, President’s Office – Civil Service Department. 1999. Civil Service 
Reform Programme Implementation Status Report (1993 – 1999), Dar es Salaam, p. 29. 
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Capacity for Ethics Management in MDAs: 
The Ethics Secretariat has offered various training programs to build the capacity 
of MDAs to enable them to monitor ethics and accountability of the public servants. 
Training of trainers courses in public service ethics have been offered to more than 200 
trainers from different Ministries. Those trained are available to continuously train 
members of their Ministries in public service ethics.538 Subjects covered in the training 
include accountability, transparency, conflict of interest, diligence and competency, 
confidentiality, fairness and impartiality, integrity and honesty, codes of conduct, 
corruption, its causes, effects, and strategies to combat it among others. To better handle 
ethics complaints and address ethics issues within the MDAs, the latter were supposed to 
form ethics committees. However this has not been done. This failure is a major 
shortcoming of the efforts to enhance ethics and accountability because the committees 
are not only supposed to help in the monitoring and detection of unethical practices of 
corrupt public servants within the MDAs, but, are also supposed to handle internal 
complaints and those from the public.  
Enhancing Public Awareness: 
 A wide range of activities have been undertaken to raise civil society awareness 
about public service ethics and accountability. It is recognized that an informed and 
vigilant public can be a vital resource in combating unethical tendencies like corruption. 
Radio and television programs have been aired; newspaper articles and booklets 
published, and visual aids like posters have been widely displayed calling on the general 
                                                 
538 Interview with Mr. Nassor Mnambila, Assistant Director, Ethics Promotion Department, held July 4, 
2006. 
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public to embrace the responsibility of holding public servants accountable. Table 7.8 
shows the ethics awareness campaigns that have been undertaken. 
 
Table 7.8 Ethics Awareness Highlights 
EVENT 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 TOTAL 
Radio Programmes 104 104 104 − 312 
Television Programmes 0 12 24 − 36 
Newspaper Articles 104 104 104 − 312 
Posters − − 20,000 5,000 25,000 
Various Booklets − − 50,000 50,500 105,000 
Source: United Republic of Tanzania. President’s Office – Public Service Management. 2008. PSRP Phase 
1 End of Programme Report: A Summary of Results 2003-2007. Dar es Salaam, p. 44. 
 
The study participants considered radio and news papers awareness programs in 
English and Kiswahili essential in raising awareness because the two mediums of 
communication reach a large portion of the population. Posters on big roadside boards 
were visible on major highways in Dar es Salaam but study participants indicated that the 
visibility decreased the further away from the city one went. There was general 
agreement that the public is becoming increasingly aware and intolerant of unethical 
behavior. It was indicated that since 2002 public complaints about unethical behavior 
have increased by about 11 percent per quarter. However, because the Ministerial ethics 
committees are not operational, such complaints are not being addressed promptly.539  
 To hold public servants accountable, the PSRP in 2001 instituted Client Service 
Charters (CSCs) and Open Performance Reviews and Appraisals (OPRAS) in MDAs. 
                                                 
539 Interview with Mr. Nassor Mnambila, Assistant Director, Ethics Promotion Department, held July 4, 
2006. 
 338
CSCs are social pacts between service providers and the recipients specifying standards 
of service delivery in the form of commitments or promises. They are supposed to 
enhance customer service and commit public servants to meet their targets. In 2004, a 
study to assess the degree to which commitments in the charters were being met was 
undertaken by the PO-PSM office in five Ministries and two Executive Agencies. 72 
commitments were evaluated and a sample of 20 instances of actual service delivery for 
each commitment was made for the years 2001-2004. It was found that commitments 
were met 60% of the time and performance ranged from 31% to 81%. However, on 
assessing the performance before and after the charters were put in place, it was found 
that commitments were likely to be met 64% of the time prior to the charters and 60% 
post the charters. It was therefore concluded that the charters had not had any significant 
positive impact on service delivery.540  
 In the same study, it was found that 35% of the service users had complained 
about the public servants’ performance with 33% asserting that public servants were 
corrupt. However, 1% were satisfied with the responses they received while 59% were 
dissatisfied and 21% were very dissatisfied with the way their complaints were 
handled.541 It can therefore be argued that although using client charters is a good 
innovation, it has not enhanced performance and accountability. Moreover, government 
commitment to enhance accountability remains in doubt because in spite of the high 
                                                 
540 United Republic of Tanzania, President’s Office – Public Service Management. 2005. State of the Public 
Service Report 2004. Dar es Salaam. 
541 United Republic of Tanzania, President’s Office – Public Service Management. 2005. State of the Public 
Service Report 2004. Dar es Salaam. 
 339
levels of dissatisfaction, few public servants are punished for violating rules and 
regulations. It was revealed that government is taking a more strict stance in dealing with 
the corrupt and those that do not abide by accountability standards. However, evidence 
shows only a mild increase in suspension of public servants found in violation of rules. 
Figure 7.9 shows the number of suspensions effected between 2000 and 2007. 
 
Figure 7.9 Number of Suspended Public Servants per 100,000 Public Servants. 
Number of Suspended Public Servants per 100,000 Public Servants
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Source: United Republic of Tanzania. President’s Office – Public Service Management. 2008. PSRP Phase 
1 End of Programme Report: A Summary of Results 2003-2007, Dar es Salaam, p. 10. 
 
Figure 7.9 shows that the number of suspensions increased from less than 500 in 2000 to 
more than 1000 in 2003 but thereafter the rate stayed almost constant. Renewed efforts to 
enhance public service ethics and accountability exhibited by the new President and 
donor support for anti corruption programs might explain the slight increase that has 
occurred since 2006.   
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 Open Performance Reviews and Appraisals is an innovation through which 
accountability is supposed to be enhanced. At the beginning of each financial year 
subordinates and their superiors agree upon the work targets and objectives to be met, 
agree to review progress mid-year and to make an end of year assessment of objective 
achievement. The reveiw process was thought to enhance accountability because both 
parties would be involved in setting goals and objectives and in discussing evaluation 
results. It was however revealed that while performance agreements are being made and 
OPRA forms filled on a routine basis, progress is not monitored and reviewed. “Open 
performance assessment had not taken root. It is very hard to implement and not much 
progress has been made. Public servants find it cumbersome and time consuming and 
some even think it is irrelevant.”542 It can therefore be asserted that OPRAS have not yet 
attained the goal of enhancing administrative accountability. 
 In order for client charters and OPRAS to be effective, the performance has to be 
monitored closely to ensure that commitments are being met. Such monitoring requires a 
rigorous system that is firmly built in the Ministry’s daily operations and a management 
that is committed to its implementation. So far, both are lacking. Where complaints are 
raised whether from the public or from within the Ministry, they should be addressed 
promptly. The effectiveness of handling complaints however will largely depend on the 
existence and integrity of ethics committees and the officers/management addressing the 
complaints. 
                                                 
542 Interview with Mr. Magambo, Nashon, B. S., Commissioner Budget, Ministry of Finance, held July 31, 
2006. 
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In addition to the reform efforts undertaken within the PSRP framework, the 
government of Tanzania has since 1995 reenergized its efforts to fight corruption and 
enhance public service ethics and accountability. Some of the initiatives taken include the 
formulation of the Public Leadership Code; enactment of the National Anti-corruption 
Strategy and Action Plan; and the revitalization of the preexisting institutions like the 
Prevention of Corruption Bureau. 
The Public Leadership Code: 
 President Mkapa approved the Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act No. 13 in 
1995 to promote ethical behavior in government. It emphasizes the role of transparency 
and integrity in restoring public confidence in government and strengthening national 
ethics. The code requires cabinet ministers and senior public servants to annually disclose 
their property and sign a code of ethics declaring that assets acquired during their tenure 
in office will be attributable to their legal income. It was asserted that the president set a 
good precedent by declaring his assets within days of assuming office a trend that is 
being steadily embraced by those in public office.543 However, enforcement of the code is 
still a challenge. There was general agreement that some public officers have not declared 
their wealth and non compliance has not been met with strict repercussions. Moreover, 
the general public does not have access to declarations making it difficult to hold those 
that have not declared their assets accountable. Ultimately, the effectiveness of the code 
will depend on long term compliance with its provisions otherwise public officers will 
find it easy to use public office for self aggrandizement.   
                                                 
543 Interview with Prof. Gelase Mutahaba, Chief Technical Adviser, Public Service Reform Program, held 
June 29, 2006. 
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The National Anti-corruption Strategy and Action Plan (NACSAP): 
 One of the major manifestations of unethical behavior and lack of accountability 
is the presence of corruption in government. It is therefore not surprising that efforts to 
enhance ethics and accountability have placed great focus on curbing corruption. The 
Commission of inquiry into corruption in Tanzania that was appointed by President 
Mkapa soon after he assumed power made various recommendations on how to deal with 
corruption. Among them was the establishment of a national anti-corruption strategy and 
action plan. The strategy that was launched in 2000 embodies the government’s efforts to 
curb corruption and focuses on seven major areas: the rule of law and legal framework; 
financial discipline and management; procurement; public education awareness and 
sensitization of the public rights; public service reform; whistle blowers and witness 
protection; and the media. It provides a framework for dealing with corruption in 
government be it petty or large scale. It also provides guidelines for MDAs to initiate 
concrete measures for corruption prevention, enforcement of rules and regulations, and 
avenues to increase public awareness and involvement of watchdog institutions.  
 The NACSAP is implemented by the Good Governance Coordination Unit 
(GGCU) in the President’s Office. The GGCU monitors implementation of crosscutting 
reforms geared towards corruption prevention and rallies MDAs to regularly provide 
reports about their efforts against corruption. Because of this drive, MDAs are now in the 
process of developing and implementing sectoral anti-corruption action plans. One of the 
major achievements of NACSAP is the passing of the Public Procurement Act in 2004. It 
was asserted that prior to the reform government procurement was corruption and 
embezzlement ridden. “There was no clear procurement process; no transparency in the 
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use of public funds and in purchases; there was a lot of abuse. We now have a legal 
instrument that has professionalized procurement and saved government a lot of 
money.”544  
 There was a general consensus that NACSAP initiatives have generated greater 
zeal to fight corruption in the government. Yet there also was a general agreement that 
corruption is still prevalent in the public service although it was not clearly indicated that 
it is on the rise or major decline. Many of the study participants had the perception that 
there is a slight decrease in corruption especially petty corruption because it is easier to 
detect and punish. There was also a general view that the increase in remuneration and 
improvement of procurement procedures had reduced incidences of corruption. That 
corruption is decreasing seems to be the general view within civil society as well. A study 
by the PO-PSM found that the public perceived corruption to be on the decrease but 
barely so. (Figure 7.10 on the next page shows perceptions about changes in corruption.) 
In fact, the majority of the respondents felt that not much had changed and contradicted 
the surveys undertaken by Transparency international. The Transparency International 
Corruption Perception Index trend shows corruption in Tanzania on a consistent decrease. 
Figure 7.10 shows that 34% believe that the corruption stance of the public 
service has improved while 26% believe that it has worsened. Forty percent however, 
believe that no change has occurred. This implies that in spite of the numerous programs 
that government has put in place to corruption, a lot still needs to be done. Yet, the 
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Tanzanian government can find comfort in knowing that one of the most reputable 
corruption assessment organizations has reported better results.  
 
Figure 7.10 PO-PSM Assessments on Changes in Corruption 
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Source: United Republic of Tanzania. President’s Office – Public Service Management. 2008. PSRP Phase 
1 End of Programme Report: A Summary of Results 2003-2007, Dar es Salaam, p. 12. 
 
 Table 7.9 shows the corruption perception index trend generated by 
Transparency International surveys. Table 7.9 depicts an evidently consistent decrease in 
corruption. The CPI scores show a clear improvement in the degree to which corruption 
is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians in Tanzanians from a very low 
1.9 when the country was the fourth most corrupt country out of 58 in 1998, to a high 3.0 
in 2008 when the country was 78th out of 180 countries surveyed. The above scores show 
that the gains left behind by President Mkapa at the end of 2005 have so far been 
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improved upon by the new president. The trend shows a positive and consistent change 
for the better that has been applauded and supported by international donors.545 It can 
therefore be asserted that although corruption still pertains in the public service, some 
progress has been made. It should be noted that the above achievements have been partly 
possible because of the efforts of the Prevention of Corruption Bureau. 
 
Table 7.9 Tanzania’s Corruption Perception Index Ranking, 1998-2008  
YEAR FROM TOP FROM BOTTOM CPI SCORE 
1998 81out of 85 4th 1.9 
1999 93 out of 99 6th 1.9 
2000 76 out of 90 15th 2.5 
2001 82 out of 91 9th 2.2 
2002 71 out of 102 31st 2.7 
2003 92 out of 133 41st 2.5 
2004 90 out of 145 55th 2.8 
2005 86 out of 158 72nd 2.9 
2006 93 out of 163 70th 2.9 
2007 94 out of 179 85th 3.2 
2008 102 out of 180 78th 3.0 
Source: Transparency International. www.transparency.org. Accessed December 8, 2008.  
The Prevention of Corruption Bureau:  
 The Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB) is one the major national watchdog 
agencies established by parliament. It has three major roles: first, it is supposed to take 
necessary measures for prevention of corruption in government and private sectors; 
                                                 
545 In 2006, The World Bank gave Tanzania a US$ 40 Million Credit to enhance Accountability, 
Transparency and Integrity - see The World Bank 2006. Public Sector Reform and Capacity Building. 
Report No: 35615 – TZ.  
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second, it has the mandate to investigate allegations of corruption and persecute those 
found guilty of corruption; and third, it is supposed to advise the government and its 
agencies on ways and means to prevent corruption. It is headed by a director who is 
appointed by the president and reports not to parliament, but to the president. The PCB 
has offices in all regions of the country and has 43 offices at the district level. It has 
policing powers – it can enter and search premises as well as arrest suspects and 
prosecute (with the approval of the Director of Public Prosecutions - DPP) those found 
guilty. It also undertakes awareness and educational campaigns, and carries out research 
and diagnostic survey studies in MDAs to guide the formulation of strategies to fight 
corruption.  
 It was asserted that the financial and manpower of the PCB has been enhanced 
substantially for instance staff was increased from 185 in 1995 to 527 in 2002 and its 
budget was increased from 191 million Tanzanian Shillings in 1995 to 3 billion in 
2002.546 Further, an anti-corruption law containing provisions that allow the PCB 
unfettered access to information was passed by parliament in 2006. The changes have 
made it possible for the agency to expand its reach especially in investigation and 
awareness campaigns. Nonetheless, there was a general view that the PCB suffers from 
some weaknesses that hinder its performance. Despite the increase in the budget, the 
resources are still insufficient to enable it to carry out its roles and functions. The most 
notable challenge is poor rates of convictions. For instance, between 2002 and 2004 
7,058 cases were reported, 138 were investigated and on average only 24 convictions 
                                                 
546 Interview No. BW 0012. 
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were made.547 Part of the problems is lack of personnel but it is also recognized that 
investigations and convictions take a very long time because of the bureaucratic delays 
that emerge in the collection of evidence and because of the involvement of the DPPs 
office.548 There is also a general belief that the PCB “lacks teeth” as it focuses more on 
petty corruption and not so much on grand cases of corruption. The only time a high 
profile case was conclusively dealt with is when the Minister of Works and his 
Permanent Secretary were prosecuted for corruption. However, the Minister was later 
released from jail but the Permanent Secretary is still serving his sentence.  
 
7.5.1 Challenges in Enhancing Ethics and Accountability in the Tanzanian CS  
 The analysis offered in the pages above shows that some improvement has been 
made in building the ethical stance of the civil servants and in enhancing accountability 
within the Tanzanian public service. Although different surveys have shown varying 
degrees of progress, the study participants were quite optimistic that the achievements 
made are real and will be sustained. A new procurement law has permitted greater 
transparency and accountability in the process of procurement, the public is more 
involved in reporting cases of office abuse and demanding better services, public servants 
are getting the training and tools necessary to guide them in dealing with ethical 
dilemmas, the PCB has improved staffing levels and opened offices in all the regions in 
                                                 
547 United Republic of Tanzania. President’s Office-Public Service Management. 2005. State of the Public 
Service Report 2004. Dar es Salaam. 
548 Interview No. BW 0012. 
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the country, and there is great political will to strengthen ethics and accountability in 
government. 
 Nevertheless, corruption is still considered a serious problem in the Tanzanian 
public service and the majority of the public do not see any change in corruption levels. 
Not all public officers abide by the leadership code and non-compliance has so far not 
been met with strict legal action. Client service charters and OPRAS are not abided by 
and there is no evidence that poor performance is punished. Watchdog agencies, despite 
some achievements still experience major weaknesses in monitoring, enforcement, and 
execution of their mandates. The perception that the public servants do not abide by 
ethical standards is still prevalent both within the public service and in the civil society.  
Yet, when compared to the period prior to the reform, the current situation shows 
great improvement. Fighting corruption and enhancing ethics and accountability are 
extraordinarily complex and daunting tasks. Institutional reforms and change of behavior 
and mindset of public servants and the involvement of stakeholders are critical 
components in achieving those tasks. So far, the reforms are in consistent progress, and 
political goodwill and exemplary leadership have been exhibited, training and 
performance improvement and accountability measures are in place, the NACSAP was 
implemented, and watchdog bodies have been reenergized. In addition, public awareness 
campaigns have been implemented and the public is more vigilant in demanding ethical 
behavior and accountability. It can therefore be asserted that enhancing ethics and 
accountability is on course to becoming a reality in the Tanzanian civil service.  
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7.6 SUMMARY 
 Chapter 7 has offered an analytical description and assessment of the major 
findings in the study of the Civil Service Reform Program (CSRP) in Tanzania. The 
government of Tanzania embarked on administrative reform in 1991 and officially started 
implementation in 1993. The CSRP focused on cost containment, reduction of the size of 
the civil service via restructuring, and pay reform. The CSRP lasted till 1999 and major 
achievements were made under that phase. 
 The results show that in order to reduce costs, government roles and functions 
were evaluated, redefined, and rationalized. A decentralization program to decongest the 
center was implemented, non-core functions were contracted out to the private sector, 
while some functions were released to executive agencies. As a result, Ministries, 
Departments and Agencies were reduced by 25%.   The size of the civil service was 
significantly reduced from 360,000 in 1993 to 260,000 in 2007. The size reduction was 
attained through the removal of ghost workers, retrenchment of nonperformers and 
overdue leavers, and voluntary retirement.  
 The results indicate improvements were made in pay reform. The pay structure 
and payroll system were rationalized, and a computerized payroll and human resource 
system was put in place. Allowances were monetized, reduced from 36 to 7 and 
consolidated into basic salary. Salaries have been enhanced in real terms and a more 
transparent and efficient pay structure has been established. Between 2000 and 2006, real 
salaries were enhanced by an annual average compounded increase of 12.1%. 
 However by the end of the 1990s, it was apparent that CSRP was limited in scope 
and design. A need to reorient the reform process from cost containment to performance 
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enhancement was appreciated and this led to the second phase of administrative reform, 
the Public Service Reform Program (PSRP). The second phase, originally set to cover the 
period 2000-2005, lasted till 2007 and focused on the installation of performance 
management systems in order to professionalize the public service, and enhance capacity 
and accountability. 
 The results show that capacity building efforts have not met their targets. Training 
needs assessment has not been completed in all MDAs, and staff development plans have 
not been prepared by all MDAs. Further, a training policy is yet to be completed to 
streamline training and match it with MDA needs. However, various training programs 
have been offered including courses in leadership, customer service, Information 
Communication Technology (ICT), and OPRAs; and national training institutions have 
been strengthened. Capacity building was supposed to increase the skills and competency 
of the public servants so that they can provide services efficiently and effectively. In spite 
of the training so far given, it cannot be asserted that the public service is more 
competent. Until training is based on needs and performance benchmarks are put in 
place, capacity building will remain rhetoric. 
 My study found that great strides have been made in enhancing ethics and 
accountability in the Tanzanian public service. Ethics awareness programs are in place, a 
new code of ethics and conduct was availed to public servants, ethics training has been 
undertaken, a Leadership Code is in place, a National Anti-corruption Strategy and 
Action Plan was initiated, and the watchdog agencies have been revitalized. Generally, 
the corruption perception surveys indicate a decreasing rate of corruption in the public 
service.  
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Nonetheless, ethics and accountability are still great challenges. The study 
participants acknowledged that corruption is still an enduring problem and the civil 
society complaints and perceptions concur. It is therefore not surprising that the next 
phase of the reform is focusing on enhancing performance and accountability. However, 
because the reform program enjoys great political will and the new president is 
committed to stamping corruption out of government, it is contended here that reforming 
the public service into an ethical and accountable system is on course. 
My study has shown that the CSRP and PSRP in Tanzania have been gradual but 
steady endeavors. The size of the civil service was been reduced, salary has been 
enhanced, ethics and accountability have improved, and small gains have been attained in 
capacity building. Overall, the reform strategy has generated considerable success. 
Implementation has been guided by viable strategies which have to a large extent been 
abided by. A case in point is the pay strategy. In addition, the reform is being 
implemented in a stable and conducive political environment. Tanzania is characterized 
by political legitimacy and relatively high levels of commitment and motivation by the 
political leadership, especially since 1995. In addition, the country has for quite some 
time enjoyed great donor financial support which has made it possible to implement some 
expensive initiatives like SASE. It is no wonder that the reform rhetoric is steadily 
turning into reality.  
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CHAPTER 8: THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM PROGRAMS IN UGANDA AND 
TANZANIA: A COMPARISON 
 
8. 1 INTRODUCTION 
  
The discussion offered in chapters six and seven has shown that the civil service 
reform programs in Uganda and Tanzania share similarities in the objectives and content. 
Both countries aimed at reducing the size of the service, increasing salaries, enhancing 
capacity, and improving ethics and accountability. Both countries undertook size 
reduction measures, improved pay, undertook training and other capacity building efforts, 
and established agencies to foster ethics and accountability. Chapter five however 
showed that the programs were implemented under differing contexts such that each 
country embarked on the reform trajectory in a unique context. Hence, although the 
reform programs are similar, implementation has been varied and outcomes are equally 
unique as has been shown in chapters six and seven. Chapter eight offers a comparison of 
the implementation trajectory and explains what accounts for the similarities and 
differences in the paths taken and outcomes attained. It is proposed that the differences 
are a result of the nature of the political leadership, political institutionalization, and the 
role of donor funding. 
 
8. 2 THE NATURE OF THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 
 The outcomes of the CSRP in the two countries have depended on the nature of 
the political system and political leadership under which implementation has been taking 
place. The first phase of reform program in Uganda 1991 – 1997 was greatly shaped by 
President Museveni. He enjoyed substantial local and international support and 
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legitimacy, and was viewed as a strong and able leader that had reestablished peace in 
Uganda. His local preoccupation and priorities were in sync. He was committed to 
transforming the administrative, economic, and political institutions of the country that 
had endured a horrendous period of turmoil into strong, viable, effective and efficient 
institutions. His actions were instrumental in declaring to all civil servants that he was 
committed to the CSRP and expected everyone else to follow suit. A member of the 
PSRRC asserted that the president’s commitment to the reform played a major role in 
accelerating implementation progress. Describing the president’s role in reduction of the 
CS size he asserted: 
“In a surprising and swift stroke of the pen, President Museveni reduced the 
number of ministries from 32 to 21 in 1992…This action by the president was a 
strong message to the conservative mainstream of the civil service. If ministers 
could be removed from office to promote efficiency and economy, then similar 
retrenchment had to be carried out at all lower levels of government.”549  
 
Past research confirms the view that President Museveni played a significant role in the 
initial stages of the CSRP. Kjaer (2004) called the president “a new broom” asserting that 
“the president was able to act as a new broom intervening in favor of reform and 
accelerating implementation.”550 The CSRP in Uganda therefore started with great vigor 
because the political leadership, the civil servants, and general public wanted to move 
forward from the administrative, economic and political malaise that the country endured.  
                                                 
549 Katorobo J. 1996. “The Public Service Reform Programme.” In Mugaju, J. B. (ed.) Uganda’s Decade of 
Reforms 1986-1996: An Analytical Review. Kampala: Fountain Publishers, p. 48. 
550 Kjaer, A. M. 2004. “Old Brooms can Sweep Too!: An Overview of Rulers and Public Sector Reforms in 
Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya.” Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 397. 
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President Mwinyi (1985-1995) on the other hand, is not credited for engendering 
progress in the CSRP implementation although the program began during his reign. It has 
been asserted that he focused his energies on only dismantling the remnants of socialism 
and implementing the WB and IMF programs for economic liberalization. Contrary to the 
goals of civil service size reduction he increased an inherited fifteen ministers to thirty-
five and only let go of six following domestic and external pressure.551 Kiragu and 
Mukandala (2005) assert that under his reign no significant pay raise was effected, but 
rather, “The government policy was to allow employees to take on other activities to 
supplement their incomes, and hopefully help in the economic recovery.”552 It is because 
of the minimal political support and leadership that unlike Uganda’s, the CSRP in 
Tanzania started tentatively. His successor, President Benjamin Mkapa (1995-2005) 
however, was a more dynamic, committed, and versatile leader. “The pace of 
restructuring, retrenchment, and pay reform were revitalized by President Mkapa”553 one 
of the study participants said, and there was general agreement that it is under President 
Mkapa that the major changes were realized. Indeed President Mkapa has been applauded 
for re-energizing the CSRP and introducing new blood into government, and fresh ideas 
                                                 
551 Kjaer, A. M. 2004. “Old Brooms can Sweep Too!: An Overview of Rulers and Public Sector Reforms in 
Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya.” Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 400. 
552 Kiragu, K. and Rwekaza Mukandala. 2005. Politics and Tactics in Public Sector Reforms: The Dynamic 
of Public Service Pay in Africa. Dar es Salaam, Dar es Salaam University Press Ltd, p. 219.  
553 Interview with the former Permanent Secretary President’s Office - Public Service Management, Mr. 
Joseph Rugumyamheto, held June 29, 2006. 
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into the reform process.554 At the time of data collection, there was general optimism that 
the new President, Jakaya Kikwete (2005- ), will keep the momentum going. 
Although Uganda started the reform program with great vigor and support, 
Tanzania has caught up with it and in some areas like ethics and accountability has 
overtaken it. After the initial success was attained, the program slowly but surely 
stagnated. Indeed some of the gains previously achieved have been reversed. Neo-
patrimonial and clientelist politics have taken over. The president is now more concerned 
with securing his power base than in reforms. Executive agencies proliferate, and are 
arguably headed by the president’s cronies, pointing to the fact that distribution of 
patronage abounds. Corruption rates are still high and support for reform is only 
lukewarm. It is therefore my contention that there is an association between the waxing 
and waning of political legitimacy and the efficiency of administrative reforms. This turn 
of events is better understood by looking at political institutionalization in Uganda. 
 
8.3 VIABLE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 
Tanzania is currently performing better than Uganda because the reforms are 
being driven from the top political-administrative level and are taking place in a political 
context where the political leadership enjoys legitimacy. The country has developed a 
culture of democratic succession of power and has an across-ethnic lines united and 
dominant political party.  The democratic culture has engendered implementation of bold 
steps without worrying about political survival. In Uganda, uncertain political leadership 
                                                 
554 See Glickman, H. 1997. “Tanzania: From Disillusionment to Guarded Optimism.” Current History, 
May, pp. 217-221.  
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succession is hampering reform efforts. President Museveni has been in power since 
1986. He was democratically elected in 1996 after the passing of the new Constitution in 
1995 under a Movement system of government, and reelected for a second term in 2001. 
However, in 2002, he orchestrated the reversal of term limits, reintroduced multiparty 
politics, and paved the way for his reelection in 2006 under what was widely believed to 
be unfree and unfair elections. There is a general belief that he will not leave power 
democratically. The country has since the early 1990s been experiencing political 
instability in the northern part of the country. In the late 1990s more civil strife emerged 
in the eastern part of the country. The two insurgencies have exacerbated the president’s 
anxiety to hold on to power. Political instability has meant that resources allocated for the 
reform program have been diverted to quell insurgence and to support military 
operations.  
Tanzania on the other hand is one of the most stable nations in Africa largely to 
the credit of the country’s first president, Julius Nyerere who encouraged national 
brotherhood and a local common national language. The country has not experienced a 
civil war since independence, and the since political pluralism was introduced in 1995, 
elections results have not been contested or said to have been rigged. The country has 
therefore since 1995 steadily pursued civil service reform in a systematic manner. New 
public management prescriptions like performance management systems and client 
service charters have been instituted and are being adhered to by MDAs. This is not the 
case in Uganda where there is no demonstrable understanding and commitment on the 
part of the top leadership to allocate of the necessary resources to implement performance 
measurement procedures and to keep the reform process in on course. 
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8.4 THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL DONORS 
International donors have played a tremendous role in providing the funding and 
technical support for reform in the two countries. Initially, Uganda benefitted the most 
from donor support. Between 1987 and 1996, President Museveni was lauded for 
visionary and transformative leadership, and was hailed as “new breed” of African 
leaders. He was committed to bring about fundamental change in the administrative, 
economic, political, and legal sectors of the country. The economy was stabilized, a new 
constitution promulgated, and the civil service reform achieved immediate success in size 
reduction and pay reform. In the late 1990’s however, the pace slowed down because the 
president became preoccupied with maintaining himself in power. As a result, donor 
support started to wane as it became increasingly clear that he will do everything possible 
to retain the presidency. In addition, there is a strong sense the he is not committed to 
routing corruption out of the government. The rate of corruption figures presented in 
chapter six and chapter seven show that Tanzania is doing better at reining in corruption. 
The reduction in donor funding has meant that funding for the reform has become scarce 
and unpredictable.   
Donors have played a significant role in the CSRP in Tanzania as well. The 
economic, political and administrative systems in Tanzania underwent tremendous 
change under the nudging guidance of the IMF and WB. The socialistic economy was 
liberalized, the single party system abandoned for a vibrant multiparty political system, 
and the civil service reform was initiated and is progressing steadily. Currently, the 
country enjoys higher donor favor because it is abiding by the IMF/WB prescriptions 
better than Uganda.  
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It can therefore be argued that, the principal explanations for differences in the 
CSRP outcomes is neo-patrimonial politics, lack of democratic political institutions, and 
the gradual withdrawal of donor funding. In spite of the above differences, the civil 
service reform programs in the two countries share some similarities. In both countries, 
the reforms have been a top-down exercise with very limited civil society participation. 
Indeed, there is no evidence of popular civil society demand for better implementation. 
The masses are not well informed but also because the governments have been reluctant 
to educate them and include them in reform processes. Tanzania however is making 
effort to publicize the reforms and to attract public input.555 In addition, the Tanzanian 
public has been encouraged to hold public servants accountable through mechanisms like 
the civil service charters and OPRAs. Such mechanisms are absent in Uganda.  
In both countries, new organizations and structures were created to specifically 
advance reform. In Uganda, the administrative reform secretariat in the Ministry of 
Public Service is in charge, while in Tanzania the Public Service Management in the 
President’s office is in charge. This is in line with NPM prescriptions and has been 
possible because of donor funding. In both countries then, donor funding has been 
extremely important and the success of some of the reforms has largely depended on the 
generosity of foreign donors. For instance, SASE in Tanzania would not have been 
possible without donor funding, and the retrenchment in Uganda would not have been as 
smooth without donor funding. 
                                                 
555 A Public Service Fair was held between June 19-23, 2006 to educate the public about the CSRP. 
Various documents, manuals and books were availed to the public – personal observation. 
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Empirical evidence presented in this study shows that the two countries attained 
great success in reducing the number of public servants. Although the size is increasing 
again, the increase is justified because recruitment is being undertaken in service sectors 
like education and health, sectors that are critical to development and poverty eradication. 
Moreover, recruitment follows strict guidelines and is monitored through the personnel 
information system by both Ministry of Public Service and Ministry of Finance in 
Uganda, and the President’s Office – Public Service Management and Ministry of 
Finance in Tanzania. Below is a comparative depiction of the reforms. 
 
Table 8.1 Comparison of Civil Service Reforms in Uganda and Tanzania 
 
CSRP Focus Elements Uganda Tanzania 
Reduction of the Size 
of the CS 
- Rationalization and 
restructuring of Ministries 
- Retrenchment 
- Voluntary Retirement 
- Removal of Ghosts 
3 3 
Pay reform - Rationalization of salary 
structures 
- Computerization of payroll 
- Systematic salary 
enhancement 
2 3 
Capacity Building -Training needs assessment 
 -Training policy 
-Hire of qualified staff 
- Staff training 
2 1 
Ethics and 
Accountability 
 
-Anti corruption strategies 
- Democratization 
-Strengthening governance 
 and watchdog bodies 
1 3 
Overall performance -Performance improvement 
-Performance measurement 
-Consistency of the reform 
2 3 
Key: The table portrays the intensity levels and consistency in reform implementation. 0 represents no 
action, 1 minimal action, 2 some considerable action, and 3 the highest degree of action. 
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8.5 SUMMARY 
In chapter eight, I have shown that the nature of the political leadership and 
political legitimacy, presence of democratic institutions, and international donors have 
contributed to the differences between the reform trajectory in Uganda and Tanzania. It 
has been shown that in both countries, administrative reform peaked as the country was at 
a peak in political reformation. Consequently, I can conclude that Uganda will continue 
to falter in its administrative reforms until President Museveni changes his leadership 
stance or losses power. In the case of Tanzania, the ruling party, the CCM, needs 
eventually to face more credible opponents. If that does not happen, the CCM will be 
correctly viewed as a single party rule and administrative reform will eventually falter 
there too. 
Table 8.1 shows that Tanzania has generally performed better than Uganda. The 
reduction of the size has been a success in both countries; Uganda has done better in 
capacity building; but in pay reform and ethics and accountability, Tanzania has done 
much better. Based on the findings, it can be asserted that Tanzania has a better 
perspective on reform with clear and distinct strategies, while Uganda has since the late 
1990s regressed to incrementalism, muddling through particular crises and pressures as 
they arise.  
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
 Chapter nine offers a summary of the study, discusses the conclusion, provides 
recommendations, offers the limitations of the study, and identifies the opportunities for 
future research. My study was an ambitious one that aimed at remedying some of the 
weaknesses in the current literature on administrative reform in developing countries. 
Ambitious because it is an empirical comparative study, that covers two countries that 
although on the surface may look quite similar, are rather different mainly because of the 
historical, economic, and political developments, and current political contexts. A 
comparative study was favored because there is a paucity of genuine and rigorous 
comparative, multi-country studies that focus on developing nations. Much of the 
existing literature focus on one country, or one program, or one sector. My study has 
therefore generated new data to strengthen the field of comparative administration.  
The two countries were focused on because more than ten years since 
implementation was effected in 1991 and 1993 in Uganda and Tanzania respectively, no 
comprehensive and empirical comparative assessment of the results had been undertaken. 
Moreover, unlike previous studies that only focus on the post-independence period, my 
study offers the pre-colonial historical background, and the development of the 
administrative, economic, and political contexts of both countries. It has illustrated how 
the historical context has had a great impact on the countries’ civil services. The current 
study is the first to illustrate that in Uganda and Tanzania, while administrative reform 
morphed from structural adjustment conditionality programs, the end result has not been 
mere civil service reform and economic stabilization. It has shown that the program goals 
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have been reoriented towards bigger national goals of good governance and poverty 
eradication.  
 
9.2 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The civil service reforms in Uganda have been successful in the reduction of the 
size of the civil service but have fallen short in pay reform, capacity building, and ethics 
and accountability. In Tanzania, success was attained in civil service size reduction, in 
pay reform, and in enhancing ethics and accountability. However, minimal progress was 
achieved in capacity building. The reasons that account for this performance have been 
adequately covered in the chapters six, seven, and eight. 
If the reforms of the civil services in Uganda and Tanzania are going to be 
successful in attaining the set goals and objectives, they must be guided by 
comprehensive strategies that categorically specify what steps will be taken at different 
points along the process, and the government has to abide them. Tanzania has so far been 
steady in abiding with the reform strategies. For instance, the government has been 
consistently increasing civil servants’ salary within the medium term pay policy 
framework. As one participant observed; “We have a medium term pay policy, a medium 
term pay strategy, and medium term pay targets. Government is pursuing the three as 
consistently as it can. That is the most important point and I think that is the difference 
between Tanzania and Uganda on the issue of pay. The politicians do not panic here, if 
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the doctors strike you don’t say we give them this, there is a methodology for dealing 
with pay.”556  
A comprehensive and strategic approach of the reform programs does not imply 
that all the problems that dogged the civil service systems in the two countries must be 
solved within the same timeframe, but rather that the inter linkages between the different 
problem areas must be analyzed and put into consideration in the reform process. 
Piecemeal and fragmented reforms programs are rarely effective, and if they are, the 
outcomes are not easily sustained. For instance, capacity building implemented in 
isolation from pay reform, or size reduction not supplemented with pay reform and 
capacity building will rarely attain the desired goals. Consequently, a well thought out 
and viable reform strategy is critical. Such a strategy needs to be not only comprehensive 
in scope but well integrated in focus. A successful reform strategy therefore is one that 
creates and sustains conditions in which steady improvements can flourish. 
Successful reform requires strong and sustained political will. The CSRP in the 
two countries have a political nature which makes them more difficult. The reforms entail 
some radical alterations in the way government business is handled. Elements like ethics 
and accountability have a bearing on the political stance of those in political power as 
well as those in bureaucratic leadership positions. Consequently, the reforms call for 
strong and continued political support, and willingness to exercise the political power to 
enforce unpopular changes. The Ugandan and Tanzanian governments need to remain 
fully committed to, and supportive of, the reform process. At present, Tanzania enjoys 
                                                 
556 Interview with Professor Gelase Mutahaba Chief Technical Advisor, President’s Office - Public Service 
Management, held, June 29, 2006. 
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more commitment and support from the top political leadership, and seems to have viable 
strategies that will engender sustainability.  
Political commitment, and stable, democratic political processes in the country are 
important ingredients for successful policy implementation. Tanzania has both. The 
country’s current political leadership enjoys political legitimacy and democratic elections 
have been consistently held. Uganda on the other hand seems to have lost its earlier zeal. 
Unlike Tanzania, the Ugandan political leadership does not enjoy full legitimacy. 
Preoccupied with quelling insurgencies in the northern and eastern parts of the country, it 
is paying little attention to reform program. The CSRP is thus being starved of necessary 
financial and political support. It can therefore be asserted that until political stability and 
legitimacy are attained in Uganda, prospects for effective reform will remain grim.  
The role of the civil society has not been pronounced in the reform processes in 
both countries. Public relations drives focusing on clearly thought out themes like ethics, 
integrity, accountability, and better service delivery should be implemented. Such drives 
would not only help create an enabling environment for the reform programs, but would 
also encourage civil society participation in holding civil servants accountable.  
Many of the problems that the reform programs in the two countries seek to 
eliminate require persistent and continuous effort to eliminate. Payrolls have to be 
monitored periodically to ensure that ghosts do not emerge, salary increments have to 
continue, capacity building efforts must be period and continuous, and efforts to enhance 
ethics and accountability have to remain relentless. The effectiveness of reforms will 
therefore depend of sustenance. Uganda for quite a long time enjoyed favorable press – 
partly because of the traumatic history it emerged from – predicting a good reform 
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trajectory. Although Tanzania embarked on the reforms slowly, it is contended here that 
it actually has a firmer and more stable base, and a more sustainable reform trajectory.  
 In conclusion, it is important to stress that in spite of the shortcomings that have 
pervaded the implementation of the reform programs in the two countries; the reform 
process has not been a meaningless charade. Very visible, tangible, and beneficial 
outcomes have been attained. The reforms have generated definite payoffs in reducing 
the size of the civil services, increasing pay levels, enhancing capacity, and reorienting 
the ethical stance of public servants, even if longer term outputs remain relatively 
obscure. 
 
9.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
It has been indicated that the reform programs in Uganda and Tanzania have 
relied heavily on foreign assistance in both formulation and implementation. It would 
therefore have been beneficial to interview subjects from donor agencies. Their views 
would have provided a different perspective about the reforms.  
As is common with most case study qualitative studies, generalization of findings 
provided by the study beyond the scope of the two countries should be avoided. 
Moreover in this particular study, reform is context specific and the findings provided 
here illuminate the context in Uganda and Tanzania only. Nonetheless, extrapolations 
from lessons learned and recommendations offered are possible, and can be useful to 
those interested in understanding why reforms succeed or fail, or how they can be better 
implemented. 
 
 366
9.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 First, although this is a unique study, administrative reform is very wide and 
complex, and judging performance entails getting evidence from different stakeholders. 
However important the perceptions of those involved in implementation are, they do not 
adequately address whether service delivery has improved. Future research should 
therefore focus on the micro level and asses the impact of the reform program on service 
delivery from the point of view of the recipients – the masses. In the two countries, 
reforms have been reoriented; they are now being undertaken with the aim of realizing a 
larger vision – poverty eradication. Poverty eradication serves a useful function of 
rallying donor support and domestic support. Future research should assess if the poverty 
eradication vision is being realized. The gap between rhetoric and reality at micro level 
might shed even more light on how to improve the programs.  
 Second, more comparative studies are needed in other aspects of the reform 
especially results oriented management and performance improvement, public-private 
partnerships, decentralization, and management information systems. These areas are 
critical to performance and service delivery; studying them would generate valuable 
insights about performance improvement. 
 Third, controversy still abounds as to what the optimal size of the civil service 
should be. Findings in this study suggest there is need to study how other countries make 
judgments about the right size of government. For instance, although the size is 
increasing again in the two countries, the increase is justified because recruitment is 
being undertaken in service sectors like education and health, sectors that are critical to 
development and poverty eradication. Moreover, recruitment in those areas follows strict 
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guidelines and is monitored through the personnel information system by both Ministry 
of Public Service and Ministry of Finance in Uganda, and the President’s Office – Public 
Service Management and Ministry of Finance in Tanzania. Future research should 
compare civil service numbers of “good reformers” like Ghana, countries in East Asia, 
and developed countries that have a longer reform history like the UK and USA for 
benchmarks.  
Lastly, my findings show that there is an association between the pace of 
democratic political reform that the country is experiencing and the pace of 
administrative reform. In Uganda, between the years 1986 to 1996, President Museveni 
embraced popular democratic political reform and during the same time frame, the CSRP 
performed best. As the pace of political reform reduced and his political legitimacy came 
under question, the pace of civil service reform also reduced. In Tanzania, before the 
country embraced multi party politics (1985-1995), administrative reform faltered. Since 
the introduction of multi party politics and the subsequent peaceful change in political 
leadership, civil service reform has performed better. Future research should therefore 
empirically test the following hypothesis: there is a relationship between political 
legitimacy and the efficiency of administrative reform.  
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APPENDIX 1 INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
Date: 
Location: 
Start time: 
End time: 
 
Interviewee Demographics 
a) Name: 
b) Gender: 
c) Position/Rank: 
d) Years in the Public Service: 
e) Part of the PSRRC: 
 
Major Interview Questions 
1. What are the major driving forces of the Civil Service Reform Program? 
2. What has been the effect of the reform program on the size of the civil service? 
3. What has been the effect of the reform program on salary structure? 
4. Is there an optimum-target salary structure? If so, on what is it based? 
5. What is the effect of the current salary structure on worker motivation? 
6. What has been the effect of the reform program on capacity building? 
7. What has been the effect of the reform program on ethics and accountability? 
8. In your view, since the reform was initiated, is the civil service a better 
performer? 
9. What are the major challenges facing the reform program? 
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APPENDIX 2 SUMMARY OF THE PSRRC RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1. The Uganda Planning Commission should be reactivated and be given a more 
focused planning authority 
2. The Ministry of Planning and Economic Development should be the Secratariat of 
the resuscitated Uganda Planning Commission. 
3. Given the role that the Public Service plays in the development process, there is a 
need for an expanded and strengthened role of the Ministry of Public Service and 
Cabinet Affairs within an appropriate Act of NRC to facilitate effective 
management of the affairs of the Public Service. 
4. The recommended “Agenda for Action” should be implemented soon in order to 
infuse a new results-oriented management ethos and re-create a Public Service 
that is well trained, disciplined, motivated, effective and efficient. 
5. A new concept of results-oriented management style should be adopted in which 
the following management practices are adopted: Project Management, 
Management by Objectives and Program and Performance Management. 
6. A unified structure which embraces all the posts in the Civil Service from the 
lowest to the highest and provides equal opportunity for every officer to advance 
to the highest post in the service irrespective of his or her discipline should be 
instituted.  
7. Government should put in place a service that is manned mainly by professional 
and specialized personnel and not, as at present, predominantly by generalist 
administrators and functionaries. 
8. The New Era Public Service should recognize the distinction between career civil 
servants and politically appointed officers. 
9. The Service should recognize the different roles of Secretary to the President and 
Head of the Civil Service. 
10. All members of the Public Service should subscribe to and uphold a Code of 
Conduct. 
11. The establishment of new Ministers should be vetted by the Legislature and in 
this process the Legislature should be availed a clear statement of mandate 
showing in broad terms the areas of Government activities for which the new 
Ministry should be responsible. 
12. Government should follow through and decisively adopt a pure Presidential 
system for the governance of the country. 
13. On appointment of Legislators as Ministers they should resign their seats in 
Parliament in order that they concentrate on executive duties. 
14. Each Ministry should have one Cabinet Minister and, if the work load justifies, a 
Minister of State or a Deputy Minister to supervise critical functions. 
15. On-going consultations should be re-oriented to embrace the much bigger task of 
rationalizing government functions; and their reports should be submitted to and 
implemented by the Administrative Reform Commission. 
16. Government should set up a permanent body to scrutinize and keep under review 
its involvement in the various fields in which it is presently engaged with a view 
to keeping the field as narrow as possible. 
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17. The process of decentralization should involve devolution of powers direct to 
District Authorities; and all Regional Offices except those of Uganda Police Force 
should be formally abolished. 
18. The elected RC 5 Chairperson should become the District Chairman (DC) and the 
Political Head of the District. 
19. The District Executive Secretaries should cease to be called “Secretaries”. They 
should instead be called Directors. 
20. The RC 5 executive should be composed of nine people. 
21. The District Development Committee should carry out its functions as spelt out in 
its Statute, with the technocrats taking over from the elected representatives 
whose number should be trimmed down. 
22. Government should set up a Committee of experts to advise on financial 
decentralization. 
23. Political Parties whether in a single party or multiparty system should be financed 
from Public Funds even if the interests of the party are assumed to be co-terminus 
with those of the majority of the population. 
24. The NRM, as such, should not give any directives to the Civil Service except 
through the Cabinet and Legislature. 
25. Career public officers should not participate in partisan politics. 
26. Ministries as structures of the Public Service should be streamlined and reduced 
to the optimal number of 21 Ministries. 
27. The Administrative Reform Commission should regard the rationalization as top 
national priority. 
28. The Ministry as the largest unit of government with the responsibility to carry out 
similar activities in pursuit of common interrelated policies and programmes 
should be under the clear professional direction of a single manager in control of 
the required resources deployed to achieve public policies and objectives. 
29. The activities of government should be pursued in hierarchical levels of specified 
duties and responsibilities. 
30. The nomenclature of structural entities of the Public Service should be 
standardized and uniform, functionally descriptive titles be used for similar 
structures in the Public Service. 
31. In setting up new public organizations, a bottom-up analysis of demand for the 
services should first be undertaken. 
32. Decisions regarding civil service structure, recruitment and assessment of 
performance should be so determined as to optimize achievement of results, 
increased output, and improved performance. 
33. The class structure of the Public Service should be abolished and should be 
replaced with an integrated results-oriented management team approach. 
34. If the structure of the Public Service is to be more responsive to the needs of the 
majority of Ugandans, it should be moved closer to the people; the operational 
structures should also be moved to the rural areas in order to achieve 
development. 
35. Each Ministry should seek to achieve the objectives of a public policy through the 
program of a five year rolling corporate strategic plan. 
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36. Assessment of Public Officers and all Public Units should be based on clearly 
stated anticipated outputs or results. 
37. Systems of zero-based budgeting and spending linked to objectives and outputs 
should be adopted and designed in such a way as to take advantage of the 
introduction of Results-Oriented Management with a view to decentralizing the 
system and giving managers more responsibility over resources for the 
achievement of results. 
38. Government should review its role in the various sectors of socio-economic life 
with a view to determining those it performs best and those it is ineffective in 
performing.  
39. Measures should be taken to reestablish a sound mechanism of establishment 
audit and control backed by the necessary resources. 
40. Government should consider implementing measures which are critical to 
improved productivity of public employees. 
41. Clear policies and mechanisms should be established regarding organization of 
Manpower Planning for the Public Service. 
42. The more productive, the smaller will be the workforce needed by the Public 
Service. To effect changes in Manpower productivity would require skills 
improvement programs through training, and higher employee motivation through 
an appropriate compensation package, recognition of good performers together 
with appropriate technological innovations. 
43. The expansion of the public service should occur only where 
(a) there is properly formulated extra workload to perform; and 
(b) it is financed with real resources generated from internal economic 
activity. 
44. Measures to effect downward adjustment (i.e. reduction) in the size of the current 
public service should be considered. 
45. The share of the wage bill in the overall Government expenditure should be 
increased from the present 13.1% to at least 25%. 
46. Identify type of staff who are deemed to constitute the “overdue leavers” group 
who should be laid off before the launching of the retrenchment exercise. 
47. Poor performers or corrupt staff should be laid off; and be paid whatever they are 
legally entitled to receive without delay. 
48. Government should launch a selective recruitment and/or training of qualified 
staff who can competently fill the vacant critical positions. 
49. The process of selecting the staff for retention or retrenchment should be started 
from the apex of the public service structure and proceed gradually to the base. 
50. An independent body, to be known as “The Implementation and Monitoring 
Board”, should be appointed. 
51. The selection criteria to be used will be possession of the minimum qualifications 
required, on the one hand, and performance record of the candidate under 
consideration. 
52. As part of the separation agreement between retrenchees and Government, 
recipients should be required to sign a clause renouncing any further claims on 
Government before they receive their compensation package. 
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53. Government should take deliberate steps to give up some of its current functions 
to the private sector. 
54. A Department of Manpower Planning and Development should be created in the 
Ministry of Public Service and Cabinet Affairs. 
55. The Department should have the following Divisions, each headed by a Deputy 
Director: 
(i) Manpower Planning 
(ii)  Manpower Development and 
 (iii) Manpower Information. 
56. Government should consider establishing, in due course, an integrated Ministry of 
Human Resources. 
57. The continued isolation of the Ministry of Public Service and Cabinet Affairs at 
Entebbe is becoming increasingly anomalous: and consideration should now be 
given to having it relocated in Kampala. 
58. In the interim, the Manpower Planning Department within the Ministry of 
Planning and Economic Development should be renamed the Department of 
National Manpower Planning and be the Secretariat to the National Manpower 
Council. 
59. The Department should be responsible for the nation’s entire human resources 
planning, developing and utilization. 
60. Government, in general, should increase the proportion of public financing to 
education. 
61. The Ministry of Labour should make urgent reforms in Labour Administration. 
62. The National Manpower Council should provide policy guidelines for the 
development and integration of the informal sector employment programme with 
the overall National Development Plan. 
63. Measures recommended to improve conditions of Ugandans currently in the 
country should be implemented selectively and simultaneously while 
implementing measures aimed at assisting Ugandan professionals abroad. 
64. Professional in-service goal-oriented training should be encouraged and 
enhanced, to increase departmental productivity which, in turn, should determine 
promotional possibilities of individual employees. 
65. The Central Scholarships Committee should be under the Ministry of Planning, 
along with the other three Committees of the National Manpower Council: in 
order to promote harmony and coordinated management of training in the Public 
Service. 
66. The National Curriculum Development Centre should be linked with National 
Manpower Council in order to link formal academic education with in-service 
professionals and department training. 
67. The “Cabinet Affairs” functions of the Ministry of Public Service should be 
transferred to the office of the President. 
68. The Ministry should be re-named “Ministry of Public Service”. 
69. The powers of appointment, promotion, and discipline should remain with the 
Public Service Commission, but extensive delegations should be made to 
Ministries and Districts. 
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70. Both the Constitution and the Public Service Act should be amended, to reflect 
the specific recommendations of the Commission. 
71. In view of the existence of separate Service Commissions for the Judiciary, the 
Police, Prisons, and Teachers, the Public Service Commission should be renamed 
the Civil Service Commission. 
72. Merit-based recruitment through open competition (rather that political 
identification) will be absolutely necessary. 
73. The Public Service should insist on well-defined job descriptions, specifications 
and schemes of service pre-deposited with the Ministry of Public Service and 
Cabinet Affairs and the Public Service Commission. 
74. The Civil Service Commission should enhance the use of examinations in 
recruitment as far as it is applicable on selective basis. 
75. Minimum entry requirements should be retained and renewed constantly in 
response to development changes. 
76. All presidential and Ministerial appointments in the Public Service should be on 
the advice of the Civil Service Commission, or such Commission as is responsible 
for the service concerned. 
77. For Parastatal Bodies, such appointments should first be cleared by a Select 
Committee of the Legislature on political appointments, which should reserve the 
right to call the proposed candidates for interview as deemed necessary. 
78. Career guidance to schools should immediately be revived, reconstituted and 
directed to the manpower demands of the country. 
79. An expert consultancy group should be contracted to draw up different schemes 
of service for all cadres in the Public Service. 
80. The existing rules that govern the behavior of public officers, which form the 
basis of a code of conduct, be reviewed, updated, and bound in a small handbook 
or pamphlet for the Service. 
81. The IGG’s Statute should be amended to delete the “any other functions” clause. 
82. The post of IGG be made a constitutional post chargeable on the Consolidated 
Fund. 
83. The IGG should be accountable to and report to Parliament. 
84. Great care should be exercised in scrutinizing the staff of the IGG’s office both 
before and after recruitment. (Their educational, career and family background as 
well as other character and social habits should be critically examined). 
85. The office of Ombudsman should be created as a separate autonomous institution. 
86. Each department should formulate a three to five year corporate plan through the 
widest possible participation of its key employees with a view to generating 
annual action programmes which ought to be the only basis for annual budget 
requests. Quantifiable outputs or targets evolved through such action programmes 
should be the principal basis for performance appraisal of individuals, units, 
sections, divisions, departments and ultimately, Ministries. 
87. Each Ministry be required to formulate a corporate plan; and that once approved 
by Cabinet, pressure be exerted on Ministries and their officials to make it the 
principal control mechanism. 
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88. It is imperative that there is always agreement between the Treasury and each 
individual Department or Ministry on the scope of proposed department or 
Ministerial expenditure outlays and that Cabinet is advised accordingly and 
deliberates on the agreed figures well in advance of submission of the budget 
proposals to Parliament. 
89. Disciplinary action should be taken against Permanent Secretaries and Heads of 
Departments who knowingly purport to execute programmes when it is already 
obvious that they are bound to flounder on the way because of inadequate 
resources, especially when this is coupled with failure to take timely remedial 
action. 
90. Budget requests and annual lump sum appropriations be broken down into smaller 
disbursement units over the financial year and be tailored to planned user 
requirements. 
91. Budgets be recast in programme format for consideration by Parliament and that 
passage of the appropriations be construed as performance contracts subject to 
periodic assessment for conformance with the desired outputs. 
92. Establishment of a Standing Appropriations Committee of Parliament to examine 
all budget requests and supplementary estimates in greater detail than is presently 
feasible in severely time-constrained floor debate which is often confined to 
selected Ministries. 
93. The re-introduction of the ex-chequer system of releases of funds to Ministries in 
its entirety but in two stages: bimonthly and quarterly. 
94. Writing and submission of monthly and quarterly accounts to provide for timely 
political review of on-going programmes in every ministry. 
95. The Inspectorate Division of the Ministry of Finance should be disbanded and 
qualified and suitable staff redeployed as internal auditors in the various internal 
audit units, reporting directly to the Director-General (Permanent Secretary), 
which should be set up in every Ministry, in pursuance of the above objectives. 
96. The Public Accounts Committee be expanded in size and scope and be provided 
with a Secretariat that matches the task to enable it to exercise a watchdog 
function over current expenditure of public funds throughout a current financial 
year, and that in addition to the annual audited reports, it should receive and act 
on quarterly unaudited statements of expenditure. 
97. Government should establish an external efficiency audit team to probe into 
Value for Money practices or lack of them in the various units of the Public 
Service. 
98. Complaints be channelled through District Petitions Committees to avail citizens 
and their representatives of the opportunity of public hearings to accost non-
performing public servants with queries and accusations. 
99. The National Resistance Council re-establishes transparent procedures for raising 
and answering questions. 
100. All monies voted for the Office of the Minister and his deputy in each Ministry 
be channelled through the Office of the Prime Minister or Vice-President for 
control and initiation of action to the Treasury for supplementary estimates if 
warranted; in order to leave free the rest of the Ministry’s funds to carry out the 
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Ministry’s programmes unencumbered by the needs and whims of the Minister 
and his deputy. 
101. The function of Records and Information Management should be given the 
recognition it deserves through the appointment, without further delay, of a 
suitable Head to lead the Unit responsible for it within the Ministry of Public 
Service and Cabinet Affairs, to define a career for Records Officers. 
102. Officers of all cadres throughout the Services be sensitized about the importance 
of records and records systems. 
103. Computers should be acquired to replace manual records systems. 
104. A special building should be constructed to house the National Documentation 
Centre, the national Information System and the National Archives. 
105. The National Archives should be moved from the office of the President and 
placed under the administration of the Commissioner for Records. 
106. Libraries should cease to be under the Department of Community Development 
and be more appropriate put under NIS set-up. 
107. Where it is available, Ministries and Departments should take advantage of the 
ISD facility and the secret codes.  In the other areas, Ministries should install 
PABX switchboards which facilitate programming to regulate connections from 
extension as may be required.  The installation of private direct lines should also 
be kept to the very minimum to limit abuse. 
108. Proficiency in the use of the “Minute Systems” and other “paper work” 
submissions, including preparation of Cabinet Memoranda must be a necessary 
possession of all aspirants to senior Government positions.  It should be the 
responsibility of senior officers to guide their subordinates in acquiring these 
skills. 
109. The Courier Service between Kampala and Entebbe should be improved to 
previously efficiency levels – privatized preferably and bicycles provided for 
Office Messengers to perform the “messengerial” duties more effectively. 
110. The on-going rehabilitation and expansion of the media of mass 
communication, especially radio and television, is commendable since these are 
channels through which information can be passed to the majority of the 
population. 
111. The staff should be enabled to purchase and maintain their own appropriate 
vehicles on loan and at subsidized (co-ownership) rates. 
112. The standing orders should not include such easily “dated” details as rates of 
salaries and other payments.  These should be published in circulars from time 
to time. 
113. The standing orders, which should include all rules and regulations, should be 
published in small separate volumes, each volume covering a particular subject.  
The volumes should be in loose leaf binding to facilitate the insertion of 
amendments. 
114. All rules and regulations should be reviewed by a small hi-powered committee. 
115. The Fight against corruption will be hard and protracted.  It is a war that must 
be fought and won.  Remedial actions will have to be instituted on various 
fronts. 
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116. Government and all people in leadership positions must be seen to be openly 
and resolutely against corruption. 
117. Wherever possible staff should be encouraged to open personal bank/savings 
accounts at their stations. 
118. A leadership code of conduct should be established immediately for all public 
office holders both Political and Public Servant. 
119. The NRC should establish a committee to review backgrounds and 
qualifications before they clear candidates for Senior Public/Political Office. 
120. Vigorous efforts should be made to strictly enforce all anticorruption laws, rules 
and regulations. 
121. To ensure quick but fair trials, the NRC be asked to establish a special 
Anticorruption Tribunal. 
122. Corruption is a serious crime; therefore the punishment must be made to fit the 
crime. 
123. As a first step in the right direction, Government should pay a Minimum Living 
Wage to its employees. 
124. The second phase should include the paying of a Living Wage. 
125. An appropriate Wage should be paid during the third phase. 
126. Finally, the entire service will be brought to adequate and stable pay 
commensurate with salaries elsewhere in the region – PTA average. 
127. This is a critical and complex programme which requires in-depth annual 
reviews. 
128. With effect from 1 July 1991, on the assumption that Government implements 
our recommendations on salaries, all Allowances payable to Government be 
abolished except for those that are duty-facilitating or compensatory for extra 
duties performed. 
129. All responsibility Allowances be abolished for the entire Public Service. 
130. Allowances given by Donors as incentives should be abolished in principle with 
effect from 1st July 1991, except for expenditure intended to improve work 
environment, training, travel on duty etc. 
131. The National Housing Corporation should be provided with the necessary 
capital to build low cost houses and sell them to Civil Servants among others.  
The Government should act as a guarantor for the mortgage. 
132. Government should inject money into Housing Finance Co. of Uganda so that it 
can implement the loan scheme. 
133. The management of garbage collection in urban centres should be privatized. 
134. A special campaign be planned to include a maintenance culture and respect for 
public utilities among public officers. 
135. Government should reorganize and re-order its priorities to improve medical 
facilities in general; after which it can consider shedding some of the 
responsibilities of providing free or heavily subsidized medical treatment. 
136. Government should provide free medical treatment for the time being until such 
a time that the Civil Service is fully rehabilitated and adequately remunerated, 
to enable its members to meet the cost. 
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137. Government should divest itself of having, in principle, with a view to 
relinquishing, the responsibility of provision of houses to its employees.   
138. Government should immediately put in place schemes designed to assist Civil 
Servants to build their own houses, through the provision of site and service 
schemes, low-interest loans, and payment of an appropriate housing allowance 
in lieu of housing, pending payment of an appropriate wage. 
139. Government should, with the help of technical assistance, launch a survey of the 
existing stock of Government houses, ascertain their physical location and 
condition, and estimate their market value, so that they are sold off for value. 
140. Government, when it eventually divests itself and settles on selling the pool 
houses, the site of some of these properties being in high value area, and on 
planned plots, and of special architectural design, these factors should be taken 
into consideration in valuation before sale. 
141. The proceeds from the sale of pool houses should be put in a revolving fund to 
assist other Civil Servants to build their own houses. 
142. The Housing Finance Co. of Uganda should be capitalized and given the 
mandate to implement a Government loan scheme for Civil Servants. 
143. The present concept of the pension as a superannuating arrangement should be 
abandoned and replaced by a contributory pension scheme where both employer 
and employee contribute towards the employee’s pension on a monthly basis.  It 
is suggested that the employee contribute 7 ½% of his basic monthly salary, and 
the employer, i.e., the government, pays the equivalent of 15% of his basic 
salary. 
144. The Pensions Fund be divorced from the Consolidate Fund and be administered 
on purely business principles to generate profits from which pensioners can 
draw further benefit. 
145. Technical assistance should be sought to advise on the best way to convert from 
the present superannuation schemes to the proposed contributory scheme. 
146. Technical Assistance should be sought to advise on the optimum levels of 
contribution by employers and employees; the optimum rate of interest to be 
paid on the collections, and the participation formula for the members to share 
in the profits of the proposed bank/investment house. 
147. Technical Assistance should be sought to draw up the charter of the proposed 
bank/investment house, and; 
148. Offer such other advice as may be deemed pertinent in the light of the 
experience of other similar ventures elsewhere. 
149. To enhance the independent, impartial and non-partisan character of the Judicial 
Service Commission, its membership should be explained. 
150. The President should nominate the Chief Justice, the Deputy Chief Justice and 
the Principal Judge, and the Legislature should have the power to approve or 
reject the nomination. 
151. All Judicial officers should be paid an “appropriate wage”. 
152. The Judicial Service should be considered as vital to the Rule of law, to which 
the government is committed, and should be given enough funds to run the 
service. 
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153. RC 3 Court members in each District should be elected at the same time. 
154. Quite apart from their basic legal qualifications, all Magistrates Grade 1 should 
be required to obtain a Diploma in Public Administration or Personnel 
Management from the IPA or an equivalent qualification before being 
considered for further promotion. 
155. The Government should pay particular attention to the operational problems of 
the Judiciary in contributing to delays in proceedings with a view to their 
elimination so that the unintended perpetual denial of Justice is brought to a 
stop. 
156. That the law reform commission now in the process of being established by law, 
be tasked to start with examining the Laws in our Statute book with a view to 
advising the legislature on appropriate action regarding those laws found to be 
irrelevant or unjust. 
157. The rules providing for appointment of Court Brokers should be reviewed to 
provide proper screening of applicants before they are licensed. 
158. The Coroners Inquests should be re-activated. 
159. The enactment of a Judicial Service Act which should contain a Code of 
Conduct for Judicial officers.  The Minister of Justice and the Chief Justice 
should set up a Committee to draw up comprehensive Code of Conduct for this 
purpose. 
160. The Uganda Police Force should be organized and administered in accordance 
with the Police act, which should be overhauled to loosen the present tight 
control by the Minister of Internal Affairs. 
161. There should be created a Police Council, a Police Service Commission and a 
Police Service Committee to manage and administer all the affairs of the 
Ugandan Police. 
162. A separate Police Tender Board be created, but with linkage to keep it under the 
general surveillance of Central ender Board. 
163. The Police Force should have the power to control their Recurrent and Capital 
Development funds. 
164. The Uganda Police Force should now shed the Fire Service function, which 
should now be a separate National Fire Service. 
165. Both the Police Force and the Local Administration Police Forces should be 
integrated into one Ugandan Police Force. 
166. That the Inspector General of Police be appointed by the President on the advice 
of the Police Council. 
167. In the interest of the Police Force, steps should be taken immediately to appoint 
a substantive Inspector-General of Police and a Deputy Inspector-General of 
Police. 
168. The Uganda Police College should be strengthened to provide specialized 
training for the CID staff. 
169. The Special Brach, the Internal Security Organization (ISO) and the External 
Security Organization  (ESO) should be rationalized into one integrated, well-
trained, well-equipped and highly professionalized organization to avoid 
unnecessary duplication of functions and the dissipation of scarce resources that 
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invariably occurs when rival organizations are set up to perform the same 
general functions. 
170. Steps should be taken to revert the Airwing to the Police Force. 
171. Government should take steps to rationalize the role of the LDF by enacting a 
law stating their mandate, powers and limits and prescribing other matters 
relating to recruitment, training, role and discipline of the Force. 
172. The Immigration Department should be properly equipped for the tasks of the 
department, including the Police Force and equipment, stationary, and trained 
personnel. 
173. Necessary steps be taken, as a matter of urgency, to ensure that the Army leaves 
internal policing to the Uganda Police Force and concentrates on protecting the 
country from external aggressors. 
174. The function of Inspection, Registration and Licensing of all motor vehicles 
should be rationalized in one Ministry; and the Ministry to assume this 
responsibility should be the Ministry of Transport. 
175. The three Codes of Conduct be unified and up-dated into one Code of Conduct, 
which should be part of a modernized Police Act which should be enacted to 
implement all recommendations that may be accepted and any other modern 
innovations the government may see fit. 
176. There should be a Prisons Council, a Prisons Commission and a Prisons Service 
Committee. 
177. In order to enhance efficiency and promote uniform standards, the Prisons 
Service as a whole should be integrated. 
178. A separate Tender Board for the Prisons Service should be established. 
179. A performance audit Unit should be established within the Prisons personnel 
division. 
180. A Prisons Complaints Bureau should be established. 
181. A separate Health Division should be established in the Prisons Service. 
182. To ensure fullest accountability, commercial auditing should be introduced for 
the Prisons Enterprises Sector. 
The Ministry of Education should take the following steps: 
183. To encourage the grading system. 
184. To institute efficiency audit of individual teachers through institutional and 
inspectorate systems to facilitate promotion of deserving teachers. 
185. To encourage promotion of teachers in the classroom; 
186. To facilitate mobility of teachers and administrators between the classroom and 
administration; and 
187. To see to it that the grading of technical and business education teachers is 
implemented alongside that of academic education teachers. 
188. Administration of teachers’ pensions should be decentralized to sectional level 
in the Ministry of Education to ease the suffering of the large numbers of 
teachers inconvenienced by the current centralized system of pension 
administration. 
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189. Teacher’s salaries and allowances should similarly be decentralized to District 
level to minimize the administrative costs involved in each school having to 
come to Ministry Headquarters to collect. 
190. The Ministry of Education should devise a machinery to ensure that PTA funds 
are maximally utilized, by requiring that teachers do teach in one school. 
191. In order not to unduly embarrass or over-burden poor parents, the Ministry of 
Education should exercise some degree of control over the frequency and 
magnitude of PTA levies by involving the Boards of Governors and Military 
Headquarters in the decision making. 
192. The Ministry of Education should ensure that where part time teaching is 
absolutely necessary, the rules and regulations governing it are strictly 
observed. 
193. Government should look more seriously into the problems of fringe benefits for 
teachers with a view to making the profession more attractive. 
194. The Education act should be amended to make the span of the CEO’s authority 
more manageable. 
195. The CIS’s current role should be reviewed to make him independent of the CEO 
such that he assumes his traditional role of both assessor and auditor of the 
education system more effectively. 
196. The Board of Governors’ rules and authority should be reviewed so as to make 
BOGs effective managers of the Educational System. 
197. The TSC should be accorded more authority in the personnel management of 
the Teaching Service by making CEO and CIS responsible to the TSC. 
198. The interests of the teachers should be represented at both TSC and BOG level. 
199. TSC should lay down these qualifications as minimum requirements for future 
appointments to Inspector and education Officer posts in order to accord the 
posts the professional status they have long lacked. 
200. To enhance the teaching of Science, the Ministry of Education should identify 
men and women to be offered local and overseas training so they could form the 
nucleus of a corpus of future Trainers at potential Science Colleges in the 
country. 
201. Teacher Centres should be refurbished with the necessary teaching (particularly 
Science) equipment so as to train teachers effectively. 
202. Government should take a bold step of inducement by awarding three salary 
increments to Grade III teachers on first appointment. 
203. Attempts should be made to make training facilities as attractive as possible. 
204. Promising teachers should be availed the opportunity of training in Public 
Administration and management Skills. 
205.  Educational administrators should be exposed to similar in-service courses at 
IPA and elsewhere. 
206. Proper schemes of service should be prepared for all teachers incorporating 
training in management techniques. 
207. The Vice-Chancellor and the Deputy Vice-Chancellor should be ex-officio 
members of the University Appointments Board. 
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208. Relevant Technical/experience qualifications for membership of the 
Appointments Board should be stipulated. 
209. The relationship of the Appointments Board to the University Council should be 
that of a Committee of the Council. 
210. The duties/responsibilities of the Chairman of the Appointments Board should 
be spelt out, to guide his relationship with Council and Senate. 
211. The powers of the three subordinate Committees of the Appointments Board 
(Junior/Technical/Secretarial-Clerical) should be clearly defined and regulated. 
212. The Makerere University Act should be amended. 
213. That a position of Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Administration) be created to make 
for a more balanced structure at the top. 
214. The Vice-Chancellor shall be an eminent citizen. 
215. A National Council on Higher Education be established to coordinate and 
generally to spearhead the development of Higher Education in the Country. 
216. The functions and objectives of institutions of higher learning should be more 
broadly conceived. 
217. Steps should be taken to reform the legal framework under which the 
institutions of higher learning are operating.  The reform exercise should 
involve all the parties concerned, including teachers and student representatives.  
The objective should be to streamline management of, and human relations 
within, institutions of higher learning. 
218. The Treasury should take steps to understand the nature and structure of the 
financial needs of the institutions it sustains. 
219. Government should take decisive steps to rehabilitate the physical infrastructure 
of institutions of higher learning. 
220. Institutions of higher learning should be granted legal authority to borrow or 
otherwise raise money for self-financing. 
221. Plans for the third “University of the North” should be shelved indefinitely. 
222. Mbarara University should be kept relatively small (both in numbers and range 
of courses) for the foreseeable future, since the economy cannot support another 
full-blown University. 
223. Encourage training and educational institutions to develop and offer practical 
courses relevant to entrepreneurship. 
224. Encourage cooperation, including joint ventures between local investors. 
225. Assistance should be given to development banks for mobilizing resources for 
long term financing of private sector activities. 
226. Develop incentives that would encourage private sector development of small 
scale industries in the rural areas. 
227. Develop means of protecting the local markets without discouraging 
competition. 
228. Identify and remove administrative inefficiency and delays, excessive 
monitoring/control and over-regulation by public agencies. 
229. Small scale industries should be promoted by Government. 
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230. Greater recognition should be given to the important role the informal sector 
plays in employment by devising policies which would facilitate growth and 
organization in an attempt to regularize  this sector as a source of revenue. 
231. The reform of the Civil Service should be accompanied by a decision to shed 
those activities heretofore provided by the Government which can be performed 
by the private sector. 
232. A “one stop business” centre should be established for new businesses to assist 
with the licensing and registration, determination of viability of proposals, 
provision of information on domestic and export markets, etc. 
233. Applicants for licensing should have access to a government “Ombudsman” to 
complain about problems encountered in this process. 
234. Local authorities should be permitted and encouraged to assist in facilitating the 
introduction and growth of the private sector in their respective areas. 
235. The rate of corporate tax (45 percent, 1989/90 and 40 percent, 1990/91) should 
be further reduced to generate increased growth.  This should be staggered in 
favor of enterprises providing more economic growth and development for the 
nation. 
236. Government should formulate policies which would liberalize the development 
of a diversified, competitive financial market with a variety of debt and equity 
instruments and promotion of different kinds of variable institutions with a wide 
range of financial instruments for savers and investors. 
237. Greater incentives should be devised for the export-orientated enterprises with 
complementary incentives for those exporting end-products with value added. 
238. Government should develop a coordinated national plan for water, roads, energy 
and communication from the comprehensive five year plan (1990-95) with 
projection of cost and implementation phased over that time period. 
239. Additional business technical training could be made available if other 
institutions capable of offering and training were rehabilitated and their 
curricula expanded. 
240. Separation packages for the redeployed civil servants to be computed. 
241. Setting up a credit facility to finance economic projects to be promoted by the 
redeployed civil servants. 
242. Setting up a small institution to manage the redeployment of civil servant. 
243. Increasing budgetary outlays to improve the remuneration of civil servants. 
244. Procuring adequate and appropriate tools and equipment to improve the 
operation of civil servants, and  
245. Assistance in capacity and institution building to revamp and strengthen the 
Ministry of Public Service. 
246. Getting rid of loss-making parastatal corporations. 
247. Reducing the wage bill by elimination “air supply” practices, ghost workers, 
and other staff not essential in development management. 
248. Mobilizing the population to undertake community-level development projects 
using voluntary labour and in-kind contributions. 
249. Introducing user charges at affordable rates for publicly provided services 
where this is ethically acceptable and politically feasible. 
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250. Centralizing the Procurement of common-user items in order to take advantage 
of lower prices for bulk purchase, and to minimize the possibility of non-
accountability and abuse associated with many small buyers. 
251. Reducing the need, size of delegations, frequency and rates of allowance for 
official travels outside Uganda. 
252. Minimizing loss of Government funds on vehicle maintenance, by rehabilitating 
Government Central Mechanical Workshop to maintain Government vehicles, 
backed up by tighter supervision and control, as well as improved remuneration 
of the staff therein. 
253. Laying off the bulk of group employees and instituting stricter control over, and 
accounting for, activities requiring the use of group employees. 
254. Using the development plan as a basis for the annual budget, and releasing 
funds from the Treasury only for activities on programmes and projects 
included in the development plan. 
255. Eliminating Government Ministries and Departments and staff therein whose 
functions duplicate others, or which are not within the scope of the accepted 
functions of Government.  
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APPENDIX 3 LIST OF AUTONOMOUS AND SEMI-AUTONOMOUS PUBLIC 
AGENCIES IN UGANDA 
 
Capital Markets Authority 
Civil Aviation Authority 
Coffee Development Authority 
Cotton Development Authority 
Dairy Development Authority 
Electricity Regulatory Authority 
Engineers Registration Board 
Gulu University 
Inspector General of Government 
Inter University Council 
Joint Clinical Research Centre 
Kyambogo University  
Law Development Center 
Makerere University 
Makerere University Business School 
Management Training and Advisory Centre 
Mbarara University 
National Agricultural Advisory Services 
National Agricultural Research 
Organization 
National Chemotheraputic Laboratory 
National Council of Science and 
Technology 
National Council of Sports 
National Drug Authority 
National Environmental Management 
Authority 
National Forestry Authority 
National Planning Authority 
National Roads Safety Council 
National Social Security Fund 
National Women’s Council 
National Youth Council 
Nommo Gallery 
Non-performing Assess Recovery Tribunal 
Plan for Modernization Agency 
Population Secretariat 
Professional Council 
Public Libraries Board 
Road Agency Formation Unit 
Tax Appeals Tribunal 
Transport Licensing Board 
Uganda National Health Research 
Organization 
Uganda Bureau of Statistics 
Uganda Export Promotion Board 
Uganda Industrial Research Institute 
Uganda Investment Authority 
Uganda Management Institute 
Uganda National Bureau of Standards 
Uganda National Examination Board 
Uganda National Institute for Special 
Education 
Uganda Revenue Authority 
Uganda Tea Development Authority 
Uganda Tourism Board 
Uganda Travel Bureau 
Uganda Trypanosmiasis Control Council 
Uganda Virus Research Institute 
Uganda Wild Life Authority 
Urban Water Authorities 
Wild Life Education Centre 
Amnesty Commission 
Constitutional Review Commission 
District Service Commissions (80) 
Education Service Commission 
Electoral Commission 
Equal Opportunities Commission 
Health Service Commission 
Judicial Service Commission 
Law Reform Commission 
Local Government Finance Commission 
Parliamentary Commission 
Public Service Commission 
Uganda AIDs Commission 
Uganda Human Rights Commission 
Uganda Insurance Commission 
Uganda Land Commission 
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PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN UGANDA 
 
Cable Corporation Limited 
Dairy Corporation 
Development Finance Company of Uganda Limited 
Housing Finance Company of Uganda Limited 
Industrial Promotion Services 
Kilembe Mines Limited 
Kinyara Sugar Works Limited 
Mandela Stadium 
National Enterprise Corporation 
National Housing and Construction Company Limited 
National Insurance Corporation 
National Medical Stores 
National Water and Sewerage Corporation 
New Vision Printing and Publishing Company Limited 
Post Bank Uganda Limited 
Print Pak Uganda Limited 
Sugar Corporation of Uganda Limited 
Uganda Aircargo Corporation 
Uganda Consolidated Properties 
Uganda Development Bank 
Uganda Development Corporation 
Uganda Electricity Distribution Company 
Uganda Electricity Generating Company 
Uganda Electricity Transmitting Company 
Uganda Grain Milling Company Limited 
Uganda Libyan Arab Holdings Limited 
Uganda Livestock Industries Limited 
Uganda Posts Limited 
Uganda Printing and Publishing Corporation 
Uganda Prison Industries Limited 
Uganda Railways Corporation 
Uganda Seed Limited 
Uganda Telecoms Limited 
UGMA Engineering Company Limited 
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APPENDIX 4 EXECUTIVE AGENCIES IN TANZANIA 
 
Executive Agency Year Launched and Role Description 
1. Agency for Development of Educational 
Management (ADEM) 
2001 – Strengthens management capacity through 
training, research and consultancy 
2. Business Registration and Licensing Agency 
(BRELA) 
1999 – Facilitates orderly conduct of business and 
provision of regulatory services 
3. Drilling and Dam Construction Agency 
(DDCA) 
1999 – Improves efficiency and effectiveness of 
the Government in the delivery of water supply 
4. Eastern Africa Statistical Training Center 
(EASTC) 
2002  - Promotes evidence-based decision making 
for policy makers/managers through statistical 
information 
5. Government Chemistry Laboratory (GCL) 1999 – Analyses Food/Drugs; provides Chemicals 
Management and Forensic Science 
6. National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) 1999 – Provides official statistics and services 
7. National College of Tourism (NCT) 2003 – Provides training in hotel and tourism 
8. National Housing and Building Research 
Agency (NHBRA) 
2001 – Promotes utilization of local resources in to 
reduce construction costs 
9. Occupational Safety and Health Agency 
(OSHA) 
2001 – Promotes occupational safety and health to 
eliminate accidents and occupational diseases 
10. Tanzania Airports Authority (TAA) 1999 – Provides airport services 
11. Tanzania Building Agency (TBA) 2002 – Provides and improves accommodation to 
public servants through real estate management 
and consultancies 
12. Tanzania Civil Aviation Authority (TCAA) 1999 – Responsible for safety, security and 
oversight of the aviation industry and the provision 
of air navigation services 
13. Tanzania Food and Drug Authority (TFDA) 2003 – Protects consumers against health  hazards 
associated with food, drugs, cosmetics, etc.  
14. Tanzania Government Flight (TGF) 2002 – Provides air services to Head of State and 
leaders; with spare capacity provides services on a 
commercial basis 
15. Tanzania Institute of Accountancy (TIA) 2003 – Provides education, research and 
consultancy services in Accountancy, Materials 
Management, etc. 
16. Tanzania Meteorological Agency (TMA) 1999 – Provides meteorological services 
17. Tanzania National Roads Agency 
(TANROADS) 
2000 – Manages trunk and regional roads network 
of about 35,000 kilometers in Mainland Tanzania 
18. Tanzania Public Service College (TPSC) 2000 – Trains public servants and others in public 
administration an secretarial skills 
19. Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) 1996 – Manages tax administration  
20. Tanzania Tree Seed Agency (TTSA) 2003 – Provides forest products and tree seeds 
21. Weights and Measures Agency (WMA) 2002 – Protects consumers through measuring 
systems that result in fair and just trade 
transactions. 
Source: President’ Office, Public Service and Management. 2005. State of the Public Service Report 2004. 
Dar es Salaam. 
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ACADEMIC AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS  
 
Aug. 23, 2002 – 2004: Florida International University Doctoral Studies Scholarship, and 
Milander Fellowship, Florida International University, Miami, Florida.  
 
Aug. 26, 2001 – June 30, 2002: Rotary Ambassadorial Scholarship. The Joan B. Kroc 
Institute for Peace and Justice, University of San Diego, California, USA. 
 
July 22 – August 17, 2001: Summer Institute in Political Psychology Fellowship, Ohio 
State University, Columbus, Ohio, USA. 
 
Sept. 15 – Oct. 6, 2000: Training of Trainers Course offered by Crown Agents, funded by 
the Uganda Institutional Capacity Building Project, a World Bank - Government of Uganda 
Initiative, under the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development. 
 
Aug. 28 – Sept. 2, 2000: African Association of Political Science Research Methods and 
Pedagogy Scholarship, University of Nairobi, Kenya. 
 
Sept. 2 – Sept. 5, 1999: APSA Senior Scholar Travel Grant to attend the American 
Political Science Association Annual Meeting in Atlanta, Georgia, USA. 
 
Sept. 15 - Dec.12, 1997: Commonwealth East African Visiting Scholarship Scheme. 
School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London, London, UK.  
 
June 28 - August 9, 1997: U.S.I.A Summer Institute on the American Political System, at 
Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, Illinois, USA.              
 
Sept. 2, 1994 - Dec. 15, 1995: The Netherlands Fellowship Programme at the Institute of 
Social Studies, The Hague, Netherlands.  
 
Aug. 1988 – July 1991: Government of Uganda, Makerere University Undergraduate 
Scholarship. 
 
 
